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Public Diplomacy in an Australian Context : a Policy-based Framework to Enhance Understanding and Practice

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Public diplomacy in an Australian context:
A policy-based framework to enhance
understanding and practice

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Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2009

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis entitled: *Public diplomacy in an Australian context: A policy-based framework to enhance understanding and practice*, represents my own work and contains no material which has been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at this University or any other institution, except where due acknowledgement is made.

Signature:

Date:

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SUMMARY

The Australian Government's Joint Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade observed in 2007 that, when it comes to Australia's program of public diplomacy, 'perhaps the whole is not as great as the sum of its parts'.¹ Such a compelling observation is the central hypothesis for this thesis. It comes at a time of increasing international discussion around the emerging role of modern public diplomacy as an important tool for nations in advancing foreign policy priorities, a discussion from which Australian foreign policy practitioners and academics have been noticeably absent.

Public diplomacy recently defined for the Australian context as, 'work or activities undertaken to understand, engage and inform individuals and organisations in other countries in order to shape their perceptions in ways that will promote Australia's foreign policy goals',² is a contested and evolving concept. Closer examination of Australia's output-focussed public diplomacy program, coordinated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reveals that public diplomacy is generally not well understood or supported within Australia's political, bureaucratic and academic circles; is lacking in strategic leadership and coordination, and is consistently under-resourced. When considered together, these issues point to an underlying systemic failure in Australia's public diplomacy program, that is, a fundamental lack of connection between public diplomacy and strategic foreign policy priorities. Without such strategic alignment, public diplomacy floats around the fringe of foreign policy, appearing only at a superficial level in rhetoric and symbolic gestures, one-off or randomly planned events and activities, and crisis media management. This significant

¹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 15 March 2007, p.9.

² The Senate Committee definition of public diplomacy was presented to the Australian Senate on 16 August 2007 upon the conclusion of the Inquiry and delivery of the Committee's Final report. Australian Senate, *Hansard*, 16 August 2007, p.42.

gap raises concerns about Australia's ability to leverage international image, reputation and soft power to deliver on current foreign policy priorities and future challenges.

The overall lag in Australia's take up and understanding of public diplomacy is the central issue of concern for this thesis. Taking the 2007 Senate Inquiry into Australia's public diplomacy program as the launching point, the responsibility of this thesis in broad terms is twofold:

- i) to extend the contemporary body of Australian knowledge in the field of public diplomacy, with the aim of bridging a gap between theory and practice; and
- ii) to suggest a policy-based framework that might facilitate coherent and consistent consideration of public diplomacy as a strategic instrument of Australian foreign policy.

The thesis explores the current role and structure of public diplomacy in Australia's foreign policy, to better understand why the Senate Inquiry concluded that the whole of Australia's program of current diplomacy is less than the sum of its parts. In doing so, the thesis moves beyond existing literature to establish a policy-based framework to support better understanding and utilisation of public diplomacy in a way that might contribute to the achievement of strategic foreign policy objectives.

ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	Australian Broadcasting Corporation
AICC	Australian International Cultural Council
AIS	Australian Information Service
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
AIPRD	Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development
ALP	Australian Labor Party
ANAO	Australian National Audit Office
ASIO	Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation
ASIS	Australian Secret Intelligence Service
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
AYAD	Australian Youth Ambassadors for Development
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FCI	Foundations, Councils and Institutes
FCO	British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
G7	Group of Seven (7) traditionally refers to the meeting of the finance ministers from a group of seven industrialized nations: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.
G20	Group of Twenty (20) traditionally refers to the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors is the group of finance ministers and central bank governors from the following economies: South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom, and European Union. More recently, the G20 has provided a mechanism for heads of states of these economies to meet to discuss issues of global significance.
GAO	United States Government Accountability Office
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NTER	Northern Territory National Emergency Response
ONA	Office of National Assessments
PACER	Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
PM&C	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
Senate Committee	Senate Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

Senate Inquiry	Senate Joint Standing Committee Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of Australian Public Diplomacy Program (2007)
Senate Report	Final Report of the Senate Committee on the Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of Australian Public Diplomacy Program
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
VCCR	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963
VCDR	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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INTRODUCTION

When it comes to public diplomacy in Australia, ‘perhaps the whole is not as great as the sum of its parts’.¹ The central hypothesis for this thesis derives from this compelling observation reinforced recently by the Australian Government’s Joint Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence (‘the Senate Committee’), following its inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program (‘the Inquiry’). The Senate Committee findings, highlighting strategic shortcomings in Australia’s public diplomacy program put Australia at odds with contemporary thinking and international directions in public diplomacy policy and practice. At a time when international scholars are reporting that ‘public diplomacy matters more than ever...and plays a critical role in establishing a country’s position in the world, and delivering tangible policy objectives’, Australian foreign policy-makers and diplomats appear to be lagging behind.²

Public diplomacy is a contested and evolving concept. However, in simplest terms is understood to be ‘the effort by the government of one nation to influence the public or elite opinion of another nation for the purpose of turning the policy of the target nation to its advantage’.³ Building upon this simple understanding, the Senate Committee presented a definition of public diplomacy for the Australian context as, ‘work or activities undertaken to understand, engage and inform individuals and organisations in other countries in order to

¹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March 2007, p.9.

² A Lane, ‘Public Diplomacy: Key Challenges and Priorities’, *Report on Wilton Park Conference WPS06/21*, Counterpoint, London, 12 March 2006. Refer also to A Lane, ‘Diplomacy Today: Delivering Results in a World of Changing Priorities’, *Report on Wilton Park Conference*, WPS 05/4, London, March 2005. P Fiske de Gouveia, ‘The Future of Public Diplomacy’, *Presentation to the 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2006. J Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, J Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, pp.3-27.

³ E Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, 2001, p.3.

shape their perceptions in ways that will promote Australia's foreign policy goals'.⁴

However, the Senate Committee definition is not the first articulation of the meaning of public diplomacy as it relates to the Australian context. Former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans noted twenty years ago that 'the essence of public diplomacy is the shaping of attitudes in other countries in a way which is favourable to our national interests'.⁵

Furthermore, in 1995 Evans and Grant, asserted that public diplomacy is 'an exercise in persuasion and influence that extends beyond traditional diplomacy by leveraging a much larger cast of players both inside and outside government', and engaging both domestic and foreign public audiences.⁶ Such insights into the discussion of public diplomacy demonstrate that as an articulated concept, public diplomacy is not necessarily new to the Australian experience. Yet the recent findings of the Senate Committee demonstrate that at some point since 1995, public diplomacy in Australia has lost traction as an instrument for advancing foreign policy. Exploration of the policy and practice that sit behind the current rhetoric of public diplomacy gives rise to the core argument advanced through this thesis: that the understanding and effective practice of public diplomacy in the current Australian context has been seriously neglected and marginalised.

There is value in noting at this early stage that public diplomacy is grounded in traditional diplomacy for the purpose of enabling the 'conduct of relations between states'. Yet, as an innovation of traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy has moved well beyond the strict boundaries and structures set out by traditional diplomacy. Where traditional diplomacy

⁴ The Senate Committee definition of public diplomacy was presented to the Australian Senate on 16 August 2007 upon the conclusion of the Inquiry and delivery of the Committee's Final report. Australian Senate, *Hansard*, 16 August 2007, p.42. A detailed examination of the emergence of public diplomacy from foundations in traditional diplomacy, and the evolution of definitions and intricacies of contemporary public diplomacy is provided later within Chapters Two and Three respectively of this thesis.

⁵ G Evans, 'Australia and Asia: Role of Public Diplomacy' Address to the Australia-Asia Association, Melbourne, 15 March 1990.

⁶ G Evans, B Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1995, p.66.

occurs in a structured environment through controlled process, public diplomacy is fluid. Where traditional diplomacy occurs at official levels between professional diplomatic practitioners, public diplomacy instead is carried out by a range of government and non-government actors, and utilises media targeting mass public audiences.⁷ Where acts of traditional diplomacy are generally carried out behind closed doors, and in strict confidence with, at times little accountability for due process, acts of public diplomacy tend to occur on an open stage and may be open to public scrutiny and subject to the impact of public opinion.⁸

That the Australian program of public diplomacy is not as great as the sum of its parts, the hypothesis to be tested in this thesis, implies that Australia's public diplomacy is lacking in overall strategic impact, and raises issues relating to Australia's ability to leverage international image, reputation and soft power to deliver on current foreign policy priorities. During the *Australia 2020 Summit* convened at Australia's Parliament House in April 2008, a range of foreign policy experts, government and non-government representatives noted that 'as an active middle power, Australia must be smart and creative in the exercise of its international influence'.⁹ As a group they suggest that Australia would better utilise public diplomacy instruments to build soft power and influence that will assist in meeting the challenges ahead. However, the Senate Inquiry finding indicates that Australia is not as well placed as it could be to gain strategic advantage through public diplomacy, noting that 'Australia could improve its public diplomacy achievements'.¹⁰ Such indications highlight a

⁷ A Henrikson, 'What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?' *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, The Netherlands Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael', 2006, p.8.

⁸ The core tenets of traditional diplomacy are examined in detail through Chapter Two of this thesis. The definition of public diplomacy vis a vis public diplomacy is also explored further in the discussion of the concept of public diplomacy in Chapter Three.

⁹ Australia 2020 Summit, *Final Report*, Australian Government, Canberra, May 2008, p.357.

¹⁰ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.202.

significant tension between the aspirations of the Australian political, business and broad domestic community and the reality of Australia's current capacity in diplomatic practice, with specific regard to public diplomatic practice that has sparked the research underpinning this thesis.¹¹

The violence against Indian students in Australia, migration crackdowns, and education scams presents a poignant and current example that reveals strategic shortcomings in the Australian approach to public diplomacy.¹² The combined coverage of these issues has attracted worldwide criticism of Australia. Not only has the attention damaged Australia's reputation as a safe and credible destination for international students (putting at risk the A\$15 billion dollar industry), but have reinforced lingering stereotypes of Australia as a racist nation.¹³ As Michael Wesley commented in a recent policy brief on the subject, 'students who return to their country with negative experiences could become a poisoned alumni, conveying critical attitudes in other countries about Australian society and poor impressions about Australia's reputation as an education provider. They could ultimately destroy a strong export product'.¹⁴

This is an issue which has the interest not only of foreign political leaders, but of business and industry leaders, opinion leaders, and importantly the overseas communities and families who might otherwise trade with, travel to or support their children moving temporarily to

¹¹ The aspirations of the Australian community referred to here are those articulated and documented through the Australia 2020 Summit, *Final Report*, as cited in footnote 4.

¹² B Dubey, 'Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under', *The Indian Times*, 3 June 2009. A. Bolt, 'We're not the racists', *Herald Sun*, 3 June 2009, BBC News, 'India Calls Off Australia Events', *BBC News Online*, 11 June 2009, viewed on 3 November, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8094682.stm.

¹³ Dubey, 'Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under'. See also, H Gilmore, 'China Speaks Out on Student Attacks', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 June 2009. M Wesley, 'Australia's Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia', *Policy Brief*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, August 2009, p.1.

¹⁴ Wesley, 'Australia's Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia', p.1.

Australia.¹⁵ The issues relating to Indian students have sparked a full offensive and crisis management response from diplomatic officials led initially by veteran Australian diplomat John McCarthy AO.¹⁶ As Wesley reports, ‘the Government ‘damage-control’ efforts and expenditures in the wake of the violence and media coverage included sending officials to India, hosting Indian journalists in Australia, and forming a specific taskforce’.¹⁷ In addition, since August 2009 high profile political leaders, including Prime Minister Rudd, Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Foreign Minister Stephen Smith have all visited India.¹⁸ The crisis nature and fast pace of the response has served to reinforce the key messages delivered through the Senate Inquiry, and exposed a fundamental lack of strategic understanding, planning, and resourcing behind the Australian public diplomacy effort. This particular issue has highlighted a typically Australian ‘short-termist’ and crisis driven approach to building the Australian image and reputation; images and reputation that might otherwise advance national interests on the global stage.¹⁹

At a strategic level, Australia’s emerging foreign policy challenges are increasingly global in nature.²⁰ The emerging challenges include for example, shifts in global and regional power

¹⁵ Dubey, ‘Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under’. Bolt, ‘We’re not the racists’.

¹⁶ Highly regarded senior diplomat, Peter Varghese was appointed in June 2009 as Australia’s High Commissioner to India to take retiring diplomat, John McCarthy’s place. Varghese is of Indian descent, and brings vast experience and understanding in global political and economic developments having spent the past five years as the Director-General of the Office of National Assessments (an entity separate from DFAT and Defence charged with collating intelligence data, primarily for the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet). It appears that his appointment to this role demonstrates the Australian Government’s commitment to rebuilding the relationship with the Indian people. See also M Dodd, ‘Veteran diplomat Peter Varghese appointed High Commissioner to India’, *The Australian*, 9 June 2009.

¹⁷ Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.10. G Healey and A Trounson, ‘Moves to Safeguard Indian Students’, *The Australian*, 10 June 2009. ‘Australia Assumes Safety of Indian Students’, *Australian Associated Press Online*, 7 August 2009, viewed on 30 October 2009, <http://livenews.com.au/news/student_violence_prompts_rudd_to_visit_india/2009/8/7/215406>. C Banham and H Gilmore, ‘Rudd Forms Indian Violence Taskforce’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 June 2009.

¹⁸ Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.1.

¹⁹ M Wesley, ‘Planning Australia’s Foreign Policy Future’, *Lowy Institute Perspective*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2008, p.1.

²⁰ K Rudd, ‘Australia: the Region and the World: The Challenges Ahead’, *Address to the Lowy Institute for International Policy*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 6 November 2009. N Bisley, ‘Advancing the National Interest in a Globalised World: Australia’s International Policy in the 21st Century’, *Report from the Lowy Institute Seminar*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2007.

dynamics as the Group of 20 (G20) takes on a more powerful role in managing global governance, economic and environmental management, and as China and India assert their economic and military influence, alongside other threats to national interests posed by terrorism, climate change, resource scarcity and health.²¹ Within this environment, international relations academics and practitioners are recognising that there is value in pursuing foreign policy objectives and addressing global challenges through collaborative approaches that engage with broader foreign audiences, including foreign publics.²² These global challenges present new opportunities for foreign policy-makers to engage in the more collaborative public diplomacy activities to influence outcomes, as opposed to traditional sanctioning military or economic actions aimed at coercion. Public diplomacy, as an

²¹ For further discussion of the emerging global challenges see P Fiske de Gouveia, 'The Future of Public Diplomacy', *Presentation to the 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy*, Madrid, 2006. The views presented by Fiske de Gouveia are further supported by Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', pp.2-25, and B Hocking, 'Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy' in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, pp.28-43. In reference to the Group of Twenty (G20), the organisation comprises Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors and was established in December 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in the global economy. Refer to the official G-20 Website, viewed on 3 November, http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx. For further reading on the expanding roles of China and India within the region see, F Hanson, A Shearer, 'Tomorrow's China Offers Scope for Hope as well as Cause for Concern', *The Australian*, 2 December 2009. Also, F Hanson: 'China Stumbling through the Pacific', *Policy Brief*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, July 2009. R Medcalf, 'India: Leaving the Village behind', *The Australian Literary Review*, 2 December 2009. M Wesley, 'China: An Unfamiliar Terrain', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 September, 2009.

²² For the broad discussion around public diplomacy in the contemporary environment start with J Melissen (ed), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007. N Snow and P Taylor (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, Routledge, New York, 2009. Also see the range of 'Clingendael' *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy* on the emerging topic of public diplomacy, including J Batora, 'Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium States – Norway and Canada', *Discussion Paper in Diplomacy*, The Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', March 2005. E Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy'; Henrikson, 'What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?'; S Rasmussen, 'Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practice', *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, The Netherlands Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael', July 2009. Also American authors such as: B Gregory, 'Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms', *Presentation to the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict*, George Washington University, August 2005 and C Ross, 'Pillars of Public Diplomacy', *Harvard Review*. C Ross 'Public Diplomacy Comes of Age', *Washington Quarterly*, vol.5, no.2, Spring, 2002. On the intersection between public diplomacy and power refer to J Nye, *Soft Power: the Means for Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, 2002.

instrument of soft power, is increasingly being recognised by other nations facing similar global challenges as the diplomatic tool of choice.²³

Public diplomacy in the modern environment is complex and multi-dimensional, and this thesis recognises that there is currently substantial activity occurring across the Australian bureaucracy to project a strong and unique Australian image to the rest of the world. However, the activity is fragmented and ad hoc, and as the Indian students example highlights, is frequently crisis driven. The overall lag in Australia's engagement in and development of public diplomacy, in a coherent and strategic way, is a central theme for this thesis. Closer analysis of Australia's political leadership on public diplomacy reveals that the issue is more complex. The Australian Government's approach to public diplomacy has not necessarily followed consistent trends. For example, political masters during the past fifteen years have demonstrated widely divergent views and approaches towards diplomacy generally, and public diplomacy more specifically. The Labor-led administration of the 1990s put public diplomacy firmly on the agenda. From this time, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evans noted the significance of public diplomacy to influence and persuade beyond traditional boundaries as it 'not only reaches out to the decision-makers and opinion-formers, but also casts its net much wider beyond the influential few to the 'uninvolved' many'.²⁴ Indeed the rhetoric and actions surrounding the creation of the Asia Pacific

²³ Refer to the discussions and presentations by practitioners (as well as academics) at the international conferences include the 2007 *Trials of Public Diplomacy Conference* held at Wilton Park, the 2006 *Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy*, 2005 *Athens Conference on Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy*, and the 2005 *Swedish Institute National Branding and Public Diplomacy Conference*.

²³ Lane, *Public Diplomacy: Key Priorities and Challenges*, p.1.

²⁴ Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, p.66. For further reading on the foreign policy approach of the Australian Labor administration in the early 1990s see also: P Edwards, D Goldsworthy (eds), *Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia*, Volume 2, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2004; and A Milner, 'The Rhetoric of Asia', in *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-1995*, J Cotton and J Ravenhill (eds), Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, pp.32-45; and G Evans, Australia's Foreign Policy Response to Global Challenges, *Address to Advance 100 Global Australia's Summit*, Sydney, December 2006; G Evans, B Grant, 'Australia's Foreign Policy: Responding to Change', *Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific*, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1990; G Evans,

Economic Cooperation (APEC) region, continued and promoted by Evans, combined with Australia's emphasis on the primacy of multilateral institutions, and a desire to be seen as a 'good international citizen' all underpinned emergence of public diplomacy as a concept for discussion.²⁵

Public diplomacy terminology and the public recognition of the wider domestic and foreign audience were consistent themes within the political approach to foreign policy during this time.²⁶ The subsequent Liberal administration (led by then Prime Minister John Howard), eschewed overt public diplomacy, moved away from multilateralism and good international citizenship, with a firm tendency towards building bilateral relationships based on economic

'Australia's Foreign Policy', *Address to the National Press Club*, Canberra, 13 September 1989; P Keating, 'Australia, Asia and Engagement' *The Asia-Australia Papers*, No.3, June 2003, pp143-160.

²⁵ Founded formally in 1989, APEC's origins can be traced to discussions through 1960s and 1970s within the circles of intellectual elites with an interest in the possibilities for regional economic cooperation. In particular, Australian economist and senior trade official John Crawford actively engaged his Japanese counterparts and colleagues in discussions around the notion of economic cooperation with significant success. In September 1980, John Crawford, then as Chancellor of the Australian National University convened the first major conference on regional economic cooperation with full support of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sauro Okita and the Prime Ministers of both Australia and Japan (Malcolm Fraser and Ohira Masayoshi respectively). The 1980 Conference was a catalyst for building consensus around the Crawford-Okita proposal for an "Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development" (OPTAD), and enabled the subsequent establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) to formally consider proposals such as OPTAD in more detail. PECC provided a successful format for ongoing discussion between key officials from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States; with the ASEAN nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; with the Republic of Korea and a Pacific delegation through the early 1980s. The significant consensus building undertaken by Crawford and Okita from within PECC established the platform from which Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation could be launched. Indeed, APEC was subsequently orchestrated by then Prime Minister Bob Hawke and the first meeting of the 12 founding members was chaired by the then Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans in Canberra that year. APEC today is the forum for 21 Pacific Rim economies, comprising the original PECC member economies in addition to Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Taiwan, Viet Nam. The APEC purpose is to cooperate on and promote regional trade, investment and liberalisation opportunities. APEC Leaders have met on an annual basis since that time, around a range of other officials meetings, and have developed the famous tradition of dressing in the national costume of the country hosting the annual meeting. APEC Secretariat Website: viewed on 3 November 2009, http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html. For further discussion of the origins of APEC see R Pitty, 'Regional Economic Cooperation', in *Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement in Asia*, pp 13-46; also S Harris, 'Pacific Economic Cooperation: Australia and Japan', speech delivered to the 13th Annual Australia-Japan Relations Symposium, Sydney, 19 March 1985 in *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, vol 56, no.3, 1985, p.174; and R Bell, 'Reassessed: Australia's relationship with the United States', in *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-1995*, pp 213-215.

²⁶ Refer generally to sources indicated in footnote 19. Also see D Jones, A Benvenuti, 'Tradition, myth and the dilemma of Australian foreign policy', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 60, No.1, March 2006, pp.103-124;

and security foundations.²⁷ In contrast again, the current Labour administration embraces certain aspects at a political level, manifested in the hectic international travel and speaking agendas of high profile political players.

However, there is a disconnect between the political leadership and bureaucracy which has seen public diplomacy remain the lowest priority in Australia's international policy agenda. The evidence for such statements lies not in the political or bureaucratic rhetoric, but more importantly in the policy commitments and budgetary allocations, and suggests that in reality, effective or strategic public diplomacy is not valued nor understood beyond the lip service paid at conference and media events. Australia's diplomats (and the supporting bureaucracy), are discouraged from doing more in the field than crisis management, such as responding to international media reports of Indian student bashings in Melbourne, leaving strategic relationships and outcomes on key foreign policy challenges open to risk of failure.²⁸ Australia's approach to public diplomacy, while well-intentioned, appears instead to be superficially understood, crisis-driven and under-resourced. As a result, the opportunity lost for advancing Australia's strategic interests is significant, particularly in furthering national interests in emerging regions of Asia and in the Pacific, and in addressing global challenges, such as terrorism.

The Senate Inquiry reveals that practitioners find difficulty in clearly articulating why public diplomacy matters, and in pointing to concrete achievements of public diplomacy, beyond the

²⁷ P Kelly, 'Howard's Decade: an Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal', *Lowy Institute Paper 15*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006. See also J Howard, 'Australia in the World', *Address to the Lowy Institute for International Policy*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 31 March 2005.

²⁸ Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009. Australian Government, *Annual Budget Statements: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*, AGPS, Canberra 2006-2007, and 2007-2007.

number of media reports about Australia in certain parts of the world.²⁹ This arises partly from the widely held ‘pessimistic (or convenient) view that the effects of public diplomacy are difficult, if not impossible, to measure’.³⁰ Indeed, as demonstrated through the Senate Inquiry, the evidence-base surrounding public diplomacy outcomes is slim and anecdotal at best. The Committee drew attention to the ‘importance of measuring the effects of public diplomacy programs over time, or progress towards public diplomacy objectives’, and recommended that the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) take on the role of assisting the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) monitor and assess the effectiveness of its public diplomacy programs.³¹

Not surprising then, that the effectiveness of public diplomacy as it is currently practiced in the Australian context, is questioned more widely among Australian scholars and opinion leaders. Michael Wesley, appointed in June 2009 as Executive Director of Australia’s Lowy Institute for International Policy, remains sceptical about the impact that public diplomacy will have on progressing Australian national interests – certainly at the strategic level.³² In part the rationale behind Wesley’s remarks come from the fact that the purpose of public diplomacy has not been well articulated in the Australian context, and as is noted in the recently released Blue Ribbon Panel Report on *Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit*, it is a ‘conceptual muddle’.³³ This report compiled by the Lowy Institute points to the fact that

²⁹ The evidence provided to the Senate Inquiry by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials refers to a quarterly internal evaluation process of public diplomacy programs run via overseas posts, although the description provided indicates that the department is focused on the quantification of outputs of public diplomacy, without a subsequent analysis or evaluation of the respective outcomes related to national interest. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 14 March 2007, p.17.

³⁰ B Goldsmith, Y Horiuchi, ‘Spinning the Globe? U.S. Public Diplomacy and Foreign Public Opinion’, *Journal of Politics*, (Forthcoming issue), December 2009, p.3.

³¹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, p.213.

³² Interview, Michael Wesley, Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 13 July 2009.

³³ Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy’, *Blue Ribbon Panel Report*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2009, p.32.

public diplomacy is not aligned to, nor integrated with specific international policy objectives, and as such is ineffectual, vague and marginalised.³⁴ In the absence of evidence to the contrary and when considered in light of three decades of evidence-based policy making within Australia, there is a case to argue that at many levels, including the political level that Australian public diplomacy is ineffective, and therefore seen to be not of critical importance by political leaders.³⁵

Alison Broinowski is cognisant of the policy gap and presents a disturbing rationale as to why she believes Australian policy-makers and politicians should be concerned with public diplomacy, and why it matters through her recent work *About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia*. Broinowski presents the Bali Bombings of October 2002, which resulted in the deaths of 89 Australians, as her key evidence. She argues that the bombings may have been avoided had Australia taken greater care in development and delivery of its public diplomacy program on the international stage, but particularly with Asian neighbours.³⁶ The more recent October 2005 and July 2009 terrorist attacks in Indonesia, targeting tourist sites, and killing and injuring Australians among others might be similarly highlighted by Broinowski to further this line of argument.³⁷

In highlighting gaps in Australia's public diplomacy program, Broinowski has followed the trend of similar arguments advanced by opinion leaders within the United States of America

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ G Banks, 'Evidenced-based policy-making: what is it? How do we get it?', *Australian and New Zealand School of Government/Australian National University Public Lecture Series*, February 2009, p.3.

³⁶ A Broinowski, *About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia*, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2003, p.231.

³⁷ In October 2005 a bomb exploded in the Indonesian resort island of Bali killing 32 people. Later on 17 July 2009 bombs exploded in the Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels in Jakarta. Reuters, 'Indonesia Investigates Bali Bombings', *ABC News Online*, 2 October 2005, viewed on 15 December 2009, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1472723.htm>. Also, AFP, 'Timeline: Indonesia Bomb Attacks', *ABC News Online*, 17 July 2009, viewed on 15 December 2009, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/17/2628953.htm>.

(USA) which has been besieged by unfavourable sentiment from across the globe.³⁸ Both advocates and critics of public diplomacy claim that continued terrorism against America has escalated because of inconsistent, superficial and poorly delivered public diplomacy programs.³⁹ The underpinning concern being that the unfavourable views held by foreign publics ... pose a real and ongoing security threat to American interests where, 'the perceptions of foreign publics have domestic consequences'.⁴⁰ The American experience must be recognised as being starkly different to that of Australia, most obviously because the USA is positioned as a global economic and military superpower leading and supporting a range of conflict-based activities particularly with the Moslem world.⁴¹ However, the overall theme relating to the potential effect of negative foreign opinion, and the opportunity for a coherent public diplomacy program to exert strategic impact in the advancement of national interests of security and peace, remains the same.

After analysing the various views regarding the inadequacies of Australia's public diplomacy program from an engagement, leadership and resourcing perspective, a central issue emerges: a fundamental absence of alignment of public diplomacy to strategic foreign policy objectives. Without such strategic alignment, public diplomacy floats around the fringe of foreign policy, appearing only at a superficial level in rhetoric and symbolic gestures, one-off or randomly planned events and activities, and crisis media management. Against this background, the real benefits of strategic public diplomacy in tangibly advancing national interests are rarely realised.

³⁸ According to the Djerejian Report, 'surveys indicate that much of the resentment across the globe towards America stems from real conflict and displeasure with policies including those involving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and Iraq'. For the full report refer to EP Djerejian 'Changing Minds, Winning Peace', *Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Moslem World*, US House of Representatives, 1 October 2003, p.9.

³⁹ For example, C Wolf, Jr B Rosen, 'Public Diplomacy: How to think about it and improve it', *Occasional Paper*, RAND Corporation, California, 2004, p.3. Refer also to Djerejian, 'Changing Minds, Winning Peace'.

⁴⁰ Congressman Henry Hyde quoted in Wolf, Jr and Rosen, 'Public Diplomacy: How to think about it and improve it', p.3.

⁴¹ Wolf, Jr and Rosen, 'Public Diplomacy: How to think about it and improve it', p.3.

Taking the 2007 Senate Inquiry as the launching point, this thesis tests the stated hypothesis that Australia's public diplomacy program is less than the sum of its parts, by analysing more deeply the evidence and implications of the Senate Inquiry, and exploring and critiquing the many layers of Australia's public diplomacy program. From the outset, the thesis seeks to understand the relevance of public diplomacy within the broad field of foreign policy and diplomacy, and to distinguish contemporary public diplomacy activities and outcomes from the complementary but distinct activities and outcomes of traditional diplomacy. The thesis relies upon international research and literature regarding public diplomacy in a general and theoretical sense, combined with the documented experiences of international practitioners and academics to show the direction of current and emerging thinking on public diplomacy. Interviews with Australian practitioners and academics assist in building an understanding of how Australia's public diplomacy program might fit into a strategic policy framework.

The purpose of this thesis is to extend the contemporary body of Australian knowledge in the field of public diplomacy, with the aim of bridging a gap between theory and practice. The thesis will explore more deeply the current role and structure of public diplomacy in Australia's foreign policy, to better understand why the Senate Inquiry concluded that the whole of Australia's program of current diplomacy is less than the sum of its parts. In doing so, the thesis moves beyond existing literature to establish a policy-based framework to support better understanding and utilisation of public diplomacy in a way that might achieve foreign policy objectives.

To fulfil the responsibility of this study, the first half of the thesis sets the scene for the in depth discussion of contemporary public diplomacy. Chapter One introduces the Senate

Inquiry and explores the background against which contemporary public diplomacy in the Australian context has emerged. Chapter Two establishes a foundation for discussion by briefly revisiting the tradition of diplomacy, from which public diplomacy originates. Revisiting the traditionalist perspective reveals that the basis for public diplomacy practice today is grounded in the well established traditions of diplomacy. Traditionalists, such as Berridge, are clearly sceptical of the nature and role of public diplomacy and struggle to find meaning in contemporary writings about public diplomacy.⁴² However, consideration of the foundations of traditional diplomacy provides a necessary starting point for understanding the emergence of public diplomacy as a contemporary concept. This thesis also recognises that Australian diplomatic practice builds upon a traditional structure and approach, and understanding this approach is fundamental to identifying the ongoing challenges for public diplomacy to take hold within the Australian context.

Chapter Three draws more closely upon the international literature and the Australian Senate Inquiry process, hearings and findings, and further deconstructs the parameters of contemporary public diplomacy. This chapter resolves the definition and scope of public diplomacy that is relevant not only to the broader practice of diplomacy, but also to the Australian context. To this end the thesis identifies where public diplomacy both builds upon the traditions of diplomacy, and moves beyond those traditions to meet the extended needs of the modern environment within which international relations are conducted. This chapter explores the major shifts in the environment, including the increasingly multilateral and fluid nature of international relations, an emerging global agenda, and the 'complex

⁴² GR Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, Palgrave New York, 2002; also online updates viewed on 30 October 2009, <http://grberridge.diplomacy.edu/Teaching/display.asp?Topic=TheoryPractice1>.

interdependence between domestic and foreign policy issues' that have changed the way in which states cast their foreign policy objectives and interact in the pursuit of outcomes.⁴³

Against the backdrop of the modern environment within which states currently interact and conduct their international affairs, the thesis explores the deeper cultural divides that continue to challenge the boundaries of the state based system, and the structures and processes of traditional diplomacy in the twenty-first century. The discussion draws upon Samuel Huntington's theory of the 'clash of civilizations', and more recently the deep political, economic and religious cultural divides as defined by Leonard, Small and Rose.⁴⁴ Such theories present a world view that lends validity to the increasing role and relevance of public diplomacy in building relationships and addressing foreign policy goals in a chaotic, complex and less predictable world. These perspectives highlight the systemic challenges that exist within the modern diplomatic environment, including for Australia; and draw attention to the opportunities that exist for coherent and consistent public diplomacy approaches that engage and build meaningful relationships with foreign audiences.

By way of qualification, while recognising that public diplomacy is a tool utilised by both state and non-state actors for the purpose of advancing a strategic agenda, this thesis will focus primarily on the public diplomacy planned, designed, and delivered by the state, where the lead responsibility is owned by the relevant Ministry or Departments of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, in order to ensure sufficient analysis the thesis will be confined to an

⁴³ Melissen, 'Introduction' in *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p.iii.

⁴⁴ Samuel Huntington first raised the notion that civilization, culture and identity would create the divides in the future in his work, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Summer, 1993. Huntington expanded upon the theory in his subsequent book, S Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996. Key themes regarding the significance of cultural divides in international politics are raised and expanded developed further in M Leonard, A Small with M Rose, 'British Public Diplomacy in the "Age of Schisms"', *Counterpoint*, London, February 2005. The latter research identifies key heads of cultural divide as political, religious and economic, which transcend civilizations and are expected to be at the core of future clashes between publics in the future.

examination of Australian practice since 1986, from the time that the then Senator Gareth Evans took on the Foreign Affairs portfolio as a part of a newly merged Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), also incorporating the former Australian Information Service (AIS).⁴⁵

In building the picture of contemporary public diplomacy, Chapter Four explores the significance of public diplomacy in building soft power, for which the key public diplomacy currencies, such as values and identity, are critical. Through effective use of such currencies, public diplomacy can create an enabling or disabling environment for the ongoing conduct of relations between states. The discussion of values, identity and image, is supported through particular reference to the diplomatic challenges that Australia has consistently faced in understanding and reconciling an Australian approach to foreign policy positioning with the Asian region. Once again the theories and perspectives relating to deep cultural divides (as previously discussed via Huntington's theory) provides for a relevant background against which the importance of leveraging values, identity and image in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives is important.⁴⁶ More specifically, the discussion in Chapter Four supports the proposition of this thesis that public diplomacy is a strategic instrument of foreign policy, is relevant to, and could be applied more effectively for the Australian context.

Chapter Four devotes considerable and worthy attention to two key areas of practice, cultural diplomacy and development assistance, as distinct methods of public diplomacy that are frequently underutilised, but can have far reaching and powerful impacts for the engagement of, and building relationships with foreign audiences. The nature of Australia's cultural

⁴⁵ International Public Affairs Network, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, April 2007, p.38.

⁴⁶ Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?'; Leonard, Small, Rose, 'British public diplomacy in the 'Age of Schisms'', pp.5-8.

exchange and development assistance programs particularly within the Asia-Pacific region is such that they provide a subtle, credible platform from which Australian government officials can engage with foreign audiences around tangible issues and concerns and build reputational advantage.⁴⁷ These programs can establish a strong sense of Australian goodwill within the region, and act as subtle levers that enable the opening up of and facilitate manoeuvrability in critical relationships.⁴⁸ The Senate Inquiry highlighted that while cultural diplomacy and development assistance programs are evidently understood to have a public diplomacy impact by default, the strategic value of such programs as central to Australia's foreign policy interests is overlooked.

With a basic understanding of the nature of contemporary public diplomacy, including within the Australian environment the thesis moves into the second half of the study to bring public diplomacy from the periphery of Australian diplomatic practice, and to establish public diplomacy as a strategic instrument of foreign policy. Chapter Five sets out the scaffolding for the policy based framework, drawing upon the policy stages identified by Gyngell and

⁴⁷ Australia's Agency for International Development (AusAID) is the Australian Government agency responsible for managing Australia's overseas aid program, and falls within the Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio. Refer to the AusAID website: <http://www.aid.gov.au/about/default.cfm>. See also G. Evans, 'Australia's Foreign Policy Response to Global Challenges'.

⁴⁸ For example, the AusAID, Better Education: A Policy for Australian Development Assistance in Education, Australian Government, Canberra, 2006: http://www.aid.gov.au/publications/pubout.cfm?Id=7331_3301_1176_5126_9027. Additionally, the Australian Youth Ambassadors for Development program (AYAD), places skilled young Australian volunteers, aged 18-30, on short-term assignments of between 3-12 months, in developing countries throughout the Asia Pacific region. In another example, the Community Peace and Restoration Fund which has been activated in the Solomon Islands, funds project worker to work at a local community development level in bringing together communities riddled with conflict. However, the Senate Inquiry revealed that while there is anecdotal evidence that individuals such as those involved in the AYAD program may 'serendipitously' develop strong relationships and linkages with public in other countries, and 'may come back to us [DFAT] through other programs as they develop a long-term interest in a particular country so that we might connect back with them later in their lives and careers', there is no formal mechanism in place for the tracking or evaluation of such outcomes. Indeed as noted by the Senior DFAT Official providing evidence to the Committee, 'To some extent, I do not think these programs should necessarily be about us trying to script everything. Sometimes, as with our other programs, it is about establishing a relationship which can come into play in later years'. For a description of aspects of the AYAD program in operation refer to <http://www.aid.gov.au/closeup/solomons.cfm>. For further discussion regarding the evaluation and tracking of relationships and contacts developed as a result of the AYAD program refer to: Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p.18.

Wesley alongside recognised strategic foreign policy drivers.⁴⁹ This discussion examines key concepts related to foreign policy, including the structures and processes involved in the development and delivery of foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on policymaking within the Australian context. The layers or phases of the policy process as identified by Gyngell and Wesley are adapted for the purpose of constructing a practical policy reference tool.⁵⁰ These layers are aligned alongside the strategic foreign policy objectives (including two policy objectives of particular relevance to Australian foreign policy), in order to identify the strategic objectives, contextual considerations, targeted audiences, and mechanisms employed to deliver upon the policies via public diplomacy activities.⁵¹

Chapter Five examines each of the strategic foreign policy concepts in isolation. However, it is through drawing these strategic foreign policy considerations into a policy framework that the thesis gains insight into the scope and versatility of public diplomacy. In doing so, the thesis addresses the overlaps between public diplomacy and other related concepts such as public affairs and propaganda. Recognising also that there may be a tendency for discussions around public diplomacy to occur in a disorganised and chaotic manner; and acknowledging the uneven layers of understanding in the field on this issue, the responsibility of this thesis rests in setting out a framework for organised and logical discussion. The intention of the framework is to clearly align public diplomacy to recognized strategic foreign policies in

⁴⁹ A Gyngell, M Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p.24.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Henrikson reminds us of the core strategic foreign policies of consolidation, containment, penetration, enlargement and transformation via A. Henrikson, 'What can public diplomacy achieve?', The thesis adds the contemporary policy strategy of *diversion* as discussed most recently by J. Glassman, former United States Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs as articulated in 'Opinion: How to Win the War on Ideas', Opinion, *Wall Street Journal*, 24 July 2008. Additionally the key foreign policy strategies of relevance to Australia of *regional stability* and *engagement* (identified primarily in Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*) are explored through this discussion.

such a way that will allow the concepts and methods to become more accessible and relevant to the Australian practitioner.

Chapter Six brings the components of the strategic foreign policy drivers together with the policy phases into the policy-based framework (the Framework), that is developed as a unique contribution to the field of diplomacy through this thesis, and seeks to provide a starting point for practitioners to identify the role of public diplomacy in advancing primary foreign policy objectives. The purpose of this chapter is to bring the relevant pieces of the public diplomacy puzzle together, and drawing on examples that are relevant to the Australian context, provide guidance on how the Framework might then be applied.

Chapter Seven concludes this study reflecting upon the policy analysis of the previous chapter with the aim of fulfilling the thesis' responsibility to bridge the existing gap between theory and practice in the area of public diplomacy. The intention of this chapter is to enable a broader understanding of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of public diplomacy, while demonstrating the common and consistent threads and underpinning principles that provide clarity and direction, and improve the effectiveness of public diplomacy at work.

Through this exploration, the overall aim of the thesis is to facilitate a better understanding of how public diplomacy operates within the Australian context and identify opportunities for public diplomacy to be utilised as an effective tool to advance Australia's national interests. The responsibility of the thesis is to develop a framework that might engage Australian practitioners in discussion about the future direction and enhancement of public diplomacy practice. In pursuing a practical line of discussion around public diplomacy, the thesis also

aims to bridge the divide between theorist and practitioner in this one area of diplomatic enquiry and practice.

The thesis draws upon contemporary international literature relating to public diplomacy in the modern environment. A large portion of this literature emanates from Europe as the product of both international conferences bringing practitioners and academics together in the discussion of public diplomacy trends. European research and literature (particularly that from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 'Clingendael', under the directorship of public diplomacy authority, Jan Melissen), presents a wide range of perspectives that explore various facets of public diplomacy practice. In contrast, the United States of America has developed a distinct brand of public diplomacy that remains relatively separate from the European blend. American literature is specifically focused upon America's perceived public diplomacy crisis that has emerged from the 'war on terror'.⁵² American think-tanks, advisory boards, politicians and bureaucrats are well entrenched in the discussion of America's public image, and while American literature is of value to the exploration of the Australian experience, the literature presents an insular, self possessed perspective.⁵³

⁵² In particular see, Djerejian, 'Changing Minds, Winning Peace'; Snow, 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy', S. Riordan, 'Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: a New Foreign Policy Paradigm', in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, J. Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005, pp180-195, also J Glassman, *How to Win the War on Ideas*, Wall Street Journal, 24 July 2008, and J Glassman, 'US Public Diplomacy and the War of Ideas', *Briefing on Public Diplomacy*, The Washington Foreign Press Centre, Washington D.C., 15 July 2008, and C Rice, 'Transformational Diplomacy', *Address to Georgetown University*, Washington D.C., 18 January 2006.

⁵³ For example, Djerejian, 'Changing Minds Winning Peace' a report by the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Moslem and Arab World, 2008, 'Building America's Public Diplomacy through a reformed Structure and Public Diplomacy Resources', *a report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy*, 2002, 'Finding America's Voice: a Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy', *a Report by the Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations*, 2003, U.S. Public Diplomacy, *a Report by the U.S. General Accounting Office*, 2003, 'Managed Information Dissemination', *The Report of the Defence Science Board Taskforce*, Office of the Under Secretary for Defence Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2001, 'Strengthening U.S.-Moslem Communications', from the Centre for the Study for the Presidency, 2003, Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, *How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy*, Heritage Foundation, 2003.

The thesis acknowledges, as did the Senate Inquiry that there are only a handful of contemporary academic works that specifically relate to the Australian experience of public diplomacy. These gaps in current Australian academic literature and discussion regarding public diplomacy are likely to be more indicative of the more fundamental gap in Australian foreign policy research and discussion. To address the gap in understanding the Australian experience of public diplomacy, the thesis draws primarily upon the official documentation submitted to and produced by the Senate Committee through the course of the Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program. Further evidence was gathered through interviews obtaining the views of a range of stakeholders, from across Australia's political, government and non-government; business, academic and arts sectors. Participants were interviewed in relation to their particular insights and interests in public diplomacy. In some cases, interviewees were identified because of their involvement in the Senate Inquiry process, whether as a member of the Committee or its supporting Secretariat, or as a contributor and witness to the Inquiry. Lastly, the study draws upon the analysis of official documents produced by key agencies, including DFAT, Austrade and AusAID.

Of particular relevance, the delay in the development and tabling of the government's response to the Senate Inquiry deterred officials from DFAT commenting directly on this thesis through a formal interview process. However, senior DFAT officials (based in Australia and overseas) have taken part in informal discussions surrounding the concept and conduct of public diplomacy. These discussions have collectively informed much of the development of this thesis.

CHAPTER 1: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN AUSTRALIA

1.1 Senate Inquiry throws light onto Australia's Public Diplomacy Program

On 7 November 2006, the Australian Senate referred the matter of the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy to the Joint Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Defence and Trade for 'inquiry and report with particular reference to the:

- i) extent and effectiveness of current public diplomacy programs and activities in achieving the objectives of the Australian Government;
- ii) opportunities for enhancing public diplomacy both in Australia and overseas;
- iii) effectiveness of and possible need to reform administrative arrangements relating to the conduct of public diplomacy within and between Commonwealth agencies and where relevant, the agencies of state governments; and
- iv) need, and opportunities for expanding levels of funding for Australia's public diplomacy programs, including opportunities for funding within the private sector.¹

The Senate Inquiry process ran over six months during 2007.² The Committee publicly invited submissions from interested parties, and conducted a series of open hearings and roundtables in Canberra, Melbourne, and Sydney, extending upon the information presented through the submissions.³ The Senate Committee faced a challenging task in unravelling the strands of public diplomacy strategy and practice within Australia, with terms of reference

¹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of Australia's Public Diplomacy Program: Terms of Reference*, Commonwealth of Australia, November 2006.

² At the time the Senate Committee commenced the Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program (March 2007) the Committee comprised the following members: Senator Johnston (*Chair*), senator for Western Australia and member of the Australian Liberal Party (LP); Senator Steve Hutchins (*Deputy Chair*) Senator for New South Wales and member of the Australian Labor Party (ALP); alongside Senators Mark Bishop, Senator for Western Australia (LP); Alan Ferguson, Senator for South Australia (LP); Michael Forshaw, Senator for New South Wales (ALP); John Hogg, Senator for Queensland (ALP); Marisa Payne, Senator for NSW (LP); and Russell Trood, Senator for Queensland (LP).

³ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of Australia's Public Diplomacy Program* Website found at: http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/committee/fadt_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/public_diplomacy/index.htm

that straddled the strategic and tactical aspects of public diplomacy development and delivery.⁴

By way of background, there is relevance in discussing the scope and authority of a Senate Committee such as the Joint Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, particularly in relation to an Inquiry process. A Senate Inquiry carried out, as in this instance by a Joint Standing Committee, does not necessarily carry the same weight or authority as an independent inquiry, but is nonetheless an important mechanism for investigating and highlighting issues of relevance to the national agenda. As stated in the available Senate information regarding committees, ‘the role of committees is to investigate and to draw attention to what they find. They throw ‘light in dark corners’ and give advice’.⁵ The nomenclature, Joint Standing Committee means that the Committee is established by virtue of a standing order of both houses of parliament.⁶ The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade is one of six such committees. The overall purpose of a Joint Senate Standing Committee (along with other types of senate committees) is to ensure efficiency and flexibility in the workings of the Senate where issues considered to be of national importance require detailed examination or further report without the full resources or attention of the full Senate or Parliament. The powers and proceedings of such a committee are determined by resolution of both houses of parliament; and membership is drawn from both houses of parliament and all sides of politics, depending upon the interest of the members.⁷

⁴ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, *Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Terms of Reference*.

⁵ Parliament of Australia, *Senate Committees*, Senate Brief No. 4, February 2008.

⁶ Other senate committees, such as legislative and general purpose committees are established solely by the Senate (including by way of statute).

⁷ Parliament of Australia, *Senate Committees*.

The Joint Standing Committee does not operate with any powers of its own, but on the basis of the powers delegated by the Senate. As such, the Committee can take evidence under oath and ‘require’ the submission of information either through a written submission or oral hearing. It is unusual for the Committee to exercise the full extent of its delegated authority, and information is gathered through ‘invitation’, as both government and non-government agencies are generally keen to utilise Senate Inquiries as an opportunity to publicly present their position on key issues. At the conclusion of an inquiry process the Senate Committee is required to provide a report to parliament which may prompt further parliamentary debate, and subsequently inform government policy or procedure.

The 2007 Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program was conducted in what appeared to be a low key manner. The Senate Committee’s Final Report was tabled by Committee member, Senator Marise Payne without dissent from Committee members. The Report attracted only minor discussion prior to its acceptance by the Senate. The Senate discussion was fully supportive of the ‘importance of public diplomacy to Australia’s many interests, including to trade, investment, security and those in the political arena’.⁸ More pointedly, Senator Payne referred to the ‘very strong connection between Australia’s international reputation and its ability to influence the regional and global agenda in ways that promote Australia’s interests’.⁹ As Senator Payne noted, ‘Our international reputation can either promote or undermine our foreign policy objectives.’¹⁰ In other words, in Payne’s view, public diplomacy could play a more substantial role beyond information provision and peripheral campaigns aimed at foreign audiences, in underpinning and progressing Australia’s strategic foreign policy interests and objectives on the global stage.

⁸ Senate of Australia, *Senate Hansard*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 16 August 2007.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

The Senate Committee sought to establish understanding of the broad range of issues related to contemporary public diplomacy practice as a starting point for gauging the role of public diplomacy in the Australian environment. The rhetoric which emerged through the Senate hearings and subsequent report indicates a small but increasing political interest and buy-in to utilising ‘effective and effectively coordinated public diplomacy strategy [as] critical to the overall endeavours of Australia to effectively tackle some of our greatest foreign policy challenges...’.¹¹

Of interest to this line of research, some years earlier in 2003, the same Joint Committee conducted an inquiry into *Australia’s foreign and trade policy - Advancing the National Interest*. At that time, public diplomacy was given only a passing mention and only in the Government’s response to the final report. Public diplomacy activities were described by the Government as being confined to ‘annual reports and other departmental publications and resources’.¹² The stark change in the perceived scope of and approach to public diplomacy in Australia in only four years is significant, and adds credibility to the fast pace of international discussion on this issue and overall view that public diplomacy is of increasing relevance in diplomatic practice.

In presenting the Committee’s final report on public diplomacy to the Senate, Senators Payne, Trood and Kemp also pointed clearly to both ad hoc and systemic issues impacting on the current nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program. They referred to the twenty specific recommendations outlined in the report which if implemented, would raise

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, *The (not quite) White Paper: Australia’s Foreign Affairs and Trade Policy – Advancing Australia’s Interests*, Parliament of Australia, December 2003.

the profile and effectiveness of Australia's public diplomacy program.¹³ The Government, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) formally tabled its response to the Inquiry report to Parliament in January 2009 (well outside the agreed timeframes for government response; a delay more than likely caused in part by the change in Government which occurred after the Inquiry report had been tabled, and subsequent staffing changes within the DFAT business unit responsible for the response).¹⁴ Many of the twenty Committee recommendations made were 'noted', with occasional recommendations 'accepted', by the Government.¹⁵ While there were some positive elements, the Government's overall response to the Senate Inquiry report and recommendations was ambivalent, and any potentially concrete or positive actions have since been stymied by a lack of operational budget to deliver. The Government response, although significantly delayed, confirms a bureaucratic intellectual commitment to the benefits of public diplomacy, and to developing an improved strategic understanding of the role of public diplomacy that was not necessarily evident prior to the Inquiry process. However, there remains a tangible sense of disappointment and lack of direction evident from key figures and officials involved in the Inquiry, as well as from those operating within the bureaucracy about the future of Australian public diplomacy.¹⁶ For this reason, question marks linger around the overall impact and value of the Senate Inquiry in taking a serious look at and throwing light into the dark corners of Australia's public diplomacy program.

¹³ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.xi.

¹⁴ The *Images of Australia* Branch experienced three changes in Assistant Secretary from the time of the commencement of the Inquiry through to the tabling of the Government response – an unusually high staffing turnover, even by DFAT standards. Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Officials, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 November 2007 and 22 June 2009.

¹⁵ Australian Government, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', *Australian Government Response to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Report*, Australian Government, Canberra, January 2009.

¹⁶ Interview, Senator Russell Trood, 30 June 2009, and Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Official, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, 22 June 2009.

For these reasons, the Senate Inquiry must be the starting point for the analysis of contemporary public diplomacy, particularly as it fits within the Australian context. In particular, the Senate Inquiry points to five systemic issues with Australia's public diplomacy program that include the:

- i) lack of Australian practitioner and academic engagement in current international discussions – and subsequent shortfalls or gaps in Australian understanding of public diplomacy as an instrument of strategic and tactical foreign policy;
- ii) lack of political will and direction driving Australia's public diplomacy objectives and outcomes;
- iii) poor coordination of delivery across the public diplomacy system;
- iv) lack of sufficient resourcing to support effective public diplomacy delivery; and
- v) significant gaps in the engagement and consolidation of the Australian domestic public in shaping Australia's public diplomacy program.¹⁷

Examination of each of these issues provides insight into the overall complexity faced by the Senate Committee in unravelling the concept of public diplomacy as an instrument of strategic foreign policy, as well as the multi-dimensional and dynamic layers of process, structure, players, and outputs that shape public diplomacy activities and outcomes. Further exploration of these issues provides the direction required in testing the initial hypothesis that the whole of Australia's public diplomacy program is less than the sum of its parts, and may contribute to developing resources that might assist the practitioner in their understanding of public diplomacy in action.

1.2 Key issues regarding public diplomacy in Australia

1.2.1 Engagement in international directions

While there was no critical event of issue sparking the need for the Senate Inquiry, it is likely that it was instigated as a result of the interest of Committee members in the increasing

¹⁷ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image'.

academic discussions about developments occurring internationally, particularly in Europe and Canada.¹⁸ A number of international conferences have been convened in recent years, bringing academics and high profile practitioners together in dialogue on the emerging role of modern public diplomacy as a tool for achieving foreign policy priorities.¹⁹ The discussions, which have engaged a range of small, middle and large power states including Norway, Spain, United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Turkey, consistently highlight the fact that public diplomacy is no longer on the periphery of diplomatic activity, but has ‘acquired greater prominence on the agenda of [international] policy-makers since 2001’.²⁰ Scholars are recognising that public diplomacy, because of its potential to reach and influence a wider public audience through cost effective media, has a ‘key role to play in meeting some of the grand geo-political challenges of our day’.²¹

Queensland Liberal Senator, Russell Trood, member of the Senate Committee and International Relations academic, who spearheaded the 2007 Senate Inquiry noted his concern that the Australian Government appeared disinterested in these discussions, and was not playing an active role in conference proceedings.²² While the government’s response to

¹⁸ Recent conferences held in Europe have sparked more relevant discussions and literature on the use of public diplomacy as a strategic tool within contemporary international relations. The nomenclature has varied, and public diplomacy has at time been referred to under such terms as the new diplomacy, although current literature and discussion consistently utilises the terminology of public diplomacy. Recent discussions have centred on the role of public diplomacy for global giants such as China playing catch-up with the information explosion, as well as for smaller and medium sized states to boost their competitive positioning in the global market, and bolster their political standing in global discussions (Spain, Norway and Canada being key examples). In 2006, both the United Kingdom and Canada separately instigated reviews of their public diplomacy strategies, programs and operations. In both cases the result has been significant structural and operational changes and substantial funding and resourcing increases to their public diplomacy programs.

¹⁹ Key recent international conferences include the 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005 Conferences on Public Diplomacy at Wilton Park which attracts a diverse group of participants each year. In 2008 participants represented Romania, Mozambique, Vietnam, British Virgin Islands, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the U.K., Afghanistan, Canada, Denmark, and the USA. The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy held at Real Instituto Elcano included participants from Spain, Madrid, the United Kingdom, European Union. Other Conferences included the 2005 Athens Conference on Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy Conference, 2005 Swedish Institute National Branding and Public Diplomacy Conference.

²⁰ Lane *Public Diplomacy: Key Priorities and Challenges*, p.2.

²¹ Fiske de Gouveia, ‘The Future of Public Diplomacy’, and R Schlegeter, ‘German Public Diplomacy’, *The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, March 2006.

²² Interview, Senator Russell Trood, January 2008.

the Senate Inquiry refutes this point, Australia's lack of visibility in a range of high profile academic and practitioner based discussions is notable. More so, such an absence is of interest given the extent and profile of literature and discourse within international circles around the increasing role of public diplomacy in contemporary foreign policy development and delivery. Public diplomacy has been labelled by notable diplomacy and communications scholars as 'the hottest topic under discussion in the world's diplomatic services'.²³

Yet, Australian academics and practitioners have not played any substantive role nor appeared to have contributed to international discussions, research or literature relating to this 'hot topic'. While DFAT officials in the Images of Australia Branch are informed of latest trends and developments through journal subscriptions, there is no budget within the area to support practitioner participation in such conferences.²⁴ Non-participation in high level conferences and discussions represents not only a loss for Australian practitioners in the field in terms of the informal development of networks and sharing of knowledge and experience; but also an opportunity lost in terms of engaging in the more formal rigour and scrutiny of other practitioners within a learning environment. As a result, there is a net cumulative loss to the Australia's practice of diplomacy.

Contemporary Australian academic discussion and published literature regarding the Australian position on and practice of public diplomacy is virtually non-existent. Pauline Kerr, of the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University (ANU),

²³ Melissen, 'Public Diplomacy Between Theory and Practice', The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, March 2006. However, international diplomacy scholar and author Berridge does not agree with this assessment, and notes on his website that 'it is not easy to distinguish between the sense and the nonsense currently being written on this subject'. Refer to Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, online updates found at http://www.grberridge.co.uk/dip_comp-1.htm.

²⁴ Interview, Confidential, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009.

admits that ‘little has been written on the subject domestically’.²⁵ She continues that ‘it is quite noticeable, when looking through the diplomatic literature that public diplomacy really is not a topic that Australian academics find all that interesting’.²⁶ There are a small number of academics working in the field, including through the Australian National University School of Asian Studies, Sydney University and the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT). Studies are focused on drilling into the development of a better understanding and quantification of public diplomacy outcomes.²⁷ At present there is no graduate course in any Australian university specifically addressing the field of public diplomacy. This is in contrast to the many well established and high profile international academic centres, all promoting opportunities for targeted and substantial postgraduate research, study and practice in the field of public diplomacy.²⁸

After some discussion on the topic, the Senate Committee noted on record this concern, that ‘it would seem Australia is not actively involved in the international conversation about public diplomacy’.²⁹ The line of questioning pursued by the Committee through the Inquiry process, particularly towards government agencies appeared to drill into the rationale for

²⁵ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image*, p.27.

²⁶ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 11 April 2007, p.8.

²⁷ Benjamin Goldsmith, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney conducts research and study in the areas of international public opinion and US foreign policy. Goldsmith has collaborated with Yusaku Horiuchi (Lecturer, Policy and Governance, Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University), and Trevor Wilson (Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School in Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University) in the hosting of a Comparative Seminar on Public Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific in Canberra on 6 March 2007 (prior to the commencement of the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of public diplomacy). Horiuchi and Wilson continue to progress research into the area of public diplomacy evaluation, while Joseph Siracusa currently of the International and Community Studies School at RMIT is furthering a project to develop the concept of an Australian Year Book, which might be utilised as a key public diplomacy product.

²⁸ For example, including as The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Brookings Institute, University of Southern California Centre for Public Diplomacy, Tufts University Murrow Centre, and Spain’s Real Instituto Elcano.

²⁹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image*, p.30.

Australia's absence from the international debate. In particular, the Inquiry process and questioning attempted to ascertain whether such non-engagement might be a reflection of complacency or disinterest on the part of the Australian politicians, policy-makers, academics and publics. Perhaps such a view was reinforced by the surprisingly slow government and public response to the Senate Inquiry, where 'the call for submissions received a poor response even from government departments or agencies actively engaged in public diplomatic activities'.³⁰ The level of disinterest and lack of public response to the initial public call for submissions was such that the Committee was required to make specific and targeted requests for submissions from key organisations. In all, even after these targeted invitations were made by the Committee Secretariat, twenty seven submissions were received by the Committee from across government, private and community sector organisations as well as private individuals.³¹

Rather than necessarily revealing a level of complacency on behalf of the Australian agencies and publics, submissions received from key agencies including DFAT and the Department of Defence, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Asialink, and the National Gallery of Victoria, demonstrated pockets of understanding and action in the area of public diplomacy. Yet on several occasions the Senate Committee remarked on the serendipitous approach taken within Australia to public diplomacy outcomes, with particular regard to the DFAT approach.³² Along these lines, Michael Wesley, refers to Australia as being marked by 'a

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The number of submissions received might be compared to other Senate Inquiries which have taken place at similar times to provide an indication of how well attuned to and engaged the community is in relation to the issue. As an example of contrast with other Inquiries, the 2008 *Inquiry into the Effectiveness of the Broadcasting Codes of Practice* – attracted some 86 written submissions from across all sectors of the community.

³² Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p.8. In this particular instance, Senator Trood made comment on the fact that DFAT had no mechanism in place to maintain networks between those participants in the youth ambassadors exchange program. As noted by Senator Trood, 'it seems to me if you wait for serendipitous encounters...they might not be around the particular corner that you turn'. As Trood further comments to the DFAT official, 'you have an extraordinary pool of

‘culture of serendipity’ that infects much thinking about Australia’s place in the world’, and influences the approach taken to international policy planning and development.³³ Wesley’s comments point out that Australia has benefited from ‘remarkable luck in its international progress’, and has not been subjected to the full hardships or international challenges that have beset other states, whether security or resource driven. Australia has not had to plan to forge out a path for itself, and is ‘not naturally disposed to think hard about the future’.³⁴ Wesley’s comments are relevant both to this discussion, and provide some context to Australia’s lack of participation in international discussions regarding public diplomacy. By looking at Australia’s approach to the study of public diplomacy, and the lack of engagement in international discussions, through Wesley’s perspective, it becomes evident that in the case of Australia, greater effort is focused on the day to day activities and actions related to public diplomacy across government, than the more theoretical study and discussion, let alone planning or forecasting. Such an approach does have drawbacks, particularly in the development of shared understanding of what public diplomacy is, and can achieve, the articulation of clear public diplomacy related objectives, and coordination of efforts to align with those objectives. These drawbacks appear as consistent themes throughout the Senate

people who have had quite remarkable experiences, compared to the rest of the Australian population going to places where we are making long term investments in both aid and defence and generally in foreign affairs engagement, and it seems to me that we could look at doing a lot more with them’.

³³ Wesley, Planning Australia’s Foreign Policy Future, *Lowy Institute Perspective*.

³⁴ Ibid. As an aside, it is in this way Australia’s behaviour when it comes to its place in the international sphere, might be likened to that of a ‘last born child’, characteristically described as ‘ambivalent’ because of their place in the family birth order. Contrast this to the characteristic behaviour of a ‘first born’ child that has had to pave its way at times through some struggle with the parental structure as being goal and purpose oriented. While it may be considered tenuous to draw linkages from birth order studies grounded in the discipline of psychology, to the behaviours of states in conducting international policy, there are some interesting synergies that merit discussion. There are a range of personality and social science studies relating to the impact of birth order on the personalities of siblings. While this is a superficial connection to make with Australia’s approach to the world for the purpose of this thesis, it is an aspect of diplomatic conduct that may warrant further study. Refer also to Dr Frank Sulloway, *Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family Dynamics and Creative Lives*, Knopf Doubleday, 1997, or M. Grose, ‘Why first borns want to rule the world and last borns want to change it’, Random House Australia, Sydney, 2003.

Inquiry, as well as through more recent studies regarding Australian diplomatic performance, including the Lowy Institute Blue Ribbon Panel Report on *Australia's Diplomatic Deficit*.³⁵

As expected, many submissions ultimately received by the Inquiry indicated a general sense of confusion and misunderstanding within the Australian public about the terminology 'public diplomacy' and its real meaning for government policy development and delivery.³⁶

During the hearing proceedings Committee member, Senator John Hogg, noted his own doubt as to what public diplomacy is really about, and a concern 'that government departments and institutions jump on the bandwagon and say,... "Yes, that's a good catchphrase. We will use that this month. We're all for public diplomacy"', but really no-one quite has a real idea as to what it is about.'³⁷ The submissions and subsequent hearings into Australia's public diplomacy program indicated that 'there is a lot of activity in the international arena conducted by Australian organisations which might be broadly characterised as public diplomacy', yet many organisations are not fully aware that the activities they are undertaking are public diplomacy activities, and may be linked into a broader Australian public diplomacy agenda.³⁸ As a result, the linkages that do occur are the obvious ones (generally driven through the major government departments based in Canberra) or occur on an ad hoc basis with out regard to strategic foreign policy objectives or priorities.³⁹

³⁵ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy'.

³⁶ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March 2008, p.34. Of interest, Senator Trood noted during interview that he had embarked on an education program to provide his Senate Committee colleagues with a basic level of understanding of public diplomacy prior to the Inquiry because of the low levels of understanding that existed amongst them at that stage. Also confirmed in Interview, Senator Russell Trood, 13 January 2008 and 30 June 2009.

³⁷ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March 2007, p.34.

³⁸ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 12 April 2007, p.41.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p.42.

1.2.2 Political will and strategic leadership

Submissions to the Inquiry indicated that Australia's recent positioning on public diplomacy was not necessarily due to disinterest in the area, but was more indicative of a deliberate political strategy to move away from soft power tactics where public diplomacy would normally be an instrument of choice. In terms of practice during the past decade, Australia had quite openly moved away from the well established and overt public diplomacy mechanisms, such as image building through multilateral dialogue and activity on global issues like human rights, refugees, and the environment, including through the United Nations.⁴⁰ The former Howard Government promoted a position during its administration that 'what really counts is less the building of deeper cultural or popular ties than the creation of practical relations between Australia and other states based on shared interests'.⁴¹ Evidence of Howard's approach is found in the concentration of diplomatic effort on the negotiation of bilateral FTAs (with counterparts including China, United States, and Thailand as examples). In Howard's view while certain activities might 'build on a nation's popular image or appeal, and add diversity to relationships, they are no substitute for political, economic or strategic substance'.⁴²

⁴⁰ John Howard distanced Australian policy from the UN through a range of actions during his administration. For example, in 2000 when attending the UN Millennium Summit in New York, Prime Minister John Howard refused to ratify the Protocol on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women as a means to advance the then Australian position calling for treaty reform within the United Nations. See A Cusak, 'John Howard Defends Rejection of UN', *ABC National Radio*, 6 September 2000. Later through his political term, John Howard maintained Australia's distance from joining in global action to combat climate change by similarly refusing to commit to the Kyoto Protocol relating to the reduction of greenhouse emissions, noting only that his Government might sign an amended version post 2012, AAP, 'Howard Still Not Keen on Kyoto', *The Age*, 13 October 2007. For further insight into Howard's position on foreign policy, including the UN and multilateralism refer to S Firth, *Australia in International Politics*, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005, pp.252-259; Kelly, 'Howard's Decade: An Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal', and for further reinforcement of Howard's foreign policy approach see Howard, 'Australia in the World', *Address to the Lowy Institute of International Policy*, 31 March 2005; also G Smith and D Lowe, 'Howard, Downer and the Liberals' realist tradition', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, No. 51 (3), September 2005, pp.459-473.

⁴¹ A Bubalo, 'Football Diplomacy', *Lowy Institute Policy Brief*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, November 2005, p.10.

⁴² Ibid.

During ‘Howard’s decade’, Australia’s key foreign policy initiatives were firmly focused on building bilateral trade⁴³ and security ties, deploying military and police power, including as ‘deputy sheriff’⁴⁴ within our own region, and strengthening a key alliance, with the United States of America (US). Howard engaged with the notion of Australia as “deputy sheriff” to the US, reinforcing Australia’s strategic, but also political and cultural connection with this powerful friend and ally, as the centrepiece of Australian foreign and strategic policy.⁴⁵

The Howard Government was ‘sceptical about the norms of so-called “global citizenship”’, and ‘applied a blunt nationalism to dealings with Asia, and opposed efforts to limit Australia’s sovereignty by resort to the United Nations instruments, human rights conventions and international law’.⁴⁶ Howard’s personal influence over foreign policy and strategy was an important feature of his administration, and his apparent disinterest in the strategic use of public diplomacy (outside the less complex subset area known as cultural diplomacy) to win influence in international relations, was reflected in the bureaucracy’s limited attention to public diplomacy policy and practice at that time. Notable Australian foreign policy expert and former DFAT head, Richard Woolcott, commented on Australia’s lack of focus on delivering public diplomacy outcomes during this time. In his view, Australia’s image and reputation on the international stage had diminished during the Howard

⁴³ It should be noted that by 2005 under Howard, Australia had signed FTAs with Thailand, Singapore and the United States of America, and had significantly advanced bilateral ties with China, Japan, India and Indonesia.

⁴⁴ F Benchley, ‘The Howard defence doctrine’, *The Bulletin*, 28 September, 1999, pp. 22-24. The notion of Australia playing the role of “deputy sheriff” to the United States within the Asia Pacific region was first posed to John Howard during an interview conducted and reported by *The Bulletin*. Howard’s prima facie acceptance of the notion as reported through *The Bulletin* interview was significant, and created subsequent tensions with influential regional neighbours, such as Malaysia. For further discussion of Australia’s role as “deputy sheriff” or the “Howard defence doctrine”, refer also to R Leaver ‘The meanings, origins and implications of the “Howard Doctrine”’, *The Pacific Review*, Vol 14(1), pp15-34; Kelly, *Howard’s decade: an Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal*, p.13; A Milner, “What’s left of engagement in Asia”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 54 (2), 2000, p.177; M Beeson and K Jayasuriya, ‘The Politics of Asian Engagement: Ideas, Institutions and Academics’, *Australian Journal of History and Politics*, Vol 55(3), 2009, pp360-374.

⁴⁵ The importance of the “Howard defence doctrine” in Australia’s foreign policy approach is discussed further at p.160 of this thesis.

⁴⁶ Kelly, *Howard’s decade: an Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal*, p.15.

administration and, ‘...our standing has been undermined in much of the international community and some of the important countries in our own region’.⁴⁷

In the area of cultural diplomacy, it should be noted that Howard’s Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer successfully injected renewed vigour into the Australian International Cultural Council (AICC), a body responsible for the promotion of Australia’s identity and values through cultural exchange, promotions and tours. Robyn Archer, high profile artist and international festival director, and appointed member of the AICC at that time, confirmed that Downer’s support of the Council provided an enormous boost to Australian cultural diplomacy, including through a financial allocation of \$20 million over four years.⁴⁸

However, while there was no questioning of the Council’s mandate to showcase Australian assets through culture and the arts, it was clear to Archer that even still there was insufficient understanding of the area, or strategic planning carried out through the AICC.⁴⁹ For example, Archer notes that Australia’s cultural diplomacy program fostered through the Council focused on big budget one-off gala events, such as performances by the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra, the Sydney Dance Company or Opera Australia at key diplomatic functions.⁵⁰ As a representative of the Art Gallery of Western Australia remarked to the

Inquiry:

...although there have been attempts in the past to use culture to underpin initiatives with other countries during periods of exchange for the development of trade and other relations between countries, it seems that the use of culture was at best last minute, funding was not always related to costs and timing, and exploitation of the use of art exhibitions, symphony orchestra tours, etc...were not tied strongly enough to the activities aimed at particular outcomes in such exchanges.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Richard Woolcott, cited in Kelly, ‘Howard’s Decade, an Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal’, p.8.

⁴⁸ Interview, R Archer, 3 November 2008.

⁴⁹ Ibid. Archer’s view of cultural diplomacy under the current administration is more disappointing. In her view despite the current Minister for Arts, Peter Garrett’s background as an artist, the bureaucracy remains insufficiently aware of the potential of the arts to project a very unique image of Australia into the world as a smart and creative nation and to foster strategic alignments with foreign audiences.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Art Gallery of Western Australia, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry on the Nature and Conduct of Australia’s Public Diplomacy Program*, Australian Government, March 2007. In 2007, the Orchestra embarked on its second European tour to Spain, Paris, Berlin and Milan. Yet, as an example of the fragmented nature of Australia’s public diplomacy program, particularly in the area of cultural diplomacy, tours to these nations did

As will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, while such gala events can spark a new awareness or immediate appeal of the initiating country, without a clear connection to a strategic foreign policy objective, they have little lasting effect on building lasting relationships with foreign publics for a strategic outcome.

The Senate Inquiry into public diplomacy occurred prior to Kevin Rudd's election as Australian Prime Minister and does not take into account any changes in political structure of policy that may have occurred as a result of this transition. However, the events and rhetoric over the first twelve months of Rudd's term indicated that public diplomacy policy and practice was likely to take on a greater priority under his administration. For example, the Final Report of Australia's 2020 Summit held in April 2008, released by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet provides overall support for more resources to be devoted or re-allocated to soft power and cultural diplomacy, with an emphasis on achieving foreign policy interests through increased collaboration, participation in multilateral and regional institutions and policy analysis based on synergies.⁵² Early initiatives delivered after Rudd took office as Prime Minister, including Australia's signing of the Kyoto Protocol, high profile official presentations to the Chinese Government and students in Mandarin language, and the formal apology delivered to Australia's Stolen Generation, (reviewed and commented upon overseas), presented a positive outlook for a highly visible public diplomacy program.⁵³

not align with relevant priority areas in cultural diplomacy as set out by the AICC or the FCIs, nor did they align with foreign policy priorities of that year. 2007 was the year in which the federal election was held and priorities at that time including USA and China. In 2010, the Sydney Dance Company will perform for one day at the World Expo at Shanghai, after spending a week performing in Venice. See:

http://www.mso.com.au/cpa/htm/htm_article.asp?page_id=97. Once again, given the significance of the World Expo, and Australia's strategic interests in China the lack of performance time in China appears to be missing the significance of the relationship. Refer to: <http://www.sydneydancecompany.com/performances/calendar/>.

⁵² Australia 2020 Summit, *Final Report*, p.359.

⁵³ G Ferguson, 'Kevin Rudd's Mandarin words impress China APEC delegates', *Herald Sun*, 7 September 2007. C Porteous, 'World Cheers as Rudd Signs Kyoto', *The Courier Mail*, 4 December 2007; D Welch, 'Kevin Rudd Says Sorry', *The Age*, 13 February, 2008.

Rudd's initial commitment to soft power approaches in international relations has not been fully explored or articulated at a political level, and bureaucrats remain somewhat unclear of the political imperative driving Australia's public diplomacy program.⁵⁴ As reported by *The Age*, much of the work in foreign policy is 'stemming from Kevin Rudd's office, with the constant complaint from the Department of Foreign Affairs that they are out of the loop'.⁵⁵ Furthermore, despite Rudd's apparent enthusiasm for public diplomacy approaches, other factors, including the lack of strategic leadership and coordination, and initial poor budgetary commitment to Australia's official representation and networks abroad, further confuse the government's overall commitment to development and implementation of an effective public diplomacy program. During his first months of office, Rudd scrapped the planned marketing campaign called, *Australia on the World Stage*; along with and the four-year recurrent funding set up within the AICC. At the time Downer commented that, 'I believe they [the ALP] are philistines, and they have no understanding and no desire to understand the importance of promoting culture internationally.'⁵⁶ Paradoxically, these measures were implemented after the Senate Inquiry found that that 'to ensure that Australia's public diplomacy efforts are not overshadowed in the highly contested international space, Australia must ensure that it takes advantage of opportunities to capitalise on the positive outcomes from its many public diplomacy activities'.⁵⁷

However, Rudd's ambitions for public diplomacy and diplomacy more generally have not yet fully unravelled, and there are signs that the approach of the Rudd government may change. Recent political announcements indicate that, Rudd's foreign policy agenda is still forming,

⁵⁴ Interview, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 10 January 2009.

⁵⁵ D Flitton, 'Stretched to the limit', *The Age*, 18 March, 2009.

⁵⁶ N Pickard, Rudd Government is bad for the arts, *Crikey.com*, 21 January 2008.

⁵⁷ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.30.

and it appears that in the mid-years of his political term, Rudd is reaffirming Australia's commitment to being engaged on the world stage. Rudd has clearly articulated his vision that Australia win a seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2013-14 term.⁵⁸ He has also pledged Australia's commitment to the 'establishment of a regional institution that will span the entire Asia-Pacific region', and to 'reinvigorating nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations'.⁵⁹ Each of these tasks is firmly wedded to the international system, and none will occur without a strong emphasis on image building through a strong and coherent public diplomacy program.

For the purpose of this thesis, it is apparent that Australia's lack of engagement in the international sphere around public diplomacy identified through the Senate Inquiry is more reflective of the political priority placed on public diplomacy rather than a general sense of complacency or lack of interest. From a structural perspective the DFAT bureaucracy operates quite clearly on the political imperatives set by government administration, and most particularly in recent years, on the imperatives set by the Prime Minister. It is important to note that the Rudd administration is still within its first term, and there are signs, both through the rhetoric and through the most recent 2009 budget statements that Rudd aims to change the current focus of the DFAT bureaucracy, and at this stage, public diplomacy remains a low priority. Public diplomacy is likely to remain a low priority with only minimal funding attached until there is an overt change in the overall political will and strategic leadership to ensure public diplomacy is incorporated into the strategic priorities of the portfolio.

⁵⁸ Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *2008-2009 Portfolio Budget Statement*: Australian Government, AGPS, June 2008.

⁵⁹ Flitton, 'Stretched to the Limit', and Lowy Institute of International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy', p.ix.

1.2.3 Strategic coordination of policy

Importantly and related to the central theme of anchoring public diplomacy activities to foreign policy priorities, DFAT does not only hold the lead responsibility for delivering the Australian public diplomacy program, but is also responsible for coordinating this public diplomacy program across a significant number of Government agencies. The Lowy Institute's Blue Ribbon Panel Report into *Australia's Diplomatic Deficit* notes that DFAT's role in leading and coordinating foreign policy responses has become more complex in an environment where 'almost every conceivable policy issue has an international dimension', and '18 of 19 Commonwealth Departments now have a dedicated international policy area'.⁶⁰ When considering the use of public diplomacy in foreign policy development and delivery, and the additional overlap it brings with strategic communications and public relations, the complexity of this task intensifies significantly. As a result, it becomes more difficult for DFAT with lead responsibility, to identify and drive the key policy objectives across Government, and align the Government's public diplomacy program accordingly.

Other Commonwealth government agencies including the Department of Education Science and Training, the Department of Defence, the Australia Film Commission, Invest Australia, Austrade, Museums Australia and the Australian Broadcasting Commission all submitted evidence relating to their own diverse public diplomacy agendas and activities. For example, the Committee was impressed by the 'sheer volume of public diplomacy activities' that ran across government.⁶¹ However, this extensive activity noted by government agencies under the label of public diplomacy demonstrates only a superficial and operational commitment to the concept of public diplomacy. As the Senate Committee noted in its final report, 'a number

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.30.

of witnesses questioned the effectiveness of such programs'.⁶² Alison Broinowski noted that Australia's public diplomacy program was a 'hotch-potch', and witnesses such as 'former DFAT Public Affairs officer, Chris Freeman, suggested that Australia had not reached its full potential in the effectiveness of its public diplomacy programs.'⁶³

From a strategic perspective, DFAT currently leads and coordinates the public diplomacy Inter-departmental Committee (IDC) which was established in 2002, and brings together the 26 federal agencies 'to share information and identify synergies across the spectrum of agency programs'.⁶⁴ Usually meeting twice each year, the purpose of the IDC is to 'ensure that government departments and agencies project an accurate image of Australia internationally and that their activities are consistent with the whole-of-government approach'.⁶⁵ However, a number of witnesses to the Senate Inquiry questioned the effectiveness of the IDC in the absence of any strategic goals and decision-making. As one witness to the Inquiry observed, the IDC is 'not normally a high powered policy making or coordinating unit as such; it is really a good on-the-ground grouping.'⁶⁶ Additionally, while this 'on-the ground' grouping brings interested Commonwealth agencies together, there is no representation from, nor connection to state or local government, the tertiary education sector, or the non-government sector – all of which can link-in and also play a valuable role in promoting positive messages and networks that would advance Australia's interests.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ A Broinowski quoted in Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.31.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p.104. Note the reference to 26 federal agencies reflects the structure of the bureaucracy at that time. This number has since been reduced to 19 agencies as a result of the machinery of government rationalisation that occurred after Prime Minister Rudd took office.

⁶⁵ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image, p.105.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

This operationally based description of the IDC purpose, its extensive membership representing the lower levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and its infrequent meeting schedule illustrates that the IDC coordinated by DFAT is not set up to play a strategic role in the development of a coherent public diplomacy approach aligned to national interests (as such interests are articulated by the Government). Nor does the IDC (based on the above description) necessarily encourage a whole-of-government partnership or collaborative approach to Australia's public diplomacy program.⁶⁷

The limited scope of and representation on the public diplomacy IDC, and absence of any other high level strategic body focused on public diplomacy policy highlights critical gaps in Australia's strategic approach to public diplomacy. The sheer volume of activity taking place within the current fragmented public diplomacy system is evidence that public diplomacy is on the agenda, and activities and outputs may be coordinated and quantified on the ground. Yet, as Broinowski commented, 'Australia looks like little bits and pieces of little bits of departments instead of one identifiable thing'.⁶⁸ Because of a gap in strategic commitment and direction, public diplomacy activities and outputs do not necessarily link, from a process or systems perspective into meaningful outcomes for Australia's national interests. This perspective reinforces the significant gaps in Australia's current public diplomacy program. As private Australian public relations company, Media Gurus noted through the Inquiry, 'a coordinated, committed, high-level approach, along with a series of training programs is vital'.⁶⁹ Christopher Stewart, member of the International Public Affairs

⁶⁷ In particular the IDC does not allow for representation or attendance by the third tier of government (that is, local government), yet some local governments are keenly aware of the importance of public diplomacy and actively taking up public diplomacy activities to promote the image of their city onto the world stage. For example refer to The City of Melbourne, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of Public Diplomacy*, Commonwealth of Australia, April 2007.

⁶⁸ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p. 20.

⁶⁹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Public Image: Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image*, p.104.

Network and witness to the Inquiry, stated, ‘we need, in a strategic sense to be looking ahead 5 or ten years and developing a vision for where Australia wants to be in the world.’⁷⁰

1.2.4 Resourcing of public diplomacy

The Senate Inquiry process revealed that overall Australia’s public diplomacy program is poorly resourced when compared to others. For example, in its submission to the Senate Inquiry, University of Melbourne organisation, Asialink, indicates that ‘Australia spends just 17 cents per capita on cultural diplomacy (a recognised and substantial subset of public diplomacy), compared to Germany which spends approximately A\$3, and the United Kingdom, which spends an impressive A\$19 per capita’.⁷¹ While the United Kingdom and Germany have established a structured approach to public diplomacy over time, with a particular emphasis on culture, through the British Council and Goethe Institute respectively, the contrast to Australia in per capita expenditure is significant. According to one witness to the inquiry:

the reality is that Australian public diplomacy has been relegated to a level of importance equivalent to that of Embassy gardens...under DFAT this incredibly important function will remain in the domain of the garden shed while the increasingly redundant work of the traditional diplomat will maintain its place in the ivory tower.⁷²

Perhaps one of the clearest measures of Australian Government interest and commitment to public diplomacy can be found in the DFAT budget statements. While public diplomacy clearly features within the strategic language of DFAT, it is undermined by a funding allocation which has shrunk by \$A35.5 million over the past two financial years. Overall government funding allocation has shrunk from A\$93.5M in 2005-06 to A\$58M in 2007-

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.122.

⁷¹ Asialink, *Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on the Nature and Conduct of Australia’s Public Diplomacy Program*, March 2007. The Asialink representative noted that these figures were obtained through publicly available documents and annual reports.

⁷² Mr Kirk Coningham quoted in the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image*, p.188.

08.⁷³ Further Rudd Government cuts (targeting the cultural diplomacy program), to the 2008-09 budget labelled as DFATs 'contribution to the cost-cutting anti-inflationary measures', combined with consistent budgetary and resourcing cuts into Australian diplomatic representation overseas over the past two decades indicate that diplomacy, including public diplomacy is not high on the agenda.⁷⁴

At the time of writing, the 2009-2010 federal budget had delivered on additional resources including A\$106.5 million over four years 'to strengthen the contribution of diplomacy to national security; advance economic wellbeing through trade; and protect Australia's abroad'.⁷⁵ The statement also commits to the reinvigoration of Australia's engagement with the multilateral system, and to this end an amount of A\$11.2 million is allocated over two years to continue Australia's campaign to win election to a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the term 2013-14.⁷⁶ The overall language and tenor of the budget statement is clearly focused on tackling hard issues of advancing trade and national security, and protecting Australians. The lack of resourcing that is dedicated to strategic public diplomacy activities in the federal budget statement, places significant distance between the 'soft power, creative diplomacy' rhetoric of the 2020 Summit, and the reality of Australia's diplomatic agenda.⁷⁷

As the Lowy Institute argues, 'diplomacy is by far the most cost-effective way to shape the behaviour of other international actors in ways which support our international policy goals', so the on-the-ground success of current foreign policy endeavours will rest largely in the

⁷³ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *2008-2009 Portfolio Budget Statement*: June 2008.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid. Also see M Fullilove, 'The Case for Australia's UN Security Council Bid', *Perspectives*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, September 2009 and M Fullilove, 'Rudd Right to Press for UN Security Council Seat', *The Australian*, 23 September 2009.

⁷⁷ Australian 2020 Summit, *Final Report*, p.357.

diplomatic skills (traditional and otherwise) of the 542 Australian diplomats working across some 90 overseas posts.⁷⁸ DFAT Secretary, Michael L'estrage, reassures the public that 'our diplomacy will therefore need to be responsive, adaptive and with a clear-eyed view of Australia's interests and priorities'.⁷⁹ However, the Lowy Institute continues to sound an alarm with regard to Australia's relative under-representation overseas, diminished foreign policy capacity, and overstretched diplomats whose capacity to contribute to wider national policy objectives continues to be displaced by declining overall funding and increased expectations.⁸⁰ The Business Council of Australia (BCA) echoes the concerns of the Lowy Institute, noting that 'current resources and priorities for international diplomacy, especially those relating to the operation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, do not meet Australia's needs'.⁸¹ In a more specific comment regarding the resources available to DFAT to pursue national interests through diplomacy, the BCA points to a concern that, 'DFAT's resources are overstretched, and for more than a decade the financial efficiency of the department appears to have been a higher priority than its effectiveness'.⁸² If the current broad policy and business view is that Australia's diplomatic program generally is well under resourced, and overstretched, it might be surmised that the Australian public diplomacy program will as a consequence suffer. Australia's public diplomacy program can be described as active even with a shoe-string budget. However, without the underpinnings of political will, policy rigour and capacity, over time the environment of scarcity begets a less than optimal outcome for 'smart and creative' public diplomacy.⁸³

⁷⁸ Lowy Institute for International Policy, *Australia's Diplomatic Deficit*, Blue Ribbon Panel Report, Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2009, p.vii, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007-2008 Annual Report, Commonwealth of Australia, 2008, Appendices 2 and 13.

⁷⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007-2008 Annual Report, Commonwealth of Australia, 2008.

⁸⁰ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy', p.vii.

⁸¹ Business Council of Australia, 'Diplomatic Capabilities Vital to Australia's Interests', *News Release*, Business Council of Australia, 17 March 2009.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ The Australian 2020 Summit, *Final Report*, p.357.

1.2.5 Gaps in the engagement of the Australian domestic public

Currently, the Australian domestic public has little or no involvement in the shaping of the Australian public diplomacy priorities or program, and appears to be seen as little more than a recipient of bland department information or fact sheets (including annual reports). There are no formal or consistent mechanisms by which agencies such as DFAT, with lead responsibility for public diplomacy, can both tap into the thoughts and aspirations of the many diverse Australians whose story it is that is being shared with the rest of the world; let alone raise awareness about public diplomacy and the importance of Australia's image and reputation in pursuit of national interest.

Anecdotally, DFAT might even be guilty of downplaying the role of diplomats for fear of sparking a backlash from the egalitarian elements of the Australian national psyche. Much attention is given within diplomatic circles to administering public service principles that aim to ensure parity of lifestyle between diplomats and their Canberra-based public service counterparts.⁸⁴ There are only a small number of long-serving diplomats such as Australia's former permanent representative to the United Nations, Richard Butler, and highly regarded career diplomat, Richard Woolcott, alongside former career diplomats Stephen Fitzgerald, Allan Gyngell, Geoff Miller, Sue Boyd, Alison and Richard Broinowski and Tony Kevin who have taken on profiles within the broader Australian community.⁸⁵ Such profiling has not always been driven by DFAT and as in the case of Richard Butler was not always positive or engaging for the Australian public. Yet, there is little in general that promotes the skills

⁸⁴ Interview: Confidential Source, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009.

⁸⁵ Alison Broinowski, Richard Broinowski and Tony Kevin are examples of former diplomats who have taken on visible roles within the wider community, in the fields of academia, journalism and writing each incorporating political and diplomatic commentary into their respective approaches. For example, see, <http://www.tonykevin.com.au> for political commentary and links to speeches, book reviews and other published works by Tony Kevin. Also, examples of publications by Alison Broinowski include, *About Face – Asian Accounts of Australia*; and *The Yellow Lady: Australian Impressions of Asia*, Oxford University Press, 1996.

employed or the work undertaken on a daily basis by Australia's diplomats. There is even less conveyed about what these diplomats do on a daily basis to project a positive image of Australia overseas for the purpose of advancing Australia's national interests.⁸⁶

However, as one DFAT official pointed out through the interview process, other states have taken on the role of promoting the work of their diplomats and seeking to engage their domestic audiences in a dialogue about the importance and value of diplomacy. An example is found in the United Kingdom's equivalent of DFAT, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The FCO interfaces proactively with the UK public, primarily through its website. The site directs public users to a suite of options for engaging with the agency, including through the use of latest social networking technology such as FCO Flickr (for latest photos), FCO Twitter (latest alerts), FCO UTube (latest videos), and FCO Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds, which provide regular news and content updates highlighting the latest formal statements, remarks or actions of FCO officers or others in relation to foreign policy issues or events, and providing information on 'How we Promote UK interests overseas'.⁸⁷ Most impressive is the FCO Global Bloggers site, which provides a space for UK diplomats to 'maintain a weblog about their experiences living and working overseas in the diplomatic role, and to provide informal comment on key foreign policy issues'.⁸⁸ The blogs not only raise the profile of the UK diplomats and the work that they undertake, they also allow for interaction and engagement between ambassadors and diplomats and members of the general public (both international and domestic). The language and format of the site is accessible and invites the audience to engage in a way that will promote understanding on the part of the audience, while enabling insight into the public

⁸⁶ Interview: Confidential Source, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009.

⁸⁷ British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), accessed at: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/who-we-are/>

⁸⁸ Ibid.

perception, expectations and reactions to certain issues on the part of the FCO and may guide foreign policy actions.

By contrast, according to one senior DFAT official, DFAT makes no connection between the work of the Australian diplomats overseas in building the Australian image and pursuing national interests and the domestic or foreign public audience.⁸⁹ That official noted during interview that DFAT's website had not changed to reflect the introduction of new technologies and new methods of networking or engaging on a personal level with the wider audience. Such an example provides another example of opportunity lost in building the Australian image, and points to Australia's lag in adapting to and utilising new and emerging tools in the fast paced field of public diplomacy practice.⁹⁰

1.2.6 Australia's public diplomacy program: opportunity lost?

When viewed together, the five key issues set out from 1.2.1 to 1.2.5 present a poor picture of Australia's public diplomacy program. The current lack of strategic commitment to and direction of Australia's public diplomacy program along with, insufficient integration with policy, gaps in coordination and engagement and past and recent departmental budgetary constraints all highlight a critical shortfall in DFAT's overall capacity to deliver strategic thinking around the planning and development of public diplomacy policy. The Senate Inquiry highlighted these issues clearly, against a background of general disinterest, confusion and 'conceptual muddle' that surrounds the policy and practice of public diplomacy within Australia. From there, it might be argued the issue of improving Australian public diplomacy has not moved much further.

⁸⁹ Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009.

⁹⁰ Fiske de Gouveia 'The Future of Public Diplomacy'. In his presentation Fiske de Gouveia suggests, 'public diplomacy is evolving fast. Developing political climates and technological environments mean that the real and virtual landscapes in which public practitioners operate, and the tools available to them are changing'.

In an address relating to Australia's international future, Wesley asserts the need for broad public involvement in international policy making within this challenging environment because:

...the choices we make about these challenges require more than simple technical fixes. They involve choices about some of our most fundamental values as a society. They involve basic questions that will touch the lives, identity, and self perceptions of all [Australians]. And so they need to be discussed and debated at the broad societal level. There needs to be broad public engagement with the challenges faced and public ownership of the choices made.⁹¹

While Wesley remains somewhat sceptical of the strategic value of public diplomacy per se, his vision for international policy making process relies upon the ability of Government to effectively communicate to and engage in two-way dialogue with the domestic public on international policy, an activity that is enabled through public diplomacy. As will be discussed later in this thesis, such engagement and dialogue, for the purpose of consolidating identity and purpose is more than 'public affairs', and sits well within the realm of public diplomacy.⁹²

Discussions undertaken with key stakeholders (both within and outside of DFAT) for the purpose of the research in this thesis also consistently supported the work undertaken by DFAT in the area of public diplomacy. This was so despite the critical issues relating to insufficient staff, limited funding and policy development capacity, and lack of exposure to current discussions and trends. As discussed later in this thesis, accountability for raising the priority of public diplomacy firmly rests in the first instance with Australian political leadership which holds responsibility for setting the foreign policy agenda and enables that

⁹¹ M Wesley, 'Australia's International Future', *Lowy Institute Perspectives*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, July 2009, p.7.

⁹² For references regarding the intersection and distinctions between public diplomacy and public affairs see Melissen, 'Between Practice and Theory'; also RS Zarharna, 'Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives', in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, Snow and Taylor (eds), Routledge, New York, 2009; and K Heller, L Persson, 'The Distinction Between Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy', in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, Snow and Taylor (eds), Routledge, New York, 2009.

agenda to take effect via sufficient resources. Where DFAT resources have been consistently subjected to budget reductions, the Department of Defence has seen its budget share increase dramatically. The Lowy Institute's Blue Ribbon Panel Report reports:

In 2008-09 the Commonwealth budgeted over \$22 billion for the Department of Defence, but less than \$1.2 billion for DFAT. With DFAT's operating budget declining and government committed to increasing real defence spending by three percent annually until at least 2010, this gap will only widen further.⁹³

Such statistics reinforce the perception that diplomatic practice overall is seen within Australia's strategic political framework to be of limited value in delivering upon foreign policy objectives.⁹⁴

1.3 Aligning public diplomacy practice with policy objectives

The Senate Inquiry covered an enormous scope in the consideration of Australia's public diplomacy program. In doing so the Committee highlighted a number of gaps in practice that are indicative of systemic failures in public diplomacy. Yet, this study is concerned with one underlying issue not explicitly dealt with by the Senate Committee during this process. That is, the lack of connection or alignment between Australia's public diplomacy program and strategic foreign policy objectives.⁹⁵

Outside the political process, DFAT holds lead agency responsibility for the development, coordination and implementation of Australia's public diplomacy policy and program.

DFAT notes that that public diplomacy programs are firmly tied to the advancement of Australia's foreign and trade policies to the benefit of all Australians through the two tiered

⁹³ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy', p.vii.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ While not dealing with this key issue explicitly, the Committee remarked, that the first task in improving the effectiveness of Australia's public diplomacy is to 'map out a long-term strategic public diplomacy plan',...and to do that public diplomacy, 'needs to be in close contact with Australia's key foreign policy makers and fully informed about relevant foreign policies'. For further details see, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image'; p.206.

approach of ‘promoting a better understanding of Australia’s identity, values and ideas overseas; and
a better understanding of Australia’s foreign and trade policy agenda in Australia’.⁹⁶

Public diplomacy is specifically embedded as a key departmental outcome area ‘to advance the interests of Australia and Australians internationally’.⁹⁷ More specifically, the 2007-08 departmental annual budget statement provides that DFAT works ‘to foster public understanding in Australia and overseas of Australia’s foreign and trade policy and project a positive image of Australia internationally’.⁹⁸ At an organisational level, DFAT reports to have ‘integrated public diplomacy into the fabric of the department’s work as a core mainstream activity’.⁹⁹ However, such statements are vague on why public diplomacy programs are important to policy objectives, and provide little evidence of an understanding of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. A purely superficial example is that the *Images of Australia Branch* (the work area within DFAT that holds responsibility for leading DFAT’s public diplomacy program) is located within the Consular and Protocol Division of the department, with no natural or even structured linkages into the policy development areas.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Budget Statement 2007-08*, p.1.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid, p.21. Refer to Outcome 3 set out in the Budget Statement.

⁹⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry*, 2007, p.12.

¹⁰⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Organisational Structure*, Australian Government, Canberra, October 2007, also published online at <http://www.dfat.gov.au>. This current structural positioning of the Images of Australia Branch was reaffirmed in Interview, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, June 2009. The current structural positioning of the Images of Australia Branch actually reflects the fact that DFAT has not ever comfortably incorporated at least the informational side of public diplomacy, with those functions being carried out by specialist officials via the Australia Information Service for some fifty years, until machinery of government changed in 1987.

Yet, as this thesis proposes, strategic policy lies at the crux of Australia's traditional diplomacy structure and efforts, and provides the impetus for a coherent, effective and measurable public diplomacy program. To be clear on this point, public diplomacy itself is not the policy. Public diplomacy is an effective instrument (from within the diplomat's toolbox), that drives policy. In the new modern environment, clear coherent policy messages are important, and relevant to both domestic and foreign audiences. In this environment, 'manipulative spin and propaganda are not the answer, indeed, foreign policy counts'.¹⁰¹

DFAT, and related portfolio agencies Austrade and AusAID, set out their policy priorities on an annual basis. In the past, longer term policy platforms have been set out under the auspices of a White Paper. However, in more recent years the annual budget statement has provided the vehicle for overarching policy objectives. Interestingly, the foreign policy priorities of the three agencies are not reproduced together, but appear separately on the separate websites and in separate annual reports. This in itself is an opportunity lost for the three portfolio agencies to draw upon and reflect the synergies across Australia's foreign, trade and development assistance policy platform. Therefore, this thesis brings the foreign policy priorities together, to identify areas of synergy.

1.3.1 Australia's foreign policy priorities: identifying synergies with public diplomacy

Drawing on current budgetary statements, Table 1 below sets out the key policy priorities across the three portfolio agencies for the 2009-2010 financial year. The portfolio does not report priorities as a whole across the relevant agencies, and this table has been compiled for the purpose of this thesis. The policies have not been arranged within the table in any particular order of importance, but the thesis attempts to align 'like' areas of policy

¹⁰¹ Djerejian, 'Changing Minds Winning Peace'.

horizontally within the table. From this table, it is possible to note that the priorities stretch across a range of multilateral and bilateral issues across regions and states. However, there are consistent themes across the three agencies driving policies of global security and engagement, particularly within Asia and the Pacific. Policies associated with the improvement of security outcomes, or trade and investment opportunities and results, whether through multilateral or bilateral channels clearly advance the national interest in making Australia a more secure and prosperous nation. By contrast, those policy priorities associated with development assistance (delivered primarily by AusAID in conjunction with DFAT) are less overtly tied, but just as critical to advancing national interests. Given the clear indication and ambitious nature of the stated policy priorities, it might be expected that DFAT would also articulate clear linkages between these foreign policy objectives and the overall public diplomacy program, however, this is not the case.

Table 1: Current Australian Foreign Policy and Trade Priorities 2009-2010¹⁰²

Foreign Policy Priorities (DFAT)	Trade Policy Priorities (DFAT / Austrade)	Development Assistance Policy (DFAT / AusAID)
National security and protection of citizens	Reform of WTO – Doha Round	Food security and development in Asia-Pacific and Africa
Regional engagement	APEC – Asia-Pacific Development	Economic infrastructure in Asia-Pacific
Pacific engagement	Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER)	Pacific partnerships for development – including in economic and financial management; essential infrastructure; and health & education
Global security – nuclear non proliferation	Free Trade Agreement In Negotiation: China Gulf Cooperation Council Japan Malaysia Korea Trans-Pacific (Brunei, Singapore, Peru, Chile New Zealand, United States) Feasibility stage: India Indonesia Pacific region	Engagement beyond Asia-Pacific: Africa Afghanistan & Pakistan
Multilateral engagement – UN Security Council	Free Trade Agreements Current: ASEAN - New Zealand –Australia; Singapore Thailand United States New Zealand Chile	Support to multilateral economic and development institutions (World Bank and Asian Development Bank)

Despite DFAT's corporate articulation of the strategic and organisational importance of public diplomacy to its core business as well as to Australia's national and foreign policy interests and activities, there is a sense of haziness and confusion around the actual meaning and purpose of public diplomacy, and its potential for advancing Australia's national

¹⁰² Australian Government, *Federal Budget Statements 2009-2010*, Australian Government, Canberra, June 2009.

interests.¹⁰³ There is no mention in any official documentation of how public diplomacy might be utilised in the realisation of Australia's ambitious agenda. Nor is there any reference either stated or implied between foreign and trade priorities and public diplomacy programs.

This study reveals that it is at this juncture where the articulation of the interface between policy and public diplomacy is required, that the Australian understanding and practice of public diplomacy begins to unravel. One DFAT official confusingly noted in evidence to the Senate Inquiry Committee that public diplomacy 'spans...everything from integrated promotions, encompassing culture, business and politics, all the way through to quite specific, targeted activities'.¹⁰⁴ Another witness to the Inquiry noted that public diplomacy in Australia is 'spread across a large canvass with many contributors all trying to project a positive image of Australia to the world'.¹⁰⁵ These comments align with the Senate Committee's statement that 'clearly public diplomacy is not a term commonly used or understood within Australia'.¹⁰⁶

The lack of clarity evident in official statements, such as those noted above, resonated through much of the remaining evidence provided to the Senate Committee, from representatives of government and non-government agencies, as well as the small number of academics currently engaged in and observing Australia's public diplomacy activities. Dr Julie Wells, of RMIT University noted that '[public diplomacy] is not a term that is well

¹⁰³ Ibid. Outcome Three sets out the DFAT portfolio responsibility to 'promote a better understanding of Australia's identity, values and ideas overseas, and a better understanding of Australia's foreign and trade policy agenda in Australia'.

¹⁰⁴ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March 2007, p.30.

¹⁰⁵ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image*, p.202.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.30.

understood by the people we would expect to be the government's partners in the project'.¹⁰⁷

Dr Alison Broinowski, former diplomat and academic witness noted to the Inquiry that Australia's public diplomacy program is at best, 'a hotch potch... - some education centre here, and there a little information office, and over here something else. In one country there will be somebody doing cultural relations and in another country there will be none'.¹⁰⁸

The Senate Inquiry process demonstrated that DFAT in particular can point to an 'extremely wide range of activities which are focussed on promoting Australia's national interest, on shaping and influencing opinion, and on building long term relationships'.¹⁰⁹ DFAT submitted a lengthy report detailing the range of activities conducted and outputs produced in the name of projecting a positive image of Australia overseas. These included funding and support of eight bilateral Foundations, Councils and Institutes (FCIs), the AICC, and the International Media Centre, along with support to a range of cultural and media exchanges, and dissemination of information through publications, Internet and annual reports.¹¹⁰ DFAT also noted to the inquiry that these activities are framed around three key interconnected strands: 'managing the news cycle and responding to the story of the day; running proactive projects over several weeks or months; and building long term relationships'.¹¹¹ According to DFAT, when combined, these strands engender a greater understanding of Australia's identity; values and ideas, ensuring that 'Australia's international image is contemporary,

¹⁰⁷ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March 2007, p.28.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p.4.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p.2.

¹¹⁰ The following nine FCI's have been established under legislation since 1979: Australia-Japan Foundation, Australia-China Council, Australia-India Council, Australia-Indonesia Institute, Australia-Korea Foundation, Council on Australia-Latin America Relations, Council for Australian-Arab Relations, Australia-Malaysia Institute, and Australia-Thailand Institute. For early analysis relating to the role of FCIs and the use of cultural diplomacy in the Australian context see also R Smyth, "Managing Australia's Image in Asia", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 49 (2), November 1995, pp.223-236.

¹¹¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program*, April 2007, p.4.

dynamic and positive'.¹¹² These strands are further addressed in a later section of the thesis, and mirror the key categories of public diplomacy activity identified by Professor Joseph Nye, a well known United States expert in the field of public diplomacy and soft power.¹¹³

During the Inquiry process, one senior official noted DFAT's public diplomacy priorities, expressed in terms of those posts in which full-time Australian-based diplomatic resources were secured specifically for public diplomacy activity, included the United States (Washington), China, Indonesia, and Japan. The same official also noted after further questioning that the public diplomacy priority (and specific resourcing) attached to these countries had evolved over time, and was not subject to any regular review.¹¹⁴ More than the specific focus on those states, the absence of a regular review by DFAT of public diplomacy priority targets was a key concern for the Inquiry. As a consequence DFAT may not necessarily have kept pace either with Australia's own shifting policy priorities or with shifting global and regional power dynamics.¹¹⁵

To drill down further on Australia's public diplomacy priorities, the FCIs, a key mechanisms for delivery of Australia's public diplomacy activities, represent another set of public diplomacy priority countries and regions, adding India, Malaysia, Thailand, Latin America, Korea and Arab states into the mix. Furthermore, the AICC formally identifies regional cultural diplomacy priorities over the next four years broadly as including, Asia, South Pacific, the Middle East and Africa, and the Americas and Western Europe (while this is the order in which the priorities are set out by the AICC, it is not clear if they are indeed ordered

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Nye, *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*.

¹¹⁴ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March 2007, p.28.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. For example, during the Inquiry, Senator Mark Bishop noted his concern that India had not been noted as a priority target for Australia's public diplomacy program.

to reflect further priority).¹¹⁶ Additionally, the AICC runs a country focus each year. In 2009 the country-focus programs target the United States of America, while in 2010 China will be the country focus. When this information is cross-referenced against successfully negotiated free trade agreements as evidence of hard diplomacy outcomes (Australia has free trade agreements in place now with Singapore, Thailand, Chile, New Zealand, the United States and ASEAN), there is an apparent lack of clear coherency. While some broad priorities align (China, India and Japan) they are not necessarily articulated in a way that cross references the more significant 'hard' priorities of DFAT, AusAID and Austrade. The picture of how public diplomacy priorities are identified, and measured with any reference to foreign policy outcomes is unclear.

Table 2 below sets out the key public diplomacy priority areas, as reflected during the Senate Inquiry, and also through current and publicly available information on the DFAT website. As with the portfolio policy priorities shown in Table 1, there is no single reference source provided by DFAT to align the various public diplomacy priority areas against each other, nor any framework that sets out the full picture of diplomatic priorities in one view.¹¹⁷ When the contents of Table 2 are cross-referenced against the stated foreign, trade and development assistance priorities set out in Table 1, there is evidence of little internal reconciliation against or consistency between priority issues or target countries, and little connection to positive outcomes (such as improved trade relations). When combined, this information points to a serious deficit in DFAT's policy capacity, and ability to connect public diplomacy activities to strategic policy objectives.

¹¹⁶ For complete list of the AICC priority regions and target countries refer to <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/regions.htm>, and <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/focus.htm>.

¹¹⁷ Table 1 and Table 2 have been developed and cross-referenced for the purpose of this research. There is no known source or publication available to the public that provides such a view.

Table 2: Current Australian Public Diplomacy Priorities

Public diplomacy positions ¹¹⁸	AICC – Priority Regions ¹¹⁹	AICC Focus Country programs ¹²⁰	Tourism Australia promotion 2008 ¹²¹	International Education Priority States (based on top export performers) ¹²²	Current FCIs
Washington	Asia	Indonesia (2008)	U.S.A.	China	Japan
China	South Pacific	U.S.A. (2009)	New Zealand	India	China
Indonesia (x2)	Middle East & Africa	China (2010)	Japan	Rep of Korea	Indonesia
Japan	Americas and Western	Korea (2011)	United Kingdom	Malaysia	India
	Europe	India (2012)	South Korea	Thailand	Korea
			France	Hong Kong	Thailand
			Italy	Indonesia	Latin America
					Arab Relations Council
					Malaysia

The physical resourcing of dedicated public diplomacy positions overseas is deficient when compared both to the changing global dynamics, and to the breadth of Australian policy initiatives in 2009-10. For example, after analysis of the foreign and trade policy priorities against current public diplomacy priorities, further designated public diplomacy representation (by Australian-based officers) would be beneficial in India, Afghanistan and more broadly throughout Asia (particularly Korea), and in the Pacific, in order to further and support engagement, particularly in relation to the negotiation of free trade agreements, and

¹¹⁸ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p.8. The list comprises those full-time A-based officer positions, specifically designated for public diplomacy activities. As noted in the table above there are two full time equivalent Australian based public diplomacy officers at Australia's Embassy in Jakarta (Indonesia).

¹¹⁹ DFAT website found at: <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/regions.html>

¹²⁰ DFAT website found at: <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/focus.html>

¹²¹ Tourism Australia website found at:

<http://www.tourism.australia.com/Research.asp?sub=0297&al=2424#TargetsMarkets>

¹²² Australian Education International, 'Export income from education services from the top 50 nationalities', *Research Snapshot*, Australian Government, June 2009. Found at: http://aei.gov.au/AEI/PublicationsAndResearch/Snapshots/20090620_pdf.pdf

advancement of the non-proliferation agenda as well as Australia's bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Similarly, the range of established FCIs does not necessarily provide a strong indication of public diplomacy interconnecting with policy. FCIs distribute minimal (DFAT-sourced) funds into the community in support of cross-cultural education and exchange. However, there is little evidence linking such organisations to the strategic foreign policy and trade priorities, such as the successful negotiation of free trade or security agreements, or the current push to address environmental challenges. The sweeping priorities (that actually include every major continent) set by the AICC are well outside the bounds of targeted policy setting, and bear little or no correlation to foreign policy, trade or development assistance priorities.

Lastly, it is apparent across all public diplomacy perspectives that the Pacific, an area that is tied to Australia's ongoing national interests (identified across the foreign, trade and development priorities as an area for strategic concern) is neglected through current overt public diplomacy mechanisms. Yet, the subtle and critical public diplomacy impact achieved through Australia's development assistance program within the Pacific cannot be ignored. As discussed in later chapters within this thesis, development assistance aid also known as the 'diplomacy of deeds' must be identified and embraced as a key pillar of Australia's strategic public diplomacy efforts.¹²³

The Senate Inquiry made a number of recommendations aimed at addressing the key systemic issues, and other minor issues aimed at improving the effectiveness of Australia's

¹²³ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March, p.7.

public diplomacy program. The twenty recommendations included calls to strengthen bureaucratic leadership and coordination of the government's public diplomacy program; significantly boost funding for public diplomacy (and in particular cultural diplomacy activity); and impose external evaluation of the government's public diplomacy programs through the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). The recommendations, while reasonably conservative and low-key, provide a solid starting point for implementing systemic improvements to Australia's public diplomacy program. The Rudd Government's response, tabled by DFAT in January 2009, (some sixteen months after the Senate Inquiry Report was tabled in Parliament), while non-committal in its uptake of many of the recommendations, acknowledged the validity of only a few of the recommendations raised by the Inquiry. As noted earlier, little follow-up action has occurred.¹²⁴

While no reference is made to specific areas of deficit identified by the Senate Committee, the Government response merely 'welcomes the committee's commendation of the work of Australian departments and agencies, cultural and educational institutions, and private organisations actively engaged in promoting Australia's reputation overseas'.¹²⁵ The response is intended to 'reflect the Government's commitment to continue to pursue Australia's public diplomacy programs designed to positively influence the perceptions, opinions and attitudes of people overseas on Australia's values identity and ideas in a way that directly serves the advancement of Australia's foreign and trade policy interests'.¹²⁶ However, the tone of the report is lacklustre and refers to minor if any changes in existing practice to align with the Inquiry recommendations. Regardless of the content submitted within the Government's response, the 2009-2010 budget statement already referred to in this thesis provides a more

¹²⁴ Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Officer, Consular, Public Diplomacy, Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009.

¹²⁵ Australian Government, Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.1.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

accurate and perhaps disheartening picture of the Government's intentions regarding public diplomacy.

Gaps remain in understanding how public diplomacy fits within the foreign policy machine, and in clearly articulating the structures and processes underpinning its development and delivery. The Inquiry findings alone are predictable and conservative addressing the minimum threshold for improving Australia's public diplomacy program. However, the background and evidence provided to the Inquiry by government and non-government agencies, and the Committee's lines of questioning and discussion are instructive. The Senate Inquiry process and findings are important to the maturing of Australia's approach to public diplomacy. The Senate Inquiry attempts to unravel and understand public diplomacy as it operates within Australia, and provides a superficial analysis of public diplomacy. As stated, Australian practitioners and academics have not yet fully engaged with the subject of public diplomacy, and there is little political imperative upon DFAT to drive and resource public diplomacy as an instrument of strategic policy. As a result the DFAT coordinated public diplomacy program has developed without sufficient attention to its purpose and place.¹²⁷ The key issues raised through the Inquiry in terms of strategic leadership, political will and commitment, resourcing, and engagement in discussions and research have potential application not just to public diplomacy, but into other areas of Australian public policy outside the traditional realm of foreign policy.

¹²⁷ Although publicly available statements issued by DFAT indicate that changes are occurring at a departmental level to better plan, coordinate, monitor and evaluate outcomes, in line with key Senate recommendations made as a result of the recent Inquiry.

CHAPTER 2: THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WITHIN THE TRADITION OF DIPLOMACY

The aim of this chapter is to identify the origins of public diplomacy (as recognised today), within the tradition of diplomacy, particularly as diplomacy has evolved from the time of the Westphalian Settlement, close to four hundred years ago.¹ This chapter affirms public diplomacy as a subset that has existed within the wider field of diplomacy, and identifies where public diplomacy has been enabled, though not always overtly through the political realities, the protocols, and the structures of the wider field of diplomacy. The Australian diplomatic experience will be shown to have similarly provided space and opportunity for early public diplomacy practices to emerge and to evolve, though generally at arms length from foreign policy development and delivery.²

2.1 Understanding the origins of public diplomacy

The Senate Inquiry of 2007 into the nature and conduct of public diplomacy deals directly with content surrounding the meaning and method of public diplomacy as it has emerged recently in the modern international environment.³ The Senate Committee did not, through the process of inquiry, nor in the development of the final report delivered to the Australian Parliament touch on public diplomacy within the broader sense of traditional diplomatic practice. Prima facie, the divergence between the traditional practice of diplomacy and public diplomacy is wide, spanning role, method, audience and channels of activity.⁴

¹ Westphalian Settlement of 1648 is considered to provide a watershed period from which traditional diplomatic practice as practiced today has emerged.

² This separation between public diplomacy and foreign policy within the Australian diplomatic system is an issue that remains today and can be traced back to the origins of Australian public diplomacy activity.

³ The Senate Inquiry investigates and consolidates an understanding of public diplomacy based on the most recent and well documented experiences of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States of America. These examples are expected, yet limited in the context of emerging trends particularly given the extent of works available on public diplomacy emerging in other European states including Norway and Spain, as well as China, Japan, Korea, India Singapore and New Zealand.

⁴ Each of these aspects of public diplomacy are dealt with in further chapters of this thesis.

Interestingly, various participants in the Senate Inquiry presented a range of inconsistent views on whether and how public diplomacy might sit with the wider tradition of diplomacy. In particular those DFAT officials currently engaged in diplomatic practice overseas strongly voiced the position that public diplomacy fell squarely within the domain of diplomatic responsibilities, whereas others more closely involved in the development of public diplomacy specific programs appeared less certain of the connection.⁵ However, a key premise of this thesis is that the origins of public diplomacy practice do rest within the broader traditions of diplomatic practice. Public diplomacy concerns (such as the cultivation of state image and reputation) and practice (though not always known as such) have been established over time as legitimate threads of diplomacy more broadly. As Melissen states, ‘image cultivation, propaganda and activities that we would now label as public diplomacy are nearly as old as diplomacy itself’.⁶ The value, role and focus of public diplomacy practice have, quite reasonably, remained fluid, depending upon the immediately prevailing political imperatives and interests of the day, combined with the expectations of the foreign publics and the methods of interaction available. As a result, the practice of public diplomacy has moved and stretched beyond traditional boundaries to become more relevant to the challenges of the modern environment within which international relations are conducted.

Diplomacy, as Adam Watson described, is ‘a major and ubiquitous activity of governments in our time’.⁷ Watson’s description, while referencing diplomacy more broadly, and dated from 1982, sets the tone for this thesis in demonstrating the fluid necessity of traditional and public diplomatic practice in meeting the challenges of the environment. Furthermore, diplomacy is

⁵ Interviews, Confidential Source, Senior Officials (A-based and overseas) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009 and 9 September 2009.

⁶ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.3.

⁷ A Watson, *Diplomacy: Dialogue between States*, Eyre Methuen, London, 1982, p.15.

traditionally and widely viewed and utilised by sovereign states as one of the primary (but not the only) instruments for implementing foreign policy.⁸ The foundations of traditional diplomacy provide legitimacy to public diplomacy as a means of diplomatic practice relevant to foreign policy interests, and enable further understanding of the impact and reach of public diplomacy beyond the accepted boundaries of traditional diplomacy.⁹ Theorists would suggest that the term ‘traditional diplomacy’ be constrained as a reference to the type of diplomacy that occurs strictly on a state to state basis where the influence of historic tradition prevails. In such discussions traditional diplomacy is synonymous with European diplomacy, as demonstrated through the examination of the origins of diplomatic practice within this chapter.¹⁰ While the distinct subset of traditional diplomacy is important for the discussion within this thesis, this thesis takes the [small ‘t’] approach to traditional diplomacy. In this way traditional diplomacy is taken to include diplomatic practice generally as conducted by the state within the parameters set under codified international law, but also incorporating more recent developments in the role of international government organisations and non government organisations – provided that such diplomacy occurs within the confines of official government to government relations. The Senate Inquiry, limited in terms of time and scope was not positioned to thoroughly revisit the key elements of traditional diplomacy. Yet, such an omission leaves a distinct hole in current Australian understanding and literature about public diplomacy generally, and subsequent gaps in understanding about why Australia’s practice in the area of public diplomacy may be lagging today.

⁸ Diplomacy is highlighted as one of the instruments of foreign policy, as distinct from other activities such as economic sanction or military action. Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p.9.

⁹ For further discussion of the central tenets of (capital T) traditional theory of diplomacy refer to Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, and Berridge *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, Palgrave, London, 2001; R Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, Routledge, London, 1995; H Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1994; F de Callieres, *The Art of Diplomacy*, MA Keens-Soper (ed), Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1983; A Watson, *Diplomacy: the dialogue between states*, Eyre Methuen, London 1982, H Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1950, and E Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 4th edition, Longman, London, 1957.

¹⁰ S Murray, ‘Reordering Diplomatic Theory for the Twenty-First Century: A Tripartite Approach’, *Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Bond University, 2006.

For this reason, understanding the wider practice of diplomacy becomes an important foundation from which to explore public diplomacy. Establishing the linkages between the two areas is critical to developing a more full understanding of the timing, method, channels and delivery of public diplomacy, as a means to advancing strategic national interests. Indeed, if public diplomacy is to be accepted as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy (as diplomacy is recognised), such linkages must be established. Interestingly, Australian diplomatic practice has emerged to reflect a strong focus on tradition. Therefore, Australia's ability to engage with public diplomacy in a more contemporary context will depend to a significant degree upon how such public diplomacy might be seen to be congruent with the current Australian institutions and practice.

As noted, the purpose of this chapter is to address and define the broader field of diplomacy, and to provide a perspective of diplomacy that sets out the strong traditions as founded within the origins of diplomacy, and to explore where and how public diplomacy fits within these traditions. This chapter proposes that public diplomacy today is an instrument of diplomacy for the purpose of advancing foreign policy, and while grounded in the traditions of diplomacy is a natural extension of diplomacy to meet the challenges of the modern international environment, and expectations of foreign and domestic publics.¹¹ This chapter

¹¹ The changes and challenges of the modern environment in which international relations are conducted are important to the discussion of both diplomatic practice, but also public diplomacy practice, particularly as such practice is emerging today. Most writings on contemporary public diplomacy will begin with reference to the key challenges affecting the modern diplomatic environment. For example, some of the key issues including the increase in the number of states now interacting on the global level, the expansion of democracy across many of these states and the correlated explosion in the number of other international actors apart from states such as non governmental organisations, as well as politically savvy interest and lobby groups. As the same time the success of innovative technologies and communication patterns have added a dimension to the complicated and complex web of information, communications and media that overlay political processes, and at times 'circumvent the foreign ministry and the embassy'. Refer to Melissen (ed), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p.xiv. These challenges are addressed in further detail within Chapter Three of this thesis. However, for further readings and insights into key changes and challenges refer to K Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, 18 (2), 1993, pp.44-79; N Snow, 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy', *The Routledge*

also examines the emergence of diplomatic practice in Australia, in terms of structure and conduct, and offers background to the emergence of public diplomacy within Australia's traditional diplomatic practice and administration.

From the outset, this thesis acknowledges that public diplomacy neither replaces nor exceeds the value and place of traditional diplomacy. Public diplomacy as employed today, extends beyond the limitations of traditional diplomacy, and represents a fundamental shift in the way states manage their relations.¹² However, such public diplomacy ultimately leverages and complements traditional diplomatic activities.¹³ In order to facilitate a better understanding of how public diplomacy operates within the Australian context and identify opportunities for public diplomacy to be utilised as an effective tool to advance Australia's national interests, there is value in understanding the foundations from which public diplomacy emerges.¹⁴

Traditional diplomatic practice offers that foundation.

Diplomacy, commonly defined as the 'art or practice of conducting official relations between sovereign states in such a way as to avoid arousing hostility' is widely accepted as an instrument of foreign policy.¹⁵ This common definition reflects the words of Australian international relations theorist, Hedley Bull that diplomacy is 'the conduct of relations

Handbook of Public Diplomacy, Snow and Taylor (eds), Routledge, New York, 2009, pp.3-11; B Hocking, 'Rethinking the new Public Diplomacy', in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, pp.28-43; Melissen, *Between theory and practice*, and E. Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy', *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, The Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 2001.

¹² Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy', p.1.

¹³ In the words of a former Canadian Ambassador, 'the new public diplomacy requires different skills, techniques and attitudes than those found in traditional diplomacy'. Refer to Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy', p.3.

¹⁴ Chapter Three explores public diplomacy in more detail, and identifies in particular where has emerged from the traditions of diplomacy, alongside those areas where public diplomacy offers an extension of traditional diplomatic practice in order to meet the needs of a changing environment.

¹⁵ Found at: <http://thinkexist.com/dictionary/meaning/diplomacy/>. Foreign policy is also defined simply by Gyngell, Wesley as 'that dimension of public policy that deals with the outside world', the purpose of which is to create 'an international environment conducive to the nation's interest'. To refine the hierarchy of concepts even further, diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy, is the tool used to implement the foreign policy which gives rise to foreign or international relations. Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.24.

between states, with standing in world politics by official agents and peaceful means'.¹⁶

Clearly, a common theme crossing through both the definition provided by Bull to the common understanding of diplomacy relies upon the 'essential condition of plurality'.¹⁷ As Watson surmises, diplomacy 'arises out of the coexistence of a multitude of independent states in an inter-dependant world'.¹⁸ Watson's approach is not necessarily as 'statist' as that of other scholars such as Bull.¹⁹ For Watson, the entity appears to be of lesser importance; rather diplomacy in this way is 'a response to the recognition by several decision-making beings, that the performance of each one is a matter of permanent consequence to some or all of the others'.²⁰ The focus on plurality as the central core of diplomacy, where there is a sense of interdependence and a need for dialogue, gives a more flexible starting point from which to define diplomacy. In this way, plurality becomes a pivot point that allows other features of diplomatic practice, such as the entities and requirements for interactions to emerge more flexibly and meet the needs of the international system at the time.

Applying a traditionalist and functional view of diplomacy, Berridge defines diplomacy as 'the term given to the official channels of communication employed by the members of a system of states'.²¹ Batora reinforces this view, with again a particular emphasis on the role of the state, defining diplomacy as 'the set of norms and rules regulating relations between

¹⁶ H Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977. Bull acknowledges the society of states as central to the maintenance of order in an otherwise anarchical international arena. By doing so, Bull sets the tone for diplomacy as a mechanism for states to maintaining balance and order within this environment.

¹⁷ Watson, *Diplomacy: Dialogue between States*, 1982, p.15.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ For many traditionalists, the entity of the state is the central precondition for diplomacy to function. Following on from Bull, Wight for example suggests that diplomacy is 'inextricably connected to the existence and operation of the state system'. Wight in Jackson, 'Martin Wight's Thoughts on Diplomacy', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 13(4), p.3, Berridge utilises similar terminology in *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p.1.

²⁰ Watson, *Diplomacy: Dialogue between States*, p.15.

²¹ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p.1.

states'.²² Batora draws upon this functional perspective by noting that diplomacy is 'embedded in organisational structures, routines, procedures and habits of foreign ministries...and carried out by diplomats according to institutionalised professional skills and habits'.²³ Berridge writes that the chief purpose of diplomacy is to 'enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda or war'.²⁴ Plurality in Batora's approach is a given, but the additional themes from across the definitions start to converge, including the role of the sovereign state, the envoy and embassy, and the importance of rules and protocols.

Other prominent writers on traditional diplomacy, including Satow similarly rely upon the essential conditions of plurality and interdependence, and draw upon the theme also noted in earlier definitions that traditional diplomacy occurs as a means of reinforcing 'the conduct of business between states by peaceful means'.²⁵ In essence, for diplomacy to play a role, there must be more than one state (or entity), and there must be a level of interaction between those states or entities. Satow refers to the 'application of intelligence and tact' in the 'constant search for mutually acceptable terms and conditions in an atmosphere of confidence and understanding'.²⁶ As such, Satow's works draw a clear line between the role of diplomacy and that of force in progressing foreign policy interests. Satow's implied suggestion that 'diplomacy and conflict are mutually exclusive', emerges with some regularity from the common understanding of diplomacy (including Berridge's interpretation), though it is not necessarily a widely held view amongst other theorists and writers on politics and diplomacy,

²² Batora, 'Multi-stakeholder public diplomacy of small and medium sized states: Norway and Canada'.

²³ Ibid, p.1.

²⁴ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p.1.

²⁵ Ibid. p.134.

²⁶ Ibid.

including Clausewitz and Grotius.²⁷ Lastly, underlying Satow's view is a deference provided to the elitist practice of diplomacy exercised within the confidences of the officials of the state. The presumption reflected by Satow and others in a range of the definitive and classic writings on diplomacy is that diplomacy occurs as a restricted or closed practice between the elite officials in secret and away from the public view or opinion.²⁸

Batora's concise synopsis of diplomacy noted previously also highlights the key themes of discrepancy between traditional diplomacy and the emerging field of public diplomacy. These themes are addressed briefly here, though will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter. For example, public diplomacy as a modern practice occurs in a multi-dimensional and layered approach, not in accordance with well established rules and protocols. Nor is public diplomacy necessarily embedded in the organisational structure, routines or habits of the foreign ministry. While the foreign ministry provides a critical development hub (where public diplomacy activities might hopefully be developed in line with foreign policy strategies), the foreign ministry and diplomatic service provide just one channel of delivery. The various channels of media, universities, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and non government organisations (NGOs) are all similarly important to the delivery of public diplomacy.²⁹ In this way, public diplomacy reinforces a sense of openness that is abhorrent to the traditional secrecy of official diplomatic interactions. Officialdom and secrecy run entirely at odds with the principle that public diplomacy from the outset is open to and engages the public. These and other matters relating to the specific aspects of difference

²⁷ Murray, 'Reordering Diplomatic Theory for the Twenty-First Century: A Tripartite Approach', p.46. Satow's view supports the anarchist perspective of international relations, where the state system is in a constant state of anarchy, and diplomacy is one mechanism to maintain some sense of balance within that anarchy. Other classic writers such as Carl von Clausewitz would oppose Satow's interpretation, arguing that war is simply as the continuation of policy by other means. Clausewitz, *On War*, Penguin Books, Victoria, 1982, p.122.

²⁸ The prominent writers that support the traditional perspective of diplomacy as an elitist function of officials between states and away from the public domain, include Machiavelli, Grotius, Callieres, Satow, Nicholson, Kissinger and Berridge.

²⁹ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*; Hocking, 'Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy', p.30.

between traditional and public diplomacy are critical to understanding, (and are addressed in more detail in Chapter Three).

The changing needs of the international environment have challenged many accepted tenets of traditional diplomacy, including the supremacy of the sovereign state, where non state actors, including IGOs and NGOs may also play a role in the conduct of international relations and diplomatic practice, as well as the growing interest of the public in issues of both domestic and foreign policy.³⁰ However, in all instances the essential condition of plurality is maintained, though only in a more complex form. In the words of Dr Jorge Heine, Chair of the Centre for International Governance Innovation, ‘Otto von Bismarck’s dictum that ‘diplomacy is the art of gaining friends abroad’ remains valid. What has changed is the sheer number of friends that need to be gained has increased exponentially’.³¹

The nature of plurality even during the earliest decades of diplomacy in action may well have encouraged the need for states to foster early forms of public diplomacy. Even the nature of Machiavelli’s early writings on diplomacy convey the underlying yet subtle theme that image is vital in maintaining control of and managing the affairs of the state, both to the domestic audience and the foreign audience.³² Projecting an image of the state, including one that might define and set the state apart or facilitate allegiances was as important in the seventeenth century as it is today. As Melissen reinforces, ‘official communication aimed at foreign publics is after all no new phenomenon in international relations. Image cultivation, propaganda and activities that we would normally label as public diplomacy are nearly as old

³⁰ Traditional roles and boundaries that have previously separated states from non-government actors including IGOs have broken down dramatically in recent decades, to the point that IGOs participate within core multilateral institutions like the United Nations, and carry significant influence within and across states.

³¹ J Heine, ‘On the Matter of Practicing the New Diplomacy’, in *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?*, A Cooper, B Hocking and W Maley (eds), Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2008.

³² N Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Wordsworth Reference, Hertfordshire, 1993.

as diplomacy itself'.³³ For this reason, and to fully understand the nature of contemporary public diplomacy, there is value in exploring the historical origins of diplomacy in more detail.

2.2 Understanding the origins of diplomacy

Many studies of diplomacy will refer in some part to the historic origins of the discipline. The trend to relate diplomacy to the origins of the past is far more prevalent amongst those known as the traditionalists who place a high value on the basic tenets of diplomacy which, while diluted by changes in the international relations environment, remain relevant to the discussion of modern diplomacy.³⁴ Diplomacy boasts substantial historical stability that emerged from the Westphalian Settlement. The concept of the Westphalian system was described by Hedley Bull as, 'an international society composed of genuinely independent sovereign states all juridically equal despite enormous disparities of size and power, and free from all or almost all hegemonial power'.³⁵ Thus the Westphalian system, Eurocentric and dated though it may be, is accepted by many traditional diplomacy scholars as having established a largely immutable pattern for the conduct of international relations between states.

The strong historical context of diplomacy is such that discussions of traditional diplomacy are incomplete without an examination of those origins. There is little theoretical discourse in the area of diplomacy, perhaps because it is a subject so embedded within the context of international law and accepted historical practice.³⁶ As a result of a strong history of codified rules, there is little room for theoretical manoeuvrability or creativity within the discourse on

³³ Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', p.3.

³⁴ For example, refer to Callieres, Satow, Nicholson, Kissinger and Berridge.

³⁵ Bull quoted in A. Watson, *Diplomacy: the Dialogue Between States*, p.xi.

³⁶ Most prominent writers on diplomacy, including de Callieres, Satow, Nicholson, Watson and Berridge are focused on the functional aspects of how diplomacy is conducted rather than the theoretical underpinnings or opportunities for diplomacy.

traditional diplomacy. Scholars emerging in more recent times, including Der Derian, Sharp, Puchala and Murray express frustration with the limited and patchy nature of diplomatic theory, suggesting that diplomacy itself has been ‘particularly resistant to theory’.³⁷ This thesis is less concerned with the theoretical underpinnings or resilience of diplomacy, although, it notes that the patchiness in the theoretical groundings of traditional diplomacy has been similarly lamented by scholars with an interest in public diplomacy, and there is certainly room to further develop the existing body of knowledge.³⁸ However, this thesis is concerned with what might be learned from the practice and function of diplomacy, and the degree to which such practice and function influences or enables practice in the area of public diplomacy.

As a consequence of the rigid boundaries that apply to traditional diplomacy, discourse on the subject tends to be constrained. In particular, the discourse tends to focus upon the structured and official channels of communication and activities of negotiation employed both bilaterally and multilaterally to avoid hostilities (that is, to ensure relationships between states are maintained at least just short of war). The codification of legal principles and protocols

³⁷ Der Derian defines diplomacy as ‘a set of discursive practices mediating human estrangement legitimating some forms of foreign policy discourse while rejecting others as threatening to ordered global interaction’. Der Derian’s theoretical exploration of diplomacy provides an important insight into possible opportunities for addressing what he views as gaps in current diplomatic theory. However, such theoretical discourse is largely unhelpful for the purpose of this examination of public diplomacy within the wider tradition of diplomacy.

³⁸ Gregory notes that a deal of scholarly and academic research into public diplomacy has emerged almost unintentionally as a result of the analysis of events, and through the interest of think-tanks and media in the content of public diplomacy. The same cannot necessarily be said for traditional diplomacy. While scholars such as Der Derian refer to the scarcity of traditional diplomacy theory, there is an argument that traditional diplomacy deliberately developed within the bounds of a state system and agreed historically recognised rules requires no additional theoretical discourse. Der Derian, Craig, Puchala, Sharp and Murray all argue for the expansion and modernising of diplomatic theory to reflect modern practice. Refer to Der Derian, J, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987; G Craig, ‘The Historian and the Study of International Relations’, *American Historical Review*, 88(1), 1983, pp.1-11, D J Puchala, ‘The Pragmatics of International History’, *Mershon International Studies Review*, 39(1) 1995, pp.1-39, P Sharp, ‘For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations’, *International Studies Review*, 1(1) 1999, pp.33-57. For further discussion on the nature of the theoretical work related to public diplomacy refer to N Cull, ‘Public diplomacy before Gullion: the evolution of a phrase’, in *The Routledge Handbook on Public Diplomacy*, Snow and Taylor, (eds), Routledge, NY, 2009; and B Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, University of Leeds, May 2008, pp.274-290.

of diplomatic practice undertaken and finalised in the aftermath of World War Two, and set out within the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) has validated this structured focus on diplomatic practice. The VCDR is recognised today as the cornerstone of diplomatic practice, and provides a ‘complete framework for the establishment, maintenance and termination of diplomatic relations based on consent between independent sovereign states’.³⁹

However, the concepts underpinning traditional diplomacy were well established long before the development and codification of practice via the VCDR. As Berridge states, diplomacy, known in the earliest forms as ‘negotiation’ is ‘an essentially political activity and [when] well resourced and skilful, [is] a major ingredient in power’.⁴⁰ Even before the sovereign state existed, power and power dynamics were a significant concern for distinct and organised groups of people as they sought to interact and transact with each other.⁴¹

Traditional diplomatic practice as it emerged after the Westphalian settlement, remains relevant today as the backbone of the conduct of international interactions.⁴² Premised upon the key features of the primacy of the sovereign state in international relations, and the facilitative role of the envoy and the embassy, traditional diplomacy operates via a system of historically recognised rules and protocols (now codified in international law), based on reciprocity and mutual consent.⁴³

³⁹ E Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, *United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law*, United Nations, New York, 2009, p.3.

⁴⁰ Berridge, *Diplomacy Theory and Practice*, p.1.

⁴¹ Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.3, and Berridge, *Diplomacy Theory and Practice*, p.1.

⁴² The Westphalian settlement of 1648 provides a watershed in marking the origins of traditional diplomatic practice. While only brief attention is paid to the Westphalian traditions further readings on the development and emergence of diplomatic practice are found in Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*, Langman, London; G Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, Dover Publications, Mineola, 1955, and Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*.

⁴³ Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.3, and Berridge, *Diplomacy Theory and Practice*, p.1.

Early records of such diplomatic interactions and transactions drawn upon by Denza in discussion of the foundations of the VCDR illustrate the role of the envoy (also known as the herald or intermediary) as central to the concept of diplomacy, where groups of people sought to interact on a basis ‘other than conquest or subjugation’.⁴⁴ Furthermore the ‘personal inviolability of envoys’ was enshrined as sacrosanct in order to maintain and protect their effect and purpose from as early as the interactions between the cities of Ancient Greece in the fourth and fifth centuries.⁴⁵ Along with the role and immunity afforded to the envoy, a number of other features of diplomacy are likely to have originated from this time, including ‘the dependence on communication by messengers, concept of a mission, where a locally engaged person might also be employed’.⁴⁶ Through these early recordings of diplomatic practice ‘diplomacy remained chiefly in the hands of the special envoys, limited by time and task’.⁴⁷ The nature of the practice was therefore limited and undeveloped, yet still provides us with insight into the foundations for diplomatic practice.

Diplomacy as it is practiced today, is most closely linked to the practices that emerged with the establishment of permanent resident embassies by the states of the Italian peninsula during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.⁴⁸ The nature of the environment and conditions that existed on the Italian peninsula during this time were such to give rise to what is in essence the tradition of diplomatic practice today. For this reason, diplomacy has always been viewed as a distinct product of the fifteenth and sixteenth century European experience.⁴⁹ Europe, and specifically the Italian peninsula at this time was in effect the culture in which the diplomatic organism thrived, and then with time grew in relevance to

⁴⁴ Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.1.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Berridge, *Diplomacy Theory and Practice*, p.2. Berridge and other writers such as Eileen Denza also acknowledge the interactions of the states of ancient India as reflecting the early concepts of diplomacy.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.1.

have application across the interactions of other states outside that culture. Kissinger describes the conduct of diplomacy at this time, as being ‘predicated not on the peace loving nature of states but on their propensity for war, which needed to be discouraged or balanced’.⁵⁰ Kissinger’s view aligns with the picture provided to us by Machiavelli who wrote of the unpredictability of the balance of power and the need for the nobility of the state to remain on their guard because it is ‘when the prince has thought more of ease than of arms, they have lost their state’.⁵¹ Berridge also notes that ‘when it became clear that the rulers of Europe had a common interest in regulating their frequently bellicose ‘foreign’ relations, diplomatic theory acquired an explicitly political flavour’.⁵²

The establishment of the permanent mission or embassy as a lasting feature of diplomacy occurred during this time of significant insecurity on the Peninsula, from the growing numbers of independent sovereign units, and the growing security concerns between them.⁵³ According to Mattingly, ‘under jungle law, the price of survival was incessant alertness. One method of providing for this alertness and countering dangers of constant war was found in the new style of diplomacy’ of the Italian states.⁵⁴ The resident mission was headed by a resident ambassador, a representative selected and vested with the powers of the sending sovereign, and allowed to set up residence with the approval, authority and protection of the receiving or host state. Clear expectations between the sending and hosts states regarding the role and authority of the ambassador, secured the treatment of the ambassador as an

⁵⁰ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.222.

⁵¹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p.111.

⁵² Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p.2. For further insights into the emergence of diplomatic tradition on the Italian peninsula see reading suggested at footnote 204.

⁵³ L Viola, ‘Talking States: A theory of diplomacy’, *Presentation to Comparative Politics Workshop*, University of Chicago, 12 May 2004, p.6.

⁵⁴ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p.50. Further reinforces Hedley Bull’s perspective that diplomacy restores the power balance within an otherwise anarchical system of states, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*, p.8.

accredited official, and his residence as that of a mission. From this point, the structure and protocols of diplomacy gained recognition and approval across states.⁵⁵

By the mid-seventeenth century the permanent missions and ambassadorial representatives were seen as the normal foundation upon which relations between states could occur.

Resident ambassadors were employed within other states of Europe, and a web of reciprocal, bilateral diplomatic exchanges emerged.⁵⁶ The emerging structures and rules of diplomacy were therefore taking hold (within a primarily European, rules-based framework), and as Mattingly notes, 'success now depended less upon the brutal shock of massed force than upon the vigilant and agile politics...the diplomat was needed to supplement the soldier'.⁵⁷

The ceremony and formality of diplomacy carried out by elite envoys and political figures in line with accepted protocols, and within the European state system ensured that diplomacy was carried out in a closed format, at a distance from the general public; such behaviours reinforced 'the remoteness of the ordinary citizen from foreign policy'.⁵⁸ This perspective of diplomacy as a closed system carried out by elites, supported and reaffirmed by the force of an intricate set of rules has become a significant platform of diplomacy that has lasted into recent years.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Denza, 'Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations', p.3.

⁵⁶ Viola, 'Talking States: A theory of diplomacy', p.7. From this time, as Denza notes, writers such as Grotius wrote of the roles and methods of the ambassadors, the agreed and intricate rules regarding the immunity of ambassadors, their families and staff from criminal proceedings, their exception from normal customs and taxes and the inviolability of the embassy premises.

⁵⁷ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p.53.

⁵⁸ K Younger, 'Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy', *International Affairs*, Vol 40, No.1. 1964, p.22.

⁵⁹ As discussed later in this thesis, the concept of closed diplomacy is one of the features challenged by the emergence of public diplomacy.

2.2.1 An inkling of public diplomacy

The concept of closed diplomacy is one that is open to challenge. At the same time that elite rulers and official envoys were negotiating the interests of their respective states behind closed doors, those same rulers and statesmen were also conscious of their image amongst wider audiences, and that of the state on whose behalf they negotiated.⁶⁰ Melissen reminds us that biblical references reinforce the importance of image of the state, and ‘international relations in ancient Greece and Rome, Byzantium and the Italian Renaissance were familiar with diplomatic activity aimed at foreign publics’.⁶¹ Indeed the advent of the printing press was a significant shift in the early practices of image cultivation, with official communications distributed more widely amongst foreign publics. States such as seventeenth century France, and later Turkey (in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire), ensured significant effort was focused on ‘managing their country’s reputation as one of the principal sources of a nation’s power’.⁶² While not labelled public diplomacy, there is a clear link between the activities of the early state system in image cultivation and information provision, and what is seen as public diplomacy today. Herein lie the origins of what has emerged today into public diplomacy.

Similar trends continued into the twentieth century.⁶³ However, the activities associated with public diplomacy through the twentieth century detoured for several decades into the specific area of ‘supplying approved information’, an activity that has been more commonly referred

⁶⁰ Machiavelli, *The Prince*.

⁶¹ Melissen, ‘Between theory and practice’, p.3.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ A compelling challenge was mounted during World War One when United States President, Woodrow Wilson made one of the first modern references to public diplomacy when he called for an ‘international system founded on open covenants of peace, openly arrived at’. For further references regarding early usage of the terminology of public diplomacy refer to Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase’, p.20.

to as propaganda.⁶⁴ For traditionalists such as Berridge, propaganda is synonymous with public diplomacy.⁶⁵ Other scholars more closely aligned to the study of public diplomacy propose that the delineation between propaganda and public diplomacy is a fine, but distinct one.⁶⁶ Propaganda is characterised by negative historical baggage related to the use of propaganda through the Second World War and later through the Cold War.⁶⁷ From these eras, propaganda is understood to reflect manipulation and deceit of publics both domestic and foreign, and as Zaharna notes is ‘perhaps the oldest, and most prominent type of information initiative that political entities use with publics’.⁶⁸ In short, public diplomacy having re-emerged within the modern environment as a credible tool for building upon engagement with foreign audiences has moved beyond the information-based, one-way focus of propaganda. The distinction between the two concepts is important in advancing foreign policy interests in the modern diplomatic environment, and is addressed in more detail later in this thesis.

2.2.2 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

The parameters regarding the formal practice of diplomacy were not formally set out until a Regulation adopted by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.⁶⁹ Yet, it was not until the International Law Commission was established within the United Nations framework, over a

⁶⁴ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p.17.

⁶⁵ Ibid. Berridge further defines public diplomacy from the traditionalist framework noting that public diplomacy is ‘foreign propaganda conducted or orchestrated by diplomats’.

⁶⁶ The delineation between propaganda and public diplomacy is routinely dealt with in writings on contemporary public diplomacy. For example refer to Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, pp.16-19, Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, pp.36-37, Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a spectrum of Public Diplomacy’, pp.89-90.

⁶⁷ Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a spectrum of Public Diplomacy’, p.89 and Melissen, ‘Between theory and practice’, p.17.

⁶⁸ Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a spectrum of Public Diplomacy’, p.89.

⁶⁹ Further codification of immunities and privileges was commenced within the American context via the Havana Convention of 1928.

century later that the task of comprehensive codification of the law of diplomacy in the form of the VCDR was undertaken.⁷⁰

The VCDR is said to be ‘the most successful of the instruments drawn up under the United Nations framework’, primarily because of the significant engagement of state representatives in the development process, but also because of the historical stability of the rules of diplomatic law, and the ‘effectiveness of reciprocity as a sanction against non-compliance’.⁷¹ States continue to be bound by the VCDR today and engage routinely in traditional diplomacy as a matter of course.⁷² The success of the established practice of diplomacy is demonstrated through the adherence to the VCDR, along with the broad representation (by all universally recognised sovereign states) at the United Nations, formalised representation across other states, and through the general investment of states in their diplomatic corps and infrastructure to support the corps.⁷³

The International Law Commission sought to work across states within the United Nations to confirm and codify the agreed rules and practice that had governed diplomatic relations

⁷⁰ Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.1. Established in 1948, the International Law Commission’s mandate is the progressive development and codification of international law, in accordance with article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations. See International Law Commission viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/>. The codification of international law, unlike municipal law is slow moving. The codification of diplomatic and consular law represents a significant achievement, ‘as yet not much has been achieved towards the realisation of the codification of international law’. A Piip, ‘Codification of International Law’, *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, Vol. 168(1), 1933, p.1.

⁷¹ Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.1. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 can be accessed via the United Nations Website viewed on 20 October 2009, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf. The codification of international law, unlike municipal law is slow moving. For the reasons provided the codification of diplomatic and consular law represents a significant international achievement, ‘as yet not much has been achieved towards the realisation of the codification of international law’. A Piip, ‘Codification of International Law’, *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, Vol. 168(1), 1933, p.1.

⁷² For the fulsome discussion of principles of international law including codification and progressive development of international law generally, as well as more specific discussion regarding the evolution, codification and operation of the VCDR and VCCR refer to J Starke, I Shearer, *Starke’s International Law*, 11th ed, Butterworths, London, 1994; and M Shaw, *International Law*, 6th ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008.

⁷³ United Nations Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.un.org.au/>.

between states with some stability over the preceding two hundred years. The negotiation and drafting process began in 1952, and concluded with the agreement of the 81 states to the VCDR at the defining Conference in Vienna in 1961.⁷⁴ The success of the negotiation process, and ultimately adherence to the Convention is, as noted earlier attributed to the fact that the VCDR confirmed established practice and conduct that had remained relatively stable within the European context for some two hundred years.⁷⁵ For example, while some of the practicalities and activities surrounding the establishment of the permanent diplomatic mission has changed somewhat over that time, ‘their basic functions of representing the sending state and protecting its interests and the interests of its nationals, negotiation with the receiving state observing and reporting on the conditions and development there remained and still remain unaltered’.⁷⁶ This certainty of function as a result of consistent and accepted practice appears to be sustained across the field of traditional diplomacy.

The very stability of accepted and agreed practice between states is a key feature of diplomacy. Yet potentially, as noted earlier, the same stability is a source of frustration for those that argue diplomatic theory is lacking. There is little space for theory, particularly around innovations or extensions of practice, when the practice is already highly structured and almost universally accepted. In addition to these key themes of stability and acceptance, is the complementary feature that the entire practice of diplomacy is based on reciprocity and mutual consent between states. In this way, the ‘establishment of permanent missions takes place by mutual consent, every state is both a sending and receiving state’.⁷⁷ As a consequence the opportunity for opposing interests both in the negotiation of the VCDR, but

⁷⁴ International Law Commission: <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/>

⁷⁵ There is value in noting that diplomacy as codified in the VCDR reflects a predominantly European model and is less representative of the practice and conduct of the non-Western world. The exploration of the relevance and emergence of diplomacy in the non-Western world might be an avenue for exploration, but is not a task for this thesis.

⁷⁶ Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.2.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

also in the subsequent implementation of the VCDR by participating states is minimal.⁷⁸ By contrast the potential for acceptance and adherence amongst states is maximised.

2.2.3 Key aspects of the VCDR

The VCDR came into force internationally in 1964 only three years after being adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, upon receipt of the twenty-second ratification. Australia was among those states that signed the VCDR early. Australia was subsequently bound by the obligations established under the VCDR after ratifying the convention in 1968. By this time, Australia had implemented domestic legislation that would give the effect to the international provisions under Australian law.⁷⁹ The VCDR has been ratified by most states party to the United Nations, and is now accepted as universal international law.

The VCDR sets out the agreed nature of practical diplomatic interaction which establishes the foundation for the diplomatic network and diplomatic practice still relevant to diplomatic practice today as the:

- i) functions of diplomatic missions, the formal rules regulating appointments, declarations of *persona non grata* of a diplomat who has in some way given offence, and precedence among heads of missions;
- ii) privileges and immunities that enable diplomatic missions to operate without fear of coercion or harassment through enforcement of local laws, and to communicate securely with their sending governments; and
- iii) requirements for the withdrawal of a mission and for the breach of diplomatic missions which may occur as a result of the serious deterioration in relations between the sending and receiving states.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Specific issues did cause minor friction during the negotiation process, including the use of wireless communication transmitters, the right to return a diplomatic bag unopened should the receiving state raise suspicions about the contents, and the extension of diplomatic privileges and immunities to administrative and technical staff at the mission. However, each of these issues was resolved for the purpose of the VCDR without significant controversy, again pointing to the converging interests of states in diplomatic law. See Denza, *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, p.3.

⁷⁹ The Australian law enacted by the Commonwealth to give effect to the VCDR is the *Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967 (Cth)*. The Act binds all Australian states and territories to comply with Australia's international obligations under the VCDR.

⁸⁰ Denza, 'Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations', p.3.

Quite apart from the practical guidance provided by the VCDR on interactions between states (as noted above), the Article 3 of the VCDR established the functions of the mission and thereby sets out the key aspects of traditional diplomatic practice. These key aspects include:

- i) representation and protection of the interests and nationals of the sending state within the boundaries of the receiving state;
- ii) negotiation with the government of the receiving state; ascertaining the conditions and developments within the receiving state for reporting to the sending state (commonly known today as political or economic reporting); and
- iii) promoting friendly relations between the two states via economic, cultural and scientific exchange.⁸¹

The key features of traditional diplomacy are thereby well established and apparent from reviewing the terms of the VCDR. The VCDR provides a common platform which governs the conduct of official relations between states (both on a bilateral, but also on the multilateral level), that not only *transcends* differences in language, culture, and interests, but *reinforces commonalities* in accepted diplomatic language, channels, culture and interests.⁸² In particular, and as evident from the above list, the VCDR provides a clear mandate and space for public diplomacy to occur as a part of recognised diplomatic practice through the development of relations based on exchange. The exchange aspects of public diplomacy will be discussed in depth at a later stage within this thesis. However, suffice to suggest that these activities remain extremely successful and widely utilised by states in the development of lasting personal relationships outside of official channels. Building upon commonality within the society of states is a well established and necessary feature of all diplomatic practice that has remained unchanged over time.

⁸¹ Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961

http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961

⁸² For more detailed discussion of the VCDR refer to E. Denza, *Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998; and Langhorne, 'The Regulation of Diplomatic Practice: the Beginnings to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961', *Review of International Studies*, 18, pp. 3-17.

2.2.4 The MFA – supporting diplomatic practice

The diplomatic practice and conduct of relations between states that is endorsed via the VCDR does not just occur loosely within the network of embassies and envoys posted across the globe. Such practice is controlled, enabled and monitored through the key structure of the Ministry or Department of Foreign Affairs (generically referred to as the MFA). The MFA generally provides the central diplomatic authority for any state, administers the terms of the VCDR within both the international and domestic contexts, and facilitates the practice of diplomacy by the state. The MFA plays a critical role within the state to develop foreign policy priorities in accordance with the broader domestic political agenda of the day, and to give effect to such policies, primarily through the diplomatic network.⁸³

In light of the basis of diplomacy set out by the VCDR, Hocking provides an appropriate description of traditional diplomacy that applies today, as an activity where ‘the foreign ministry and the national diplomatic systems over which it presides acts as a gatekeeper, monitoring and controlling the interactions between the domestic and international policy environments and funnelling information between them’.⁸⁴ Hocking’s description is sufficiently broad to allow for a public diplomacy activity to develop within the portfolio responsibility of the MFA.

The MFA not only provides the structural and administrative support for the diplomatic network. More importantly, the MFA supports the mechanics of strategic and day-to-day

⁸³ Berridge provides comprehensive detail around the generic detail on the structure of the MFA and diplomatic network as it relates to the practice of traditional diplomacy. See Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, pp.5-20. Other related sources include, J Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office*, Chapman and Hall, London, 1992, B Hocking, (ed) *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1999, C Jonsson and M Hall, ‘Essence of Diplomacy’, *Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations*, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2005. Also, S Harris, *Review of Australia’s Representation Overseas*, AGPS, Canberra, 1986, Evans, *Grant Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*; and Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, for the Australian perspective.

⁸⁴ Hocking, (ed), *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*, p.4.

foreign policy development, including the translation of political policy into foreign policy initiatives, and the negotiation and planning for the delivery and implementation of policy via diplomatic networks.⁸⁵ The internal workings of the MFA reflect the development of priorities over time and are organised into areas of speciality whether based on geographic representations (such as South East Asia, Europe and the Americas) or long more functional lines, such as treaty law, protocol, media or public diplomacy.

2.2.5 Features of Diplomatic practice

From within this structure of the MFA and the corresponding diplomatic network in which states are able to participate on an official basis with the international agenda, an agenda that occurs through both bilateral and multilateral channels. Primarily the work that occurs within this space relates to the initiation of actions or anticipation of and response to developments within the foreign policy space, where those actions or developments have a bearing on the national interest.⁸⁶ As a mechanism for policy development and coordination, the MFA undertakes consultations across the entire bureaucratic structure of government, where issues of foreign policy have relevance to ongoing domestic policy outcomes. The machinations of the bureaucracy and other structures in the development and delivery of policy, and specifically foreign policy are addressed in more detail within chapter four of this thesis.

The central concern of the MFA is the promotion of the national interests of the state, as articulated through foreign policy priorities, and delivered through supporting diplomatic practice. However, there is validity in identifying key themes that drive diplomatic practice, and are therefore reinforced from within the MFA through to the diplomatic networks. There is broad consistency in these themes as discussed both by Berridge, and also from within the

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.64.

Australian context by Evans and Grant and Gyngell and Wesley; all of which remain consistent with the terms of the VCDR as described earlier. As such the key themes include: i) a sense of formality and protocol; ii) the promotion of economic and commercial concerns; and the iii) promotion of public diplomacy activities.

Review of these key themes of diplomacy demonstrates that there is opportunity for public diplomacy activity as an element of diplomatic practice. Firstly, the business of ceremony, formality and attention-paying is 'all important in establishing the parameters for the relationship and laying the ground work for mutual respect between officers'.⁸⁷ This function includes the setting up and maintenance of diplomatic relations, and is a powerful tool that might be wielded to give effect to a significant policy decision. For example, the withdrawal of diplomatic representation by the sending state from the receiving state is a strong statement of dissatisfaction with the relationship. Such withdrawal is usually met with reciprocal action, symbolising the breakdown of official bilateral relations.⁸⁸ Similarly, official communications that occur between states usually through the diplomatic envoys and the MFA will incorporate particular and antiquated language and styles, such as that exhibited in the 'aide memoire'.⁸⁹ The language is frequently excessively flowery and unclear, but still makes up the common form of communication between states. Embassy officials and Ambassadors attend to formality in everyday operations within the receiving state. Such

⁸⁷ Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, p.60.

⁸⁸ As occurred on 4 November 2009 when the Australian High Commissioner to Fiji was declared to be persona non grata and expelled from the country. Within hours, the reciprocal action was taken by the Australian Government and the Fijian High Commissioner similarly expelled. Such action reinforces the foreign policy positions of each of those states. C Merritt and P Walters, 'Fiji expels High Commissioner', *The Australian*, 4 November, 2009.

⁸⁹ For the purpose of diplomatic interaction, an aide memoire refers to a document of memorandum of discussion or proposed agreement. <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=1769&dict=CALD>.

formality is frequently described at length in the memoirs of retiring officials, and provides more entertainment than insight into the value of this aspect of practice.⁹⁰

The second critical theme of practice is the promotion and support of economic and commercial interests. Such practice incorporates both the functions of observing and reporting on economic trends within the receiving state, as well as the negotiation of trade terms including the reduction of tariffs or other forms of protection that might secure improved trade or economic conditions for both states.⁹¹ Frequently, states utilise the bilateral communications to gauge interest in or to build momentum for key initiatives being advanced at the multilateral level. Traditionalists might argue that this is not reflective of the origins of diplomatic practice, where the traditional approach would ‘privilege political transactions and neglect economic transactions’.⁹² However, such suggestions hold little weight. In the modern diplomatic environment, with the clear guidance of the VCDR, this is not the case, and the pursuit of commercial interests forms the mainstay of diplomatic discourse. Indeed, commercial aspects of diplomacy are ‘rudimentary to ancient, modern and contemporary diplomacy’.⁹³

Lastly, as noted in the VCDR, public diplomacy features prominently as a key area of diplomatic practice. Drawing on the established understanding that image cultivation has always been an important element of diplomacy, even traditionalists refer to the practice of

⁹⁰ See for example, R Woolcott, *The Hot Seat, reflections on diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings*, Harper Collins, Sydney, 2003, or R Broinowski, *Driven: A Diplomat’s Autobiography*, Harper Collins, Sydney, 2009.

⁹¹ Economic interests of the state are also a key issue addressed through multilateral fora, such as the World Trade Organisation negotiations. Grant and Evan *Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, p.60.

⁹² D Lee and D Hudson, ‘The Old and New: Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy’, *Review of International Studies*, 30, 2004, pp.343-360.

⁹³ Evidence of the diplomatic practice in Australia would support the recognition that pursuit of positive economic and commercial outcomes have been central to Australia’s diplomatic practice.

diplomacy as incorporating information provision, cultural and educational exchanges.⁹⁴

From the Evans and Grant perspective, the public diplomacy function sits well within the purview of the MFA and the associated diplomatic network and is an established thread that underpins other official diplomatic work.⁹⁵ However, Berridge notes also the role of the generic press and information department – a key bureaucratic structure of the twentieth century diplomatic landscape as being specifically focused on the management of news and media with regard to foreign audiences.⁹⁶ The information department is historically aligned to the production of propaganda materials, as noted earlier, and as discussed through this thesis, is an area from which public diplomacy has developed. However, drawing on the intrinsic and soft power value of public diplomacy activities, Evans and Grant suggest that in the modern diplomatic environment states:

need to be concerned with what other nations think of us for the good reason that the images which others carry of us influence their attitudes towards us – not only in the general sense, but also with regard to our security requirements, to our goods and services, to our appeal as a place to invest in, to migrate to, to visit and so on.⁹⁷

This viewpoint reinforces the early writings of Machiavelli and reinforces Meissen's view, that public diplomacy can be seen as old wine in new bottles.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ For example, Berridge also notes in *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* that public diplomacy is synonymous with propaganda – though this is a view that is not explicitly shared by others including those writing as public diplomacy experts, such as Melissen, Taylor or writing about diplomacy from the Australian perspective such as Evans, Grant, or Gynge, Wesley.

⁹⁵ Evans, Grant, *Australia's foreign relations in the world of the 1990s*, p.66.

⁹⁶ Berridge, *Diplomacy: theory and practice*, p17. Berridge notes that 'the chief task here is to give 'breaking news' the best possible 'spin'.

⁹⁷ Evans, Grant, *Australia's foreign relations in the world of the 1990s*, (1995), p.66.

⁹⁸ Melissen, *Between Theory and Practice*, (2007), p.3.

2.3 Traditions of diplomacy and the Australian experience

With an understanding of the nature, structure and practice of diplomacy, brief attention is required to examine how the traditions of diplomacy have emerged in the Australian landscape. The Department of Trade and Customs, and the Department of External Affairs were established as two of the first seven Commonwealth Government departments at the time of Australian federation.⁹⁹ Historian Peter Edwards, quoted in Gyngell and Wesley indicates that the Department of External Affairs was a minor agency and dealt only with miscellaneous issues under the auspices of the Prime Minister and his department.¹⁰⁰ The Department of Trade and Customs played a more significant and active role in representing Australia's interests, particularly overseas. This imbalance in significance was less a reflection of Australia's commitment to traditional diplomacy, and more a reflection of Australia's continued reliance upon the British Empire for a foreign policy lead during the early years of federation. Additionally, the lesser stature of external affairs also reflects that Australian's foreign representations overseas, even from the earliest years of federation were driven by trade concerns (reflective of Australia's positioning in the world, from federation, and strong reliance on building trade relationships in external markets).¹⁰¹

A significant shift occurred in the Australian bureaucracy when in 1935 the Department of External Affairs gained full administrative authority, according to historian Peter Edwards, this 'was the birth of the present day Department of Foreign Affairs'.¹⁰² By this time:

⁹⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *History of the Department*, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/history.html>.

¹⁰⁰ P.G.Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats: the Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1949*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1983, p.93.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. Refer also to sources cited at footnotes 19 and 20 for further discussion of the development of Australia's independent foreign policy, and the establishment of supporting bureaucratic structures including DFAT and its diplomatic network.

¹⁰² Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats: the making of Australian foreign policy 1901-1949*, p.93.

the growth in Australia's international commitments, the deterioration in the international situation and the increasing interest by Australians in world affairs combined to force a reluctant government to accept that the tiny foreign office at least had to be regarded as a department in its own right.¹⁰³

The Department of Foreign Affairs actively worked for a fifty year span to progress Australia's foreign policies, while the Department of Trade promoted commercial and trade interests separately. Interestingly, as further explained below, for this period in the development of Australia's diplomatic practice, the Department of Foreign Affairs only fully delivered on one of those key aspects of diplomatic practice. That is, the department delivered upon the practice of formality and ceremony (which included the recognition of diplomatic relations and aspects associated with such relations). The business of commercial promotion was carried out by the Department of Trade; and that of public diplomacy activity (primarily information provision), was delivered quite separately by the Australian Information Agency.¹⁰⁴ There was no surprise in the fact that some ninety years after their initial establishment, Australia's Department of Trade merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs in the Machinery of Government changes of 1987.¹⁰⁵ From that time the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Trade have shared the primary responsibilities within the double portfolio.¹⁰⁶

2.3.1 An inkling of public diplomacy in Australia's diplomatic tradition

From quite early in federation Australia had developed an overseas information capacity aligning to some degree with traditional diplomatic practice. However, Australia's public diplomacy capacity, which was information provision at that stage, developed in a way that was fundamentally separate to the structures of traditional diplomacy. For example, the

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ DFAT, *History of the Department*.

¹⁰⁶ Including responsibility for the activities of AusAID and Austrade falling to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Trade respectively. The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) also falls within the purview of the foreign affairs portfolio, but carries out activities that are essentially distinct from but aligned to the activities of diplomacy.

Commonwealth Government's publicity overseas was one of the 'miscellaneous' functions attributed initially to the Department of External Affairs.¹⁰⁷ However, this function of overseas publicity was quickly excised from External Affairs and managed through various incarnations of the Australian Information Service (AIS) for several decades.¹⁰⁸

Importantly, historical evolution reveals a fundamental gap that existed in the way that public diplomacy was delivered within Australia. That is, public diplomacy was largely disconnected from the development and delivery of foreign policy, and delivered from outside the traditional structures of diplomacy. Such a gap is indicative of the difficulties that Australia's public diplomacy program is experiencing today. The information provision activities carried out during this time by the AIS (also referred to as public affairs) were focussed on both foreign and domestic audiences, and through times of war gained a distinctly propaganda feel (that is, the persuasion of audiences through one-way communication from the authority to the public audience (domestic and external)).¹⁰⁹ In some cases the focus of the information was to promote the Australian lifestyle to potential migrants.¹¹⁰ At other times the activities reflected a 'large publicity campaign necessary to

¹⁰⁷ According to the DFAT history of the department, 'external affairs' meant in the first decades of Federation a miscellany of 'overseas' functions such as immigration, off-shore fisheries, exploration of Papua New Guinea and Antarctica, and Commonwealth Government publicity. To be clear, the (then) Department of Territories held responsibility for the administering and handling the affairs of Papua New Guinea until World War II, at which time responsibility was transferred to the Department of External Affairs.

¹⁰⁸ International Public Affairs Network, *Submission to the Senate inquiry into public diplomacy*, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 3 April 2007, p.38.

¹⁰⁹ Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice', p.18. As noted earlier, Zaharna reports that 'propaganda is perhaps the oldest, and most prominent type of information initiative that political entities use with publics'. However the elements of control, deception and manipulation that frequently characterise propaganda weaken the persuasive power of this form of information provision, and separate propaganda from public diplomacy, see Zaharna, 'Mapping out a spectrum of public diplomacy initiatives', p.89. Yet, traditionalists such as Berridge refer to public diplomacy in the contemporary environment as a form of propaganda. The contrast between public diplomacy and propaganda is more specifically addressed in chapter five.

¹¹⁰ Though as Broinowski reports in some cases the portrayal of Australia's egalitarian lifestyle was repelled particularly by Asian audiences who saw the portrayal of an egalitarian life as a terminal servantless condition, where 'besides being the breadwinner the head of the Australian family has to be the gardener, the chauffeur, carpenter and handy man around the house'. At the same time, Broinowski claims that public affairs broadcasts sought to reinforce negative Asian stereotypes to the Australian audience, affirming the racist white Australia policies of the time. Broinowski, *About Face*, pp.124 and 128.

support Australia's war effort'.¹¹¹ In the style of propaganda, the war effort campaign was 'centered principally on increasing and sustaining the people's faith in the cause for which they were fighting, and sought to gain support for the government's security and fundraising activities and distribute 'sound' facts on the war and its progress'.¹¹² In order to carry out the information provision duties, the AIS maintained a linkage to diplomatic structures and a number of specialist journalists or information officers were 'posted overseas across 10 Australian diplomatic missions and posts'.¹¹³

The AIS developed as a specialised agency that engaged in aspects of traditional diplomacy purely via the overseas missions network, but not necessarily through diplomatic activities. Instead the information officers are said to have brought a specific set of journalistic and media qualifications and skills to the corps.¹¹⁴ The divergence was reinforced by the structural divisions between the niche information agency and the traditional arm of diplomacy, then known as the Department of Foreign Affairs. Indeed the following was stated in a 1984 consultancy review of Australia's overseas information service:

AIS is a unique information organisation. The uniqueness results from a capacity to research, obtain and develop and successfully place information in support of Australian interests with overseas print, radio and television media organisations. No other organisation in Australia and few in other countries have these capabilities, and fewer still have the capabilities within an organisation of 150 people.¹¹⁵

As a result, there were shockwaves when in 1987, machinery of government changes integrated Australia's specialised overseas information capability (the AIS) within the newly merged foreign affairs and trade portfolio (from that point known as the Department of

¹¹¹ DFAT, *History of the Department*.

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ International Public Affairs Network, *Submission to the Senate inquiry into public diplomacy*, p.38. Mainstream texts (such as Evans, Grant, and Gyngell, Wesley) that discuss Australian foreign policy or diplomacy rarely connect the work of the information agency to the portfolio responsibilities of external affairs or DFAT providing some insight into the separation of traditional diplomacy and information based activities and purpose.

¹¹⁴ International Public Affairs Network, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into public diplomacy*, p.38.

¹¹⁵ Price Waterhouse review of Australia Information Service referred to in International Public Affairs Network, *Submission to the Senate inquiry into public diplomacy*, p.40.

Foreign Affairs and Trade or DFAT). Despite internal restructures and reshuffling, during the decade of operation within DFAT the International Public Affairs Branch as it was then known carried out a range of information based activities of public diplomacy significance. Indeed, reports provided of some activities indicate that the role of the International Public Affairs Branch was developing during this time beyond pure information provision, and connecting with the broader engagement aspects of modern public diplomacy.

For example, activities which included international campaigns including the campaign launched in 1992 against wild pig hunting in Europe which threatened Australian meat sales, through to a separate campaign against French nuclear testing in the Pacific in the late 1990s both engaged with and influenced foreign audiences in a way that effected international policy changes.¹¹⁶ The activities carried out by the International Public Affairs Branch might be said to be more closely aligned to modern public diplomacy. In conjunction, at about this time the then Foreign Minister, Evans began talking publicly about the role and using the terminology of public diplomacy, particularly within the context of Australia building its image in Asia. In Evans' words, the objective of public diplomacy at this time was to 'shape attitudes in other countries in a way which is favourable to Australian national interests'.¹¹⁷ Consequently, by the 1990s the International Public Affairs Branch, was beginning to take shape. The Branch enjoyed an environment that recognised the value of engaging with audiences beyond the traditional parameters. However, the emerging shape of public diplomacy in Australian practice halted with the change of government in 1996. The International Public Affairs Branch was abolished altogether. The subsequent Howard government established the Images of Australia work unit to continue giving effect to Australia's public diplomacy effort, by allocating the unit the task of projecting a positive

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the world of the 1990s*.

image of Australia.¹¹⁸ However the rhetoric around public diplomacy as an instrument of policy ceased and many specialised staff were abolished, and public diplomacy remained separated from policy activities within the mainstream DFAT, with a seriously reduced budget.¹¹⁹

2.3 Australia's contemporary diplomatic environment

As foreshadowed in the previous chapter, Australia's current diplomatic capacity has come under scrutiny in recent months, sparked by the Lowy Institute's panel report into diplomatic capacity and resources. Today, Australia spends approximately A\$4.4 billion on the development and delivery of foreign policy.¹²⁰ Australia actively pursues foreign policy interests via DFAT, which supports 91 overseas missions across the globe.¹²¹ A total of 542 Australian diplomats are currently posted overseas throughout this network.¹²²

¹¹⁸ DFAT Annual Budget Statements, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008.

¹¹⁹ International Public Affairs Network, *Submission to the Senate inquiry into public diplomacy*, p.40.

¹²⁰ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy', p.17. The Report also notes that this sum of \$4.4 billion equates to just 13 per cent of the \$34 billion currently spent on national security through the combined budgets of the Department of Defence, Australian Security Intelligence Office (ASIO), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Office of National Assessments (ONA).

¹²¹ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy', p.17. The Report provides these numbers based on July 2008 reporting, and notes that the 91 missions comprise 73 embassies and high commissions, 12 consulates-general and consulates and four permanent missions/delegations and two offices.

¹²² Details of the staff attached to missions are set out in the previous chapter. By way of comparison, Evans, Grant note that in 1994 (some 14 years, and two administrations ago), a total of 918 diplomatic staff were posted overseas across 72 missions and 25 consulates-general and consulates. By and large, such statistics provide evidence (albeit superficial) that the key savings in Australia's diplomatic practice has occurred in the number of diplomats supports overseas. Some eight years earlier in 1986 Stuart Harris conducted the Review of Australia's Overseas Representation. In his final report Harris challenged a familiar argument that might be relevant today when comparing numbers of diplomats posted overseas, noting (with implied sarcasm), that 'it is a common argument that changes in the world have reduced the need for overseas representation through resident missions. Developments in communications it is suggested, reduce the needs for resident representation because of speedy alternative sources of communications. Telephones it is argued enable Ministers and home based officials to discuss and negotiate directly and easy plane travel enables Ministers or expert officials to replace Ambassadors in much international negotiations, reducing perhaps...the need for local representatives at all'. However, Harris concluded that despite such developments, the complexity of Australia's bilateral and multilateral relations and the challenges emerging in the environment within which relations are conducted requires more, not fewer diplomats. Evans, Grant add, 'there is no substitute for continuous on the ground contact to pull together shifts in attitudes and policies and to develop the kind of person-to-person understandings upon which analyses [of information] have to be based'. S Harris, Review of Australia's Overseas representation, AGPS, Canberra, 1986 p xv; Evans, Grant, Australia's foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, p.57.

As a moderate economic power with relatively small military clout, Australia actively pursues foreign policy interests through the diplomatic network. In particular, Australian diplomatic practice is aimed ‘at influencing the decisions of other states and persuading those states that actions proposed or supported by Australia are also in their own interest’.¹²³ Australia promotes strong regional engagement, (including though APEC) and comprehensive engagement within the Pacific via regional partnership.¹²⁴ Furthermore, Australia has maintained a strong voice and position within multilateral for a including the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) , and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), primarily as a key player in the Asia Pacific (where such multilateral organisations have developed and retain strong interests).

Australia relies upon the smaller diplomatic network to engage across these networks and pursue the foreign policy agenda in line with traditional diplomatic practice. The Lowy Institute notes that the key aspects of Australia’s diplomatic practice today relate to the:

advocacy of Australian interests to other governments, representing Australia at multilateral meetings and monitoring multilateral agreements that affect our interest, negotiating agreements to implement Australian government policy and collecting, analysing and reporting back to Canberra information relevant to the formulation of Australian foreign policy.¹²⁵

Despite recent concerns aired primarily as a result of the Senate Inquiry, and followed up by the Lowy Institute, the Australian government can point to a well-established tradition of diplomacy as managed through the structure of DFAT. Within this contemporary environment, Australian public diplomacy currently plays only a minor role that clearly

¹²³ Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy’, p.9.

¹²⁴ Regional partnerships including the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), and the Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Arrangements (PACER). S Crean, ‘The Pacific Region: Realising the Potential’, Speech delivered to the PNG Business Council Ministerial Forum, Business Breakfast in Brisbane, 10 June 2009.

¹²⁵ Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy’, p.10.

reflects the traditional practice and priority of information provision, educational and cultural exchange, and remains separate from the policy arena.

CHAPTER 3: CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

In tabling the Final Report to the Australian Parliament regarding the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program, the Senate Committee provided their definition of Australian public diplomacy as, 'work or activities undertaken to *understand, engage and inform individuals and organisations* in other countries in order to *shape their perceptions* in ways that will *promote* Australia's foreign policy goals'.¹ This thesis suggests that the Senate Committee may have undersold public diplomacy to the Australian constituency. The definition provided by the Senate Committee, while bearing some resemblance to the definitions of public diplomacy developed in the United Kingdom and Canada presents inadequacies.²

Firstly, the Senate Committee definition of public diplomacy makes only a tenuous link between public diplomacy and Australia's tradition in diplomacy. The fact that the Senate Committee definition of public diplomacy does not make reference to role of the sovereign state, nor highlight the role of the professional diplomat, nor imply the requirements of strict protocol (the cornerstones of traditional diplomacy), poses no issue. This is because as this thesis suggests, public diplomacy in a contemporary context has stretched beyond these traditional boundaries.³ However, the final phrase, 'to promote...foreign policy goals' presents a passive and superficial picture of public diplomacy. From this phrase public

¹ Australian Senate, *Hansard*, 16 August 2007, p.42. (emphasis added).

² The United Kingdom definition as set out by The Lord Carter Review expresses the more direct role of public diplomacy as being to 'improve the understanding of and influence of the United Kingdom...', and the Canadian definition refers to 'cultivating long term relationships, dialogue and understanding abroad and to underpin advocacy and increase influence'. Refer to the Lord Carter, 'Public Diplomacy Review by Lord Carter', *Presented to the Foreign Secretary of the Treasurer*, London, 13 February 2008, and 'Diplomacy: Canada's International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World', tabled in Parliament, April 2005.

³ Refer to Chapter Two for a more fulsome examination of the traditions of diplomacy. Additionally, Chapter Two, footnote 185 sets out those guiding texts that enable further discussion of traditional diplomacy.

diplomacy might be considered as merely a vehicle for encouragement or advertisement of policies. Such a phrase does not necessarily convey the true ambition and potential of contemporary public diplomacy, that in fact public diplomacy ‘may be formulated in direct support of a foreign policy initiative’.⁴

The aim of this chapter is to examine public diplomacy as an increasingly important element of diplomacy (recognising from the discussion in the previous chapter that the origins of public diplomacy are well established and in fact embedded within the traditions of diplomacy) that may be employed directly in the pursuit of the foreign policy objectives.

The connection between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy is pivotal, because this linkage lends validity to public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. In this way, if strategic policy objectives are at the crux of Australia’s traditional diplomacy structure and efforts, such strategic policy objectives could also be at the crux of public diplomacy efforts.

From this point, public diplomacy might move in from the periphery of Australian diplomatic practice to be incorporated into strategic foreign policy development and delivery.⁵ This point was articulated forcefully in 2009 by Philip Seib, when he wrote that:

public diplomacy diplomats cannot do their job as long as people at the top of government see public diplomacy as primarily a smokescreen for ineffective or wrongheaded policy. The assumption that public diplomacy can move in one direction while policy goes in another shows how little understanding exists of what public diplomacy can and cannot do. As U.S. public diplomats (Edward R. Murrow among them) have long observed, policy making and public diplomacy planning must move forward in tandem.⁶

⁴ Potter, ‘Canada and the new public diplomacy’, p.4. To draw upon the themes presented by Potter, a core theme of this thesis is to establish public diplomacy as a strategic instrument of policy in and of itself, not just a supporting mechanism for traditional diplomatic practice.

⁵ As noted in the previous chapter, public diplomacy sits, literally removed from strategic policy areas, at the periphery of DFAT operations within the Consular, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Division.

⁶ P Seib, ‘Connecting Public Diplomacy and Policy’, *Perspectives*, Vol 1, Issue 5, September 2009. Seib is Professor of Journalism and Public Diplomacy, and Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California and director of University of Southern California Centre on Public Diplomacy supported in connecting public diplomacy to policy by various other works including most specifically Henrikson, ‘What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve’; Djerejian, ‘Changing Minds, Winning Peace’, and Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’.

Acknowledging that the roots of public diplomacy are found in the traditions of diplomacy (and accepted as valid within codified diplomatic law), this thesis further proposes that public diplomacy has emerged in recent years (since 2001) to take on a vastly expanded shape that stretches well beyond the boundaries of traditional diplomacy. In particular, public diplomacy today reflects the innovation of diplomatic practice in response to the complex challenges of the modern environment, and high expectations of the connected and involved public audience. This thesis proposes that public diplomacy fills the void where traditional diplomacy has been revealed as having limited reach, impact or endurance.⁷ With the foundations of public diplomacy established, this chapter will further investigate the critical emerging questions of what is contemporary public diplomacy, and how does it intersect with and extend from traditional diplomacy to advance foreign policy interests in the international system?

There are two important caveats to note in setting the scene for this investigation. Firstly, that this thesis is concerned with public diplomacy as an activity initiated by the state in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. The first caveat is particularly important in understanding public diplomacy in an Australian context, as well as providing the necessary linkage between public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy. This thesis is concerned with public diplomacy efforts that are defined as being driven by the state in the pursuit of national interests (while recognising that broader perspectives exist regarding public diplomacy being generated by a range of non-state entities and individuals).⁸

⁷ For example, those very central tenets of traditional diplomacy and that require interactions between the sovereign states to occur through structured, official and frequently closed channels of communication frequently neglect the complexity of international relations, the increase and role of actors including NGOs and IGOs and a wide range of individuals, the increasing role of communications technology and media.

⁸ For example, Canada's International Policy Statement clearly articulates the expectation that public diplomacy is generated by a range of actors, including, but beyond the state. Research into the Canadian experience of public diplomacy demonstrates that the Canadian Government has taken a significant interest in incorporating public diplomacy as an integrated strand of policy development and delivery. Understanding of and approaches to public diplomacy in the Canadian context are well developed, and Batora's study of public diplomacy in the

Public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy remains within the purview of the state, and is well aligned to traditional diplomacy. This baseline understanding is critical for the purpose of clearly defining public diplomacy and understanding the impact of public diplomacy (as a component of diplomacy) in advancing the national interests of a state in international relations. At the same time, the thesis recognises that non-state entities and individuals make valuable and necessary contribution to evolution, texture and complexity of public diplomacy. The role of such non-state entities as actors in international relations ensures that such entities will also have an interest in public diplomacy activities for their own purposes. As Berridge provides, ‘diplomacy is not merely what professional diplomats do. It is carried out by other officials and by private persons under the direction of officials...it is also carried out through many different channels besides the traditional resident mission’.⁹

The key point for emphasis at this stage is that in discussions of public diplomacy there is a requirement for clarity about how and why public diplomacy is *initiated*, and such clarity emanates from the ‘state’. An approach that clearly and definitively links public diplomacy to the foreign policy objectives of the state is helpful also in distinguishing public diplomacy from the similar, but predominantly commercially-based and potentially superficial disciplines of strategic communications, branding / marketing or public relations.¹⁰ For example, with regard to strategic communication, Nye refers to strategic communications as

Canadian context suggests that Canada’s public diplomacy program has matured beyond that of states still grappling with an understanding of the concept, such as Australia. Refer to Batora, ‘Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium States – Norway and Canada’.

⁹ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p.1.

¹⁰ For references regarding the intersection and distinctions between public diplomacy and public affairs see Melissen, ‘Between Practice and Theory’, and Zarharna, ‘Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives’. Works outlining the concept of nation branding as a concept intersecting with public diplomacy refer to S Anholt, ‘Public Diplomacy and Place Branding: Where’s the Link?’ *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* (2), 2006, and S Anholt, *Brand New Justice*, Butterworth-Heinemann, New York, 2003.

a subset of public diplomacy that takes the form of a long range campaign, and Gregory suggests that ‘public diplomacy and strategic communication are analogous (shaped by other concepts of advocacy, propaganda, branding etc), and states that both terms describe an instrument of statecraft with multiple components and purposes’.¹¹ In relation to the latter point, Australian publications, such as the Lowy Institute’s Blue Ribbon Panel Report on Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit, refers to public diplomacy as ‘strategic communications’. However when addressed during a confidential interview with a senior DFAT official involved in public diplomacy activities, that official presented a different view that ‘public diplomacy is more than strategic communications, but I am not sure how’.¹²

Such clarity of purpose is missing from the Senate Committee’s definition of public diplomacy as provided to the Australian Parliament. For this reason, this thesis is not necessarily limited by the Senate Committee definition, but revisits the discussions around the defining of public diplomacy. Furthermore, the discussions and findings of the Senate Inquiry indicate that the nature, scope and complexity of any state’s public diplomacy program may vary depending upon the understanding and engagement of practitioners, along with the resourcing, and opportunity for expanded networks in support of state activities. In contrast to states such as Norway, Canada, the United States or the United Kingdom where practitioners and academics have been grappling with the issues of public diplomacy for some time, Australia’s program appears somewhat less developed and less mature.¹³ The

¹¹ Nye, *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*, pp. 107-111, and B Gregory, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms’, *Presented to the American Political Science Association Conference on International Conflict and Communication*, 31 August 2005.

¹² Confidential Interview, Senior DFAT Official, 30 June 2009.

¹³ Quite apart from the significant independent reviews that have occurred within the United Kingdom and Canada in recent years, there is a growing body of knowledge developing around the public diplomacy of states such as the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada. This body of knowledge particularly visible through the *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy* series produced by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ demonstrates greater practitioner experience in public diplomacy and subsequent professional maturity shaping the public diplomacy methodologies. Public diplomacy practice in these states evidences high levels of engagement (through consultative mechanisms) with the target audiences utilising innovative and

Senate Inquiry addressed such a wide spectrum of perspectives on public diplomacy theory and practice, that it did not necessarily enhance clarity and understanding for the Australian context. For this reason there is value in unravelling the many threads of public diplomacy, to ensure that at the core of Australia's public diplomacy program the linkage between public diplomacy and foreign policy objectives is clearly established and articulated.

In progressing the second caveat, references to public diplomacy in this thesis, relate to the concept of the 'new public diplomacy' that has emerged within the field of diplomacy since 2001. This caveat recognises that the terminology of 'public diplomacy' is frequently accompanied by historical connotations of the phrase which are more closely related to the propaganda and information programs relevant to the Cold War era. United States public diplomacy scholar Bruce Gregory clearly tells us that the 'historical approach to public diplomacy is too narrow, and no longer fits today's multi-player, multi-issue public diplomacy universe'.¹⁴ Similarly, to provide clarity of terminology, Melissen refers to 'the *new* public diplomacy as relevant to the modern international environment and cautions that: 'it is unhelpful to hang on to past images of diplomacy...nor is it advisable to make a forward projection of historical practices into the present international environment (in the case of equalling public diplomacy to traditional propaganda)'.¹⁵

interactive technologies as well as face-to-face relationship building. For example, refer to: A Henrikson, 'Niche Diplomacy in the World Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway', in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, J Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005; S Rasmussen, 'Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practice'; Batora, 'Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium States - Norway and Canada', and Potter, Canada and the New Public Diplomacy'.

¹⁴ Gregory, 'Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms', p.39.

¹⁵ Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice' p.11. Note also the number of scholars who have taken up Melissen's lead in referring in some way to the 'new' public diplomacy, including Hocking 'Rethinking the new Public Diplomacy'; Snow, 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy'; Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy', Riordan, 'Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: a New Foreign Policy Paradigm'; and Ross, 'Public Diplomacy Comes of Age'.

On the international stage, discussions around the ‘new’ public diplomacy have escalated in recent years, and scholars such as Melissen consider that public diplomacy has re-emerged in the last decade in response to fundamental evolution and changes in the international landscape, and consequently in the conduct of international relations.¹⁶ At the fundamental level of that ‘essential condition of plurality’ such changes include the significant increase in the number of recognised sovereign states (from 51 founding state members of the United Nations in 1945, to 192 recognised state members in 2009), and the subsequent increase in the complexity of the relationships, conventions, protocols and other interventions required to govern those relationships.¹⁷ From a strategic perspective other major shifts in the environment, including the increasingly multilateral and fluid nature of international relations, an emerging global agenda, and the ‘complex interdependence between domestic and foreign policy issues’ have changed the way in which states cast their foreign policy objectives and interact in the pursuit of outcomes.¹⁸

The previous chapter examined the key tenets diplomacy that have developed and emerged over centuries. Whilst there is evidence of significant stability in diplomatic practice deriving from the combined effects of historical practice and clear codified protocols, there is also evidence that diplomatic practice does change depending upon the needs or challenges of the international environment.¹⁹ Evans and Grant commence *Australia’s Foreign Relations in the*

¹⁶ J. Melissen, ‘Introduction’ in *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p.iii.

¹⁷ United Nations member states found at: <http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml>. The United Nations also recognises some 46 Intergovernmental Organisations and 4 international entities which maintain permanent headquarters attached to the United Nations. The United Nations Secretariat currently administers 500 major multilateral conventions (of the 158,000 treaties currently contained in the United Nations Secretariat collection). Refer also to Watson, *The Dialogue Between States*, p.15, and to the previous chapter two of this thesis for further discussion on the essential condition of plurality and interdependence in diplomacy.

¹⁸ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p.iii.

¹⁹ This is particularly evident in the way that diplomatic practice has evolved to accept and define the role of inter-governmental organisations and non government organisations particularly operating within the multilateral context. One significant example of this is the fact that international organisations have received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, and to maintain permanent offices at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. As Lane notes, ‘foreign policy

World of the 1990s by noting a dominant idea that, ‘in international relations, change is the only constant’.²⁰ Melissen picks up on this well understood theme and applies it to the nature of diplomacy arguing that ‘confronted with change in many forms, diplomacy itself must be inherently adaptive and elastic’.²¹ Melissen continues that such inherent characteristics of innovation go to the heart of diplomacy itself. In particular, Melissen draws upon the statements of George Kennan made at the time the Cold War, that ‘the function of a system of international relationships, is not to inhibit the process of change by imposing a legal straightjacket upon it, but rather to facilitate it...But this [facilitation] is a task for diplomacy in the most old fashioned sense of the word’.²² Melissen concludes that if diplomacy is about the management and facilitation of international relations in a changing environment, then diplomacy must be firmly aligned to and supportive of adaptation and innovation.²³

Based on Melissen’s approach, public diplomacy has emerged to extend beyond the parameters of traditional diplomacy. Public diplomacy offers the diplomat more choice and greater scope in opportunity to utilise alternative structures, processes and channels to engage with a broader audience while still ‘serving strategic foreign policy goals’.²⁴ In Leonard’s view, public diplomacy is becoming increasingly relevant as ‘enabling’ tool of diplomacy, providing pathways that might complement (or even circumvent) the traditional pathways for advancing foreign policy priorities.²⁵ This is particularly the case, as states grapple with the

..involves an array of government and non government actors and networks which require new ways of managing international politics’, in Lane, *Diplomacy Today*.

²⁰ Evans, Grant, *Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s*, p.3.

²¹ Melissen, (ed), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p.xix.

²² Kennan quoted in Melissen (ed): *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p.xix.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p. 9.

²⁵ Leonard, *Diplomacy by Other Means*.

changing nature of international relations, and pursue national interests in an ‘ever more globalised and interdependent world’.²⁶

The sphere of diplomacy is changing in response to the organic needs of the international stage and the actors who are actively engaged in it. The review of traditional diplomacy theory and practice undertaken in the previous chapter reveals that the accepted boundaries, structures, and conventions of traditional diplomacy continue to be relevant and provide the foundation for the ordered conduct of international relations between nation-states in pursuit of foreign policy goals. However, such review also reveals that in a changing and increasingly competitive international arena, there are emerging opportunities for innovations in traditional diplomacy to emerge. At this point the discussion around public diplomacy, an increasingly valuable subset of diplomatic practice that operates outside of the norms of traditional diplomacy, or as phrased by Leonard, ‘diplomacy by other means’, takes centre stage.²⁷

Tuch suggests that public diplomacy ‘does not in any sense replace the discreet and confidential relationships between state representatives’.²⁸ As public diplomacy scholar Melissen adds, ‘it is indeed important... not to overstate the importance of public diplomacy’.²⁹ However, public diplomacy is taking on a place of significance in diplomatic practice and method, and arguably underpins, or sits alongside traditional diplomatic activities. Fiske de Gouveia asserts, ‘effective public diplomacy can only complement traditional diplomacy – it ‘paves the way for traditional diplomacy: it lays the groundwork,

²⁶ Evans, ‘Australia’s Foreign Policy Response to Global Challenges’, p.1. Evans’ statement draws the fine line balancing realism and interdependence in the world of diplomacy.

²⁷ Leonard, *Diplomacy by Other Means*.

²⁸ Tuch, *Communicating with the World: US public diplomacy overseas*, p.3.

²⁹ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.12.

like a sapper'.³⁰ This statement reinforces that public diplomacy is more than a crisis management or damage control response, and sets the scene for an ongoing role for public diplomacy in building lasting relationships with foreign publics upon which traditional diplomatic practice is overlaid.³¹

3.1 Understanding the public diplomacy environment

Before advancing to the definition of contemporary public diplomacy, the thesis seeks to understand firstly the modern landscape in which public diplomacy has re-emerged, and continues to develop. The working environment plays a significant role in identifying the nature of the innovations made to diplomatic practice through public diplomacy, and in understanding the parameters that sit somewhat loosely around it. The emergence of public diplomacy can be mapped to significant features of the changing global environment, such as the increasing role and influence of non-state actors (including highly informed and active individuals) in enabling foreign policy, prodded on by the impact of significant and unexpected international events, like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States.³² As an example, the latter event created shock waves through the political, academic and diplomatic communities across the globe, and thrust public diplomacy into the

³⁰ Fiske de Gouveia, 'The Present and Future of Public Diplomacy'.

³¹ Note in the Introduction, commentary on Australia's response to the Indian student crisis categorised such a response as the 'damage control' pointing to a potential hole in the underlying Australian-Indian relationship. Refer to: Wesley, 'Australia's Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia', p.1; Healey and Trounson, 'Moves to Safeguard Indian Students'; News.com, 'Australia Assumes Safety of Indian Students', *Australian Associated Press Online*; and Banham and Gilmore, 'Rudd Forms Indian Violence Taskforce'.

³² For example, Snow reports that 'in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. Government emphasised a new strategy in public diplomacy designed to get out more and better coordinated information about the U.S. response to the attacks. This was followed by a further change in direction to focus on aspects of common values in engaging with the Moslem world. Snow, 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy', p7. Melissen also notes that 'between 9/11 and the outbreak of the war in Iraq, public diplomacy was without a doubt the hottest item in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.' He further notes that from the broader perspective, while public diplomacy had been on the agenda well before 9/11, the events of that day provided an 'important trigger for the present debate on public diplomacy throughout the global community'. J. Melissen (ed), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, pp.xvii-xix.

international arena for discussion and debate.³³ As if in response to such an event, over the past decade states such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, China and New Zealand reviewed and restructured their approach to public diplomacy, and while resulting in different approaches and methods, such reviews have also further contributed to the learnings and body of knowledge relating to the practice of public diplomacy.³⁴

While there are quite differing perspectives on the definition and practice of public diplomacy, key contemporary commentators on the topic, including Melissen, Sharp, Fiske de Gouveia, Batora and Leonard make similar references to the key environmental features or shifts which have sparked the forceful re-emergence and relevance of public diplomacy.³⁵ The literature relevant to public diplomacy, that has been produced by each of these scholars generally springboards from this point. For this reason, this chapter must also reflect upon the environmental and other external factors which have created the tipping point for public diplomacy to take on greater significance as a strand of diplomatic practice, alongside official or traditional diplomacy. These environmental and other external factors can be categorised as follows to include the:

- i) highly connected, inter-dependent environment in which foreign and domestic policy weave in and out of each other, and both exert influence in the conduct of international relations;

³³ Both Melissen and Hocking comment on the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the discourse on public diplomacy (while noting that the United States experience should not distract from the observation that many countries became interested in public diplomacy before 9/11 and for very different reasons'. Refer to J. Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', pp6-10, and B. Hocking 'Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy', pp.28-33; S. Riordan, 'Dialogue Based Public Diplomacy', and P. Taylor, 'Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications'. For each of these writers, September 11 2001 is a key, but not necessarily dominating theme regarding the shift in public diplomacy practice.

³⁴ See for example, *Public Diplomacy Review* by Lord Carter, presented to the Foreign Secretary of the Treasurer on 13 December 2005, UK Government, *Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy*, March 2002, Diplomacy: Canada's International Policy Statement, 'A Role of Pride and Influence in the World', tabled in parliament, April 2005, United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005, p.2. Government Administration Office, 'U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges', September 2003,

³⁵ For example, Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', pp3-10.

- ii) increased influence and relevance of a web of non-state actors in advancing (or derailing) strategic state-based foreign policy interests;
- iii) impact of key events (including the September 11 terrorist attacks); and
- iv) the increasing interest in and influence of individuals (via public opinion) in achieving foreign policy outcomes.

Each of these factors is highly relevant both to the re-emergence, but also to the ongoing evolution of public diplomacy, and requires further attention.

3.1.1 A highly connected interdependent environment

The international environment has been transformed over the last two decades by dual impacts of ‘globalization - the integration of peoples, societies, and economies - and information technologies that now link nations, cultures, and societies in complex and unprecedented ways’.³⁶ With a slightly different slant on the current environment, UK diplomacy expert, Leonard writes about factors such as the ‘spread of democracy, the media explosion, the rise of global NGOs and protest movements as key factors behind the growing importance of public diplomacy.’³⁷ Similarly, Leonard draws on the words of German bureaucrat Schleger as pointing to the impact of the ‘global media and information society, in which billions of people worldwide witness events in real time via the electronic media, where states are competing more than ever for markets, investment, tourists, value systems and political influence’, as the major impetus for renewed international interest in public diplomacy.³⁸ Schleger observes that ‘as a result of electronic and digital media incorporating radio, television, the internet, a wider public has to – and can be addressed’.³⁹

³⁶ C Ross, ‘The Pillars of Public Diplomacy, Grappling with International Public Opinion’, *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 25 (2) - Summer 2003, p.1.

³⁷ M Leonard with Sneed and Stewing, *Public Diplomacy*, The Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2002, p.95.

³⁸ Schleger, ‘German Public Diplomacy’.

³⁹ Ibid.

More importantly, media and information advances since the 1990s have created a web of information and news services that link publics across the globe on a range of issues of domestic and foreign policy importance. Batora describes this environment as a ‘complex information-intensive global environment in which international crises play out directly into domestic political debates of nations and domestic issues are debated by foreign audiences’.⁴⁰ Today audiences on a mass scale across the globe are connected to ‘round the clock’ information and data streams. Domestic and foreign policy events or activities are no longer distinctly separated from each other, but as Batora describes, have become interconnected and play out to a broader, more highly connected audience. Melissen surmises, that ‘public diplomacy above all thrives in highly interdependent regions, between countries that are linked by multiple transnational relationships, and therefore a substantial degree of ‘interconnectedness’ between their civil societies’.⁴¹ In this way, public diplomacy activities move easily between the layers of audiences and can adapt to the many channels of communication in a way that traditional diplomacy cannot.

3.1.2 A web of non-state actors

Within this interconnected world, journalists, private individuals, think-tanks, activists, academics and school students all participate in global debate and discussion surrounding international events. Much of the discussion around the changing international environment points to the increasing role of non-state entities in international relations. Non-state entities including NGOs, have led the way in engaging with and influencing foreign audiences on issues of domestic and foreign policy concern. For example, organisations such as Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC)

⁴⁰ Batora, ‘Public diplomacy in small and medium sized states: Norway and Canada’, p.1.

⁴¹ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.10.

rely upon their ability to engage with foreign publics using smart technology, convey powerful messages, persuading large scale action by individuals which is ultimately aimed at changing government policy outcomes.⁴² Additionally, rogue states, or terrorist groups like Al Qaeda have also become adept at spreading key messages through their expansive networks by utilising global networks connected via media channels and new technologies, including the internet.⁴³

For the purpose of this study, the discussion of public diplomacy is confined to those activities generated by the state to engage foreign audiences in the pursuit of national policy goals. However, it is important that both scholars and practitioners discuss public diplomacy from an expanded viewpoint and including the broader range of activities carried out by state and non state entities to engage with and influence foreign audiences in such pursuit. This may be a reflection of the maturity of public diplomacy programs operating within the state. The approach taken in this study reflects a state-initiated public diplomacy program more relevant at this point in time, to the Australian context. In particular, the increase in the role of non-government organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (some of which may have quasi-diplomatic status in some countries, (such as the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Australia), in international relations has stretched the boundaries of diplomatic practice. As Leonard notes:

NGOs have access to networks of activists, experts, and foreign politicians - and they know how to marshal those networks to exert pressure in a given policy area. No diplomatic mission possesses, or

⁴² Hocking, 'Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy', pp.30-31; Henrikson, 'Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Norway and Canada', p.70. Also Interview, Mr Greg Vickery, President, Australian Red Cross, 26 May 2009; and Interview, Mr Chris Lamb, Special Adviser, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 13 May, 2009.

⁴³ P Sharp, 'Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy', in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005, pp.117-121.

would wish to possess, the capability to organize street demonstrations, nor are diplomats well positioned to coordinate sustained lobbying campaigns.⁴⁴

NGOs and other entities weave in and out of the public diplomacy spectrum at any stage without the same constraints on practice as apply to state entities such as DFAT. These non-state entities can initiate a range of public diplomacy activities, with or without the goodwill of the state, coordinate the public diplomacy response, or deliver the message or activity into the community.

Importantly NGOs can offer to both the domestic and foreign public audience key qualities of credibility, expertise and appropriate networks, and in doing so can at times exercise greater influence over a public that may be sceptical of its government. Public audiences frequently trust organisations such as the Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies or Amnesty International, even where scepticism of the government regime is high.⁴⁵ These NGOs are effective in undertaking highly sensitive work (that might include humanitarian relief, family tracing or assisting and visiting detainees in hostile or conflict situations) because of these very qualities. Increasingly, governments are recognising the place of NGOs in the development and delivery of domestic public policy, and even formalising the level of connectivity through the development of high level agreements or protocols through the Compact model.⁴⁶ These formalised and sweeping connections, while popular in the

⁴⁴ Leonard, 'Diplomacy by Other Means', *Philip Taylor's Website*, The Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=7&paper=1062>.

⁴⁵ While not all NGOs will live up to the reputation proposed in this thesis, particularly that they might be trusted more than governments, many do. For example, the adherence by the ICRC broadly, and national red cross or red crescent societies to key principles such as independence, impartiality and neutrality can and does impact significantly upon the access the NGO might be granted to political prisoners / detainees or conflict territories in order to administer appropriate assistance and conduct normal functions. Similarly, such adherence is critical to the perceived credibility of the organisations and consequently to the trust that the public might place in their work or comment. Interview, G Vickery, President, Australian Red Cross, 27 May 2009.

⁴⁶ The Compact model – establishing a formalised partnership between government and the NGO (or Third Sector) has been developed and implemented with success in the United Kingdom, Canada and Scotland. Australia is progressing the negotiation of a national Compact at present.

delivery of domestic policy, have not been replicated as such in the foreign policy sphere, yet there are clear opportunities for the development of partnerships between state and NGO actors under the public diplomacy umbrella.

The vast numbers of people who live overseas away from their country of birth, as a part of their nation's 'diaspora' is also of relevance to the significance to the web of public diplomacy actors. Diasporas make up the 'living link' connecting virtually every nation state in the world. This largely untapped resource (which is estimated in the case of Australia to amount to some one million people), operates under the radar for much of the time, cultivating important personal relationships, usually in the local language within the host state that ultimately can link in to trade and security interests, and influence foreign public perspectives about the home state.⁴⁷ MacAulay makes the key point that the unique narrative of each individual member of a diaspora is relevant. As she notes, 'the overall effects of large-scale movements such as migration and transnationalism, tend to overwhelm the person unless they are encountered "one story, one memory at a time"'.⁴⁸ MacAulay's exploration of the individual narratives that make up diasporas strikes at the core of the craft that is public diplomacy. As a "living link", a diaspora therefore comprises individuals, each bringing a unique story, particularly in relation to their land of origin. The understanding of this notion of diaspora is vital to enable meaningful engagement.

⁴⁷ Leonard, 'Diplomacy by Other Means'.

⁴⁸ S MacAulay, 'Diaspora by degree: narrative and performance in interviews of expatriates from Wanganui', *The Journal of American Folklore*, Vol 117(465), p.2. For further reading on diaspora refer to S Castles, A Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*, Macmillan, London, 2000; and M Fullilove, C Flutter, 'Diaspora: the world wide web of Australians', *Lowy Institute Paper* No. 4., Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2004.

The general view expressed through the Senate Inquiry was that Australia's diaspora is 'far-flung, influential and well-disposed'.⁴⁹ According to Wells, 'so much of people's impressions and understanding of Australian values and the Australian way of life come from person to person engagement...it is our expatriate diaspora which is working with industry offshore, that is doing that engagement on the ground'.⁵⁰ While the Committee noted DFAT maintains contact with a number of expatriates living and working overseas through the Embassy network, the contact is usually ad hoc and fragmented, and driven by specific events.⁵¹ However, the Senate Inquiry revealed that there is no central or systemic approach in place to proactively leverage the perspectives, networks and intelligence of the Australian diaspora.⁵² The Senate Committee referred through their Report to a 2004 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee which noted: ... 'expatriate Australians represent an under-utilised resource. Not only are they an asset in terms of promoting Australia and its social economic and cultural interests; they are also ambassadors for our nation, which is otherwise disadvantaged by our geographic remoteness and small population'.⁵³ The findings of the Senate Inquiry in relation to diaspora reflected similar findings of the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee which had examined the issue of the Australian diaspora some three years earlier. Essentially both Inquiries recognise that such a diaspora is a major element in Australia's public diplomacy kit bag. A potential opportunity exists to leverage the 'personal networks and influence held by many Australian expatriates in their respective industries and fields of endeavour abroad, for the purpose of supporting or even progressing strategic national interests'.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.135.

⁵⁰ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March, 2007, p.25.

⁵¹ Each of the Australian Embassy websites advertises coming events of interest to the diaspora. Refer to

⁵² Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image*, p.137.

⁵³ Ibid, p.135.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.140.

3.1.3 The impact of key events

While it is widely acknowledged that transformations in global communications and information have changed the international landscape, the events and aftermath of September 11, 2001 played an important role in bringing public diplomacy to the fore as ‘the hottest topic under discussion in the world’s diplomatic services’.⁵⁵ Specifically, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and subsequent media coverage and public engagement that followed, known generally as the ‘CNN effect’, brought attention to the instantaneous global reach and impact that worldwide media and digital communications can have on relations between states.⁵⁶ Importantly, CNN and other media attention simply focused the international spotlight onto public diplomacy, but it should be noted that contemporary public diplomacy itself was already in existence.⁵⁷

For UK academic Brian Hocking, the events and media rush following September 11, 2001 highlighted public diplomacy activities like never before in diplomatic, media and academic circles.⁵⁸ Melissen agrees that September 11, 2001 was an important trigger for the present debate around the new public diplomacy throughout the global diplomatic community.

However, he notes that the United States’ experience and rhetoric does not necessarily reflect the approach of other states, and cautions his audience not to apply too strong an emphasis on the United States’ experience post September 2001, because for ‘many countries it was not the beginning’.⁵⁹ Instead, the role of the media in engaging foreign and domestic publics in the official responses to September 11 heightened awareness of the emerging role of public diplomacy in navigating and achieving strategic outcomes in a changing international environment.

⁵⁵ Melissen, J, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.9.

⁵⁶ Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, p.30.

⁵⁷ Also known under various guises such as the ‘new public diplomacy’ or ‘new diplomacy’.

⁵⁸ Melissen, (ed), *The New Public Diplomacy - Soft Power in International Relations*, p.xvii.

⁵⁹ Melissen, (ed), ‘Introduction’, *The New Public Diplomacy - soft power in international relation*, p.xiv.

3.1.4 The increasing influence of foreign and domestic publics

The ‘global information-intensive’ environment sets the scene within which public diplomacy is acquiring a new prominence. Many scholars such as Melissen refer to the ‘new public diplomacy’ acknowledging that the world is a very different place today, and public diplomacy takes on a different shape than in earlier decades. As United States Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs asserts, the ‘new world is a marketplace of ideas’.⁶⁰ In this vein, Melissen acknowledges that ‘In an era in which it has become increasingly important to influence world opinion, domestic and international communication with the public has become an increasingly complex challenge for foreign ministries’.⁶¹ Therefore, Melissen concludes ‘foreign publics now matter to practitioners in a way that was unthinkable as little as twenty five years ago’.⁶²

The public in all parts of the world make up an increasingly information hungry, and technologically savvy consumer group. These consumer stakeholders, whether they comprise the domestic or foreign public audience, are increasingly informed about and interested in the impact of policy on their lives, shifting what has traditionally been a state-based power balance in international relations to include a range of non-state actors, structures and processes. This is a dynamic that has not gone unnoticed by the well known expert in power dynamics, Joseph Nye as he notes, the ‘information revolution and globalisation are shrinking the world...’.⁶³

Additionally, in the age of information technology, most individuals making up the bloc of foreign publics are linked into the world on a 24 hour cycle via smart, portable technology

⁶⁰ J Glassman, ‘Public Diplomacy 2.0 – A new Approach to Public Engagement’, speech to New America Foundation, Washington, DC, 1 December, 2008

⁶¹ Melissen, ‘Introduction’, *The New Public Diplomacy- soft power in international relations*, p.31.

⁶² Ibid, p.xvii.

⁶³ Nye, *Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.30.

modes. For example, in 2007 Reuters reported that ‘global mobile phone use had topped 3.25 billion with demand surging in China, Africa and India’.⁶⁴ As an indication of the accelerated pace with which technologies are being taken up worldwide, the report noted that while it ‘took over twenty years to connect the first one billion mobile phone subscribers, it took just forty months to reach the two billion milestone’.⁶⁵ The point to note is that overwhelming numbers of individuals from ‘African farmers, to Chinese factory workers and Brazilian slum dwellers’ are connecting into the world via new forms of technology each minute.⁶⁶ As Kubalija notes in his study of the impact of IT on diplomatic practice, ‘the last decade has brought us growing applications of information technology, in all areas of human existence’, which because of ‘lower costs, increased performance power and ease of use, have made the use of IT an affordable and functional tool that will alter the way most people live and work’.⁶⁷ Given the advancements made in the IT field, even the most simple technology not only allows the individual to connect to and receive information through internet and news feeds, but to respond and contribute to the local or global policy debate including through the increased use of opinion polls. The portability and convenience of new technologies means that this can occur at practically any location, and any time.

Nye is joined by public diplomacy scholars such as Hocking who suggest that the accumulated input and opinion of the public marketplace can and does exert a weighty influence on the development and pursuit of foreign policy, ‘individuals and groups, empowered by the resources provided by the ITC [information technology and

⁶⁴ K Ridley, *Global mobile phone use to hit record 3.25 billion*, Reuters, 27 June 2007. Found at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSL2712199720070627>

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ J Kubalija, ‘Diplomacy in the Information Technology Age’, in J. Melissen (ed), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, MacMillan Press, London, 1998, p.xx.

communications] revolution – and particularly by the internet – are direct participants in shaping international policy’.⁶⁸

The increasing role of foreign publics and other non state actors in international relations is a trend that challenges the traditional institutions of diplomacy. The methods of traditional diplomacy simply do not accommodate the weighty influence of public opinion. Indeed, as will be discussed further, traditional diplomacy methods tend to bypass the public audience completely. As Hocking suggests, ‘all of these developments offer the opportunity for the redefinition of public diplomacy in terms of *an active role for publics* rather than as passive objects of government foreign policy strategies’.⁶⁹ While the concept of image cultivation in public diplomacy has been in existence alongside traditional diplomacy for centuries, public diplomacy in effect has only recently emerged from the ‘periphery’ as an important instrument for nations looking to engage with foreign publics and non-government organisations in this changed environment in pursuit of national interests. As Leonard surmises, ‘public diplomacy can no longer be seen as an add-on to the rest of diplomacy - it must be seen as a central activity that is played out across many dimensions and with many partners’.⁷⁰

As Sharp notes, as a result of September 2001, ‘governments will have to conduct more public diplomacy and become better at it’.⁷¹ To be competitive, and maintain and progress security and economic interests, governments are now communicating and engaging more

⁶⁸ Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, p.31.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.30. The significant role of non government actors, including publics from around the world working with the Canadian and other governments to drive unprecedented international agreement on the banning of antipersonnel landmines, known as the ‘Ottawa Process’, and manifested in the signing of the ‘Ottawa Convention’ in 1999 is an important example of the influence that can be wielded by actors outside the state, including individuals. For further discussion of the Ottawa discussion in relation to public diplomacy refer to Henrikson, ‘Niche diplomacy in the public arena: Canada and Norway’, pp.76-77.

⁷⁰ Leonard, *Diplomacy by Other Means*.

⁷¹ Sharp, ‘Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy’, p.xvii.

broadly than ever, beyond traditional diplomatic exchanges with foreign public audiences, for strategic outcomes. It is in this environment, where ‘communication of ideas and information, arguably has become a powerful form of action’, that Henrikson argues that ‘the public diplomacy factor can make a difference’. ⁷²

Adding weight to the importance of the role of public diplomacy is that public diplomacy has been clearly linked to the popular though elusive concept of ‘soft power’ initially introduced into policy discussions by United States academic, Joseph Nye in 1990.⁷³ Nye himself notes that public diplomacy plays an important role in ‘shaping the preferences’ of others to achieve desired outcomes, including in foreign policy.⁷⁴ While the intersection between public diplomacy and soft power will receive further attention in this thesis, what is clear is that international academics and diplomacy practitioners agree that foreign publics now matter to practitioners of diplomacy in a complex way that was unthinkable as little as 25 years ago.⁷⁵

3.2 Public diplomacy relevance to cultural divides

Adding to the growing discussion about the changing international environment, and challenges faced by modern diplomacy, scholars such as Huntington, Leonard, Small and Rose point to the emergence of deeper cultural divides that challenge the boundaries of the state based system, and the structures and processes of traditional diplomacy in the twenty-first century. For this reason, changes in the international landscape cannot be discussed without at least brief attention in the first instance to Huntington’s theory of the Clash of Civilisations. At the time the theory was published in 1993, the Clash of Civilisations

⁷² Henrikson, ‘What can Public Diplomacy Achieve’, p.2.

⁷³ Nye introduced the concept in 1990 in *Bound to Lead*, and returned to the theme later in 2001 in *The Paradox of American Power*.

⁷⁴ Nye, *Soft Power - the Means to Success in World Politics*.

⁷⁵ Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, pxvii.

represented a significant shift in thinking about foreign policy and the international stage in the post-Cold war period.

The concept articulated by Huntington has been expanded upon through the more contemporary study of the relevance of public diplomacy in an 'age of schisms' by United Kingdom foreign policy experts Leonard, Small and Rose.⁷⁶ The two similarly argued concepts, relating to the underlying themes of cultural identity as a basis for new areas of commonality and division between populations, lend validity to the increasing role and relevance of public diplomacy in addressing foreign policy goals in a chaotic, complex and less predictable world.

Huntington argued in 1993 that 'the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural'.⁷⁷ In his view the clash of civilisations represented a progression in international relations away from economic or ideological divides, towards new culturally based divisions between civilisations or 'cultural entities', posing a new challenge to the relevance of the sovereign state, traditional state-based boundaries and traditional diplomatic responses.⁷⁸ His analysis focused on the ultimate impact such divisions might have on the concept of the nation state. In Huntington's view, the nation state, as the cornerstone of traditional diplomacy and international relations, was weakened in the face of this new challenge.⁷⁹ Huntington provides several intertwined reasons for the progression

⁷⁶ M Leonard, A Small, M Rose, 'British public diplomacy in the 'Age of Schisms'', *Counterpoint*, February 2005.

⁷⁷ S Huntington, 'Clash of Civilisations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Summer, 1993. Huntington expanded upon the concept of a 'clash of civilizations' first used by his peer, B Lewis, a British-American historian and political commentator who first used the phrase in an article 'The Roots of Muslim Rage' which was published in the September 1990 edition of *The Atlantic Monthly*.

⁷⁸ S. Huntington, 'Clash of Civilisations?'.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

towards the clash in civilisations, several of which align to the changes in the environmental landscape already observed in this chapter, including the:

- i) increased interaction and movement of peoples across nation state boundaries, intensifying civilian consciousness and awareness of the differences between and commonalities that bind civilizations;
- ii) impact of modernisation and globalisation in weakening the identity of the nation state, and providing the opportunity for a re-emergence of religious fundamentalism as a basis for affirming identity;
- iii) emergence and reaffirmation of non-Western civilisations, with a focus on values and culture, responding to and challenging the values and mass culture of the Western civilization; and
- iv) effect of economic regionalism aligning trade partnerships to cultural identity.⁸⁰

While Huntington does not dismiss the role of the nation state in international relations, he argues that the importance of the nation state will diminish, and foreshadows that the new fault lines based on cultural identity may result in incompatible demands, both at the ‘micro-level between adjacent groups clashing over territory; and at the macro level as civilisations compete over the top of nation states for economic, political power and to promote their values and identity.’⁸¹

The more recent work of Leonard, Small and Rose translated and extended the Huntington argument, to the post September 11, 2001 environment. Where Huntington’s work established the concept and significance or relevance of the cultural divide, the work of Leonard, Small and Rose not only supports the notion that ‘cultural factors underlie many of the divides that have recently become important in policy-making’, but provides an analysis of the nature of the divides.⁸² By doing so, Leonard, Small and Rose identify ‘a series of global schisms’ that define the international stage from the start of the twenty-first century.⁸³ By broadly categorising the key cultural schisms or divides under the three heads of

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Leonard, Small, Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’’, p.8.

⁸³ Leonard, Small, Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’’, p.4.

political/cultural, religious/cultural and economic/cultural divides, the trio note that they represent not only divides at a diplomatic level, but more importantly for the discussion of public diplomacy, divides that can incite ‘clashes between publics, where public opinion for the first time in many years is shaping and pressurising foreign policy decisions’.⁸⁴ The September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the long standing United States-led ‘war against terror’, the 2003 Bali bombings, the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict and the internal violence between the Chinese government and Xinjiang province provide a sampling of contemporary international events that might be classified according to the cultural divide theory. In each case, there is value in noting both the increased interest and opinion of foreign audiences in the outcomes, and the growing challenges to the impact and reach of traditional diplomacy.

Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilisations has attracted voluminous and widespread criticism from intellectual leaders and across disciplines worldwide.⁸⁵ For example, a range of critics characterise Huntington’s theory as an oversimplified explanation that lacks sufficient rigour in the definition of civilizations, assumes conflict where it does not necessarily exist, neglects the internal fractures and tensions that split cultural groups from within, and diminish the importance of shared values or dynamism of culture within an interdependent world.⁸⁶ Much of this criticism could be equally applied to the Leonard, Small

⁸⁴ Ibid. The three heads of divide are spit further into six specific areas of tension: i) Political/Cultural: power-based order vs rule based order, realpolitik vs liberal internationalism, ii) Religious/Cultural: traditionalism vs liberalism, faith-based vs secular government, and iii) Economic/Cultural: power vs powerlessness, pro-globalisation vs anti-globalisation. In some instances, these divides reflect the contrast traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy.

⁸⁵ According to Wikipedia, ‘Clash of Civilizations?’ Attracted the largest response of any article published in Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁶ Leonard, Small, and Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’. As noted Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis attracted wide criticism such as: A Sen, *Identity and Violence: The illusion of destiny (Issues of Our Time)*, W.W. Norton, New York, 2006; P Berman, *Terror and Liberalism*, W.W. Norton, New York, 2003; and E Said, ‘The Clash of Ignorance’, *The Nation*, 22 October 2001, p.3. Higgott and Nossal caution against the use of ‘dichotomous [“Western” or “Eastern”] labels as [being] too closely associated with Samuel Huntington’s shonky “clash of civilizations” thesis. R Higgott and K Nossal, ‘Odd man in, odd man

and Rose approach. However, despite the valid criticisms, the theories of Huntington, Leonard, Small and Rose expose the deeper complexities within the international environment that are owned and driven by the broad public constituencies and not necessarily the officials or the elites. The analysis of such complexities, as provided by these scholars reinforces the value of public diplomacy activities that extend the reach of foreign policy interests to the wider public audience, where traditional diplomatic efforts are limited.

3.3 Public diplomacy responding to a challenging environment

International discussions regarding public diplomacy have emerged with renewed vigour, providing diplomatic options for meeting the challenges of the current international environment. As already noted, the recent focus surrounding public diplomacy in international conversations is quick to distinguish the new public diplomacy from historical connotations (though the reminder is made that public diplomacy is nearly ‘as old as diplomacy itself’).⁸⁷ Recent discussions reveal that the concept of public diplomacy is not static, nor it is viewed through a single lens – differing thematic and national interest angles impact on the look and feel of public diplomacy for different audiences. For this reason, the study of public diplomacy policy and practice must engage in establishing some parameters around the definition and scope of the subject. There is value in examining not only the parameters around public diplomacy in the contemporary environment, but also in exploring how and why public diplomacy has evolved in recent years to take on increasing significance for an array of small, medium and large states from Australia, Norway, Canada through to the

out: Australia’s luminal position in Asia revisited – a reply to Ann Capling’, *The Pacific Review*, Vol.21(5), December 2008, p.627. See also K Nossal, ‘Throwing out the baby with the bathwater? Huntington’s “kin-country” thesis and Australian-Canadian relations’, in *Shaping Nations: Constitutionalism, and Society in Australia and Canada*, University of Ottawa Press, Cardinal, L, and Headon, D, (eds), Ottawa, pp.167-81, accessed on 9 April 2010 at: <http://post.queensu.ca/~nossalk/papers/Nossal_2002_Kin_Country.pdf>

⁸⁷ In particular, Melissen tracks the origins of public diplomacy back to the diplomatic activity aimed at foreign publics carried out in ancient Greece and Rome. However, he points to the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century as a turning point for official communications by states with foreign publics. Melissen, ed, *The New Public Diplomacy - Soft Power in International Relations*, p.xvii.

United Kingdom, China and the United States of America - all pursuing their national interests on the international stage. The rapid evolution and importance of public diplomacy represents a significant transformation in the way that both nation-states and non-state actors are carrying out contemporary diplomatic activities in order to win influence, prestige and strategic benefits within a globalised 'mass market' environment.

3.3.1 Defining public diplomacy

The Senate Inquiry process highlighted the difficulties that are encountered in pinning the concept of public diplomacy to a fixed definition. In practice, public diplomacy continues to evolve. Unlike traditional diplomacy which for Berridge, is founded in strong tradition, custom and ritual, public diplomacy reflects an organic response to the more complex and multi-dimensional transaction-based world in which the role of state and non-state actors and individuals are entwined, and domestic and foreign policy debate is blurred. The points of intersection and divergence between public and traditional diplomacy are also relevant to the exercise of defining public diplomacy. However, before these points can be further examined, it is useful to start with an overview of the definitions of public diplomacy as they provide a frame of reference for further discussion.

In the simplest terms, Potter defines 'public diplomacy as the effort by the government of one nation to *influence* the public or elite opinion of another nation for the purpose of turning the policy of the target nation to its advantage'.⁸⁸ Potter indicates that his definition draws upon that of Hans Tuch who describes public diplomacy as '...a government's process of *communicating* with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current

⁸⁸ Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy', p.3.

policies'.⁸⁹ The emphasis is placed on the key words 'influence' and 'communicate' used in these early definitions of public diplomacy. Both these words are indicative of *one-way contact*, that being context or information provided from the government (or state), and received by the publics. In this format, the emphasis tends to attach to the message itself, as it is communicated, and little attention is given to the way in which the message is received, or impact it might have on the recipient.

Fiske de Gouveia engages with a definitional format similar to that provided by Potter and Tuch, though some years later, leading into a more comprehensive description of public diplomacy encompassing, 'the many and varied activities conducted by governments to *engage* and communicate with foreign publics'.⁹⁰ He takes this definition further by asserting the rationale behind public diplomacy 'is generally to influence attitudes towards that government's country, so as to encourage tourism, and inward investment and to facilitate closer political ties'.⁹¹ Sharp extends this idea of engagement asserting that public diplomacy is 'the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented'.⁹² Each of these later definitions, while similar in format, reflect a subtle extension in thinking and practice around public diplomacy from one-way to two-way exchange, where both government and publics contribute to the process and outcome. There is a significant difference in this two-way format of public diplomacy (as opposed to the one-way variety), because it requires that more attention be given to the way that messages are received, the impact the message has and response that the message might evoke from the recipient. The ability of states to engage

⁸⁹ Hans Tuch quoted in Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy', p.3. Hans Tuch is the author of *Communicating with the World: US public diplomacy overseas*, which published in 1990 provided the earlier descriptions of and perspectives on the new public diplomacy as it relates to a modern environment.

⁹⁰ Fiske de Gouveia, 'The Future of Public Diplomacy'.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Sharp, 'Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy', p.106.

in the two-way format is an indication of whether the state has a well developed approach to public diplomacy.⁹³

A number of states considered to be leaders in the field of public diplomacy continue to review and revise their articulated statements regarding public diplomacy and by doing so contribute to the expanding international discussion to define public diplomacy. For example, in 2005, the Lord Carter Review of the United Kingdom's public diplomacy program identified that previous definitions of public diplomacy had been deficient in 'explaining what public diplomacy seeks to achieve and why'.⁹⁴ The Lord Carter Review then defined public diplomacy as 'work aiming to inform and engage individuals and organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for the United Kingdom in a manner consistent with the governmental medium and long term goals'.⁹⁵ The United Kingdom definition, which pins public diplomacy to strategic government priorities remains current in guiding the work of the United Kingdom Public Diplomacy Board.⁹⁶

Also during 2005, Canada released its International Policy Statement describing public diplomacy as being 'about projecting a coherent and influential voice to all those who have influence within a society – not just within its government.'⁹⁷ The Canadian policy statement goes further to note the important role played by government as well as a range of non state actors, including individuals, in carrying out public diplomacy to 'cultivate long term relationships, dialogue and understanding abroad and to underpin advocacy and increase

⁹³ Canada is known to engage in strong dialogue with both foreign and domestic publics – through innovative modes of communication. By contrast, the Senate Inquiry demonstrated that Australia's public diplomacy program has remained more closely attuned to the one-way format of public diplomacy.

⁹⁴ UK Public Diplomacy Review by Lord Carter, *Presented to the Foreign Secretary of the Treasurer*, 13 December 2005, p.8.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p.8.

⁹⁶ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building our Image', p.10.

⁹⁷ Canadian Government, 'Diplomacy: Canada's International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World', *Report to Parliament*, April 2005.

influence’.⁹⁸ The explicit inclusion non-state actors and Canadian individuals as initiators of public diplomacy indicates that Canada is further developed in the understanding of and engagement with public diplomacy as a strategic instrument. In 2006, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) following a review of its own public diplomacy statements, noted that the overall goal of the United States public diplomacy effort was to, ‘understand, inform, engage and influence the attitudes and behaviour of global audiences in ways that support the United States strategic efforts’.⁹⁹

Through the Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program, the Senate Committee drew upon key elements of each of these key definitions. From them, the Senate Committee agreed to the broad view of Australian public diplomacy, reported to parliament as, ‘work or activities undertaken to *understand, engage and inform individuals and organisations* in other countries in order to *shape their perceptions* in ways that will *promote* Australia’s foreign policy goals’.¹⁰⁰ The Committee definition appears to draw on the approach adopted in the early 1990s by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans who noted that public diplomacy as relevant to Australia ‘is the shaping of attitudes in other countries in a way which is favourable to our national interests’.¹⁰¹ However, through further analysis of public diplomacy in the Australian context, this thesis suggests that both the Evans definition and the subsequent Senate Committee definition overestimate the Australian government’s understanding of and engagement with the concepts of public diplomacy.

Developments in the public diplomacy approaches of states occur incrementally, with layers

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ United States General Accounting Office, ‘U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges’ Testimony before the Subcommittee on Science, Departments of State, Justice and Commerce, and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2006, p.4. accessed at: < <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06707t.pdf> on 19 October 2009.

¹⁰⁰ Australian Senate, *Hansard*, 16 August 2007, p.42. (emphasis added).

¹⁰¹ G Evans, ‘Australia and Asia: Role of Public Diplomacy’, address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade to the Australia-Asia Association, Melbourne, 15 March 1990.

of complexity building upon foundations of understanding. If the foundations of understanding are absent, there is little strategic value to be derived from the layers of complexity. The responsibility of this thesis is to enable more fulsome discussion of the foundations of public diplomacy, so as to enhance the development and implementation of Australian public diplomacy programs.

3.3.2 Unravelling the definitions of public diplomacy

Each of the definitions discussed to this point reinforce the consistent and key messages being delivered through international literature, that public diplomacy operates as an extension of traditional diplomacy, and involves an extensive cast of government and non-government actors and public audiences. In various ways, each definition reaffirms the move towards two-way exchange with a broad range of actors, and the need to tie public diplomacy activities more closely to strategic interests. Most specifically, by introducing the element of ‘understanding’, the United States statement (reflected in the Australian statement) links public diplomacy into research and evaluation, not previously built in to public diplomacy definitions, (critical to guide strategy development and delivery).

While there are consistencies across each of these definitions, there are also deficiencies and gaps in each interpretation, further demonstrating the fluid nature of the terminology itself. For example, Melissen cautions that the existing definitions of public diplomacy are of little help in clearly distinguishing public diplomacy from the related, but separate concepts in international communications including propaganda, public affairs/relations and nation-branding. In many cases, the definitions may highlight similar themes, yet the underlying principles and resulting outcomes may be vastly different. The distinction between each of these concepts deserves attention and will be addressed within the context of public diplomacy as strategic policy in the following chapter.

Additionally, while Fiske de Gouveia provides a comprehensive, yet succinct definition, evidence today points to the increasingly important role played by both state and non-state actors in the development and delivery of a country's public diplomacy efforts, where 'the roles and responsibilities of actors in international relations are no longer clearly delineated, and most actors are not nearly as much in control as they would like to be'.¹⁰² From this it may be suggested that in developing a framework for public diplomacy, governments must understand their role, but also that of external non-government actors. The role of government and non government actors in public diplomacy within state-centric nations such as China, will differ greatly to the role of government in a liberal democracy, such as the United Kingdom or Australia.

Where China's public diplomacy program is more closely controlled through state-owned instruments, governments operating within a liberal democracy are well placed to take on more of a strategic and coordination role engaging non-government actors, as well as maintaining a delivery role through the diplomatic networks.¹⁰³ Moreover, as previously noted NGOs including the ICRC, Greenpeace and Amnesty International have demonstrated that they are adept at influencing foreign publics, and joining forces with each other and with governments to do so. The Ottawa Process, a campaign initiated to ban the use of antipersonnel landmines in the 1990s, already referenced in this thesis provides a clear example of the influence held by non state actors working in concert to mobilising popular support and change international law and policy via the Ottawa Convention 1997.¹⁰⁴ The collaborative activities of the NGOs, individuals and the Canadian Government in broad

¹⁰² Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', p.106.

¹⁰³ d'Hooghe, 'Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China', in Melissen, J, (ed), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave, NY, 2005, p.97.

¹⁰⁴ Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', p.12.

based advocacy and consensus building among publics for the purpose of influencing international policy and enabling the Ottawa Convention is a clear example of public diplomacy at work.¹⁰⁵

The growing collection of literature and dialogue on public diplomacy reaffirms that public diplomacy represents a dynamic area of international policy and practice. Because of this dynamism, scholars such as Gregory have expressed concerns (similar to those expressed by Melissen), that from an academic perspective, public diplomacy lacks credibility.¹⁰⁶ Gregory points to a range of factors including the fluid nature of public diplomacy, the wide gap separating academic analysis and practitioner-based discussions around public diplomacy, and the consequent lack of rigorous academic research supporting policy and practice developments, as contributing to a lack of consensus around the analytical boundaries of public diplomacy, undermining its credibility as a field of diplomatic theory and practice.¹⁰⁷

Gregory asserts that ‘there is no common approach or established method around public diplomacy, rather ‘interests, values, identities, memories and geostrategic contexts shape both public diplomacy scope and practice’.¹⁰⁸ Melissen agrees that public diplomacy cannot be defined or characterised by a ‘one size fits all model’.¹⁰⁹ For example, the United States’ recent perspective and practice of public diplomacy has been preoccupied with and shaped by

¹⁰⁵ As noted previously, such activity of NGOs and citizens in areas previously reserved as the domain of traditional diplomacy has been referred to as the ‘new diplomacy’. However, this ‘new diplomacy’ has been subsumed by consistent discussion of the broad discussion of ‘public diplomacy’. For example, when providing examples of public diplomacy at work former Canadian diplomat and diplomacy expert Darryl Copeland, refers to the Ottawa example as a case in point. D Copeland, ‘Guerrilla Diplomacy’, Presentation to the Griffith Asia Institute, Brisbane, 30 March 2010.

¹⁰⁶ The distinction here must be noted between the perspectives of public diplomacy as an academic field, vis a vis public diplomacy practice. Gregory’s concern regarding the lack of academic credibility behind public diplomacy does not necessarily reflect on the practice of public diplomacy.

¹⁰⁷ At the time of publishing the article ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, Gregory was the Director of the Public Diplomacy Institute and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Media and Public Affairs and George Washington University, United States of America.

¹⁰⁸ Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, p.274.

¹⁰⁹ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’.

its ideologically driven political response to the terrorist attacks on September 2001, through a 'war on ideas'.¹¹⁰ By contrast, the European perspective generally reflects a more subtle approach to consolidating identities and projecting a brand, to improving economic activities and outcomes.¹¹¹ The Australian perspective on public diplomacy appears to be within the early stages of development, maintaining a strong reliance on media responses and standard gala events (such as the appearance by the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra at the Australian Consulate in Milan).¹¹² There is flexibility within the domain of public diplomacy for different objectives involving an array of states and non-state actors depending upon the strategic or national interests and political priorities in place. This argument also reveals the dynamic nature of public diplomacy as an instrument of strategic policy. While scholars such as Gregory find the very fluid and organic nature of public diplomacy to be a frustration in establishing the underpinning theoretical boundaries, there is also opportunity to apply a broad framework that enables creative public diplomacy approaches that better fit the multi-issue, multi-layer modern public diplomacy environment.¹¹³

3.3.3 Public diplomacy vis a vis traditional diplomacy

Having discussed in a broad sense, the parameters around public diplomacy today, it is timely to review the boundaries that separate public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy. Such a discussion around the consistencies and inconsistencies between public and traditional

¹¹⁰ Foreign Press Centre Briefing with J. K. Glassman, Under Secretary, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, *State's Glassman briefs on Public Diplomacy, War on Ideas*, The Washington Foreign Press Centre, Washington D.C., 15 July 2008.

¹¹¹ Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice'.

¹¹² Interview, Robyn Archer, High Profile Australian artist and International Festival Director, 22 November 2007. Archer's statements are backed up by the example (also noted in Chapter Four), provided by an official from the City of Melbourne Council participating as a witness in the Senate Inquiry. The official noted that incorporating cultural elements (including a performance by the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra) into negotiations between the City of Melbourne and the City of Milan 'provided the consulate-general with very high level access into the city of Milan that they were not able to get just by struggling through the normal diplomatic channels. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March 2007, p.20.

¹¹³ Gregory, 'Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms', *Presentation to the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict*, George Washington University, August 2005, p.38.

diplomacy also provides a convenient method of establishing the key elements of public diplomacy more closely. Gyngell and Wensley remind us that, in a broad sense, diplomacy is the tool used to implement foreign policy: a means to an end; where ‘foreign policy is that dimension of the public policy that deals with the outside world aimed at creating an international environment conducive to the nation’s interest’.¹¹⁴ Batora further describes traditional diplomacy as ‘a set of norms and rules regulating relations between states’.¹¹⁵ He elaborates on this distinction by noting that, ‘diplomacy is traditionally carried out by diplomats, according to institutionalised professional standards and habits’.¹¹⁶ This latter definition in particular conveys the sense of strict control and formality that are entrenched in and inseparable from the theory and practice of traditional diplomacy.

Many definitions take the relationship between public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy as their launching point. Dating back to the 1960s, an early Murrow Centre publication attempts to distinguish public diplomacy as a field that:

...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations *beyond traditional diplomacy*; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.¹¹⁷

The Murrow Centre’s approach to defining public diplomacy as an extension of traditional diplomacy continues to underpin the common approach today. Where traditional diplomacy revolves around strict government to government relations and the direct efforts of the state to influence the activities of another state; public diplomacy generally refers to the more subtle, fluid and complex interactions that extend beyond government, aimed at influencing

¹¹⁴ Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.9.

¹¹⁵ Batora, ‘Public diplomacy in small and medium sized states: Norway and Canada’, p.2.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p.3.

¹¹⁷ ‘Origins of Public Diplomacy’, Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm#origins> – emphasis in original.

an information savy, connected and globalised public. Australia's former Foreign Affairs Minister, Gareth Evans elaborated on this point of difference through his comments to a public conference in 1990, by noting '...traditional diplomacy seeks to influence the influential. Public diplomacy too reaches out to the decision-makers and opinion-formers, but also casts its net much wider, beyond the influential few to the "uninvolved many".¹¹⁸ This point regarding public diplomacy's extended audience (a notable deficiency in Fiske de Gouveia definition), is picked up by Leonard and Small as the defining characteristic of public diplomacy, where 'the major difference between public and traditional diplomacy is that public diplomacy involves a much broader group of people on both sides, and a broader set of interests that go beyond the government of the day'.¹¹⁹

In taking this approach, it must be noted that the conduct of traditional diplomacy is strictly and vertically bound by international treaties, conventions and protocols, and is carried out at an official level between governments, through appointed and recognised diplomatic staff. For example, the VCDR 1961 recognises the requirements of formal diplomatic relations between states and 'confers not just diplomatic privileges and immunities upon the members of diplomatic missions (including consular officials), but also certain limiting expectations regarding their activity in the host country'.¹²⁰ Article 41 of the VCDR notes the requirement that all 'official business' entrusted to the mission 'be conducted with or through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving state or such other Ministry as may be agreed'.¹²¹ While Article 3 of the VCDR also alludes to the practice of public diplomacy through the 'promotion of friendly relations between states via economic, cultural and scientific

¹¹⁸ Evans, Speech to the Australian-Asia Association, also found in Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the 1990s*, p.67.

¹¹⁹ Batora, 'Public diplomacy in small and medium sized states: Norway and Canada', p.3.

¹²⁰ Article 111, *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* 1961, Henrikson, 'What can Public Diplomacy Achieve?', pp.7-8.

¹²¹ Article 41, *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, 1961.

exchange', such practice would traditionally have occurred within the traditional structures and channels allowed under the treaty.¹²² However, public diplomacy as practiced today has moved beyond such structures and channels, and must be differentiated from traditional practice. Public diplomacy practice today occurs well outside such official structure, and engages a broad audience of foreign publics through channels other than official lines of communication. Contemporary public diplomacy operates outside the regulation of the VCDR, and without placing limits on the persons involved or their activities. This is where the deviations between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy are most evident.

Where traditional diplomacy operates within an official bureaucratic framework public diplomacy operates through 'actions, relationships, images, and words; and usually across three defined timeframes: 24/7 news streams, medium range campaigns on high value policies, and long term engagement'.¹²³ As supported by Wolf and Rosen, 'Public diplomacy relates to the attitudes and behaviours of publics, whereas official diplomacy relates to the attitudes and policies of governments.'¹²⁴ The language and transactional framework of traditional diplomacy has developed over time with the intent to ensure outcomes in a controlled, easily understood and linear format. International scholar, Taylor summarises that 'public diplomacy encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another;...and the processes of intercultural communications.'¹²⁵

¹²² Article 3, *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961*.

¹²³ Gregory, 'Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field', p.276.

¹²⁴ Wolf, Jnr and Rosen, 'Public Diplomacy: How to think about and improve it', p.2.

¹²⁵ P Taylor, 'What is Public Diplomacy?' The Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, United Kingdom, 2006, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.ics.leeds.ac>>

Nonetheless, there are also significant areas of common ground binding traditional and public diplomacy. Indeed, Gregory continues to expand upon the key features of public diplomacy which include the ‘*understanding of cultures, attitudes and behaviour; building and managing relationships; and influencing opinions and actions to advance national interests and values*’.¹²⁶ Each of these key features can be equally applied in a discussion of the theory and practice of traditional diplomacy. Central to the role of diplomacy (traditional and public) is its purpose, to exert influence over the policies, dispositions, and actions of other states in the interests of national interest, usually defined by states in terms of their security and prosperity. Where traditional diplomacy operates through official and direct channels, public diplomacy seeks to exert indirect influence on other states via the broad public audience and through non-official channels, ‘notably the press and other media of mass communication, such as the internet, along with specialised networks ranging from student and cultural exchanges, business connections, scholarly associations, diasporic relationships’.¹²⁷

The fact that public diplomacy activities are about influencing, albeit by different means than traditional diplomacy, other governments for the purpose of advancing national interests, means that public diplomacy falls squarely within the scope of diplomacy. To pick up on the Gyngell and Wesley ‘toolbox’ analogy referred to previously, public diplomacy can be described as sitting alongside traditional diplomacy: ‘an indispensable tool in the toolbox of international diplomacy and politics: that effectively can and does place a country at an advantage in advancing its national interests’.¹²⁸ In view of the changing global environment, the stakeholders and range of interests at stake in international relations, it is reasonable to surmise that public diplomacy is a necessary strategic response instrument in the diplomat’s toolbox, addressing those gaps where traditional diplomacy cannot reach.

¹²⁶ Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, p.276.

¹²⁷ Henrikson, ‘What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?’, p.8.

¹²⁸ Schlegeter, ‘Public Diplomacy and the Media’ p. 21.

DFAT asserts in its submission to the Senate Inquiry that, ‘public diplomacy has become a standard arm of statecraft’.¹²⁹ This is an important point of intersection which supports the growing recognition afforded to public diplomacy practice and policy.

3.4 Australia’s diplomatic response to the changing environment

Australia’s diplomatic approach to the world in recent decades has been shaped primarily in response to the tensions arising and vulnerabilities of the Australian geographic location within the Asia Pacific and a Western/European cultural disposition. In terms of physical size, economic activity, access to natural resources, military and aid budgets, Australia is a significant nation, but ‘is not of itself a major economic or military power beyond its immediate neighbourhood’.¹³⁰ With one foot in the Western and European Others Group for the purposes of United Nations voting, and another toggled between the Asia Pacific in the pursuit of regional trade liberalisation, and the Commonwealth satisfying an unusual reverence of colonial heritage, Australia experiences difficulty in establishing a natural geopolitical position. There are tensions that cross each of these levels. In exploring his clash of civilizations theory, Huntington makes special note of Australia’s situation, noting that Australia is a ‘country torn between its Western civilizational heritage and its growing economic engagement with Asia’.¹³¹ As a result, for much of the past century, Australia has had to take responsibility for the pursuit and protection of its own interests, and a strong diplomatic tradition has been at the centre of such an approach.¹³²

¹²⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program*, April 2007, p.8.

¹³⁰ Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our instruments of international policy’, p.9.

¹³¹ Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilizations?’.

¹³² Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy’, p.9.

Australia's international policy has been and continues to be characterised by the broad consensus that 'Australia should engage actively with the world'.¹³³ Indeed, Australia has overall:

sought to influence the decisions of other states – particularly traditional allies and countries in our region – in directions conducive to the Australian national interest. We have done this mostly by persuading those states that actions proposed or supported by Australia are also in their interests.¹³⁴

That is, Australia has successfully given effect to international policy through active diplomatic engagement within the immediate neighbourhood and with the rest of the world. Although, the political alignment and thrust of the governing administrations has had a heavy influence on the methods of (diplomatic) engagement employed. According to Australian commentators David Martin Jones and Andrea Benvenuti, 'a change of federal government regularly provokes significant shifts both with regional governments and with great and powerful friends beyond'.¹³⁵ Although despite the differences in approach between government administrations and political leaders, there have been consistent threads weaving through Australia's international policy program. These threads pull together as the close connection between foreign and trade policy objectives, a strong reliance upon Australia's alliance with the United States, a continued focus on Australian engagement with the Asia Pacific region and a substantial aid program.¹³⁶

The reality of Australia's geographic, economic and cultural position, has posed significant challenges in determining the method of Australia's diplomatic engagement. Australian practitioners have teetered towards public diplomacy responses at times in order to give effect to particular objectives. Under the (then Minister for Foreign Affairs), Gareth Evans,

¹³³ Martin Jones and Benvenuti, 'Tradition, myth and the dilemma of Australian foreign policy', p.105.

¹³⁴ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy', p.9.

¹³⁵ Martin Jones and Benvenuti, 'Tradition, Myth and the Dilemma of Australian Foreign Policy', p.105.

¹³⁶ Kelly, 'Howard's decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal'.

Australian diplomatic practice of the 1980s and 1990s became concerned with ‘what other nations think of us – for the good reason that the images that others carry of us influence their attitudes towards us’.¹³⁷ By encouraging diplomats to cast their nets much wider towards the ‘uninvolved many’, Evans clearly articulated a role for public diplomacy in Australian diplomatic practice, and was perhaps ahead of his time in doing so.¹³⁸ Evans approach at the time appeared to have been centred upon mechanisms such as the ABC and the use of media broadcasts (radio, film and television)¹³⁹, as well as strategic campaigns¹⁴⁰, and symbolic gestures to convey positive, benign and constructive images of Australia to publics across the globe, so that they ‘might adopt a generally positive attitude towards Australia’.¹⁴¹ Through his approach, Evans provided a platform for both traditional and public diplomacy and Australian practitioners at this time actively progressed both to realise foreign policy objectives of good international citizenship, and engagement in the Asia Pacific region.

The emerging focus on and understanding of public diplomacy fostered by Evans was diminished under the subsequent regime. Howard’s pragmatic traditionalist approach built concrete outcomes in international policy primarily through bilateral economic and security agreements.¹⁴² Indeed, in contrast to the Evans approach, foreign policy under the Howard regime was characterised as reactive and ad hoc, based on Howard’s view that ‘there is little to be gained from trying to influence the direction in which international affairs is moving, rather one is better served by adapting to issues as they emerge’.¹⁴³ Employing in the first

¹³⁷ Evans, Grant, *Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990’s*, p.66.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Television series and soap operas such as *Return to Eden* and *Neighbours* and films such as *Crocodile Dundee* and *Strictly Ballroom* have been cited by Evans as examples of such public diplomacy. Evans and Grant, ‘Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s’, p.67.

¹⁴⁰ Including popular and successful campaigns such as *Come and Say G’day* 1984-1990, and *Celebrating Australia* 1993.

¹⁴¹ Evans, Grant, *Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990’s*, p.67.

¹⁴² Kelly, ‘Howards decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal’.

¹⁴³ N Bisley, ‘Advancing the national interest in a globalised world, *Lowy Institute Perspectives*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, NSW, February 2007, p.4. Although Foreign Minister Downer’s strong personal

instance traditional diplomacy (and military force in some instances), Howard progressed key bilateral and regional foreign policy initiatives. However, while Howard displayed no overt commitment to public diplomacy, his approach to foreign policy may have been in some instances propped up by the lasting effects of public diplomacy initiated under his predecessor, as well as that which occurred almost unintentionally as Australia's humanitarian disaster relief response to areas affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26 December 2004. Furthermore, Howard always maintained a close eye on domestic public opinion. Bisley argues that Howard more than any other political leader shaped his foreign policy via domestic political considerations and electoral calculations.¹⁴⁴ As proposed in the subsequent chapter such an attention to and garnering of domestic public opinion as a consolidation strategy is a form of public diplomacy.

Since his take-up of the political leadership in 2007, Prime Minister Rudd has dominated Australia's foreign policy agenda. Rudd employs rhetoric and aspirations with a strong public diplomacy flavour (including speaking to Chinese audiences in their own language). His agenda has renewed Australia's interest and engagement in multilateral systems, and re-established a role for Australia in shaping international outcomes based upon previous traits of good international citizenship. To achieve this agenda, Rudd has embraced the language of creative and collaborative diplomacy and regional community building and has set an ambitious agenda for the Australian diplomatic service. As Allan Gyngell states, Rudd's strategy 'requires extensive coalition building and a diplomacy with a global reach', which can be outside the boundaries of traditional diplomacy, and brings public diplomacy to the

interest in the arts sparked an effort to revive Australia's cultural diplomacy activity, under the auspices of the Australian International Cultural Council, the impact of which it might be argued was felt only at the margins of diplomatic practice.

¹⁴⁴ Bisley 'Advancing the national interest in a globalised world, p.4.

centre of practice.¹⁴⁵ Yet the substantial budget reallocations and cuts from the DFAT budget along with the removal of diplomatic positions and consolidation of missions, continues a trend of eroding DFAT resources that jeopardises the future of strategic public diplomacy in Australia.¹⁴⁶

3.4.1 Australia in the Asia-Pacific – a case for public diplomacy

Australia's diplomatic approach to the Asia Pacific region deserves attention, in particular in terms of whether the environment has been and will continue to be responsive to public diplomacy practice. Being a torn country in Huntington's view of the world, would suggest that Australia would need to consider the Australian cultural identity in approaching the Asia Pacific region within which it is located. Huntington (might even) suggest redefinition of the Australian cultural identity is required. The redefinition of national identity does not occur easily or quickly, and while Australia continues to look to regional engagement mechanisms such as APEC, or ASEAN + 3 as a means of maintaining strong linkages with close neighbours, full cultural redefinition remains incongruent with Australian traditional and current foreign policy positioning.¹⁴⁷ More importantly there is little evidence to suggest that the Australian population would support such redefinition, and recent past experiences would indicate that the Asia Pacific region may not wholeheartedly welcome Australia into the fold.

¹⁴⁵ A Gyngeell, 'Ambition: the emerging foreign policy of the Rudd Government', *Lowy Institute Analysis*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, December 2008, p.1.

¹⁴⁶ Chapter 1 (pp.43, 44) of this thesis provides an overview of the 2009-2010 budget cuts sustained by DFAT.

¹⁴⁷ For example, particularly as a nation that continues to vote within the United Nations as a member of the informal Western European and Others Group (WEOG), retains strong and symbolic ties to the colonial monarchy, and vigorously pursues the bilateral friendship with the United States as a fundamental pillar of foreign policy. Evans, Grant, *Australia's foreign relations in the world of the 1990s*, p.61. Also, as Capling alludes the terminology of Asia-Pacific for the purposes of APEC signals a deliberate attempt on the part of Australia (and Japan) to ensure the inclusion of the US within the broader membership base, rather than an attempt to fully reorient itself in Asia. A Capling, 'Twenty years of engagement with Asia', *Pacific Review*, Vol 21(5), 2008, p.603. In addition, there is a substantial body of Australian literature regarding Australia's identity within the Asian region spanning several decades. For further references see M Barr, *Cultural Politics and Asian Values: The Tepid War*, Routledge, New York, 2002; Cotton and Ravenhill (eds), *Seeking Asian Engagement*; S Fitzgerald, *Is Australia an Asian Country: Can Australia survive in an East Asian future?*, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1997; Stephen Castles et al, *Mistaken Identity: multiculturalism and the demise of nationalism in Australia*, 2nd ed., Pluto Press, Sydney, 1988; and A Milner, 'What's left of engagement in Asia?'.

For example, Capling reminds us that the efforts of the Keating government in the early 1990s ‘to forge a new national identity for Australia as an independent, cosmopolitan society, located in Asia, with an international role’, were ‘challenged and contested, not only by other governments in the region but also by many at home who rejected Keating’s attempts to reshape Australian identity through engagement with Asia’.¹⁴⁸ The challenges therefore presented by the cultural divide require consideration in diplomacy method, and provide the platform for the consideration of the importance of the Australian image and reputation in supporting positive diplomatic outcomes, and the role for public diplomacy activities as underpinning traditional practice.

Australia is a significant middle power with much at stake particularly within the broader Asia-Pacific region. Huntington, Leonard, Small and Rose raise pertinent issues in their interpretation of the ‘age of schisms’ and potential categories of cultural divides that threaten international order and stability, that are relevant to Australia in terms of how Australian governments and diplomats might navigate through the potential divides that may directly impact upon Australian national interests.

As already noted, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Labor administration driven by Hawke, and Keating, with Evans responsible for the foreign affairs portfolio drew upon the early notions of public diplomacy in establishing Australia’s place within the region. They sought to enmesh Australian interests in the Asian Pacific, including through the APEC architecture. Official negotiations were and remain underpinned with the symbolism of the Annual Leaders’ Summits, and built upon the goodwill engendered for most through high level

¹⁴⁸ Capling, ‘Twenty years of engagement with Asia’, p.602.

Ministerial and Prime Ministerial visits.¹⁴⁹ At the same time, Australia actively pursued negotiation roles, including at the helm of the Cambodian peace process, and initiated cultural and youth exchange programs within the region.¹⁵⁰ The Asia-Australia Institute (now defunct) emerged as a leading think-tank on Asian engagement from the University of New South Wales, and a new push for Asian languages to be taught throughout Australian schools came to the fore across each of the Australian states. In describing Australia's policy approach to the Asian region, in 1989 Evans clearly articulated an approach that incorporated public diplomacy practice that included:

- i) building a more diverse array of linkages with the countries of South East Asia, so that they have an important national interest in the maintenance of a positive relationship with Australia; and
- ii) recognising that Australia in vigorously pursuing its national interests in the region should do so as a confident and natural partner in a common neighbourhood of remarkable diversity, rather than as a cultural misfit trapped by geography.¹⁵¹

By contrast, from 1996, Howard approached Asia as a cultural traditionalist, that saw him:

champion the constitutional monarchy, reject ethnocentric views of multiculturalism, repudiate the 'black arm-band' view of Australian history, oppose an apology for past injustices upon the indigenous peoples, extol the virtues of the traditional family model, promote a nationalism from the foundations of ANZAC, mateship and the common man, and champion the 'Australian way of life'.¹⁵²

The result was a foreign policy driven more than ever by domestic public opinion, the downgrading of Asian engagements, weakened support for multilateral engagement and

¹⁴⁹ While APEC commenced as an informal Ministers' dialogue from 1989, the first of the Annual Leaders' Meetings was held in the United States in 1993, and from that time the tradition of the leaders' meeting, at which the leaders are photographed together in the national dress or costume of the host country has become an important symbol of collaboration. APEC Website: <http://www.apec.org/>

¹⁵⁰ From July 1989 to May 1993 Australia (and particularly DFAT and the Department of Defence) was actively involved in the development, diplomatic negotiation and leadership of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), a key initiative to broker peaceful settlement and allow for democratic elections to take place in Cambodia. For further discussion on Australia's role in the Cambodian Peace process refer to: Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, pp 88-95. See also K Berry, *Cambodia – From Red to Blue: Australia's Initiative for Peace*, Allan and Unwin, Sydney, 1997. Also, Asialink provides a positive example of the organisations that developed and supported opportunities for cultural and education exchange within the region. Established within Melbourne University in 1990, Asialink's mission is to 'create a new generation of Australians who are knowledgeable about the countries of Asia and who understand more fully what we can learn from our neighbours and what we can contribute to the region in which we live. Following a series of search conferences with experts from around Australia, Asialink developed programs in education, the arts, business and community awareness, with education being its first priority'. See also http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/about_asialink/history

¹⁵¹ Evans, Grant, *Australia's foreign relations in the world of the 1990's*, p.196.

¹⁵² Kelly, *Howard's decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal*, p.23.

focus on the U.S. and alliance diplomacy tactics.¹⁵³ Prime Minister Howard presented his policies as ‘promoting national interests in accord with the values of the Australian people’.¹⁵⁴ Howard’s Foreign Minister, Downer echoed such sentiments in his opening speech to the Asia Leaders’ Forum in Beijing when he drew the dangerous distinction between cultural and practical regionalism, and by so doing implied that from a value and culture-based perspective Australia did not fit into, and was therefore not interested in fitting into, the East Asian community.¹⁵⁵

The issue of cultural identity flared with the entry of Pauline Hanson and the One Nation Party onto the Australian political stage. The One Nation anti-Asia, anti-immigration policy agenda gained significant domestic support within Australia and immediately caught the attention of Australia’s regional neighbours – reawakening old resentments and provoking intense regional anger towards Australia, ‘it served to remind Asians, that Australia had within living memory practiced a white Australia policy, and that some influential Australians might not yet have entirely renounced its attractions’.¹⁵⁶ Howard’s response was at best cautious, and a campaign was only mounted against Hanson when her ratings in the polls climbed to a level which may have posed a threat to Government control of the Senate. Howard’s failure to publicly rebuke the One Nation statements, and at the same time positively reinforce Australia’s commitment to the region, simply reinforced his own perceived position on issues relating to Australia’s position within the region, and some argue damaged Howard’s and Australian credibility within the region.¹⁵⁷ By contrast Capling proposes such damage ‘has not transpired, and Australia’s standing in the region is as good if

¹⁵³ Ibid, p 7.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p 13.

¹⁵⁵ A Downer, Opening speech to the Asia Leaders’ Forum.

¹⁵⁶ C Kessler, ‘Surely you must be joking, Mr Mahatir’, *The Asia Australia Papers*, No.3, June 2000, p.163.

¹⁵⁷ Firth, *Australia in International Politics*, p.256. See also R Manne (ed), *The Howard Years*, Black Inc. Agenda, Melbourne, 2004, p.50. Capling, ‘Twenty years of engagement in Asia, p. 602.

not better than anything Labor could have hoped for in the 1990s'.¹⁵⁸ Though as discussed later within this thesis, the potential improvements regarding Australia's positioning within the region, 'resulted more from a serendipitous confluence of interests than as a result of the Howard government's embrace of bilateralism and pragmatism'.¹⁵⁹

The crisis in East Timor, and Australia's seemingly inappropriate and inconsistent response sparked vehement criticism, on the domestic, bilateral and regional fronts.¹⁶⁰ Australia's impressive role in negotiating and leading the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was overshadowed by Prime Minister Howard's subsequent suggestion of Australia filling a deputy peacekeeping role on behalf of United States interests in the region under the guise of the 'Howard Doctrine'.¹⁶¹ Howard's claim that because of Australia's characteristics as a 'European, Western civilization with strong links to the North America' it was able to 'do something that no other country could do', in leading of INTERFET drew quick criticism from regional neighbours.¹⁶² The 'jingoism, neo-colonialism and latent racism' implied by the Howard Doctrine evoked a bitter reaction from regional leaders – and seriously impacted on the fragile relations with the newly elected Indonesian President Wahid, at that time.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ Capling, 'Twenty years of engagement in Asia', p. 602. This point is specifically supported by Higgott and Nossal, 'Odd man in, odd man out', p.626.

¹⁵⁹ For example, Australia's standing in Asia was impacted by 'exogenous factors [including] the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the ousting of Suharto, the rise of China, and the Australian role in the December 2004 tsunami'. Higgott and Nossal, 'Odd man in, odd man out', p.626.

¹⁶⁰ For further reading on Australia's role in East Timor, including with regard to the Indonesia, the Timor Gap Treaty and Timor Leste independence see also James Dunn, *Timor: A people betrayed*, Jacaranda, Milton, 1983; Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor*, Scribe Publications, Carlton, 2004; Firth, *Australia in International Politics*; and Edwards and Goldsworthy (eds), *Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia*, Vols 1 and 2.

¹⁶¹ Woolcott, 'Stop Waltzing and advance our nation fairly'. See also Leaver, 'The meanings, origins and implications of the "Howard Doctrine"'; and F Brenchley, 'The Howard Defence Doctrine', *The Bulletin*, 28 September 1999; and Milner, 'What's left of engagement with Asia'.

¹⁶² Brenchley, 'The Howard Defence Doctrine'.

¹⁶³ Woolcott, 'Stop Waltzing and advance our nation fairly'.

By 2000, Australia's standing and reputation in the region had plummeted significantly. A host of domestic and international policy issues, including the public rejection of an Australian Republic, the continued support of mandatory sentencing laws and failure to act on Indigenous deaths in custody despite United Nations attention to such issues, the withdrawal from the United Nations Human Rights Committee process, overall lack of leadership on national reconciliation and marginalised voting patterns aligned to United States interests in the United Nations General Assembly supported the view of Australia as a lackey of the US with a cultural traditionalist approach. These views contributed to regional confusion about Australia's foreign policy direction. The most vocal and notable critic of Australia's standing was Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad who openly stated at the time that Prime Minister Howard would not be welcome in the region.¹⁶⁴

Since 2000, Australia's standing in the Asian region has continued to fluctuate in the absence of a consistent long-term approach to relationship-building, including at the grassroots. The 12 October 2002 suicide bombing in Kuta, Bali, reported by the Australian Federal Police as 'Australia's September 11 because of the number of Australians killed', gave rise to a reinvigorated relationship between Prime Minister Howard with then Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid based upon the common and serious threat to national security.¹⁶⁵ The relationship has been bolstered by the common commitment to fight terrorism, including through the involvement of Australian Federal Police working on the ground with Indonesian

¹⁶⁴ Kelly, 'Firing from the chip on his shoulder'. Malaysian former Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamad is quoted as saying about then Australian Prime Minister John Howard, 'If Australia wants to be a friend of Asia it should stop behaving as if it is there to teach us how to run our country. It is a small nation in terms of numbers and it should behave like a small nation and not be a teacher.'. When asked whether he thought Howard was welcome in the region, Mahathir said: 'No, I don't think so. Not in Malaysia, anyway'. Business Services Industry, 'Asia's 'bully' hits back – the squabble between John Howard and Mahathir Mohamad', *Business Asia*, June 2000 viewed on 20 October 2009 <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BJT/is_10_8/ai_63767966/>

¹⁶⁵ Australian Federal Police, 'Bali Bombings', Australian Federal Police website: http://www.afp.gov.au/international/operations/previous_operations/bali_bombings_2002.html. Kelly 'Howard's Decade: An Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal'. I Coton, 'Australia Ties: East Timor, Bali Bombings, Tsunami and Beyond', *The Jakarta Post*, 7 March 2005.

police in the subsequent investigation. Australia's subsequent overwhelming aid and disaster recovery response to the Indian Ocean tsunami 'heralded a new era of close relations between the two countries', according to the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia.¹⁶⁶

As these events demonstrate, Australia's relationship in the region, and particularly with Indonesia has been one 'characterised by peaks and troughs, seldom has there been the stable, friendly, cooperative and long-term relationship that some would expect of close neighbours'.¹⁶⁷ Opportunities that have allowed personal lasting relationships to develop, including in the policing cooperation in the wake of the Bali bombings, and the disaster recovery efforts in the aftermath of the tsunami have had significant impact on the overall health of the relationship. However, these events also demonstrate once again that the nature of Australia's current public diplomacy program is fragmented, ad hoc and driven by crisis.

Australia faces new uncertainties and challenges within the immediate region, including significant shifts in the balance of power bringing China and India to the forefront of regional politics. The way in which these powers participate in and address regional and global issues will be 'significant determinants of the future international system'.¹⁶⁸ As a past student of China, this is an area of specific and personal interest for Prime Minister Rudd, and when speaking last year to students at Peking University (in an act of true public diplomacy), he reflected upon the relationship between the two nations as reflecting 'a true friendship which

¹⁶⁶ Banham, 'Australia, Indonesia closer than ever', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 January 2005. Following the Indian Ocean tsunami which ravaged the Indonesian province of Aceh, then Australian Prime Minister committed over \$500 million in aid to Indonesia, along with 350 military personnel, seven large aircraft, three helicopters, the transport warship HMAS Kanimbla, and a 480,000-litre-a-day water purifying plant as part of the relief operations.

¹⁶⁷ Banham, 'Australia, Indonesia closer than ever'.

¹⁶⁸ Gyngell, 'Ambition: the Emerging Foreign Policy of the Rudd Government', p.8.

offers unflinching advice and counsels restraint to engage in dialogue about matters of contention'.¹⁶⁹ According to Michael Dutton, Chair of the Griffith Asia Institute:

as the first elected Mandarin-speaking leader outside the Chinese-speaking world, Rudd's linguistic ability and lived knowledge of China suggested a new, more grounded style of engagement with Asia. In China, the fact that Rudd was the first elected leader of a democratic country to have studied and become fluent in the main language of the country made him something of a celebrity.¹⁷⁰

Rudd evidently was laying the ground work for the bilateral relationship, and establishing a position for Australia within the region vis a vis China.

Australia's relationship with China has been subsequently marred by issues, including China's jailing of an Australian citizen and executive of Anglo-Australian mining firm, Rio Tinto on claims of commercial spying and subversion, and granting of a visa to and subsequent visit by the Uighur activist to participate in the Melbourne film festival.¹⁷¹ While diplomatic action was taken by both sides, the Chinese Press have reported Australia as being 'sino-phobic' and 'challenging China's core national interests'.¹⁷² Such statements not only wound the Australian reputation in China, but may reignite past (images of) Australian anti-Asian sentiment more broadly across the region. With hindsight, Dutton suggests that 'Rudd may have missed (or even studiously avoided) the opportunity to forge a 'special relationship' with the People's Republic of China in the political arena'.¹⁷³ With this in mind, perhaps Rudd's earlier ad hoc attempts to employ public diplomacy through language and show himself to be a 'China hand' may not have been sufficiently strategic to smooth out the ongoing diplomatic pressures of the Australia-China relationship in the future. Rudd's experiences in navigating the many challenges of the Australia-China relationship might also

¹⁶⁹ K Rudd, 'Speech to Chinese Students At Peking University, Peking University, 9 April 2009, viewed on 15 December 2009, <<http://www.news.com.au/adelaidenow/story/0,22606,23511829-5006301,00.html>>

¹⁷⁰ M Dutton and D Kessler, 'Australia's Asia: An Illiterate Future', *China Heritage Quarterly*, Australian National University, No19, September 2009:

http://www.chinaheritageneewsletter.org/articles.php?searchterm=019_australia_asia.inc&issue=019

¹⁷¹ BBC, 'Australia-China tie challenging', BBC Online News, Thursday 20 August 2009, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8211025.stm>>

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Dutton and Kessler, 'Australia's Asia: An Illiterate Future'.

serve to caution against the strong reliance upon personal diplomacy, and promote instead the need for a systemic, robust and coherent public diplomacy program.

The significant actual and potential impact the effect of such incidents of misunderstanding between Australia and China became clear when Rio Tinto pulled out of a \$A19.5 billion dollar investment deal with China's Chinalco (before the arrest of Stern Hu); and signature of a further \$A41 billion dollar agreement between PetroChina and Australia was put at risk.¹⁷⁴ In addition, several Chinese film makers withdrew from the Melbourne Film Festival in protest of Australian actions. In this instance, there is a strategic role for public diplomacy in both addressing the negative media, but also in establishing and building Australia's reputation and image with the Chinese people, and more broadly amongst the Chinese diaspora across the region.¹⁷⁵ The fact that China is Australia largest trading partner (worth \$53 billion in 2008), may have been the motivation for Rudd to speak to the Chinese students of Peking University last year, and continues to motivate Rudd's push to become the most 'Asian literate country in the collective West'.¹⁷⁶ As Rudd himself has reflected, 'the China-

¹⁷⁴ BBC, 'PetroChina in huge Australia deal', *BBC Online News*, Wednesday 18 August 2009, found at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8208877.stm>

¹⁷⁵ The gift of Giant Pandas Wangwang and Funi by China to Australia was recently realised when the two pandas arrived at Adelaide Zoo. Such a gift is a strong public diplomacy statement and should be well received by Australian foreign policy makers as a sign that the bilateral relationship is in good shape. Less apparent in recent media attention was the fact that the gift was formalised in 2007 between China's President Hu and former Prime Minister Howard, as a lasting reminder of the warm relations between Australia and China and the successful visit of President Hu to Australia at that time. While the gift does not necessarily reflect on the nature of the relationship since Rudd took office, the fact that the Pandas arrived might be seen as endorsement. Also, while the rhetoric reflects a 'lasting relationship' between the two countries, there is value in noting that the fine print of the agreement qualifies this as a finite term of ten years, noting that the 'gift' is actually considered to be a 'loan'. Of significance, this is no altruistic gift, and the pandas are expected to have a significant impact on tourism to Adelaide and Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'A Pair of Pandas for Adelaide Zoo', *Media Release*, Commonwealth of Australia, 6 September 2007. 'Adelaide ready for Giant Pandas' Arrival', *NZ Herald*, 27 November 2009, viewed on 2 December 2009, <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/asia/news/article.cfm?l_id=3&objectid=10612071&pnum=1>

¹⁷⁶ A Gyngell, 'Kevin Rudd's Big Idea', found at: <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2008/06/Kevin-Rudd's-big-idea.aspx>. BBC, 'China Urges Respect in Rio Case', *BBC Online News*, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8180872.stm>>

Australia relationship is always full of challenges and can I say it always has been thus and it will be thus for quite a long time to come'.¹⁷⁷

As the DFAT submission to the Senate Inquiry demonstrates, Australia is active in public diplomacy, and the Australian public support the use of creative and smart diplomacy to meet the challenges of the international environment. However, Australia's understanding of public diplomacy has not maintained pace with the understanding and emerging trends and practices abroad.

Overall, building Australia's positive standing and longer-term relationship with Asia is critical to Australia's ongoing national interests. To engage with this challenge means that Australia must firstly seek to understand public diplomacy in the contemporary context, and carefully consider its strategic commitment to this public diplomacy. A significant aspect to public diplomacy comes from the '*understanding*' and '*engaging*' activities, highlighted in the Senate Committee definition. Such activities are particularly important to the development of Australia's relationship within Asia. Furthermore, a public diplomacy program must comprise more than one-off or random events like the Prime Minister's speaking at one event in Chinese, or a one-off development response to a disaster. While such actions are positive in themselves, they do not sufficiently build Australian understanding of the region, nor maintain a strong and lasting relationship. As Dutton notes:

Globalization might mean the world has become smaller, but one side effect of this process is that particular regions have also become much more tightly enmeshed. For Australia, this has meant that the much-discussed 'tyranny of distance' has been transformed into an era dominated by the proximity to markets and, here Australia has a distinct advantage. Whether in regard to education or the trade in primary resources, the nation's wealth is increasingly derived from the north. Yet as a nation, Australians generally remain woefully ignorant of their near and important northern neighbours' societies, cultures and languages.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ BBC, 'Australia-China tie challenging', BBC Online News, Thursday 20 August 2009, found at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8211025.stm>

¹⁷⁸ Dutton and Kessler, 'Australia's Asia: An Illiterate Future'.

This chapter has covered a range of opportunities that might allow the Australian public diplomacy program to be improved. These include firstly an engagement of academics and practitioners in the international discussions on public diplomacy. The unravelling of public diplomacy theory and practice opens new venues for improvements in practice, including in understanding the use of new interactive technologies that will allow Australia to be competitive upon the already crowded multi-dimensional international stage. Other opportunities, like taking up the challenge to be the ‘most Asian-language literate country in Asia’, or developing and deepening linkages with the Australian diaspora are also key activities that will provide greater substance to the current program.¹⁷⁹ However, above all else, the theme that continues to take precedence is the need to establish the critical link between public diplomacy and strategic foreign policy. Australia’s public diplomacy program will need to shift from a currently fragmented and inconsistent approach to a policy-based approach if public diplomacy is to become an effective tool for leveraging the Australian image and reputation, building lasting and solid relationships and ultimately progressing Australian foreign policy priorities.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. For a summary of the Australian Government’s response to the call made during the Australian 2020 Summit for Australia to develop a strong sense of Asian literacy refer to the Australia 2020 Summit, *Final Report*.

CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN ACTION

Defining public diplomacy, including vis a vis traditional diplomacy as a strategic instrument used by nation states in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, provides the fundamental platform from which this thesis proposes that contemporary public diplomacy is an innovation of traditional diplomacy. By virtue of the channels, networks, media types and audiences that public diplomacy activities encompass, such activities clearly extend the reach, impact and relevance of diplomacy within the dynamic and complex modern environment in which states operate. Essential to the understanding of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy that sits alongside traditional diplomacy in the diplomat's toolbox, is the need to understand how and why public diplomacy delivers outcomes. How does understanding, engaging and influencing foreign publics achieve foreign policy outcomes and advance national interests?

4.1 Public diplomacy - beyond definitions

Public diplomacy is complex, subtle and far reaching. Public diplomacy as an instrument of 'soft power' can allow states to gain influence and shape political agendas through the engagement of foreign publics, beyond the boundaries of the traditional hard powers, such as the use of military or economic strength to make others follow your will.¹ At its core, public diplomacy refers to the use of 'government sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries'.² Potter observes that public diplomacy is not just a foreign policy challenge, but also a national challenge.³ For example, the conduct of a group of UK football supporters can have an impact on the national reputation and image, even though those individuals are acting outside the parameters of state sanctioned public

¹ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.

² U.S. Department of State Library, *Dictionary of International Relations Terms*, US, GPO, Washington DC, 1987: http://openlibrary.org/b/OL2493850M/Dictionary_of_international_relations_terms.

³ Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy', p.6.

diplomacy activities.⁴ Such a perspective adds to the layered and complex nature of public diplomacy. While liberal democratic states would not normally govern the behaviours of citizens travelling abroad, there is value in revisiting the importance of person-to-person contacts. Such individuals are well placed to project the image and reputation of their home state abroad.

The complexities that underpin the definition of public diplomacy and in particular that link public diplomacy to the concept of soft power require further unravelling. The degree to which public diplomacy activities can engage and influence foreign audiences, is supported by the national reputation, image and identity of the initiating state, and the extent to which receiving audiences will seek to relate to that image or identity. The concepts of national reputation, image and identity are given sporadic attention in contemporary literature and discussion about public diplomacy, but the analysis of the degree to which these concepts are linked to public diplomacy is developing.⁵ However, the conclusion that is most widely accepted is that image, reputation and identity are critical to the ability of a state to engage and influence foreign (and domestic audiences) in the increasingly globalised, connected and competitive world. In her opening speech to the 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy, then Spanish Culture Minister, Carmen Calvo remarked:

Some years ago the issue of 'country image' began to take centre stage in diplomatic and many other circles, among other reasons because we are in an increasingly interconnected world, and also, in a way, one that is increasingly homogenous and globalised, where every country needs to identify itself and offer its own unique and differentiating aspects.⁶

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Public diplomacy readings routinely refer to concepts such as image, reputation and identity. However, there is little further discussion that drills further into these concepts, as if an assumption is made that these concepts are well understood. See for example, Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice'; Hocking, 'Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy'; Snow, 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy'; and Nye, *Soft power: the Means to Success in World Power*.

⁶ C Calvo, 'The present and future of public diplomacy: A European perspective', *The 2006 Madrid Conference on public diplomacy*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2006.

There is value in noting that the concepts of national reputation, image and identity can work in both positive and negative ways. As Leonard explains:

public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods which can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for individual transactions. Work on particular issues will feed off the general image of a country and reflect back onto it – in both positive and negative directions.⁷

Australian bureaucratic rhetoric and structures indicate an awareness of the importance of national reputation, image and identity to the success of public diplomacy. For example, the DFAT Budget Statement (2007-2008) notes the accountability that rests with the department in ‘promoting ...better understanding of Australia’s identity, values and ideas overseas’.⁸

The work unit within DFAT responsible for public diplomacy program is the *Images of Australia Branch*; and the Senate Inquiry was framed under the title, *Building Our National Image*. However, the naming conventions and rhetoric illustrate only superficial understanding of the importance of reputation, image, and identity in Australia’s public diplomacy program. The importance of Australia’s national reputation in pursuit of foreign policy came to a head recently with the extremely negative media coverage of Australia by Indian and Asian media relating to the Indian student bashings, education related visa scams and collapse of high profile educational institutions offering study programs to Indian students.⁹ The racist image of Australia promoted through media (particularly in India, but throughout Asia) escalated when the associated international education crisis was revealed. The events ‘made headlines around the world and India has warned it could jeopardise Australia’s lucrative education sector, which earns \$2 billion annually from Indian students’.¹⁰

⁷ Leonard, *Public Diplomacy*, Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2002, p. 9.

⁸ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Budget Statement 2007-08, p.1

⁹ Dubey, ‘Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under’; Bolt, ‘We’re not the racists’; BBC News, ‘India Calls Off Australia Events’.

¹⁰ SBS Online, ‘Rudd moves to reassure India Australia is not racist’, *SBS Online*, 2 June, 2009. Found at: <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1020601/Rudd-moves-to-reassure-India-Australia-is-not-racist>; Gilmore,

The fact that the Indian education crisis issue escalated and was taken up so quickly and dramatically within the Indian community, is an indication that Australia had not given enough overall attention to building a sufficiently credible Australian image and reputation in India over the long term (with specific reference to supporting the needs of Indian students and families taking part in the Australian education system) to weather the difficulties when they arise. Such an example gives insight to the varying timeframes against which public diplomacy may operate – in some cases public diplomacy is required to be actioned for short-term crisis response, but there is a place for the development of a long range view within a public diplomacy program. While activities work across both short and long term timeframes, there appears to be a greater benefit derived from the latter. Melissen makes the point that, ‘public diplomacy should be in tune with medium term objectives and long term aims...and public diplomacy works best with a long horizon’.¹¹

This chapter addresses the intersection between public diplomacy and the core concepts of image, identity and reputation. The examination of such concepts leads to a discussion of soft power, and the value of public diplomacy in building the soft power capability of states.¹² Once again, the literature, particularly that emanating from Clingendael (with authors such as Melissen, Hocking, and Fiske de Gouveia), is quick to point out that ‘public diplomacy is one of soft power’s key instruments’.¹³ Once the underlying threads of reputation, image, and identity are understood as intrinsic to public diplomacy, with the

‘China Speaks Out on Student Attacks’, *Sydney Morning Herald*; Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.1.

¹¹ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.4.

¹² The source of readings on soft power is Dr Joseph Nye. The concept of soft power was first articulated by Nye in his book, *Bound to Lead* (1990). He further developed the concept in development of the next publication, *The Paradox of American Power* (2001) and has explored the concept again in the more recent publication *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics* (2004). Nye is former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and former Assistant Secretary of Defence in the Clinton administration.

¹³ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.4.

appropriate reflection upon their capacity to generate soft power, the exploration must then turn to a discussion of what shape public diplomacy takes in action, and to the many and varied tools and methods of public diplomacy activity.

4.2 Building soft power through public diplomacy

Melissen proposes that ‘public diplomacy can be seen as a symptom of the rise of soft power, and a part of the changing fabric of international relations’.¹⁴ Soft power, as defined by Nye, relates to ‘the influence and attractiveness a nation acquires when others are drawn to its culture and ideas’.¹⁵ In his 2004 study of the different forms and interrelationships of power dynamics, Nye introduces a significant intersection between public diplomacy and his own concept of soft power. According to Nye’s theories of power, public diplomacy is an instrument of soft power which can improve a state’s ‘ability to shape the preferences of others...and get the outcomes that it wants by co-opting people not coercing them’.¹⁶

There are some aspects of difficulty associated with the intersection between soft power and public diplomacy. For example Rasmussen notes that some scholars explicitly define public diplomacy in soft power terms, while others such as Melissen, see public diplomacy as an instrument of soft power.¹⁷ Both Hocking and Henrikson pursue a slightly different line in their critique of soft power, ‘highlighting the paradox of associating soft power (or any power equation) with public diplomacy, on the basis that if attraction actually worked, there would

¹⁴ Ibid, p.8.

¹⁵ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 5.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Rasmussen, ‘Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practices’, pp.7-8. According to Rasmussen, examples of those defining public diplomacy in soft power terms include Batora, ‘Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium sized States: Norway and Canada’, and Zaharna quoted in K Fitzpatrick, ‘Advancing the New Public Diplomacy: A Public Relations Perspective’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Vol.2, No.3, 2007, p.195. By contrast, Melissen states, ‘Public diplomacy is *one of soft power’s key instruments*’ in Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.4 (emphasis added).

be no need for public diplomacy'.¹⁸ However by reference to Nye, the intersection between soft power and public diplomacy becomes clearer, as Nye notes that public diplomacy is the instrument that enables the development and wielding of soft power.¹⁹ Within this context, the attractiveness of a state, as portrayed through its identity, values and culture is central to soft power. Nye argues that the:

countries most likely to be more attractive in postmodern international relations (that is countries that have soft power), are those that help to frame issues, whose culture and ideas are closer to the prevailing norms and whose credibility abroad is reinforced by their values and policies.²⁰

For the purpose of this discussion, it is important to contrast soft power as opposed to the notion of 'hard power – which relies on coercion through force (i.e. military or economic force), as the primary means of delivering on key outcomes.²¹ In Nye's view, public diplomacy is one of the tools of soft power; and while the 'three recognised sources of power – military, economic and soft – remain relevant...if the current economic and social trends of the information revolution continue, soft power will become more important in the mix'.²² Despite some scepticism around soft power, Nye's power theory is widely accepted and recognised both within the United States and European academic and practitioner circles.

The generic concept of soft power has featured in recent high profile Australian discussions and reports including the *2020 Summit Final Report* and the Lowy Institute's *Blue Ribbon Report on Australia's Diplomatic Deficit*, as being a highly desirable outcome of Australia's

¹⁸ Hocking, 'Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy', p.35. Henrikson's view is similar to that of Hocking, noting that 'power is a misnomer in diplomacy'. Yet both Hocking and Henrikson acknowledge the reality that there is an overlap between soft power and public diplomacy. However this area of overlap is not fully resolved by either Hocking or Henrikson. Refer to Henrikson, 'Niche Diplomacy in the Public Arena: Canada and Norway', p.73.

¹⁹ Nye, *Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics*, pp.99-125. Melissen's view aligns with that of Nye.

²⁰ Ibid, p.31.

²¹ Hocking, 'Rethinking the 'New' Public Diplomacy', p.33. Hocking also refers to the recently developed concept of 'sticky power' – the power of economic attraction – which is not widely used, and appears to represent a subset of soft power.

²² Nye, *Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.32.

diplomatic endeavours. While the language is utilised, the concept of soft power in an Australian context remains blurry and intangible, and there is little evidence that Australian practitioners or academics have engaged with the notion, beyond high level rhetoric, to unpack what soft power means for Australia on the international stage, and how it might be achieved. For example, Lowy Institute Executive Director Wesley views soft power as ‘a concept that is still a little underdone’.²³ Senator Trood, an advocate for public diplomacy, also remarks that the notion of soft power is lacking in any sort of ‘practical or hard-edged appeal that would make it relevant to Australian practitioners’.²⁴

However, despite these comments, public diplomacy provides a relevant lens through which soft power can be more easily unpacked and understood. The intersection between public diplomacy and soft power is critical to understanding the growing importance and discussion of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is not an end in itself within foreign policy, ‘nor is it an altruistic affair’.²⁵ Instead, it is the ability of a nation to employ public diplomacy tools in such a way as to influence foreign publics to get the desired foreign policy outcomes without having to resort to force or coercion, that is increasingly important: ‘[public diplomacy] can pursue a variety of objectives, such as in the field of political dialogue, trade and foreign investment, and the establishment of links with civil society groups’.²⁶ Again this point reaffirms Nye’s proposal as supported by Melissen that public diplomacy is an instrument of soft power.

²³ Interview, Michael Wesley, Executive Director, Lowy Institute of International Policy, 13 July 2009. During interview, Wesley also distanced himself from the recommendations of the Australia 2020 Summit, despite the high profile role he played through the Summit as facilitator. He noted that there was a clear intention that the facilitators not be seen to have influenced the participants. This position explains Wesley’s scepticism of ‘soft power’ despite the soft power rhetoric of the Australia 2020 Summit.

²⁴ Interview, Senator Russell Trood, Chair, Senate Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 30 June 2009.

²⁵ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.14.

²⁶ Ibid.

Leonard builds the intersection between soft power and public diplomacy by articulating the key goals of public diplomacy as assisting states to 'confront two major goals: i) advocacy or the presentation of policies in ways that are genuinely convincing and attractive to foreign audiences; and ii) trust-building – the creation of a climate of mutual respect, understanding and trust, which permits and anticipates disagreement'.²⁷ According to Leonard, the ability of public diplomacy to progress these goals at a time of complex divides across the political, religious and economic landscape places it at the centre of foreign policy for any nation.

As mentioned earlier, Nye suggests that soft power is traded in the currency of shared values, ideas and culture reinforced through credible institutions and policies. Public diplomacy is the vehicle that connects such currency to potential traders (those traders being the foreign public), on the international stage. Fiske de Gouveia observes that:

everyone wants to develop and exercise their 'soft power'. This is a trend that can only intensify, in a globalised world, international communications, and their impact on attitudes and behaviour, have profound economic and political implications. States realise this and are acting accordingly.²⁸

While there appears to be substantial support for the concept of soft power within international diplomatic circles, the language of soft power poses a risk in that many political leaders and members of the public may relate the notion of 'soft' to being a weak option. In a similar way, the language of hard power may translate to some as representing strength (as a positive) which can easily move towards bullying (a negative). Perhaps this is the rationale behind Nye's more recent writings and interviews in which he notes that 'effective strategies in the real world are a mix of hard and soft power, and that combination of hard and soft power in effective ways is what is called 'smart power'.'²⁹

²⁷ Leonard, Small, and Rose, *British Public Diplomacy in the Age of Schisms*, p.36.

²⁸ Fiske de Gouveia, 'The Future of Public Diplomacy', p.5.

²⁹ Nye, 'Joseph Nye on Smart Power', *Interview with the Harvard Kennedy School of Government*, 3 July 2008.

A cynic might argue that 'smart power' language introduced by Nye, provides states and leaders with a convenient escape from the stereotype perceptions that accompany the perceptions of soft and hard, while instead promoting the positive associations that accompany the term 'smart'. At the same time, Nye's articulation of smart power has been used to describe the United States approach to the Taliban in Afghanistan.³⁰ In this instance, the use of 'smart power' language may achieve value in translating what might be a largely 'hard' and therefore unpopular approach into an approach that may be more palatable to the public audiences, because of the label 'smart'. The difficulty with the notion of smart power representing a mix of hard and soft, is that there is little guidance provided on how that mix might be achieved, and this blurs the transparency of actions. The introduction of terminology relating to smart power appears propagandist, and may actually undermine the value of distinguishing between hard and soft powers.

Prior to Nye's invention of the concept soft power, former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans coined the term 'niche diplomacy' describing the ability of small to middle powers who have sufficient size and capacity to play a notable role on the international stage through the exercise of persuasive influence (or soft power), where they would not be able to impose or coerce outcomes through the use of military or economic force.³¹ Evans' description notes that niche diplomacy requires the 'concentration of resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having', and so might be more appropriately aligned with today's concept of public diplomacy as an instrument for building soft power.³² The discussion of soft power from a niche diplomacy perspective is clearly of relevance to

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Evans, Grant, B, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, pp.35-37. For other applications of niche diplomacy to the foreign policy behaviours of small and middle sized powers see Henrikson, 'Niche Diplomacy in the Public Arena: Canada and Norway', pp.67-85. Cooper, (ed), *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War*, MacMillan, London 1997.

³² Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, p35-37.

Australia as a country that continues to rely on an ability to engage and influence a range of actors on the international stage in the interests of progressing foreign policy objectives.³³

Evans requires that the state prioritise and focus on the objectives which are identified as worth having, and build niche areas or coalitions of interest which may carry greater effect than would otherwise be the case. For example, during Evans' tenure as Australia's Foreign Minister, emphasis was placed upon building broad coalitions with 'like-minded', built upon a shared common interest (if not common values) through regional and multilateral fora such as APEC and The Cairns Group.³⁴ Established in 1986, the Cairns Group brought together an interest group of nineteen agricultural exporters from Asia, the Americas, and Australasia, and established a sense of commonality of purpose, or an alliance.³⁵ From that point, the Cairns Group is recognised as having had significant success in keeping the issue of agricultural trade subsidies on the World Trade Organisation agenda – despite resistance from major powers of the United States and Europe.³⁶ The Cairns Group might be seen as an example of an unlikely grouping of developing and developed states, all leveraging their soft power to establish a coalition, and to achieve a positive outcome that aligned broadly with their separate national interests.

At the same time, Evans also holds responsibility for pushing Australia's position on the international stage during the late 1980s and 1990s as a 'good international citizen'.³⁷ Far

³³ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International policy'.

³⁴ APEC membership at the time of Evans' concept of niche diplomacy included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States.

³⁵ The Cairns Group comprising Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay was unique in the way that it linked developing and developed nation for the purpose of promoting a unified view on agricultural trade reform in the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

³⁶ The Cairns Group, viewed on 20 October 2009, < [http:// www.cairnsgroup.org](http://www.cairnsgroup.org)>

³⁷ Evans, 'Australia's foreign policy response to global challenges', p.2.

more than the pursuit of altruistic goals, Evans is convincing in his submissions that the strategic intent of the good international citizen policy was two-fold. Firstly because ‘in a globalised, interdependent, fast-travelling, fast-communicating world, a lot of what at first sight seem to be just remote and abstract values issues really do have the capacity to impact quite strongly on our traditional security and economic interests’.³⁸ Through this argument, Evans places the pursuit of global interests not only on a par with, but within the same space as the pursuit of national interests: a theme which clearly resonated with the participants in the 2008 Australian 2020 Summit.³⁹

Secondly, Evans states that while certain activities (particularly aid-related activities) may appear to be of little benefit to the national interests ‘there is nonetheless a *reputational* advantage which accrues and can be very useful indeed when an issue comes along that is more important to us than to others, and on which *we* want *others*’ support’.⁴⁰ Under Evans foreign ministerial-ship, Australia consistently pursued numerous opportunities to carve out a reputation as a ‘good international citizen’, focusing resources (in line with the principles of niche diplomacy) onto the key areas of development assistance, human rights and the environment and squarely linked to other regional policy objectives, such as the Pacific.⁴¹ The focus was clear, and the foreign policy intent particularly in relation to opportunities for *reputational advantage* was a strategic one. Through his ‘good international citizen’ approach, Evans had clearly connected Australian foreign policy approach of the day (reputational advantage) to Nye’s (then undocumented) concept of soft power.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Australia 2020 Summit, *Final Report*, p.359.

⁴⁰ Evans, ‘Australia’s foreign policy response to global challenges’, p.2. (emphasis added)

⁴¹ Evans, Grant, *Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s*, p.40.

Canada and Norway provide similar examples, frequently cited within contemporary public diplomacy literature, of middle power states that have also developed the notion of 'niche diplomacy' in building effective soft power capacity to exert influence on the global stage. For example, Canada has utilised its dual French, English heritage and connections to build a distinct and active role on the international stage, including within international organisations that span the Commonwealth to *la Francophonie*.⁴² Canada's high profile contributions to development assistance projects along with a significant role in international peacekeeping efforts⁴³, and demonstrated leadership in the international effort to ban anti-personnel landmines⁴⁴ have enabled the Canadian Government to build Canada's credibility as an international good citizen.⁴⁵

Similarly, for Norway, niche diplomacy is concentrated in building opportunities for shared peace. For example, Norway is known for the Nobel Peace Prize, a clear voting pattern within the United Nations, and work in facilitating outcomes for peace.⁴⁶ Through these open and publicly communicated activities, Norway has cultivated a distinct identity and attractiveness on the global stage, and improves its influence.⁴⁷ Through Norway's 'ruthless prioritisation of target audiences and concentration on a single message, (Norway as a force for peace in the world), Norway has developed a voice and presence out of proportion to its

⁴² Henrikson, 'Niche diplomacy in the world public arena: the global corners of 'Canada and Norway', p.68.

⁴³ According to Canadian politician, David Kilgour as at January 2004, 'More than 125,000 Canadian military personnel and thousands of civilians have been deployed in conflicts from Ethiopia/Eritrea, to East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Cyprus, Sierra Leone, Central America and a host of other "hot spots"—including, most recently, Afghanistan'. D Kilgour, 'Canada's Peacekeeping role: then and now', Presentation to University of Alberta, 26 January 2004.

⁴⁴ Also known as "the Ottawa Process". Henrikson, 'Niche diplomacy in the world public arena: the global corners of 'Canada and Norway', p.68.

⁴⁵ Henrikson, 'Niche diplomacy in the world public arena: the global corners of 'Canada and Norway', p.68. See also Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy'.

⁴⁶ Including in the Middle East (the Oslo Process) commenced in 1993 as an open, time-bound diplomatic peace process aimed to end the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

⁴⁷ Henrikson, 'Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global Corners of Canada and Norway', p.70-73.

modest size and resources'.⁴⁸ Both Canada and Norway have grappled with challenges in isolated geographic positioning, though with an abundance of natural resources. While military capacity is moderate, both states have 'extensive diplomatic outreach' and used networks to great advantage. The ability to project themselves and their image overseas through public diplomacy approaches has been a significant element in their diplomatic practice.⁴⁹

The contrast to be made between Australia and the states of Norway and Canada appears to lie in consistency and strategic alignment of objectives and outcome. Australia's indirect focus on public diplomacy through good international citizenship and concerns with the broader global audience ceased slowly with the change in federal government and subsequent changes in foreign policy priorities, approach and responses from 1996. By contrast, Norway and Canada appear to have developed and maintained their reputational advantage (soft power) through a consistent focus of resources into areas of identified strength (niche diplomacy) and clear communication and engagement with broad foreign audiences (public diplomacy).

4.2.1 Addressing values, identity and image

Without deviating at this stage into an in-depth examination of values, identity and image, this thesis cannot ignore the need to undertake a brief discussion of the role played by public diplomacy in promoting a nation's identity, its values and image specifically, as these elements are highlighted as the primary currencies of soft power. In the words of former Foreign Minister Downer, 'At the core of foreign policy are Australian values, which guide our approach to the world. Our national identity informs our foreign policy, not the other

⁴⁸ Nye, *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*, p.112.

⁴⁹ Henrikson, 'Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global Corners of Canada and Norway', pp.70-73.

way around'.⁵⁰ As Downer's statement demonstrates, current academic literature and government rhetoric brings each of these elements to the fore, but there is little available information provided as to what national identity and values really are, and how they might fit together for the purpose of developing and delivering public diplomacy policy and programs.

A nation's values and identity generally speaking, are developed and constructed to reflect the history, traditions, symbols, and political foundations and institutions of a nation as they have evolved over time.⁵¹ In terms of how they fit together, theorists Henderson and McEwen suggest that values are a useful tool in shaping and reinforcing national identities. They suggest that 'values contribute to defining the collective conception of national identity, describing the people that make up the nation, and what it is that binds those people together, while distinguishing them from others'.⁵² From that point, Melissen notes that the image of a nation is 'merely the projection of identity'.⁵³

Indeed, the introduction of values into discussion creates an additional layer separating the practice of public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy not mentioned previously. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations sets the parameters for the establishment of official and workable diplomatic relations between states with differing values, policies and systems in place. The preamble to that Convention expressly notes that the Convention itself is 'premised on the belief that an international convention on diplomatic intercourse privileges and immunities would contribute to the development of friendly relations among

⁵⁰ A Downer, 'Foreign policy values and the media', Speech to the National Newspaper Publishers' Conference, 28 August 2006.

⁵¹ A Henderson, N McEwen, 'Do Shared Values Underpin National Identity? Examining the Role of Values in National Identity in Canada and the United Kingdom', *National Identities*, Volume 7, Issue 2 June 2005, p.173.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ A Gonesh and J Melissen, 'Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice', *Diplomacy Papers*, No.5, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, December 2005, p.19.

nations irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems'.⁵⁴ By linking values more closely to the development and delivery of foreign policy strategy through public diplomacy, it would appear that states may apply some flexibility in their interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention, and may pursue an agenda of political transformation through public diplomacy strategies based on values, where differences are not in the strategic national interest (the concept of transformational public diplomacy will be picked up in more detail in the next chapter).

While identity and values are intangible and slippery concepts, they are central in the discussion of public diplomacy. To borrow the boiled down definition of public diplomacy from Newton Minnow, the high profile former chairman of the United States Federal Communications Commission, public diplomacy is 'the process of explaining and advocating American values to the world', it becomes clear that while not always articulated in the official definition, values and identity are at the heart of what is public diplomacy.⁵⁵

Together, the elements of values and identity are packaged as the national image, or persona defined in terms of Jungian psychology as the 'façade that is presented to the rest of the world'.⁵⁶ While Jung's definition has application primarily to the psychological study of individuals it is also relevant to the persona (or image) which is constructed by the nation-state. The national image may be presented in a multitude of ways, including through the media, the Internet, personal networks, publications, cultural displays, conferences, and the behaviour and visibility of its people – all activities utilised by public diplomacy. The national image, along with the national identity, and values are at heart of what makes a

⁵⁴ Preamble, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.

⁵⁵ N Minnow, former chairman of the RAND Corporation Board of trustees and former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, quoted in Wolf, Rosen, 'Public Diplomacy: how to think about and improve it', p.iii.

⁵⁶ C Jung, 'Psychological Types'. *Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 6*. Princeton University Press, August, 1971.

nation state attractive to a spectrum of audiences (that is, to foreign publics in like-minded states, or those living in nations with contrasting values and political systems), and form the basis from which nations build their soft power. Leonard, Small and Rose note that ‘there is a dynamic relationship between who you are and what you do’.⁵⁷ Leonard furthermore links this notion of identity to public diplomacy whereby:

Public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods which can create either an enabling or disabling environment for individual transactions. Work on particular issues will feed off the general image of a country and reflect back onto it – in both positive and negative directions.⁵⁸

The Senate Inquiry addressed the issue of Australian image both through the Inquiry proceedings and in the Final Report. Participants to the Inquiry indicated that there was work to be done to improve Australia’s image overseas. According to DFAT officials, Australia’s public diplomacy program is intended to convey the ‘broad message to the outside world that Australia is diverse, dynamic and pluralistic’.⁵⁹ The concern that surrounds such a message is that it is not a message that is unique to Australia, but is mirrored by many other Western nations, and does not necessarily differentiate Australia on the highly competitive global playing field. It is not clear whether, or to what extent this message has been successfully received, by which audiences, and to what end.

Some commentators, including participants in the Senate Inquiry process, and Australian writers like Chris Wallace note that in the absence of a unique message about the Australian identity underpinned by credible values, many overseas (and domestic) audiences automatically default to images of the natural environment. One participant in the Senate

⁵⁷ Leonard, Small, Rose, ‘Public Diplomacy in the “Age of Schisms”’, p.6.

⁵⁸ Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, *Public Diplomacy*, p.9.

⁵⁹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p.16.

Inquiry, a representative of foreign media stated, 'Australia has not really had a great interest in its image overseas, apart from that we have to look nice and cuddly because we want to get the tourists here'.⁶⁰ Australian author, David Malouf commented a decade ago that 'visitors to our country are still drawn mainly because of the promise of exotic landscapes and creatures, by sun, surf and the special interest of our Indigenous people; they are seldom disappointed'.⁶¹ Yet he continues to note that these elements do not provide full insight into the 'complex vision of who we are and what we have achieved' and a place relevant to 'the international present'.⁶² A more recent essay by Australian writer, Chris Wallace notes that 'the wider world has locked us into a virtual Nolan painting circa 1955, with embroidery at the edges courtesy of Paul Hogan's films of the 1980s'.⁶³ She concludes that the 'trail out of this impasse is unclear'.⁶⁴ DFAT officers currently serving overseas (and holding responsibility for public diplomacy activities) openly acknowledge the deficit in Australia's image noting that 'Australia has no national dress, national songs nor literature that are widely embraced... and we are left with an apologetic use of indigenous imagery (which most of us do not understand), Crocodile Dundee images of the outback (where few of us live), kangaroos (which we shoot) and Kylie. Hardly enough to define a country'.⁶⁵

As an interesting contrast, political rhetoric surrounding Australian values and identity are clear. For example, the values underpinning the Australian identity are frequently noted in broad terms as liberal and democratic values that form the basis of a free, pluralistic society, manifested through such notions as freedom of speech, protection of human rights and

⁶⁰ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, Thursday 12 April 2007, p32.

⁶¹ D Malouf, Foreword in 'Securing our Future', *Major Performing Arts Inquiry Final Report*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1999, p94.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ C Wallace, 'Clean, orderly and laminex coloured', *Re-Imagining Australia*, Griffith Review, Griffith Graduate Centre, August 2008, p.136.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Interviews, Confidential Source including current and former Senior DFAT Officers August-September 2009.

freedom of the media, freedom of religion.⁶⁶ According to the *Life in Australia* publication produced by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship since 2007 for people applying to live in Australia either permanently or temporarily, Australian society values:

Respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual, freedom of religion and commitment to the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, equality of men and women, and a spirit of egalitarianism that embraces mutual respect, tolerance, fair play and compassion for those in need and pursuit of the public good; and equality of opportunity for individuals regardless of their race, religion or ethnic background.⁶⁷

It is not clear which Australians, outside of those working in the relevant bureaucracy provided input into the definition of the Australian values for the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. While those people applying for visas to come into Australia must sign their understanding of and commitment to these Australian values, there is some evidence to suggest that these values are not necessarily fully understood, nor consolidated within the broad Australian society.⁶⁸ Indeed events such as the Cronulla riots, and the more recent bashings of Indian students in Melbourne provide high profile examples of a possible fracture between the political rhetoric and broad Australian sentiment when it comes to Australian values. Continuing this theme of incongruence in Australian values, prominent Australian writer and expatriate businesswomen, Jill Kerr Conway argues that:

almost all our popular images express anti-civic values, and do so very powerfully. The great heroes celebrated in Australian myth (who are white and male) are outlaws. They are Ned Kelly, or they are non functional or dysfunctional white males who can't bond with anyone – like the Man from Snowy River.⁶⁹

If Australia is to pursue effective, strategic public diplomacy, and to project the Australian identity and underpinning values towards the rest of the world (including through a mechanism like the *Life in Australia* publication), there is room to widen the debate, consideration and input around identity and values.

⁶⁶ T Ewins, 'Contesting the constructs of national identity and values', *Online Opinion*, 27 September 2007.

⁶⁷ Department of Immigration and Citizenship, *Life in Australia*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2007.

⁶⁸ Certainly, those citizens born in Australia are not required by Government to read, understand or sign their commitment to obey such values.

⁶⁹ Kerr Conway, quoted in Wallace, 'Clean, orderly and laminex coloured', p.139.

Without dwelling overly on the negative aspects of the values debate, there are also positive outcomes to be gained through broad community debate relating to an:

...enlarged notion of who we are, what we are about and why we are here. Perhaps we need to look further, wider, deeper into Australia ourselves...and think about what is in front of us instead of settling for the received story.⁷⁰

The same DFAT officers quoted earlier also provide some ideas, including that Australia needs to:

understand and embrace Indigenous Australia, including through the introduction of Indigenous folklore, imagery, language and colours through Australian schools, create and protect national customs and cultural icons, support and promote Australian technical experts and intellectual talents overseas, and promote Australia overseas as the oldest nation on the planet.⁷¹

The purpose of this thesis is not to define Australia's values, identity or image. However, the discussion highlights a richness of ideas within the Australian public that could be harnessed into a meaningful discussion and definition of values, identity and image for the purpose of promoting Australia overseas. Such an exercise would be costly to the public purse, but both challenging, exciting and potentially extremely productive. As will be discussed in a later chapter, this level of public engagement can be achieved most effectively through various public diplomacy mechanisms (utilising technology solutions, such as e-policy initiated by Canada to gain public input into the development of foreign policy), and can contribute positively to subsequent and outward public diplomacy activities.

4.2.2 Australia's place within Asia – a question of identity and values

The discussion about how the Australian identity and underpinning values have been subject to ongoing challenges by virtue of the tension that exists between Australia's geographic location within the Asia Pacific region, and largely European cultural makeup and historical

⁷⁰ C Wallace, 'Clean, orderly and laminex coloured', p.141.

⁷¹ Interviews, Confidential sources including current Senior DFAT Officers, August-September 2009.

ties, identified in the previous chapter vis a vis Huntington's clash of civilizations theory. As alluded to previously, Australia has for much of the last century thought of itself, and been thought of as 'an Anglophonic and Anglophilic outpost – tied by history, language, culture, economics and emotion to Europe and North America'.⁷² Such positioning has been reinforced by factors such as Australia's unwavering alliance with the United States, the white Australia immigration policies of the past, the popularity of the One Nation anti-Asian sentiment in Australian politics through the 1990s, and a voting connection (that continues today) to the Western and Others Group (known as WEOG) within the United Nations General Assembly system.⁷³ Yet the reality of Australia's geographic positioning, and subsequent implications for the broader Australian national interest, has encouraged attempts at the deliberate reframing of the national identity and values for the Asian Pacific audience.⁷⁴

As discussed earlier, the Australian identity debate and rhetoric has moved back and forth markedly since 1983 as the various political leaders from Hawke to Keating, to Howard, and now to Rudd, have sought to make their mark on Australia's foreign policy approach, respond to external events and crises and build strategic regional alliances to protect national interests. Under the Hawke and Keating Labour administrations from 1983 to 1996, Australia sought to expand and deepen engagement and its identity within the Asia Pacific

⁷² Evans, Grant, *Australia's foreign relations in the world of the 1990s*, p.348.

⁷³ A Burke, 'Australia's Asian Crisis', *Australian Humanities Review*, 2001. Extract from Anthony Burke, *In Fear of Security: Australia's Asian Anxiety*, Pluto Press Australia, Sydney, 2001, <http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-June-2001/burke.html>

⁷⁴ R Garnaut, 'Australia and North East Asian Ascendancy', *Report to the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs*, AGPS, Canberra, 1989; R Robison, 'Asian Engagement Necessary', *The Australian*, 28 October 1998; A Milner, 'The Rhetoric of Asia', in Cotton J, and Ravenhill, J (eds), *Seeking Asian Engagement*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997; R Robison, 'Comfortable and Relaxed in Asia Too', *The Australian*, 20 September 1996; P Keating, *Engagement: Australia faces the Asia Pacific*, MacMillan, Sydney, 1999; D Jones and A Benevuti, 'Tradition, Myth and Dilemma of Australian Foreign Policy'; and P Gorjao, 'Australia's dilemma between geography and history: how consolidated is engagement with Asia' *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol 55 (3), 2009, pp.360-374.

region.⁷⁵ Australia's role in regional coalition building, particularly through the APEC forum was pronounced. Inspired by the outstanding economic growth of the region Australian policy faced up to its geographic location, Australian leadership began to talk of living in an East Asian hemisphere nation, and sought to move Australia's regional approach 'beyond comprehensive engagement to an new plane of partnership and integration'.⁷⁶ Commentators on international policy even wrote of the 'Asianization of Australia'.⁷⁷ Yet this accelerated pace of Australian engagement with Asia and the accompanying rhetoric created also a sense of unease and resistance and ignited cultural uncertainties within both intellectual and mainstream thinking. In particular, this fracture reflected a disconnect between Australian and Asian values.⁷⁸

The spectacular rise of the Asian economies from the 1980s through to the late 1990s against difficult odds and despite unconventional practices 'encouraged the sense of Asian-ness and with it a strong element of cultural assertiveness'.⁷⁹ The geographic spread of the economic growth sparked vigorous debate and discussion on significance and importance surrounding the role of Asian values in creating the conditions for the economic boom. The 'Asian

⁷⁵ Refer to, Keating, *Engagement: Australia faces the Asia Pacific*, Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*; and G Sheridan, *Living with Dragons: Australia Confronts its Asian Destiny*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1995.

⁷⁶ A Milner, 'Neighbours must be our priority', *The Australian*, 1 August 2000.

⁷⁷ For example, Sheridan wrote of Australians becoming a 'honey-coloured people', himself in a state referred to by Higgott and Nossal of 'hyperenthusiasm for the Asianization movement'. G Sheridan, 'Australia's Asian odyssey', in *Living with Dragons: Australia Confronts its Asian Destiny*, G Sheridan, (ed), Allen and Unwin, Sydney, pp.18; and A Millar, 'The Rhetoric of Asia', p.35; also Higgott and Nossal, 'Odd man in, odd man out'

⁷⁸ This ongoing fracture has been well discussed and documented in Australian academic literature, including for example in: Broinowski, *About Face*; Burke, 'Australia's Asian Crisis'; J Howard, 'Australia and Asia: Enduring Engagement', *Address to the Asia-Australia Society*, 8 May 1997; R Dalrymple, *Continental Drift: Australia's Search for a Regional Identity*, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2003; M Curry, *Identifying Australia's Region: From Evatt to Evans*, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.49, No.1, May 1995, pp17-31, Stephen Fitzgerald, *Is Australia an Asian Country?*; and Dutton, M and Kessler, K, 'Australia's Asia: An Illiterate Future'; Beeson, Jayasuriya, 'The Politics of Asian Engagement: Ideas, Institutions and Academics'; Higgott and Nossal, 'Odd man in, odd man out: Australia's luminal position in Asia revisited – a reply to Ann Capling', pp.623-634; A Robertson, 'Australia's position in Asia: closer than ever', *Policy*, Vol 22 (2), Winter 2006, pp26-32; and P Gorjao, 'Australia's dilemma between geography and history: how consolidated is engagement with Asia'.

⁷⁹ Milner, 'Neighbours must be our priority'.

economic miracle' represented a uniquely Asian model, which 'thrived on co-operative rather than individualistic principles, and upon sets of moral values that ensure individualistic behaviour is responsible to the larger interest of social cohesion and economic progress'.⁸⁰

Such rhetoric has been a powerful force in East Asian public diplomacy consolidating the populations of diverse nations, towards East Asian regionalism and promoting Asia as a culturally cohesive region with a distinct set of Asian values that set the region apart from western society.⁸¹ It is evident that deep cultural factors exist providing a sense of cohesion and solidarity (notably against the West), within the region. The difficulty is that varying interpretations abound as to the precise origins and nature of Asian values, and they appear to exist and operate in a subjective, ambiguous and undefinable sense. On this point, political commentator, Sheridan notes that the 'very cultural forces, [are] too subtle, too slippery, above all too alive, to be captured by a document designed by a government committee'.⁸² Barr highlights the difficulty in defining Asian values by quoting Singapore's (then) Foreign Minister who, in closing the 1977 Asian Values and Modernization Conference noted:

I have very serious doubt as to whether such a thing as Asian values really exists...If it has any meaning at all it is merely a convenient way of describing the heterogeneous, conflicting and complex network of beliefs, prejudices and values developed in the countries which for geographical purposes have been grouped in Asia.⁸³

Nonetheless, given the focus on Asian cohesion, while the nations of Asia were receptive to Australian regional initiatives including through the APEC framework, individual nations,

⁸⁰ R Robinson, 'Is Asian engagement necessary?', p11.

⁸¹ Barr states that the term 'Asian values' was introduced at a 1977 academic conference on 'Asian values and Modernization'. Barr, 'Cultural Politics and Asian Values: the tepid war', p.31.

⁸² Sheridan, *Asian Values, Western Dream: Understanding the New Asia*, p. 294. Refer also to selected readings identified in footnotes 545, 548 and 549 for expanded discussion on the perceptions of Australia within the Asia-Pacific region.

⁸³ Singapore Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam quoted in Barr, *Cultural Politics and Asian Values: the tepid war*, p.31.

including Malaysia did not fully embrace Australia as a natural member of the region.⁸⁴ As a vast island desert continent made up of a small, homogenous population, supporting a liberal parliamentary democracy, an adversarial media and with strong links on the one hand to a colonial past and on the other to ‘an overbearing power bereft of moral fibre’, Australia is at times seen as an anomaly to the region.⁸⁵ Former Australian Ambassador, Richard Woolcott noted bluntly that:

some of our neighbours see us – or some of us – as still racist, uncouth, assertive, self-righteous, intrusive, and pre-occupied with sporting prowess; as unwilling to make the effort to understand their cultures and the complexities of their societies.⁸⁶

Woolcott’s concerns around the Australian identity in the Asia Pacific are shared clearly by author and academic Alison Broinowski who quotes the stereotyped images of Australians according to Asians as, ‘distant and irrelevant, British and second-rate Western; stooges of the United States and lacking in independence; ...uncouth and rude; racist and ignorant of Asia; ...simple and uncultured, ...and not Asians’.⁸⁷ More recently, Australian former Prime Minister Bob Hawke reconfirmed the importance of the Australian image to advancing strategic interests in Asia, commenting that ‘even today, for many Asians, and particularly the Chinese, Australia was little more than a big farm or a big quarry’.⁸⁸

Such comments suggest that Australia simply had not invested sufficiently in the long term elements of public diplomacy that build upon commonalities, including commonality in values. The raft of high level leaders and ministerial visits and associated rhetoric, which characterised the diplomacy efforts of the Hawke-Keating era may not have been enough to demonstrate the required level of understanding and engagement with the distinct and

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Woolcott, ‘Stop Waltzing and advance our nation fairly’.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Broinowski, *About Face*, p.11.

⁸⁸ R Hawke, Australia and China Relations, *Australia-China Futures Dialogues - Annual Leader's Lecture*, Brisbane, 1 December 2009.

complex societies and populations within the region. Broinowski quotes Indonesian scholar David Reeve who comments on Indonesian perceptions of Australia in a way that might be relevant for the perceptions held across Asia, noting that ‘negativity about Australia was largely due to the fact that Australia had provided nothing in its defence, no dispassionate and intellectually compelling counter-story to which Indonesians have access’.⁸⁹ However as Broinowski also notes:

image like culture has a “soft edged” reputation in official Australia. It is an area that serious politicians and bureaucrats stay out of. But perceptions of Australia... define its acceptability in the region, and underlie many of the decisions that are made about engagement with Australia.⁹⁰

Remembering that public diplomacy is about ‘building the Australian image and reputation in a way that might advance national interests on the global stage’, there is value in revisiting the concept that image and identity are central themes that must run through the many strands of public diplomacy activity.⁹¹ As Senator Payne noted in the presentation of the Senate Report to Parliament, the connection between Australia’s image and reputation and subsequent ability to influence the regional and global agenda in ways that promote Australian foreign policy interests is strong.

Drawing on Payne’s words, ‘our international reputation can either promote or undermine our foreign policy objectives’,⁹² this thesis does not propose that Australia launch a full scale public relations campaign to identify and brand a possible Australian image. However, the officially presented Australian image, ‘that Australia is an open liberal democracy, and tolerant society’ does little to differentiate this country from many others in the competitive

⁸⁹ Broinowski, *About Face*, p.231.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p.230.

⁹¹ Wesley, ‘Planning Australia’s Foreign Policy Future’, p.1.

⁹² Senate Hansard, 16 August 2007, p.43.

global environment.⁹³ The 2020 Summit Report initiated an important conversation in this regard noting that ‘Australia must be *smart* and *creative* in exercise of its international influence’.⁹⁴ Melissen suggests that the first step in improving public diplomacy practice is to ‘make an effort to express a nation’s identity - who the citizens of the country are and what they stand for’.⁹⁵ Siracusa similarly proposes an Australian Year Book that provides a collection of essays that tell the rich and textured story of Australia’.⁹⁶ More so as Broinowski points out, ‘rarely do the debaters ask what identity people in other [Asian] societies ascribe to Australia’.⁹⁷ According to Broinowski, critics within the region complain that ‘Australians state, they don’t ask, they talk down and as a result they don’t hear, or don’t comprehend, what others think’.⁹⁸ Further conversations around the Australian image might do well to take this statement as their launching point to start the discussions across both domestic and foreign audiences about what is important about the Australian identity, and how can that identity be best conveyed for a strategic outcome.

4.3 The elements that shape public diplomacy actions

The evolving discussion and definitions provide insight into the nature of public diplomacy, but are not entirely helpful in establishing a clear picture of the purpose, shape and scope of activities that are employed through public diplomacy. For example, despite the lengthy discussions initiated through the Senate Inquiry, the concept and actions defined as public diplomacy remained vague and ever-elusive for many of the participants. This is not surprising; public diplomacy is ‘far from uniform’, and the activities which may be classified

⁹³ T Holloway, Economic Counsellor, Australian Embassy in Beijing, presentation on Australia-China Relations, Beijing, 28 October 2009.

⁹⁴ Australia 2020 Summit, *Final Report*, May 2008, p.357.

⁹⁵ Gonesh and Melissen, ‘Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice’, p.19.

⁹⁶ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007.

⁹⁷ Broinowski, *About Face*, p.219.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

as public diplomacy are extensive.⁹⁹ Any attempt to prescribe the activities that may be viewed as public diplomacy would simply be impractical, because of the fluid nature of the subject matter, and extensive array of opportunities. Additionally, as Evans clearly submits in his arguments about the ‘good international citizen’ approach, a number of government-generated activities like defence, aid or humanitarian relief programs, while not specifically designed to achieve a public diplomacy outcome, may nonetheless have a positive impact on the promotion of a nation’s image.¹⁰⁰

Taking an instrumentalist view of public diplomacy activities, Sharp defines public diplomacy as, ‘the process by which direct relations with the people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented’.¹⁰¹ McClellan progresses a similar line defining public diplomacy as:

the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country or countries that will enable target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of the advocate country’s foreign policy objectives.¹⁰²

Naren Chitty, Foundation Chair in International Communication and Head of the Department of International Communication at Macquarie University, pursues a similar line to Sharp and McClellan noting that public diplomacy comes in different forms, ‘an important bundle of approaches ...in winning over domestic and external public opinion in relation to foreign policy’.¹⁰³ Importantly, both McClellan and Chitty articulate a clear linkage between public diplomacy activities and the advancement of foreign policy. This is a critical aspect in

⁹⁹ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.4.

¹⁰⁰ Evans, ‘Australia’s foreign policy response to global challenges’, p.2.

¹⁰¹ Sharp, ‘Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy’, p.106.

¹⁰² M McClellan, ‘Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy’, *Address to the Vienna Diplomatic Academy*, 14 October 2004, viewed on 20 October 2009, <
<http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/45.htm>>

¹⁰³ N Chitty, ‘Public Diplomacy, Developing the Road Rules’, *Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Regarding the Nature and Conduct of Public Diplomacy*, April 2007, p.12.

defining public diplomacy, also picked up in the definition provided by the Senate Committee.

The complexity in establishing the shape of public diplomacy is due in part to the lack of clarity which surrounds the definition of public diplomacy mentioned earlier, but more importantly, due to the recognition of the dynamic nature of the activities employed; the wide-range of potential contributors to a public diplomacy program, distinct audiences to which messages are conveyed, and the fluid environment within which this occurs. In their discussion of public diplomacy, Evans and Grant reinforce the notion that ‘that there is no single approach to be employed, rather that the approach and tools utilised in each instance of public diplomacy will depend on the objective intended and audience targeted’.¹⁰⁴ Van Ham and Melissen draw similar conclusions that there is no one size fits all approach to public diplomacy.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, based on the consensus that there is little value in simply listing public diplomacy activities in isolation, this thesis will approach public diplomacy from the perspective of the factors that are considered to shape the scope and nature of public diplomacy activities. Such factors include the content focus, the objective and the potential outcomes that drive public diplomacy development, and the categories of activities that may be relevant to these.

In McClellan’s view, the three streams of culture, information and education constitute the major platforms from which a range of activities may be proactively launched for nations to engage with foreign audiences for the purpose of building a nation’s image and influencing and persuading foreign publics for positive foreign policy outcome. McClellan starts to

¹⁰⁴ Evans, Grant, *Australia’s Foreign Relations In the World of the 1990s*, p.66.

¹⁰⁵ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’; and Van Ham, ‘Power, Public Diplomacy and the *Pax Americana*’, in Melissen (ed), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, p.60-61.

provide concrete shape to the understanding of what public diplomacy looks like and his perspective is widely supported.¹⁰⁶ In particular, there is evidence to demonstrate that McClellan's views were relevant to the Australian context as proposed by public relation academic Smyth in her 1995 publication which states that 'public diplomacy programs cover the three areas of information, education and cultural relations'¹⁰⁷ as appropriate in 'the shaping of attitudes in other countries in a way which is favourable to our national interests'.¹⁰⁸ This view reveals the practical and operational aspects of public diplomacy, where the academic definitions discussed in the previous chapter may be lacking. McClellan teases public diplomacy activities out into broadly tangible, actionable and measurable categories. In support of this approach, the Canadian government states that public diplomacy includes, 'cultural events, conferences, trade shows, youth travel, foreign students in country; Canadian studies abroad and visits of opinion leaders'.¹⁰⁹ In a similar approach, d'Hooghe scopes out the range of operational instruments employed in China's public diplomacy efforts as 'instruments such as the media, internet, events and projects, celebrities, and publications...newspapers and journals'.¹¹⁰ Essentially both examples of public diplomacy at work can be distilled back to the broad categories noted previously of information, education and culture.

Nye also incorporates the identified content streams of information, education and culture but from a different perspective. Nye refers to these streams as having relevance across each of the three dimensions he identifies as shaping public diplomacy 'requiring relative proportions

¹⁰⁶ Rasmussen, 'Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practices. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image*, p.230. This description of public diplomacy was supported in Interview, Alison Broinowski, 12 October 2007.

¹⁰⁷ R Smyth, 'Managing Australia's Image in Asia', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 49 (2), November 1995, p.223.

¹⁰⁸ Evan quoted in Smyth, 'Managing Australia's Image in Asia', p.223.

¹⁰⁹ Diplomacy: Canada's International Policy Statement - A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, tabled in Parliament April 2005.

¹¹⁰ I d'Hooghe, 'Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China', in Melissen (ed), *The New Public Diplomacy: soft power in international relations*, Palgrave, 2007, p.96.

of direct government information and long-term cultural relationships'.¹¹¹ The three dimensions examined by Nye include i) daily communications, involving an explanation of domestic and foreign policy decisions; ii) strategic communication; and iii) the development of lasting relationships with key individuals.¹¹² DFAT largely adopts Nye's dimensions as the core of the official approach to public diplomacy in the submission to the Senate Inquiry.¹¹³ Each of these dimensions, and the type of activity they generate is then relevant to the Australian context and will be explored in more detail below.

Before exploring Nye's dimensions of public diplomacy, McClellan also reminds us that there are five layers of message or strategic communication, the 'communication pyramid' that he considers requires consideration in the public diplomacy context.¹¹⁴ These stages, represented from the most broad through to the most targeted include, i) creating awareness; ii) developing interest; iii) developing knowledge; iv) growing advocacy; and v) action. McClellan indicates that each layer of the communication pyramid represents a sequential step process for public diplomacy, where each layer supports the next, for the ultimate purpose of achieving actions intended to advance the strategic interests of the advocate nation.¹¹⁵

An additional primary layer of 'providing information' is required in adapting the communications pyramid to the Australian context, based on the feedback provided by

¹¹¹ Nye, *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*, p.112.

¹¹² Ibid, p.107.

¹¹³ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program*, April 2007, p.21.

¹¹⁴ McClellan, *Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy*.

¹¹⁵ McClellan, *Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy*. As McClellan notes such action may include increased support via votes to the advocate nation within a multilateral negotiating forum such as the UN, agreement by the target country to progress a bilateral treaty, and so on.

Australian government agencies, and particularly DFAT through the Senate Inquiry.¹¹⁶ For example, during the Senate Inquiry hearings, a senior DFAT officer referred to the information provided to both foreign and domestic audiences through annual reports, fact sheets and other information publications produced by DFAT (primarily online), as significant to the public diplomacy program. As the same official noted, ‘the annual report is another resource that people can use to get a sense of the overview of what our foreign and trade policies are all about’.¹¹⁷ While important to government governance and reporting processes, this type of information is purely a one-way stream of information about the advocate state. Providing information in the form of annual reports, country reports, trade statistics and national profiles will generally occur as a routine function of any Ministry or Department of Foreign Affairs.¹¹⁸ By nature, such information provision does little to engage or encourage dialogue with the audiences, as one Senator commented in discussion with the DFAT official during the Inquiry, ‘I do not know that a lot of people read your annual report’.¹¹⁹ The various layers of communication are relevant to each of the dimensions of public diplomacy identified by Nye, and may be utilised across each of the three dimensions to varying degrees to achieve a specific outcome.

4.3.1 Daily communications

The first dimension of daily communications highlights the need for governments to communicate to both the domestic and foreign public the nature, rationale and implications of decisions made on a day-to-day basis. This dimension is based upon the 24/7 data stream to which many domestic and foreign publics have access. Government officials in most nations have encouraged close relationships with media, and in particular international media to

¹¹⁶ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p.3.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Such basic information provision is more closely aligned to the requirements of public affairs.

¹¹⁹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p.6.

ensure that an explanation of domestic politics reaches foreign publics. Currently there are over 120 foreign correspondents based in and registered as operating from within Australia.¹²⁰ These correspondents play an important role in reporting on domestic Australian events to foreign publics.

The tools most frequently employed to achieve awareness within the target country include radio or television broadcasts, media relations, or mass cultural events. Activities such as localised Radio Australia broadcasting, positive media coverage relating to Australian initiated projects relevant to the target audience; or possibly presentations made by high ranking government officials of the advocate state to a broad target audience in their local language are employed effectively to create awareness of the advocate state. Frequently, local languages or locally engaged staff might be employed to engage in awareness creating strategies as a more relevant and appropriate way with the audience. For example, where budget has allowed, the use of local presenters utilising local languages such as Bahasa Indonesian has been a strategy utilised by Radio Australia in its broadcasts within the Asian region.¹²¹

Leonard warns that a failure to engage foreign publics in the explanation of domestic policy can have unintended yet serious consequences. For example, racially motivated riots which occurred in Sydney suburbs including Cronulla, leading the government to employ 'lock-down' tactics for a brief period were reported extensively in foreign media. The internationally distributed newspaper, *The Guardian*, reported on the riots as 'a day of racial

¹²⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program*, p.21. In particular the DFAT Submission notes that foreign journalists based in Australia are networked through their membership of the Foreign Correspondents Association (FCA) based in Sydney.

¹²¹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p.62.

unrest that turned a popular beachside suburb into a battleground... in the worst race riots Australia has witnessed'.¹²² In his speech to the National Newspaper Publishers' Conference in 2006, Alexander Downer former Minister for Foreign Affairs conceded that in this instance 'people overseas got the impression that law and order had broken down across Sydney, which was not the case'.¹²³ Based on the broad and negative international media coverage of the events, and Downer's subsequent remarks, it would appear that the Australian Government may have failed to adequately involve foreign media in its daily explanation of events and issues. A similar example might be made of the Australian media response to the Indian student bashings which occurred in Melbourne in 2009.¹²⁴

Implicit in the daily communications requirements of public diplomacy activity is the need for a central international media watch and rapid response capability to address or answer to misleading or negative information reported in foreign media which has the potential to damage a nation's image and soft power. This informational activity is 'largely reactive aimed at containing rumours rather than spreading truth of a higher order'.¹²⁵ For example, the United States Department of State has become adept at this kind of rapid response information based activity, having established a 24 hour media watch capability as part of the massive public diplomacy apparatus aimed at improving the United States image in the Moslem world. In her November 10, 2005, testimony before the House Committee on International Affairs, the (then) Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes described the activities of the rapid response office at the state department:

it monitors global news and issues a one page report each morning with alerts as needed so that busy policy makers focus not only on the news environment in Washington or America, but also around the

¹²² B O'Riordan, 'Race Riots turn Sydney suburbs into Battleground', *The Guardian*, 12 December 2005.

¹²³ Downer, 'Foreign policy values and the media'.

¹²⁴ Dubey, 'Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under'; Bolt, 'We're not the racists'; BBC News, 'India Calls Off Australia Events', 11 June 2009: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8094682.stm.

¹²⁵ Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve', p.20.

world. This has already proven to be an effective early warning system that helps us respond quickly to misinformation or emerging stories.¹²⁶

DFAT reports to engage in such a model of rapid response activities, ‘ensuring that negative stories do not have an adverse cumulative effect’.¹²⁷ In action, rapid response is media focussed and may include the preparation of ‘talking points’ or media responses for ambassadors and other diplomatic staff on key media issues.¹²⁸ The Cronulla riots received such attention, as did the Indian student crisis.¹²⁹ Of interest, a senior DFAT official commented in interview that at that point in time (July 2009), DFAT’s Images of Australia Branch was wholly focused upon responding to negative media regarding the Indian student incidents with no resources or budget to move outside the scope of such daily issues management.¹³⁰ Crisis and daily communications management is an important component of public diplomacy practice, though relatively minor in terms of impact and value on building longer term relationships with foreign audiences. However, as the *The Guardian*, Downer’s comments, and the recent Lowy Institute Report all indicate there is room for sustained improvements in Australia’s approach to ‘issues management’.¹³¹

4.3.2 Strategic communications

In his description of strategic communication, Nye refers to the need for the development of a simple set of themes that may be focused around specific policy initiatives. As if adopting Nye’s approach, DFAT points the Senate Inquiry to the need for ‘targeted information and

¹²⁶ Former Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes quoted in M Hand, ‘Department of State ‘rapid response office’’, *PR Week*, 17 November 2005.

¹²⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program*, p.22.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Interview, Senior DFAT official, 13 July 2009.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ O’Riordan, ‘Race Riots turn Sydney suburbs into Battleground’, *The Guardian*, 12 December 2005; Downer, ‘Foreign policy values and the media’; Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’.

campaigns that play an important role in influencing official perceptions about the public image of Australia'.¹³² There are a number of activities which fall into this category of strategic communications, including role of ambassadors and diplomatic staff in engaging directly with foreign publics and with the media on issues of concern. DFAT points to issues such as 'Australia's position on the World Trade Organisation negotiations, bilateral FTA negotiations, Australia's engagement in the Middle East, and efforts to fight terrorism' as examples of issues requiring a strategic communications approach.¹³³

Strategic communication is at the centre of the US approach to promoting a positive image of the US and Western liberal democracy into the Moslem world in an effort to counter terrorism. To this end, Former Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes publicly noted the 'importance of ambassadors to speak out on major issues, to do more speeches and television interviews... in ways that are clear, concise and coordinated'.¹³⁴ Hughes also referred to:

plans to set up regional public diplomacy platforms to expand our television presence, and make programs such as our speaker's bureau more targeted and strategic, noting work on a technology initiative to make greater use of web chats, graphics, streaming video perhaps even text messaging to help *amplify* our message and make it relevant to younger audiences.¹³⁵

Other examples of strategic communication include the fostering of direct relationships with foreign journalists, and sponsoring improved networks, through a journalist exchange or visit program within a host country. Many states utilise their own media networks to broadcast programs into a range of external states. DFAT sponsors the Australian Broadcasting

¹³² Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program*, April 2007, p.22.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Former Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes quoted in M. Hand, 'Department of State 'rapid response office''. In line with Hughes approach, at a presentation by the American Consul-General to Bond University in May 2009, the Consul General noted one of her key official duties was to 'tell and promote the American story overseas'.

¹³⁵ Former Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes quoted in Hand 'Department of State 'rapid response office''.

Corporation (ABC) to provide a television service into the Asia Pacific. Known as the Australia Network, the 'service contributes to Australian public diplomacy efforts through the delivery of high quality and contemporary programming in education, arts, culture and drama as well as through the provision of news and current affairs into the region'.¹³⁶ Additionally, DFAT sponsors radio broadcasts via the ABC's Radio Australia which frequently provides a service into areas of the Asia Pacific area where television or other media are less likely to penetrate. Currently DFAT estimates that Radio Australia reaches an audience of 100 million across the Asia Pacific region, and is celebrating seventy years of broadcasting within the region.¹³⁷

Cultural diplomacy, generally understood as a subset of public diplomacy involving 'the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding' can be utilised effectively within Nye's second dimension of strategic communication.¹³⁸ According to DFAT, cultural projects provide a 'neutral platform for projecting an image of Australia and generating a better understanding of our values'.¹³⁹ For example, the Director of the National Gallery of Victoria explained during the Senate Inquiry into Australia's public diplomacy program that:

it is not uncommon for an exhibition to be sent from one country to another to coincide with a state visit by the head of that country. The presence in another country of great cultural objects or works of art can give tremendous focus to the culture and history of the country from which they have come.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade regarding the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program*, p.5.

¹³⁷ There is no evaluation data either collected or available that provides evidence of the impact of such a wide net of broadcasting. This is not inconsistent with the Australian Government's overall output or activity focused approach to public diplomacy. Evaluation of the impact of public diplomacy activities, including through opinion surveys was one of the recommendations made by the Senate Committee. Also regarding seventy years of international broadcasting refer to Radio Australia website: <http://blogs.radioaustralia.net.au/70/>

¹³⁸ Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', p.22.

¹³⁹ R Sorensen 'Artists help public diplomacy to push Australian 'soft power', *The Australian*, 17 April 2007.

¹⁴⁰ G Vaughan, Director, National Gallery of Australia, quoted in Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March 2007.

Furthermore, a bureaucrat from the City of Melbourne Council participating as a witness in the Senate Inquiry noted that incorporating cultural elements, including a performance by the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra, into negotiations between the City of Melbourne and the City of Milan ‘provided the Consulate-General with very high level access into the city of Milan that they were not able to get just by struggling through the normal diplomatic channels’.¹⁴¹ Cultural diplomacy is an important part of the strategic communication process of public diplomacy. The one off engagement of a national orchestra, the touring of a national art exhibition or indeed presentation of a new film to coincide with an official diplomatic activity can be effective in promoting a particular theme or responding to a key issue.

A highly successful strategic communications campaign delivered by Tourism Australia some twenty five years ago was known as ‘*Come and Say G’Day*’.¹⁴² The campaign utilised Australian icon Paul Hogan, already internationally known for his Crocodile Dundee persona from the movie of the same name, and specifically targeted the American public from 1984 through to 1990, inviting them to come to Australia to ‘throw another shrimp on the barbie’.¹⁴³ While there was minor public controversy within Australia around Hogan’s stereotypical culturally deficient image, ‘the campaign was hugely successful, and in just three months, Australia leapt into America’s top ten ‘most desired’ holiday destinations, having previously failed to make the top 50. Visa applications skyrocketed.’¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, Thursday, 15 March 2007, p.20.

¹⁴² ABC Television, *The Gruen Transfer*, ABC, 18 March 2009, found at: <http://www.abc.net.au/tv/gruentransfer/stories/s2518823.htm>

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

More recently, the highly publicised world-wide release of Baz Lurhmann's film *Australia* provides a contemporary example of Australian strategic public diplomacy communication. Ironically this contemporary campaign relies on a movie that promotes a 1940s image of life in Australia's Northern Territory, drawing on the predictable themes of the macho bushman / drover, overt racism and the White Australia policy, ties to British colonialism and shifting dependence upon the Americans at time of Japanese aggression in the Pacific, all set in the wide-open space and mixed with a tinge of Australian sarcasm and mockery. *Australia* represents a A\$50 million advertising campaign sponsored by Tourism Australia based around the theme of promoting Australia in a 'fresh and compelling' light as a tourist destination, 'at a time when the tourism industry is struggling in a tough market made worse by the tyranny of distance, a strong Australian dollar and the high price of fuel'.¹⁴⁵ The movie was released in seventy countries, including Australia. The advertising campaign, supported by long-term, under-pinning structures including internet campaigns, fact sheets, campaign kits, media releases and ongoing localised appearances by high profile Australia actors Hugh Jackman and Nicole Kidman, ran from October 2008 until the middle of 2009. The public announcements, key interviews and information surrounding the campaign, including release of the movie have been tightly coordinated through Tourism Australia, and the network of Australian diplomatic staff have been involved in the promotion of the campaign.¹⁴⁶

Generally strategic communications programs such as advertising campaigns or tourism promotions run over a medium term. Such programs should be measurable in terms of contribution made towards achievement of the key outcome for which the program was developed, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative measures. The '*Come and Say G'day*' campaign, provides an example of successful Australian public diplomacy in action,

¹⁴⁵ Tourism Australia, *Baz Lurhmann to conceive ad campaign*, Tourism Australia Media Release, 29 July 2008.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

with measurable strategic outcomes. Tourism Australia states that the key markets aligned with the release of *Australia* included ‘those markets from which Australia generates most visitation: the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United Kingdom, South Korea, France and Italy’.¹⁴⁷ Tourism Australia has a range of mechanisms for measuring the success (that is, the economic benefit derived from the uptake and acceptance) of their campaigns, including for *Australia*. For example, in the month following the release of the movie, Tourism Australia had identified that 580 million people worldwide had been exposed to the campaign, the number of visitors to the Australia.com website has increased by 17 percent, box office rankings on a country by country basis were high, 40 positive media visits had taken place, worldwide tickets sales amounted to USD\$150 million, and national admissions at that stage stood at three million dollars.¹⁴⁸ Despite this, a critical indication of success for such a campaign must be the impact that it has on tourism, measured through international visitor numbers. While there were positive one-off anecdotes about the number of tourist bookings made as a direct result of the movie, it is clear that international visitation is on the decline. Tourism Australia’s Managing Director, Geoff Buckley blames the current global economic crisis for the downturn, noting instead that ‘by keeping Australia front of mind amongst consumers we can minimise the impact of the crisis this year and lay a foundation for a return to growth in 2010’.¹⁴⁹

Evidently, Australian strategic communications programs have achieved some measurable success in obvious markets (particularly the United States, Europe and Japan), largely by relying upon well used and stereotypical images of both the natural Australian environment

¹⁴⁷ Tourism Australia website found at <http://www.tourism.australia.com/Marketing.asp?sub=0451&al=2913>. By curious contrast, the target markets identified in a separate statement on the website, Tourism Australia lists Australia’s top ten markets (in terms of no. of visitors annually in descending order), as New Zealand, United Kingdom, Japan, United States of America, China, Singapore, Germany, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.

¹⁴⁸ Tourism Australia, ‘Movie Drives Publicity Boom’, *Tourism Australia Media Release*, 14 January 2009.

¹⁴⁹ Geoff Buckley quoted in, ‘Movie Drives Publicity Boom’.

and Australians themselves. Yet, as Robyn Archer articulated in the Tenth Manning Clarke Lecture there remains a fundamental problem with campaigns such as *Australia*, namely a problem of authenticity, which is, in public diplomacy:

...important, [and] one of the problems many have had with the film *Australia* is that it lacks authenticity. Not just that it starts with documentary newsreel, leading the audience to think this will be factual, and then proceeds with pure fiction, but that many have come away saying 'this is not Australia and I don't want the global cinematic audience to think so.'¹⁵⁰

As discussed earlier, some (including those practitioners working in the field) might argue that the Australian image, identity and underpinning values are far richer than our expensive strategic communications programs let on. Evans noted in 1995 that:

while more recent surveys have revealed an increased interest in Australia's intellectual and cultural achievements, knowledge of our technological capabilities remains at a comparatively low level...and a more complex and well rounded image of Australia than currently exists would greatly help us to build the sort of multidimensional relations in Asia that we seek.¹⁵¹

While Evans' view may be dated, this thesis suggests that in light of comments made through the Senate Inquiry process and by interview participants, Evans' view remains valid today. Archer adds to the tenor of Evans' view, in her 2009 lecture regarding Australia's national identity which can be applied to the projection of that identity in the globalized world noting that "Perhaps [it is] not whether we survive or not, but in which way we survive, with how much strength and dignity, and to what degree an authentic sense of national identity is nurtured, as opposed to that which is myopic, naive and kitsch".¹⁵² Bearing in mind the arguments launched by scholars such as Melissen who advocate the 'two way engagement model of public diplomacy', the Australian public may be ready to engage in a fresh dialogue

¹⁵⁰ R Archer, 'The Price of Survival', Tenth Manning Clarke Lecture, National Library of Canberra, 3 March 2009 accessed on 9 December 2009 at: http://www.manningclark.org.au/html/Paper-Archer_Robyn-The_Price_of_Survival.html.

¹⁵¹ Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the world of the 1990s*, p.71.

¹⁵² Archer, 'The Price of Survival'.

about what constitutes the Australia image, identity and values that are portrayed overseas through strategic communications.¹⁵³

4.3.3 Lasting relationships

The third key dimension to public diplomacy activities relates to the ‘development of relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels’.¹⁵⁴ This third dimension deals with those relationships that are developed predominantly through people-to-people linkages (incorporating each of the elements of information, education and culture), that deliver fundamental and long-term trust and change in relations between states. Diplomats are generally on the front-line of establishing lasting relationships within the host country, but as noted earlier from a traditional diplomacy perspective such relationships exist primarily at the government to government level without branching out to grassroots.

The communication requirements of government-to-government contact are vastly different to the informal and less predictable demands of public outreach and relationship building. This is an area in which the skills and attributes of diplomats in the field may be tested as they adapt to integrating public diplomacy activities into the scope of their daily work. There is significant opportunity for public diplomacy to leverage the goodwill, grassroots relationships and networks created through officially sponsored personal contacts which are not primarily intended to be public diplomacy activity. For example, the relationships that may develop between Australian peace-keepers or Australian Federal Police and local communities in East Timor or the Solomon Islands can play a significant role in the building of a positive image of Australia within the broader community.

¹⁵³ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.18.

¹⁵⁴ Nye, *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*, p.109.

Included within this third dimension are those relationships formed with foreign publics through cultural, media or educational visit programs – usually targeted at certain sectors of the foreign public audience.¹⁵⁵ Frequently bilateral institutions, councils or foundations (such as the nine that exist within Australia) operate to support key relationships through funding and coordination. However, there is a significant challenge in the ability of the state to track and maintain the positive relationships developed through such programs.¹⁵⁶ The work of the bilateral institutions, councils or foundations is extremely valuable in fostering opportunities for exchange, but limited due to a small funding pool made available through DFAT.¹⁵⁷ The evidence presented to the Inquiry was not clear whether any of the foundations, councils or institutes evaluate the programs they run, and the Senate Inquiry called for greater accountability from each of these.¹⁵⁸

Other organisations linked to the foundations frequently undertake the networking, coordination and communications functions on behalf of the foundation and/or DFAT. One such successful entity is Asialink, established by the University of Melbourne and Myer Foundation. With an authoritative submission and presentation regarding Australian public diplomacy to the Senate Inquiry, Asialink receives funding from DFAT and other sources ‘to work with business, government, philanthropic and cultural partners to initiate and strengthen Australia Asia engagement’.¹⁵⁹ The scope of work undertaken by Asialink includes, ‘high level forums, international collaborations, school programs and cultural exchanges, Asialink

¹⁵⁵ Refer also to Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives’, p.86, for further discussion about public diplomacy activities aimed at ‘social process of building relationships and fostering harmony’.

¹⁵⁶ For example, the failure of DFAT to adequately track the person-to-person relationships created through exchange programs was highlighted through the Senate Inquiry.

¹⁵⁷ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, pp.189–193.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Asialink website found at: http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/about_asialink

engages the corporate, media, arts, education, health and community sectors – reaching from primary school children to prime ministers – in Australia and Asia’.¹⁶⁰ The scope of work falls clearly within the boundaries of building lasting relationships through public diplomacy, with enormous breadth of reach utilised by DFAT, yet several members of the Senate Inquiry Committee were unaware of the public diplomacy focus of work carried out by Asialink. Similarly, DFAT’s approach to such entities appeared through the Senate Inquiry process to be ad hoc. Asialink and other organisations of a similar ilk provide an excellent resource and network for DFAT in building and maintaining strong personal relationships, and might be better coordinated and supported for this purpose.

An additional and untapped source of potential relationships with foreign publics exists in a nation’s diaspora – ‘those nationals who live offshore on a permanent or long-term basis’.¹⁶¹ As noted in the previous chapter, research undertaken by the Lowy Institute reveals that ‘the Australian diaspora is large, at approximately one million people; prosperous, well educated, well connected, mobile and well disposed to Australia’.¹⁶² The diaspora of any nation provides an immediate network often deeply engaged with foreign publics. There is enormous potential for any nation to connect and engage with the diaspora network as an additional means of promoting its image effectively and building soft power through people-to-people connections.

Ultimately building lasting relations ‘works best with a long term horizon’.¹⁶³ As Zaharna notes, relationship building strategies are ‘best measured by their duration, strength and

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ M Fullilove, C Flutter, ‘Diaspora the world wide web of Australians’, *Lowy Institute Paper 04*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2004, p.vii.

¹⁶² Ibid p.vii.

¹⁶³ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.18.

perceived satisfaction among the parties'.¹⁶⁴ The scope and nature and objectives of the activities required to build lasting relations are vastly different to both those required for the crisis response, and strategic communications. Relationship building is about cultural or educational exchange opportunities, conferences, visits or other ways of enabling person to person dialogue.¹⁶⁵ In many ways, this final dimension as described by Nye offers the most true form of public diplomacy that not only facilitates the understanding and engagement of foreign audiences, but more importantly enables the influencing of foreign audiences at times when it counts, and is particularly relevant in countering security threats including those posed by terrorism.¹⁶⁶

4.3.4 Cultural diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy requires separate consideration as a distinct subset of activity within the broad scope of public diplomacy.¹⁶⁷ There is agreement among other scholars, that the cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are indeed entwined.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, cultural diplomacy is approached within this thesis as a subset of public diplomacy and an important tool in building and maintaining lasting relationships. Indeed, 'culture is a powerful instrument in the hands of diplomats to pursue national interest in an un-intrusive, intelligent, convincing and cost-effective manner'.¹⁶⁹ Melissen observes that the accent of cultural diplomacy is increasingly on engaging with a foreign audience,...on mutuality and the

¹⁶⁴ Zaharna, 'Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives', p.92.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. Zaharna provides a range of relationship building activities that include cultural and educational exchanges, leadership visits, cultural and language Institutes, development aid projects, and non-political networking schemes.

¹⁶⁶ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.60.

¹⁶⁷ Zaharna makes the point that 'few scholars or practitioners are able to articulate what a relationship building approach would entail beyond conducting more cultural and educational exchange programs,' and for this reason, 'some scholars argue for keeping cultural relations separate from public diplomacy'. Zaharna, 'Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives', p.92. Melissen, is one such scholar who distinguishes clearly between cultural relations and public diplomacy, but from a position of pragmatism recognises the 'growing overlap' between the two. See Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', p.23. See also M Rose and N Wadham-Smith, *Mutuality, Trust, and Cultural Relations*, The British Council, London, 2004.

¹⁶⁸ C Schneider, 'Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy that Works, in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Melissen, J (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, pp.147-168.

¹⁶⁹ <http://textus.diplomacy.edu/textusBin/BViewers/oview/culturaldiplomacy/oview.asp>

establishment of stable relationships, ...on the long-haul, ...and on winning hearts and minds and building trust'.¹⁷⁰ This description, even from Melissen's viewpoint, places cultural diplomacy well within the bounds of public diplomacy more generally.

Because cultural exchange usually involves the sharing of or engagement in creative expression, it is enjoyable, and cuts across traditional boundaries and attracts natural audiences.¹⁷¹ As with public diplomacy itself, the parameters of cultural diplomacy are fluid. Schneider defines cultural diplomacy as 'the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding'.¹⁷² Scholars such as Mette Lending of Norway argue that cultural diplomacy extends beyond the traditional boundaries of ideas, information and art, as noted earlier, to incorporate a 'country's thinking, research, journalism, and national debate'.¹⁷³ Based on Lending's broad definition, culture provides an open window into the identity and values of the state, honing in on the currencies of soft power.¹⁷⁴ For this reason, cultural diplomacy is likened to the 'linchpin of public diplomacy' provides a common ground for lasting relationships of trust upon which political, economic and military agreements may be made.¹⁷⁵

Drawing upon the definition of public diplomacy discussed earlier, the intent of any cultural diplomacy program should be to develop soft power capabilities, to engage public opinion, gain influence and shape political agendas beyond the boundaries of the traditional diplomacy and statecraft. While cultural diplomacy activities may be subtle in nature, there should be

¹⁷⁰ Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', p.21.

¹⁷¹ Schneider, 'Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy that Works', p.147.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ M Lending, *Change and Renewal: Norwegian foreign Cultural Policy 2001-2005*, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2000, p13-14.

¹⁷⁴ The currencies of soft power being 'values, culture, policies and institutions', as articulated by Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p. 30-32.

¹⁷⁵ Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve', p.27.

no mistaking the requirement for underlying intent or foreign policy objective. Much more than propaganda, public relations or even nation branding, the soft power capability that comes from cultural diplomacy, 'is as important as the usual bilateral economic and political negotiations that go on at government-to-government level'.¹⁷⁶ If successful, cultural diplomacy may deliver real and tangible benefits to the foreign policy agenda of the implementing state. This would obviously include linkages from cultural diplomacy programs to increased investment and improved economic performance through tourism and trade, but more so, cultural diplomacy activities might be explicitly linked to achieving international strategic priorities, such as positive outcomes on climate change and global security (including anti-terrorism).¹⁷⁷ However, it needs to be noted that in the case of Australia such a proposition has not ever been sufficiently tested, let alone investigated or developed either internally via DFAT or independently.

Cultural diplomacy is overtly values-and-identity driven, and provides a foundation for large audiences to connect through creative and personal experiences with areas in which they find a commonality in values and identity. Experiences of other states, including the United Kingdom, China and Germany indicate that there is strategic value to be found in this subset of the broader public diplomacy field. Further exploration of the approaches taken by other states, and a comparison to key Australian approaches provides a basis for contrast with Australia's program. Such exploration reveals that Australia has taken steps to implement a reasonably active cultural diplomacy program, but one that is to some degree directionless, conducted at times for its own sake, and requires rethinking.

¹⁷⁶ Sorensen, 'Artists help public diplomacy to push Australia's soft power', *The Australian*, 17 April 2007

¹⁷⁷ Refer to Broinowski, *About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia*, p.232.

The United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany have embedded cultural diplomacy into the bureaucracy through the establishment of the British Council and Goethe Institute (founded in 1934 and in 1951 respectively). Both institutions are largely subsidised by government, but exist as autonomous institutions with the purpose of promoting the language and culture of the respective states abroad. China's Confucius Institute, and the French Alliance Francais networks follow a similar approach. Other states, while not formally recognising cultural diplomacy through structural or institutional entities such as these, can point to significant funding of cultural exchange and activities abroad (whether such activity includes exchange programs for youth, or supporting a major performing arts initiative overseas), usually sponsored through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

These cultural structures and networks have relevance to the states from which they originate. As Wesley comments, the Goethe Institute emerges following World War Two as a deliberate attempt on the part of Germany to repair and rebuild a national identity and reputation, both internally and externally; the Confucius Institute are a critical thread in progressing China's strategy of peaceful rise; Alliance Francais ensures the French language is preserved and spoken across the globe.¹⁷⁸ Such cultural exchange can impress audiences, and change broader attitudes and perceptions about a culture or state, ultimately contributing to soft power reserves of the state.¹⁷⁹

This view of cultural diplomacy is supported through Australian practice.¹⁸⁰ DFAT plays a coordinating role in Australia's cultural diplomacy program through the relevant statutory bodies, including the AICC and the Australia Council for the Arts. The AICC defines the aim

¹⁷⁸ Goethe Institute Website: <http://www.goethe.de/en/index.htm>, Confucius Institute Online: <http://www.chinese.cn/en/>, Alliance Francais Australia: <http://www.alliancefrancais.com.au/>

¹⁷⁹ W Adams, 'The Art of Diplomacy', *Time Magazine*, March 2, 2009, p.42.

¹⁸⁰ For early evidence of Australian support of cultural diplomacy refer to Smyth, 'Managing Australia's Image in Asia'.

of cultural diplomacy, 'to engage overseas audiences through the delivery of high-quality and innovative arts and cultural promotions to increase their understanding of Australia's contemporary identity, values, interests and policies'.¹⁸¹

However, while the positive rhetoric exists around the role of cultural diplomacy, others, such as former Australian Ambassador, Christopher Lamb are not convinced of the inherent value or effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in advancing Australian strategic interests.¹⁸² The arguments around public diplomacy are at times vague and rely largely on anecdotal evidence. In the case of Australia, as indicated through interview comments, there are gaps in what culture is presented, to which audiences, why, and, what is achieved.

4.3.5 Australian cultural diplomacy

Certainly, Australian cultural diplomacy programs are modest compared to those of the UK, France, Germany and China. However, as noted by Wesley previously, Australia has not necessarily defined a *raison d'être* for the Australian cultural diplomacy program. Perhaps ahead of his time, Australian author, David Malouf provided pertinent observation, from an Australian perspective regarding the potential for states to leverage culture for economic benefit,

when we think of other places, France or Britain or Italy, or the US, what comes first to our mind as characterising their contribution to the world, their identity or style, is the arts they have produced books, paintings, films, their orchestras and opera companies, their galleries, their music. Either consciously or not, it is this that guarantees for us that the goods we buy from them, everything from high tech to clothes and perfumes and domestic appliances, will be of the highest quality, both of performance and design. Shouldn't we assume that others will make the same assessment of us?¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Australian International Cultural Council website. Found at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/about.htm>

¹⁸² Christopher Lamb, Interview, 13 May 2009. Michael Wesley also noted his scepticism of the strategic value of public diplomacy generally, and also cultural diplomacy in interview: Wesley, Interview, 13 July 2009.

¹⁸³ Malouf, Foreword in 'Securing the Future', p.94.

Malouf expands upon his observation to provide some direction for Australian policy when he suggests that:

our potential customers for sophisticated commodities might be more inclined to believe in the high standard of what we have to offer if they see from the films we make, the books we produce and from what we offer in the way of theatre, opera, galleries, music that we are a society that demands and produces work of the highest quality.¹⁸⁴

More recently, yet along similar lines to comments made by Malouf as noted above, Vaughan, highlighted the bearing of cultural sophistication on the Australian image when he told the Senate Inquiry that:

we at the NGV [National Gallery of Victoria] have for many years lent entire exhibitions and are increasingly lending individual works of art to other museums of art around the world. We feel that in doing this we are contributing to Australia's international standing and profile.¹⁸⁵

The AICC is a consultative body comprising government appointed representatives from DFAT, Austrade, Tourism Australia, Australia Network, the Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Screen Australia and the Australia Council for the Arts, along with a range of members representing the business, arts and community sectors. The stated objective of the AICC, which meets twice a year is:

to promote Australia overseas through the arts and culture, reinforcing Australia's standing as a stable, sophisticated, tolerant and innovative nation with a rich and diverse culture and promoting an accurate and positive image of Australia's Indigenous people.¹⁸⁶

The AICC determines the priority countries for cultural diplomacy, along with a country specific focus per year. These priorities, as discussed earlier in this thesis, are not necessarily linked to the broader foreign policy objectives. Indeed the AICC appears to work in isolation

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. Malouf's statements were made in the context of Australia's 1999 Major Performing Arts Inquiry Final Report, and while 'cultural diplomacy' per se was not referenced specifically within the report, such statements indicate that the underpinning elements and understandings of cultural diplomacy were resonating at that time within enclaves of Australia's cultural sector.

¹⁸⁵ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 15 March 2008, p. 37.

¹⁸⁶ AICC website found viewed on 20 October, 2009, <<http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/about.htm>>

from the greater foreign policy development areas of DFAT.¹⁸⁷ Such isolation may explain the sense of disconnect between the many cultural activities that Australia promotes overseas, and the subsequent lack of significant impact of such activities on advancing strategic objectives.

Events such as the Venice Biennale are utilised by galleries like the NGV as an opportunity for Australia to showcase and raise the profile of the best of Australian contemporary art in front of a diverse and prestigious international audience.¹⁸⁸ Australia's presence at the 2009 Venice Biennale, managed by the Australia Council, successfully presented a contemporary and diverse image of Australia, particularly through the works of four emerging artists in the *Once Removed* exhibition. The exhibition was intended to resonate with international audiences via 'its themes of displacement and environmental issues, while also revealing a diversity of work by early career Australian artists'.¹⁸⁹ The artists comprising *Once Removed* represented culturally diverse backgrounds – including emigrant, immigrant and Indigenous-Chinese perspectives of Australia. The pavilion style, highly competitive approach of the Vienna Biennale, requires a precision and clarity of approach by exhibiting states that will engage international audiences while articulating a sense of national place and identity.¹⁹⁰ Importantly, the curator of *Once Removed* indicates through her essay accompanying the *Once Removed* installation an understanding of the soft power that is derived by a nation through such an event, not only from quality of the art itself, but implicitly through the choice and themes of the artists:

¹⁸⁷ Interview, Confidential Source, DFAT Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Branch, DFAT, 22 June 2009.

¹⁸⁸ Venice Biennale Australia: <http://www.australiavenicebiennale.com.au/>.

¹⁸⁹ Australia 53rd International Art Exhibition, *Once Removed*, Australia Council for the Arts, 2009, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.australiavenicebiennale.com.au/once-removed>>

¹⁹⁰ F Fenner, *Once Removed*, Australia 53rd International Art Exhibition, Australia Council for the Arts 2009, viewed on 20 October, <<http://www.australiavenicebiennale.com.au/once-removed>>

Over the past two decades, a politically-led re-articulation of Australia's place in the world has resulted in a surge of interest from local and international audiences in Aboriginal art, and a new Australian preparedness to engage with the cultures of neighbouring Asian and Pacific nations.¹⁹¹

Another notable example of Australia's cultural diplomacy exchange and soft power is evident in the permanent exhibition of Australian Indigenous contemporary art in the entrance to the recently opened museum of world Indigenous art, Musee de Quai Branly.¹⁹²

The Museum features:

more than 300,000 art works and artifacts from Asia, Africa, Oceania and the Americas. What makes Australia's contribution unique is that, at the request of architect Jean Nouvel, eight Aboriginal art works made especially for the museum will be embedded in its walls, ceilings and glass frontages. In contrast to many other artworks, at the time of opening, seven of the eight Australian artists were living, and were striking in their blend of the traditional and contemporary.¹⁹³

The exhibition aligns with the recognition that contemporary Australian Indigenous art has attracted interest and attention around the world since the 1970s. As Vaughn of the NGV confirmed to the Senate Inquiry, 'there is a general acknowledgement that this is a significant contemporary movement within the international context, and many exhibitions of Australian Indigenous art have been sent overseas in recent decades'.¹⁹⁴

From that perspective, the permanent exhibition of Australian Indigenous art within the Museum is a significant promotion of Australia. As Australian arts writer, Jeremy Eccles noted in his review, 'with five million visitors passing through the Museum each year, it will be noticed'.¹⁹⁵ Some even refer to the building (one of three making up the Museum complex) as 'the Australian building'.¹⁹⁶ As would be expected, Australian diplomats played

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Musee de Quai Branly Website accessed at: <http://www.quaibranly.fr/en/>

¹⁹³ J Button, 'Artists' stories will live on forever in Paris', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 September, 2005.

¹⁹⁴ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, Thursday 15 March 2008, p. 37.

¹⁹⁵ J Eccles, 'Musee de Quai Branly', *Australian Art Review*, February 2006, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.artreview.com.au/art/profiles/galleries/musee-du-quai-branly.aspx>>

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. As noted in 'Design for Diplomacy', the design and appearance of the embassy or other structure directly related to the state overseas, can reflect the values of the state, and may symbolise the characteristics of the state identity, such a vitality, enduring strength, decency and innovation. As such the qualities of the built

a major role in facilitating connections with the Indigenous artists. The Australian Embassy in Paris also ran a cultural program to convey a positive and strong image of Australia's Indigenous people and culture to coincide with the Museum opening.¹⁹⁷

The significance of the Musee de Quai Branly opportunity for positive cultural diplomacy is impressive. However, cultural diplomacy serves a purpose and has its limits. In this case, there are also difficulties in reconciling the image of Australia's Indigenous people and culture presented by the Australian Embassy, and the reality for many Indigenous people living within Australia, both prior to and following the exhibition launch. Not to diminish the significance or importance of the international presentation of such artworks, the message they send to foreign audiences may be slightly skewed, and more aligned to propaganda than public diplomacy.

For example, at the time of the Museum's opening, a large proportion of Australia's Indigenous population across urban, regional and remote communities within Australia were (and continue to) enduring chronic 'disadvantage with respect to life expectancy, child mortality, access to early childhood education, educational attainment and employment outcomes'.¹⁹⁸ Indigenous communities continue to be characterised by far higher rates of domestic and family violence issues, alcohol and drug abuse, incarceration, and deaths in custody than other identified community groups within Australia.¹⁹⁹ Shortly after the Musee

structure can 'contribute to the conduct of diplomacy, encourage international commerce and enhance cultural exchange'. Refer to The American Institute of Architects, 'Design for Diplomacy: New Embassies for the 21st Century', *A Report for the American Institute of Architects 21st Century Embassy Taskforce*, Washington DC, 2009, p.2.

¹⁹⁷ DFAT *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program*, April 2007, p.14.

¹⁹⁸ Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Jenny Macklin MP, 'Closing the Gap', *Budget Statement 2007-2008*, 13 May 2008.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. The Budget Statement provides one source of information regarding the situation of Indigenous Australian peoples and communities. There is a substantial body of evidence available through both Federal and

de Quai Branly exhibition was opened to the (world-wide) public, the Australian Federal Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister John Howard, launched Operation Outreach as part of the a Northern Territory National Emergency Response (NTER): an Australian Defense Force operation to address child sexual abuse in the Northern Territory communities.²⁰⁰ Within this context, it is unlikely that many Indigenous Australians were aware then, or are even aware now of the prominence of Indigenous cultural artworks in the Paris museum.²⁰¹ This example highlights a concern that messages conveyed through cultural diplomacy may be disingenuous, and breach to varying degrees the underpinning requirement for truth and credibility in public diplomacy.²⁰² The example sits uneasily alongside the comments from DFAT officers that they must rely upon apologetic indigenous images in promoting Australia ('which they do not understand').²⁰³

Perhaps the lesson for Australia is that in the case of cultural diplomacy we do not necessarily need to believe or follow through on what we promote. While this may be the case for Australia, such an approach would align with difficulty to strategic foreign policy, without crossing a line into propaganda. Furthermore, such an approach would breach the widely held views, that truth and credibility are underpinning principles for successful public diplomacy.²⁰⁴ Drawing upon the similar themes in Archer's critique of *Australia* Archer reminds us of the importance of authenticity in the projection of national identity:

If we are to grow, we need our artists to sing with authentic voices. The early colonial painters' eyes were often betrayed by their cultural backgrounds – they painted Aboriginal people with European

State Government and non-government sources pointing to the entrenched and chronic disadvantage of Indigenous Australian peoples.

²⁰⁰ Department of Defence, 'Friendly hand Lent to Help Solve Outback Problems', *Media Release*, 27 June 2007.

²⁰¹ There is no specific market research or literature on this point, rendering this a purely speculative statement on the part of the author.

²⁰² As may be the case with other examples of Australian cultural diplomacy, such as *Australia* the movie.

²⁰³ Confidential Interview, Various, senior DFAT Officials, posted overseas, 9 September 2009.

²⁰⁴ A Henrikson, 'Credible Public Diplomacy: Truth and Policy, Persuasion and People', *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 32:3, Special Edition, 2008, pp.5-6; R Woolcott, 'Truth Spinning out of Control', *The Canberra Times*, 6 March 2007; Ross, C, 'Pillars of public diplomacy'.

features, the trees were not the right kind of green. By the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, though artists may still have needed the authority of European education and experiences, their eyes told them something different – the Heidelberg mob quite literally ‘saw the light’ and we started to have an authentic visual record of Australia.²⁰⁵

4.3.5 Strategic impact of humanitarian assistance

This thesis is careful not to overlook the public diplomacy impact that is achieved through humanitarian assistance and development programs. For example, Australia engaged in this indirect form of public diplomacy in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.²⁰⁶ Ten days after the tsunami occurred, then Australian Prime Minister Howard announced a \$1 billion contribution to a newly formed Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD).²⁰⁷ Australia’s actions were widely applauded in both the national and international media.²⁰⁸ Nationally, the media portrayed the announcement as a foreign policy master stroke in developing close ties with Indonesia in keeping with Australia’s status as a regional actor. Through this single announcement, Australia came to be considered as the world’s most generous post-tsunami donor at the time.²⁰⁹ The strategic contribution of such humanitarian and aid actions to Australia’s public diplomacy program should be acknowledged, even though such actions are not initiated, nor publicly recognised for their public diplomacy impact. There is value in noting such actions, otherwise known as the ‘diplomacy of deeds’, may create, as a by-product, a certain amount of goodwill, which may provide leverage for other public diplomacy activities.²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ Archer, ‘The Price of Survival’.

²⁰⁶ Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, *Australia’s \$1 billion tsunami-related aid package to Indonesia: progress on the eve of the March ministerial meetings*, Research Note No. 36, 7 March 2005.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, Wednesday 14 March, 2007, p.13.

AusAID engages routinely and as a matter of core business in the provision of development assistance, channelled particularly to key nations within our region, including the Pacific. The forms of such assistance are extremely broad and extend well beyond the provision of humanitarian relief in the event of a natural disaster, such as that provided at the time of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Other creative and strategic examples are found in projects such as the Australian-Indonesian Education Partnership. Through the Partnership, Australia has committed \$355 million to the building or expansion of two thousand junior secondary schools (including five hundred junior secondary Islamic schools), as part of a basic education program.²¹¹ Prima facie, the project is intended to support the Indonesian Government ensure universal education for Indonesian children up to the end of Secondary School education.²¹² An additional aspect of the project includes the commitment of a further \$755,000 specifically earmarked to allow Indonesian teachers to visit Australian schools and to maintain ongoing avenues of online communication between Australian teachers and students and their counterparts in Indonesia.²¹³ While not a specifically promoted public diplomacy strategy at work, there is strategic value to be derived from such a project. Not only will the communities (including local officials) be more likely to develop a favourable predisposition to Australia as a result of strong project marketing, but the project provides an opportunity for the Australian Government to directly and positively influence the teachers and young students attending the schools.

It is clear both through the information presented to the Senate Inquiry, and further exploration of public diplomacy activities through this chapter that public diplomacy is on the Australian political and bureaucratic agenda (and has been for some time), and is manifested

²¹¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Australian-Indonesian Partnership reaches 1,000 schools – 1,000 to go', *Media Release*, 12 August 2008.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

through a great many and varied activities, that involve a range of diverse actors both in the development and the delivery of the activity. Indeed, Australia's public diplomacy program is made up of many parts. For ease of reference and organised discussion, this thesis has drilled into the types of activity, rather than examined public diplomacy by agency or even activity type. Because of the sheer scope of the activities, to take such a route would potentially be cumbersome and unproductive for the purpose of this study.²¹⁴ In all, the level of diverse public diplomacy activity, varying budgets and scale of some activities, when viewed with the general level of confusion about public diplomacy within the Australian professional community, the absence of clear strategic outcomes, and inconsistent and sometimes unflattering perceptions of Australia and Australians, reinforces the original theme of this thesis that: the sum of the parts is indeed less than the whole.

²¹⁴ However, for future reference, such an 'audit' of government initiated public diplomacy activity would be valuable activity to undertake, and was within the scope of the Senate recommendations.

CHAPTER 5: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY – AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

5.1 The components of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy

Having explored the current status of public diplomacy in the current Australian context, with reference to the emerging definitions and practice shaping public diplomacy activities, the purpose of this chapter is to now align public diplomacy to key foreign policy concepts, incorporating an appreciation for both the policy process and policy content. This analysis drives to the core of the critical gap in Australian public diplomacy as identified through this thesis. The aim therefore, is to begin to unravel the layers of consideration that support the delivery of effective public diplomacy in line with strategic foreign policy priorities.

The Senate Inquiry noted in the Final Report that the ‘paucity of material on public diplomacy in Australia, and confusion surrounding the use of the term was one of the most striking features of the Inquiry’. As a result, the Inquiry spent a significant amount of effort on establishing an understanding of the meaning and significance of, and exploring the scope of activities encompassed by Australia’s public diplomacy program. While the Inquiry covered these areas, and revealed a great many parts to the Australian public diplomacy program, the Committee fell short of identifying or developing a mechanism for these parts to be viewed as a consistent and coherent whole.

In particular the Committee did not venture into further analysis of public diplomacy from a more in-depth policy context, highlighting a significant gap in Australian understanding of the concept of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. The responsibility of this

thesis therefore, is to specifically address this gap in understanding and apply a logical framework that might enhance discussion and understanding of public diplomacy, with specific reference to public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy in the Australian context. In particular, to be effective at a strategic level public diplomacy must be ‘more than a series of ad hoc responses to changing events...’, indeed public diplomacy ‘...must be incorporated into the ground floor of foreign policy’.¹

Chapter 5 is central to delivering upon this thesis’ responsibility. Much of the discussion sparked through the Senate Inquiry was overtaken with the discussion of public diplomacy activities or outputs. DFAT led the charge with a submission weighted towards demonstrating the breadth of activity carried out by the department.² The Committee commented upon the ‘sheer number of activities’ presented by DFAT and other government agencies, but acknowledged that Australia’s public diplomacy activities are not well understood by Australians in general’.³ The activity-based approach tends towards disorganisation and distraction, without improving the fundamental understanding of why public diplomacy is important to the strategic foreign policy interests of the state, and what public diplomacy can achieve from a strategic standpoint.⁴

This approach, while indicative of fundamental gaps in theoretical understanding of public diplomacy, is also indicative of Australia’s still immature development in relation to the full and contemporary concept of public diplomacy. With the recognised limitations of Australia’s current public diplomacy program in mind, the Senate Committee reminds us that

¹ C Ross, ‘Public diplomacy comes of age’, *Washington Quarterly*, vol 5, no.2, spring, 2002, p1.

² Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program*, DFAT, Canberra, April 2007.

³ Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, p27.

⁴ Henrikson, ‘What can Public Diplomacy Achieve?’, p.1.

‘clearly, it is in Australia’s interest to make sure that its public diplomacy programs are effectively meeting their objectives, that it is strategically and deliberately tailoring its public diplomacy in support of long term foreign policy objectives’.⁵ This chapter explores the need highlighted, but not taken up further by the Senate Inquiry, to understand public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy.

The connection between public diplomacy and foreign policy is a theme that resonates in international literatures on public diplomacy (particularly from authorities such as Melissen, Henrikson, Hocking). However, the discussion around this theme tends to remain at a superficial level. This chapter takes the discussion to greater depth, exploring the key policy process phases and the implications for strategic policy development and delivery within those stages. Such discussion provides the scaffolding upon which a policy-based public diplomacy framework can be further constructed. The policy-based framework, examined further in Chapter Six, provides a new comprehensive way of viewing of public diplomacy. The policy process and content perspectives identified through this and subsequent chapters, and utilised in the framework have not been examined or drawn together in this way before, and provide a unique lens through which the practitioner can identify, develop and deliver the many parts that make up a public diplomacy program in a consistent and coherent way.

The tenor of international discussion indicates public diplomacy is a concept that ‘matters more than ever...and plays a critical role in establishing a country’s position in the world, and delivering tangible policy objectives’.⁶ Hocking also reminds us, ‘public diplomacy remains a technique for achieving policy objectives’.⁷ Furthermore, with reference to the impact of public diplomacy in connecting with the broader public audience and building soft power,

⁵ Ibid. p.25.

⁶ Melissen ‘Between Theory and Practice’; p.24.

⁷ Hocking, ‘Rethinking the new public diplomacy’, p.37.

Hocking quotes Hill who pointed out that ‘the rationale of the soft power paradigm is that *people* are targets of foreign policy’.⁸ Yet, as reported by the Senate Committee, Australia is not necessarily engaged in the discussion of emerging trends in the theory and practice of public diplomacy, nor is public diplomacy considered in strategic planning of longer-term foreign policy objectives. Australian commentators such as Wesley openly admit that they are sceptical of the strategic foreign policy value to be derived from public diplomacy.⁹

Wesley’s views reflect the historical rationale, also presented by Evans and Grant, that public diplomacy has not ever been relevant to the ‘serendipitous’ Australian experience or foreign policy approach.¹⁰ For example, Australia has not ever had to focus on re-building an image in the same way that the Germans did after their devastating defeat in World War Two.¹¹ Nor has Australia ever felt the obligation or need that appears to fall upon great civilisations or cultures to systematically spread their culture or language across an uncivilized world, as the French have through Alliance Française, the British through the British Council or the Chinese through the Confucius Institute.¹² As Executive Director for one of Australia’s leading think-tanks on international policy, Wesley holds an influential position among the opinion-leaders, and his view will be important in any further discussions of public diplomacy. While at the time of interview Wesley remained to be convinced about the strategic policy merits of public diplomacy in Australia, his more recent writings demonstrate

⁸ Ibid, emphasis added.

⁹ Interview, Michael Wesley, Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 13 July 2009.

¹⁰ Wesley, ‘Planning Australia’s Foreign Policy Future’, p.1.

¹¹ Interview, Michael Wesley, Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 13 July 2009. See also Evans, Grant, *Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, p.69.

¹² Ibid. However, Australian practitioners might be cautioned against relying on the usual excuses as to why public diplomacy has little relevance to Australia. Comparing the Australian experience with that of post world war Germany or to the early experiences of France, China and Britain is of little value, firstly because the Australian experience was vastly different, and secondly because the public diplomacy methods and outcomes in use following World War II and through the Cold War period have since evolved sufficiently to be distinguished from those exercised in the post world war environment.

a small but evident shift in thinking to incorporate considerations of public diplomacy in specific policy matters.¹³

The brief attention paid by the Australian Government to public diplomacy strategies during the 1990s reflected an early pragmatic recognition of a shift in the Australian international outlook, and a corresponding need for the Government to establish Australia's international positioning, and 'reputational advantage' via lasting (regional) relationships and alliances, and with a strong Asian-Australian identity.¹⁴ However, this brief attention to public diplomacy as a strategic foreign policy instrument during the 1990s (preceded by decades of traditionalist foreign policy), was subsequently followed by a return to overtly traditionalist foreign policy.¹⁵ As a result in the change in administration, public diplomacy did not progress past the very early stages of development within the Australian foreign policy structure. Ultimately, the impact of Prime Minister Howard's more traditionalist approach to foreign policy development and delivery saw public diplomacy fade into the background of Australian foreign policy, while at the same time in other parts of the world the public diplomacy moved to the forefront of innovative foreign policy and practice.

More importantly, the international environment, and Australia's place in that environment has shifted substantially. The foreign policy founded in 'serendipity' is not longer relevant nor appropriate. Australia must operate within an international system in which the power dynamics are far more complex and fluid, and the issues confronting the global community

¹³ In particular, refer to Wesley, 'China an unfamiliar terrain', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 September, 2009. As Wesley notes, 'Getting China right means Australia must make the effort to *better understand China...*' emphasis added. The reference to 'understanding China' directly relates to public diplomacy activities that enable wider understanding of the target foreign audience.

¹⁴ Evans, 'Australia's foreign policy response to global challenges'.

¹⁵ Howard was not a supporter of overt public diplomacy activities, but nonetheless by virtue of events and situations played a role in fostering strategic elements of public diplomacy, including through Australia's high profile role in brokering solutions with the International Monetary Fund during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, alongside the strong Australian response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. Both are examples of indirect public diplomacy impacting positively on the Australian image and reputation.

and the players in that community are indeed ‘wicked’; that is they involve ‘complex interdependencies emerging between social, environmental and economic issues, and across national, regional and international policy spheres’.¹⁶ Dealing with ‘wicked problems’ requires not only agreement between governments, but also agreement and deliberate action of targeted and mass population groups if solutions are to be developed and progressed.¹⁷ Public diplomacy can have an impact within this sphere.

The globalised and competitive world in which Australia now seeks to secure a place will require innovations and adaptations in diplomatic practice, and new forms of engagement with foreign audiences, who hold the power of influence. The very recent shift in global dialogue, governance and management towards the G20 presents Australia with the opportunity to exercise creative diplomacy and skilful persuasion across a range of audiences and nations. Consequently this shift brings about significant change in addressing some of the most pressing issues of national concern, including global economic performance and climate change.¹⁸ To achieve significant and strategic outcomes in this environment, public diplomacy can not be seen as an ‘add-on’ to diplomatic efforts, but must align closely to the development and delivery of foreign policy.

¹⁶ The terminology of the ‘wicked’ problem is relatively new and frequently applies to issues or problems that reflect a significant degree of social complexity, among other defined characteristics. The term was first coined by Horst Rittel in H Rittel and M Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, *Policy Sciences*, Vol 4, 1973, pp. 155-169. For further reading, see also, K Christensen, ‘Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems - Interview with Jeff Conklin’, *Rotman Magazine*, Winter 2009; J Conklin, ‘Wicked Problems and Social Complexity’, *Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems*, Wiley, October 2008, p.1. The statement made by L J Peter that ‘some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them’, may apply to these wicked global problems, such as climate change, quoted in J Conklin, ‘Wicked Problems and Social Complexity’, p.1.

¹⁷ For example, McClellan’s communication pyramid becomes relevant, where the public diplomacy methods employed must be appropriately engaging of the audience to spark action by that audience.

¹⁸ D Shanahan, ‘Kevin Rudd looks for wider role in G20 as he launches global campaign’, *The Australian*, 10 September 2009.

The Senate Inquiry devoted considerable time contributing to the understanding of what public diplomacy means to various players within Australia, including across the actors involved in delivering various aspects of Australia's public diplomacy program. From this perspective, the Inquiry was impressive in the breadth of witnesses involved, scope and depth of content covered during a relatively short timeframe of operation. The nature of the questioning highlighted aspects of why public diplomacy might be important from an international perspective, including a discussion of soft power, alongside an examination of public diplomacy structures and activities, and identification of possible deficiencies in the Australian context. However, while the Senate Inquiry illuminated many facets of public diplomacy, the discussion lacked strategic logic, which according to Gregory, is not unusual in discussions relating to public diplomacy.¹⁹ The Senate Committee unravelled many threads relating to the 'how' and 'what' of an Australian public diplomacy program, but was not positioned to address the questions that remain around 'why public diplomacy?'. Nor was the Committee positioned to weave those threads together into any meaningful or logical pattern for understanding public diplomacy. As a result, the Final Report presented a picture of Australian public diplomacy program as a series of fragmented and ad hoc responses to a changing environment, otherwise referred to as a 'hotch-potch'.²⁰ The Inquiry outcome did not produce recommendations that would enable Australian public diplomacy to be framed or organised differently to deliver coherent and tangible policy objectives in the Australian context. This is the point at which the responsibility of this thesis, to specifically address the existing gap in understanding and apply a logical framework that might enhance discussion and understanding of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy in the Australian context, becomes relevant.

¹⁹ See B Gregory, 'Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field', p.285.

²⁰ Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.62.

The growing body of international literature around public diplomacy presents different perspectives on this emerging field of contemporary public diplomacy. Gregory and Cull approach public diplomacy through a chronological lens pivoting around Edmund Gullion's introduction of the phrase 'public diplomacy' in 1965 with the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Centre for Public Diplomacy at Tufts University.²¹ However, a chronological discourse does not adequately unravel the many layers that make up public diplomacy, nor set public diplomacy into context as a policy framework. Others seek to present public diplomacy as an examination of the public diplomacy methods and techniques.²² Once again, while providing a platform for organising discussion, such a perspective does not necessarily distil the critical features of public diplomacy, nor provide sufficient guidance on when certain methods should be employed above others, and for what purpose. However, the work of Henrikson and Leonard, supported by Melissen tends to anchor the discussion of public diplomacy more closely to a policy perspective, and strikes a chord. This perspective is of most value to the practitioner with an interest in strategically and deliberately tailoring public diplomacy in support of long-term foreign policy objectives.

For this reason, there is value in drawing together key concepts in foreign policy thinking into a public diplomacy framework that allows the practitioner to apply a degree of organisation and logic in a policy context. To do this, this chapter will firstly draw upon and examine

²¹ In his essay Cull provides a history of the term public diplomacy which is centred around Gullion's coining of the phrase in 1965 with the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Centre for Public Diplomacy at Tufts University. Use of the phrase was a clever exercise in word politics and marketing, as devised by Gullion. Public diplomacy was successfully relaunched as a fresh alternative to the phrase 'propaganda', which had accumulated negative connotations as a result of the previous decades of the Cold War. Through his reinvention of the term, Gullion abandoned the negative baggage associated with the term 'propaganda' and presented a more sophisticated and savvy image than could even be achieved through use of the term 'public relations'. Refer to Cull, 'Public diplomacy before Gullion: the evolution of a phrase', and Gregory also 'Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field'.

²² Zahara, McClellan, Sharp and Rasmussen all present different discussions of public diplomacy from an instrumental perspective. Refer to Zaharna, 'Mapping out the Spectrum of Public Diplomacy'; McClellan, 'Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy'; Rasmussen, 'Discourse analysis of EU public diplomacy: messages and practice'; and Sharp, 'Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy'.

aspects of the work of Gyngell and Wesley in their definition of the Australian foreign policy process.²³ Gyngell and Wesley bring together the practitioner and academic perspectives in describing the foreign policy process, as it occurs in Australia. Their work looks specifically at how Australia deals with the outside world, and outlines a clear process for the development and delivery of foreign policy.

The policy process must be examined in parallel with the distinct and separate thread of thinking supported in the work of contemporary European scholars and practitioners, (Henrikson, Melissen, Hocking and Leonard) in relating public diplomacy objectives and methods to the recognised strategies that drive foreign policy.²⁴ As shall be seen, Henrikson's work supported through writings of other contemporary scholars provides deeper analysis of the broad foreign policy continuum, and identifies the major strategic considerations and subsequent tactical instruments deployed by governments through public diplomacy.²⁵

5.1.1 Understanding foreign policy concepts

Firstly, this chapter must set the scene for a discussion around key foreign policy strategies. To do so, requires first a definition of policy (which, for the purposes of this thesis should be read as public policy) and subsequently foreign policy, and to briefly outline the structures and processes involved in the development and delivery of such policy. Gyngell and Wesley define policy quite simply as 'the promotion and protection of given social values within the

²³ Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, pp.17-57.

²⁴ Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve', Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', Hocking, 'Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy'; and Leonard, Small, and Rose, 'British public diplomacy in the 'Age of Schisms''.

²⁵ While key scholars such as Melissen, Hocking, and Leonard each articulate the generic and important link between public diplomacy and foreign policy, their works do not go as far as Henrikson's to articulate more closely the foreign policy strategies that might be applicable, and how public diplomacy might progress those policy strategies. Henrikson concedes that his work then stops short of defining the methods of public diplomacy that sit best against each of the foreign policy objectives. This thesis addresses this gap within the proposed framework. A. Henrikson, 'What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve', p.7.

boundaries of state responsibility by agents of the state’, and note that ‘each department of government is assigned responsibility for monitoring a certain policy space’.²⁶ The definition reveals a classical outlook on policy that is aligned with the equally contemporary, though more confined Bridgman and Davis statement that policy is ‘an authoritative statement by a government about its intentions’.²⁷ Essentially, the consistent classical view of policy which provides a foundation for further discussion of the public diplomacy system is that policy relates to the decisions and actions that ‘must to some degree have been generated or at least processed within the framework of governmental procedures, influences and organizations’ (as opposed to the decisions and actions of those outside the public sector, such as private corporations).²⁸

From this definition of public policy, there is a natural extension into a discussion of the policy subset of foreign policy described by Gyngell and Wesley as ‘the anticipation of and response to disturbances...that either originate from sources external to the country, or can be addressed at sites external to the country’.²⁹ Foreign policy, like any matter of public policy, emerges from within the political environment, in which a government administration exercises its authority to make decisions and implement actions on behalf of the broader community of citizens. Bridgman and Davis describe policy in this environment as ‘an authoritative response to a public issue or problem’; adding that ‘it is intentional, purposeful and structured and both requires and tests decision-making’.³⁰

²⁶ Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.22.

²⁷ P Bridgman, G Davis, *Australian Policy Handbook*, Allen and Unwin, 1998, p.5. The *Policy Handbook* has been adopted across Australian bureaucracy as an authoritative and comprehensive practitioner focused guide to policy making in Australia. In particular, the ‘policy cycle’ outlined in the Handbook has been integrated into best practice guidelines within both Commonwealth and state jurisdictions. Consequently Bridgman and Davis are regarded as authorities in the area of Australian public policy.

²⁸ Hogwood and Gunn, *Policy Analysis for the Real World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, p.12.

²⁹ Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.23.

³⁰ Bridgman, Davis, *Australian Policy Handbook*, p.6.

Australian based public policy practitioner, Richard Curtain notes that public policy making is ‘first and foremost about determining objectives or societal goals, the latter of which might include issues such as the principles to underpin the conduct of foreign affairs, how to promote internal social cohesion, how to best meet citizens’ needs during major life cycle changes’.³¹ Curtain further argues that based on the broad and complex nature of issues dealt with in public policy, it ‘must, at the very least be effective, efficient, and long term in perspective’.³² Each of these aspirations present challenges for policy-makers in any field, but particularly in the case of foreign policy, which incorporates a range of additional structures, processes and relationships applicable to the international sphere which are not normally present in the domestic sphere. Indeed, for this reason foreign policy is by nature ‘highly varied and unpredictable’.³³

Despite the inherent complexity and unpredictability of foreign policy development and delivery, there are opportunities to analyse key foreign policy strategies that have been, and continue to be exercised by states in enabling a reliable response to or active management of disturbances in the external policy space. In each instance it is also possible to deconstruct the policy strategies further to identify patterned linkages between the strategy and appropriate public diplomacy activities.

5.1.2 Foreign policy structures

The system of government that supports policy-making, includes both political and non-political actors and layers of decision-making, leadership, coordination and action. While the role of DFAT with respect to public diplomacy in Australia has already been raised and examined throughout this thesis, the structures that sit behind and around DFAT, can in some

³¹ R Curtain, ‘Good public policy making: how Australia fares’, *Agenda: a Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform*, Volume 8, Number 1, 2000, p.35.

³² Ibid.

³³ Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.39.

cases play an even more important role in understanding the development and delivery of foreign policy through public diplomacy. Interestingly, this is not a view that is necessarily held within DFAT, and comments made by DFAT officials currently working overseas (including in policy roles that encompass public diplomacy responsibilities), indicate a view that there is no role for any other agency outside DFAT, and outside agencies need no information. As one official responded, ‘no other Australian Government agency has any active role, so we coordinate, implement then clean up the empties and sweep away the butts afterwards. The rest of the public service is absent unless they are selling something’.³⁴ On the point of an overall lack of understanding about public diplomacy across the Australian public service, one official commented, ‘why should they understand it when they have no role to play’?³⁵ These statements support the view proposed earlier within this thesis that DFAT officials themselves may be out of step with current trends in and requirements of contemporary public diplomacy, particularly in relation to public diplomacy’s link to policy, and the role played by other government and non government agencies in giving effect to such policy. For this reason, this chapter will provide a brief overview of the political structures that can give effect to policy within the Australian system.

Policy is generated as a result of an initiative that either drives, or responds to shifts in the environment in such as way as to ‘protect or promote given social values within the responsibility of the state’.³⁶ Policy priorities and initiatives are generated and determined from within the political leadership.³⁷ The role of the Prime Minister in the policy process cannot be understated. Former Australian Prime Minister, John Howard asserted the practice

³⁴ Interview Confidential Sources, Senior DFAT officials posted overseas and currently working to give effect to Australia’s public diplomacy program overseas, 27 May 2009, 29 July 2009, 9 September 2009.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Bridgman, Davis, *Australian Policy Handbook*, p.5.

³⁷ Ibid. Which in the Australian federal system, refers to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the latter of which comprises portfolio Ministers as determined by the Prime Minister.

that, ‘the Prime Minister sets out his priorities and strategic direction for each portfolio in a letter sent to respective Ministers shortly after they are appointed’.³⁸ In assessing the merits of Howard’s approach, Professor Patrick Weller provides useful context in noting that ‘the influence of prime ministers and their impact on policy will depend on their capacity to cajole, persuade or bully cabinet colleagues – either individually or collectively – into accepting their solutions’.³⁹

During the last decade, Australia’s Prime Ministers with the strong and consistent support of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, have played a significant role in the setting of Australia’s foreign policy agenda. From the late 1980s, the Hawke-Evans and Keating-Evans partnerships drove an active agenda of Australian engagement in Asia, and international good citizenship, buttressed by a reliance on the mechanisms of multilateralism. Public diplomacy was publicly placed on the foreign policy agenda as an opportunity to ‘cast the net much wider, beyond the influential few to the ‘uninvolved’ many’.⁴⁰ Subsequently, Howard’s interest and expertise in foreign policy grew during his time in the role, and was influenced by the significant international crises and events that occurred while he was in a leadership position.⁴¹ Howard, supported in his leadership by Foreign Minister Downer, ultimately played a formidable role in the setting of policy agendas which moved to ‘practical politics based upon the national interest and Australian values’.⁴² Howard’s cynicism of public diplomacy was clearly articulated on a number of occasions but most clearly when he noted

³⁸ John Howard quoted in Bridgman and Davis, *Australian Policy Handbook*, p.11.

³⁹ Patrick Weller quoted in Bridgman and Davis, *Australian Policy Handbook*, p.11. Weller is the Director of the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University.

⁴⁰ Evans, Grant, *Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s*, p.66.

⁴¹ For further reading on Howard’s interest in foreign policy refer to Firth, Australia in International Politics; Kevin, ‘Foreign policy’, in *The Howard Years*, R Manne (ed); Robertson, ‘Australia’s Position on Asia: closer than ever’; Capling, ‘Twenty years of Australia’s engagement with Asia’ in addition to Kelly, *Howard’s decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal*.

⁴² Kelly, *Howard’s decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal*, p.3.

‘while it may build on a nation’s popular image or appeal, and add diversity to relationships, public diplomacy is no substitute for political, economic or strategic substance’.⁴³

By contrast, Rudd has come into the role of Prime Minister with definite and ambitious views on foreign policy shaped in part as a result of his experience as a diplomatic practitioner.⁴⁴ Much of the rhetoric and symbolism employed by Rudd, particularly in his first year of office pointed to a greater level of sympathy for the role of public diplomacy in the conduct of international relations. At the strategic and political level, Rudd is clearly utilising public diplomacy (including through high level visits by himself and members of his Cabinet) to influence global power dynamics and decision-making, securing a legitimate place for Australia. However, as the budget and annual statements of key agencies (PM&C and DFAT) indicate, Rudd’s natural alignment to public diplomacy practice has not been translated into more concrete outcomes at a policy level for Australia’s ongoing and broad public diplomacy program.⁴⁵ Suffice to say, that Australian leaders exercise their influence over the foreign policy agenda. Through Cabinet and the policy structures of the bureaucracy, the foreign policy agenda can then be developed and delivered.

The public service, ‘the collection of departments, and agencies, staff and resources that make up the machinery of government’,⁴⁶ holds the bulk of responsibility for policy development and delivery (including through activities, services and programs) and is generally organised in departments that align with defined portfolio streams (such as health,

⁴³ Bubalo, ‘Football Diplomacy’, p.10.

⁴⁴ Kelly, *Howard’s decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal* and Gynge, ‘Ambition: The emerging foreign policy of the Rudd Government’.

⁴⁵ For example, under Rudd, Australia’s public diplomacy has continued to wear budgetary cuts, for example, Australia’s cultural diplomacy program has been cut by \$20 million over four years. Other budget cuts while less evident, are equally as significant. During interview, one senior DFAT official from the Consular, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Division noted that Australia’s public diplomacy program was funded only \$3 million this year. Confidential Interview, Senior DFAT official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Division, 22 June 2009.

⁴⁶ Bridgman, Davis, *Australian Policy Handbook*, p.15.

education, justice, and so on). Each government department actively pursues and monitors the development and delivery of public policy relevant to its portfolio space. For many departments, such policy activity relates solely to activity within the domestic sphere. Generally where aspects of policy relate to the international sphere they have been addressed and responded to by the department with responsibility for foreign policy. However, the impact of a global world is that increasingly domestic and international policy issues collide, and policy responsibility extends across a range of departments. The Senate Inquiry revealed, (contrary to the view of some DFAT officials), that within the Australian Government some 22 departments carry some responsibility for areas international policy and have an interest in public diplomacy activities.⁴⁷ Generally, DFAT assumes a lead policy role, but this is not always the case.

Within Australia's machinery of government structure, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) plays a primary role in setting and coordinating government policy in total by ensuring that decisions taken across government are consistent with each other and with the overarching policy position set by cabinet.⁴⁸ The role played by PM&C in the development of public policy, and including foreign policy is pivotal, yet is frequently overlooked in literature relating to foreign policy making in Australia. In fact, PM&C plays an overarching and strategic role – a role that cannot be over-emphasised, and provides for a dominant presence in setting and shaping the foreign policy agenda. The role of PM&C in developing and directing Australian foreign policy is significant by virtue of the connection and responsibility of the department to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. While the Prime Minister and Cabinet together set the overarching strategic agenda for Australian policy, PM&C takes responsibility for the coordination and overall direction of the policy

⁴⁷ The number of government departments operating within the international policy space will vary from time to time depending upon the machinery of government changes implemented by respective administrations.

⁴⁸ Bridgman, Davis, *Australian Policy Handbook*, p.15.

implementation process across the scope of government agencies. Specific to foreign policy, the International Strategic Policy Unit within PM&C reports to have a dedicated focus on strategic international and foreign policy issues and is responsible for advising on Australia's foreign, trade and aid policies.

As an aside, the extent and method of interaction between the International Strategic Policy Unit and DFAT is not clear.⁴⁹ The publicly produced departmental materials provide little insight into the agency's interpretation of the Prime Minister's engagement with the concept of public diplomacy. PM&C did not make a submission to the Senate Inquiry nor was the agency called upon to produce evidence to the hearings. Despite several attempts for contact, departmental officials were unresponsive to requests to participate in an interview for the purpose of this thesis. There appears to be a gap in the continuity of strategic thought around public diplomacy at this critical juncture in the policy structure.

Foreign policy concepts and structures, as they operate within the confines of the state, play a fundamental and practical role in the development and shape of foreign policy. The development and shape of Australia's public diplomacy program as an instrument of both strategic and operational foreign policy is also determined within these parameters. DFAT suggests through the evidence presented to the Senate Inquiry that the department 'has integrated public diplomacy into the policy fabric of the department's work as a core mainstream activity'. However analysis of the current corporate plan and organisational structure of DFAT, along with comments made by DFAT officials both within Australia and operating overseas suggest that public diplomacy is well outside the current policy thinking and structure. For example, the Images of Australia Branch located within Consular and

⁴⁹ Refer to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/index.cfm>

Protocol Division of the department (considered to be more aligned to the operational service delivery lines of DFAT's consular and protocol work) is structurally separate from the key policy areas of the department. DFAT officers confirmed the lack of synergy between their policy focus and their understanding of public diplomacy, stating that 'DFAT public diplomacy is a "lowest common denominator" of the international component of other departments' projections of Australia overseas plus the best [DFAT] can manage with a shrinking budget'.⁵⁰

While the task of engaging Australia's political masters and policy structures to more fully support public diplomacy is a challenge, aligning public diplomacy more closely to the policy process, particularly within DFAT is not an insurmountable task. Through the construction of a framework, the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that public diplomacy not only fits but is inextricably linked to the development and delivery of foreign policy. Armed with the understanding that there are numerous structures and actors contributing to the policy process more broadly within Australia, it is then important to touch on the policy process itself.

5.2 The foreign policy process

The initial scaffolding to be constructed for the public diplomacy framework comes from the phases identified by Gyngell and Wesley as making up the foreign policy making process.⁵¹

Other studies and research into foreign policy decision-making and processes, including that

⁵⁰ Interviews, Confidential Source, Current and Former Senior Officials, DFAT, 13 May 2009, 27 May 2009, 28 May 2009, 29 July 2009, 9 September 2009.

⁵¹ The Gyngell and Wesley foreign policy making process has been identified as contributing to the scaffolding for the public diplomacy policy framework to be developed through the thesis. For sources of relevance to foreign policymaking in Australia refer to Firth, *Australia in International Politics*, T Kevin, 'Foreign policy', in *The Howard Years*, R Manne (ed), Black Inc, 2004, pp.291-313; and A Cooper, R Higgott and K Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, UBC Press, Vancouver, 1994; P Gorjao, 'Australia's dilemma between geography and history: how consolidated is engagement in Asia'; and C Ungerer, 'The "Middle Power" Concept in Australian Foreign Policy'.

undertaken by Charles Hermann et al, are acknowledged and have relevance to the overarching themes provided by Gyngell and Wesley. For example, Beasley, Kaarbo Hermann and Hermann examine the specific dynamics, actors, processes and choices that impact critically upon foreign policy decision-making, and established a framework for 'classifying the people involved in foreign policymaking into decision units'.⁵² Such research provides a background that demonstrates the broad international study of foreign policy making processes, that have relevance to the discussion of public diplomacy. However, the Gyngell and Wesley policy process forms the primary platform from which the discussion of how public diplomacy may be aligned to foreign policy in this thesis, because of its practical and realist approach to the foreign policy process, and particular applicability to the Australian context. Gyngell's strong background in the policy process at the highest levels (as Keating's former senior foreign affairs adviser), lends credibility and authenticity from Australian practitioner viewpoint. This is an asset to be leveraged if this thesis is to achieve the aim of making public diplomacy more relevant and accessible to the practitioner. As Kevin notes, 'At a time...when classic literature on Australian foreign policy risks being left behind' the more contemporary Gyngell and Wesley's *Making Australian Foreign Policy* 'is quickly becoming standard text'.⁵³

This thesis draws upon the level defined by Gyngell and Wesley, comprising 'four distinct but inter-related levels of activity a) strategic, b) contextual, c)organisational; and d) operational'.⁵⁴ Each of these levels, labelled and incorporated into the first column in Table 3

⁵² R Beasley, J Kaarbo, C Hermann, M Hermann, 'People and processes in foreign policymaking: insights from comparative case studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, 2001, pp.217. See also M Hermann and C Hermann, 'Who makes foreign policy decisions and how: an empirical inquiry', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, 1989, pp.361-387; A Rosati, 'Developing a theory of foreign policy: the evolution of American foreign policy' Paper presented at the Conference on New Directions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, Ohio State University, May 1985.

⁵³ Kevin, 'Foreign Policy', p.311.

⁵⁴ Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.25.

and Table 4 at Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively, is important to the process of policy making. However, the aim of unpicking the distinct threads of the policy process is not to oversimplify the process, as Gyngell and Wesley note the practitioner must be aware that ‘policy-making occurs simultaneously at all of these levels, the boundaries are constantly in flux, and the actors and participants may vary and are not mutually exclusive to any level’.⁵⁵ Defining and delineating each of the levels at which certain policy development and delivery processes and activities occur, allows for a clearer picture of the actual dynamics and considerations that inform policy making.⁵⁶ While it may be unrealistic to produce or rely upon a set of pre-determined processes or routines in the development of policy to achieve expected outcomes, it is reasonable to argue that for a policy to progress from the germination of an idea or initial response to shift in the external environment, the process must be considered carefully, with consideration given to the various actors, structures, processes and relationships that occur at each phase.

Each layer of activity identified in the Gyngell and Wesley model and adapted into the first column of the policy based public diplomacy framework requires brief attention, before more detailed examination of the policy strategies themselves. For ease of understanding the policy phases will be represented at the start of each new section as a horizontal continuum, (bearing in mind that the policy phases appear as a vertical axis in the Framework), highlighting the specific policy under discussion for that section, as shown below:

Foreign Policy Process Phases:

Strategic phase	Contextual phase	Organisational phase	Operational phase
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⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

5.2.1 The strategic phase

Strategic phase	Contextual phase	Organisational phase	Operational phase
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Foreign policy activity occurring at the strategic level is that of the highest order reflecting authoritative statements of political commitment or priority regarding the pursuit of the national agenda on the international stage. The strategic phase is reinforced by the basic premise set out by Hermann and Herman that:

At the apex of foreign policy decision making in all governments or ruling parties is a group of actors – the ultimate decision unit – who, if they agree, both have the ability to commit the resources of the government in foreign affairs and the power or authority to prevent other entities within the government from overtly reversing that decision.⁵⁷

High level policy statements are usually articulated or endorsed by the political leadership, and are passed on to the machinery of government, that is, the structures of government agencies and departments that support the political process, for more detailed development and delivery. The outcome at this stage may also take the form of a White Paper, or budget statement. Strategic policy statements and rhetoric are usually aimed to appeal to a broad public audience, which incorporates the government, bureaucracy, diplomatic community, and importantly the electorate as a whole. From this perspective, engagement of the audiences can be critical, particularly when the policy involves publicly unpopular choices, such as the introduction of trade liberalisation measures, or sending troops into situations of conflict.⁵⁸ Strategic policy positions are usually secured to arguments of public interest and national values, while providing a degree of political latitude for various interpretations in application.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Hermann, Hermann, ‘Who makes foreign policy decisions and how: an empirical inquiry’, p.362.

⁵⁸ ABC Online, ‘I’m responsible for Troops to Afghanistan: Howard’, *ABC News Online*, 9 October 2007: <http://abc.gov.au/news/stories/2007/10/09/2055035.htm>; Bartlett, ‘More Aussie Troops to Afghanistan’, *Bartlett’s Blog*, 23 February 2006, <http://andrewbartlett.com/?p=143>; M Fiel, ‘Australia-US FTA: Still A drain on Economy’, *The Age*, 10 February 2009; M Fiel, ‘Do Tariffs Matter?’, *The Age*, 10 December 2008.

⁵⁹ Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.25. For example, Australian strategic policy on climate change might be to support an Emissions Trading System. However, the strategic policy does not set

During the former Howard Government, Alexander Downer, as the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, released two white papers (*In the National Interest* – released in 1997; and *Advancing the National Interest* released in 2002), setting out Australia's strategic longer term foreign policy priorities and objectives for that time, with a strong emphasis on 'security of the Australian economy, jobs, standard of living and way of life; ...while being responsive to the values and ethics of the Australian people'.⁶⁰ Each of these white papers were developed with the contribution of academics, business leaders, and former policy-makers. The white papers themselves were the central outputs of the strategic policy process and set out the roadmap for foreign policy development and delivery.

After nearly two years of leadership, the Rudd Government has not yet produced a white paper on foreign policy, and has consequently been criticised for not articulating the strategic path for Australia's forward foreign policy.⁶¹ However, Rudd initiated the Australia 2020 Summit early in his tenure, which incorporated significant discussion with a range of business, government and community stakeholders regarding Australia's foreign policy challenges and priorities. An argument might be suggested, that in the twenty-first century the format of the 2020 Summit is an equivalent to the traditional White Paper approach. In line with contemporary public diplomacy practice, the methodology and format driving the 2020 Summit was that such an activity be broadly accessible and engaging for the Australian

out the detail of the rules and requirements that will regulate such a scheme, nor necessarily the targets themselves. These have been matters for subsequent parliamentary debate, further detailed analysis, consultation and drafting. C Kerr, 'Rudd Denies Early Poll Plan over Emissions Trading Scheme', *The Australian*, August 14 2009; L Taylor, 'Libs Stick to Emissions Targets by Other Means', *The Australian*, 3 December, 2009.

⁶⁰ A Downer, *Advancing the national interest: Australia's foreign policy challenge*, Media Release, May 7 2002; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy', *White Paper*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997.

⁶¹ In his *Current Issues Blog*, 'Rudd needs clearer idea to stem growing disarray' posted on 5 July 2008, Senator Russell Trood calls for the Rudd Government to 'immediately prepare and issue its own foreign policy white paper' on the basis of a 'significant shift in the main trends of international affairs, substantial reorientation in government policy and need for restatement of principles and direction to regain clarity of purpose'.

domestic public, and televised for viewing rather than printed for reading.⁶² As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Rudd himself, ‘dominates the formulation of Australian foreign policy more securely than any of his predecessors’ and the use of the white paper mechanism may be more a reflection of style, preference and experience.⁶³ Rudd has clearly articulated a firm, and as Gyngell notes, an ambitious strategic policy direction through statements and speeches outlining an ambitious agenda for Australia on the international stage, and these initiatives themselves also reflect the strategic phase of policy development.⁶⁴ Through such statements Rudd has alluded to a strong role for public diplomacy, for example in ‘creative middle power diplomacy’ in which Australia ‘should use its influence to build coalitions of support with others on issues of global significance’.⁶⁵ As noted by Allan Gyngell, Rudd ‘speaks about Australia as a regional power prosecuting global interests’.⁶⁶ In support of Australia’s foreign policy objectives at the regional and international level, Rudd has pointed to activities that will enable greater people-to-people linkages, understanding and engagement within the region. For example, Rudd has pointed with some urgency to the need for Australia to pursue greater understanding of regional cultures and to ‘become the most Asia literate country in the collective West’.⁶⁷

⁶² ABC Online, ‘Australia 2020 Summit’: *ABC News*, 18-20 April 2008: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/events/2020/>. The ABC provided online coverage of the 2020 Summit events, ideas and participants through the Summit weekend. Opinion, 2020 Summit: Not just Another talkfest, *The Australian*, 4 February 2008. M. David, ‘2020 Summit: Rudd Vision to Map Future’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 February 2008, Some criticism of the Summit focused on the format and methodology claiming that the Summit was simply a political public relations stunt, and those involved were given a false mandate. See for example, ABC Online, *2020 Summit a PR Stunt*, ABC News, 21 April 2008, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/04/21/2222966.htm>>

⁶³ Gyngell, ‘Ambition: the emerging foreign policy of the Rudd Government’, *Lowy Institute Analysis*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, December 2008, p.1.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p5. For more on the background to Australia’s middle power diplomacy, see Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers*; and Ungerer, ‘The Middle Power Concept in Australian Foreign Policy’, for a more recent discussion.

⁶⁶ Gyngell, ‘Ambition: the emerging foreign policy of the Rudd Government’, p.5.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Supported through government rhetoric also, for example J Gillard, ‘Call to Action: Asia Literacy for Every Young Australian’, Presentation to the Australia Education Foundation Forum, 8 May 2008.

At the strategic level, Rudd could be said to have embarked on a strategic public diplomacy program himself, also involving several senior ministers through a hectic travel agenda through mid to late 2009 enabling high level meetings with leaders in India, Brazil, Chile, China, Russia, Peru and the United States, all in an effort to build new relations and strengthen critical international links.⁶⁸ The primary purpose for the travel was to engage in a strategic campaign that would build support and recognition of the G20 grouping (of which Australia is a founding member) as the premier forum for global governance and economic management'.⁶⁹

Such a campaign, founded in public diplomacy has substantially increased the international standing of both Kevin Rudd and of Australia.⁷⁰ This position may be further strengthened through the winning of a seat on the Security Council in 2013 (for which a separate and equally intense travel agenda has been underway). Though a public diplomacy program relies upon more than travel and high level meetings, success in the latter initiative may well depend upon how well Australia engages and influences the rest of the world on a range of other levels. Rudd's approach to such strategic foreign policy matters is clearly underpinned by attention to the importance of public diplomacy within the political and strategic spheres. However, such an approach is not reflected further within the Australian policy process, and Fullilove, Director Global Issues program at the Lowy Institute for International policy pointedly notes that 'Rudd intends to...single-handedly elevate Australia's international

⁶⁸ D Shanahan, 'Kevin Rudd looks for wider role in G20 as he launches global campaign', *The Australian*, 10 September, 2009.

⁶⁹ G Milne, 'Kevin Rudd's G20 force shifts world order', *The Australian*, 27 September, 2009. The international travel agenda has included senior members of Rudd's cabinet, including Julia Gillard, Stephen Smith, Simon Crean, and Martin Ferguson. The G20 was created during the 1997-98 Asian Financial crisis as a mechanism for bringing finance ministers together. As a founding member of the grouping at that time, Australia won significant recognition and according to Paul Kelly's review of the Howard decade gained soft power credibility within the region for the role played in assisting Asian nations manage the financial crisis.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

profile, as seen in his initiatives on the G-20, Asia-Pacific architecture and nuclear weapons’.⁷¹

What might be lacking from the current strategic picture is the opportunity for robust debate, engagement and consensus building beyond the boundaries of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to incorporate departmental policy heads and opinion leaders. There is a sense of disconnect that exists between these. At present, while Rudd’s strategic public diplomacy agenda appears to promote strategic foreign policy outcomes, the lack of clear and broad based understanding of the goals is proving to be problematic, and DFAT along with the rest of the bureaucracy appear to be getting left behind. The challenge for Rudd lies in the translation of his personal and professional high-level engagement with public diplomacy to an understanding and acceptance of public diplomacy value and strategies more broadly by Cabinet, Parliament, bureaucracy and other key actors (such as second and third tier governments, local communities, academic institutions, think-tanks, non governmental organisations and media). At this point, public diplomacy must be seen as more than high level global soirees and positive rhetoric delivered in the languages of the globe. At the strategic level, making the connection between policy and public diplomacy is critical, because the overall policy objective will become the enabling vehicle that allows for consideration of public diplomacy within each subsequent layer of the policy process.

⁷¹ M O’Hanlon and M Fullilove, ‘Barack Obama, Kevin Rudd and the Alliance: American and Australian Perspectives’, *Lowy Institute Perspectives*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, August 2009, p.8.

5.2.2 The contextual phase

Strategic phase	Contextual phase	Organisational phase	Operational phase
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The contextual phase in policy making usually signals the movement of a policy initiative from the Government decision-makers to the bureaucracy; in the case of foreign policy this is usually to DFAT via PM&C. The contextual phase may be likened to the business-casing phase for a policy idea or initiative, in which the policy initiative is interrogated, and response options scrutinised, in light of a range of contextual factors (including political, economic, social, cultural, factors) and associated risks. The outcome of this process will allow for the prioritisation of the policy within the broader scope of Government activity. In particular, the nature of the international situation and environment, and the potential impact of the policy response on other competing or complementary initiatives must be assessed taking into account ‘the identities, dispositions or relative power of the states involved in an issue or potential response; other foreign (or domestic) policy commitments of the state, and coalitions and understandings crucial to the conduct of other strands of foreign policy’.⁷²

Based on an assessment of these factors decisions regarding the preferred policy option and appropriate contingencies are made. In some instances, decisions require compromises and the trade-off on competing policy priorities. For the purpose of public diplomacy, this thesis expands upon the Gyngell and Wesley description of contextual factors, to include the consideration of two distinct elements; i) the target audience at which the particular strategy is aimed; and ii) the proposed public diplomacy approach.

⁷² Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.29.

In relation to target audiences, while public diplomacy is by definition aimed broadly at foreign audiences, there are many layers and groupings of audiences. Not only will the different groupings respond differently to the same message, depending upon the context of the message, there may be a greater imperative to only reach certain target audiences in order to achieve the required outcome. In other words, effective public diplomacy teases out the target audiences that are relevant to the strategic objective, an exercise that is particularly critical where limited resources are available for public diplomacy activities.⁷³ Generally, audiences will be categorised into specific groups of people, such as political leaders, opinion leaders, diaspora networks, policy makers or friendly networks. Audience needs within these categories will vary from state to state, depending upon a range of variables, including whether they are urbanised or rural, developed or less developed, and will influence the nature and delivery of the public diplomacy activity.

Once identified, there is scope to tailor messages for specific themes and different audience groups – whether they are defined by interest, language, culture, location, demographic, or economic status. As Ross asserts understanding the differing needs of the audience, even where the underlying message is the same for those audiences, is critical: ‘an information campaign in support of open trade or religious freedom will employ vastly different images and words for different audiences. The values that stand behind such efforts, however, are enduring’.⁷⁴ Contemporary discussions about public diplomacy recognise that because of the close interplay between international and domestic policy, domestic constituencies are increasingly considered as an audience for public diplomacy strategies. Traditionally, the targeting of domestic constituent audiences fell into the arena of public affairs, yet Melissen,

⁷³ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, p.42; also, Batora, ‘Multi-stakeholder Public Diplomacy of Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada Compared’.

⁷⁴ Ross, ‘Pillars of Public Diplomacy: Grappling with Public Opinion’.

Fiske de Gouveia and Henrikson acknowledge that in the current fluid and interconnected environment, some states are increasingly incorporating consideration of the domestic audience within public diplomacy strategies.⁷⁵

The second underpinning element within the contextual layer of the policy process requires identification of the desired public diplomacy approach, given an understanding of the strategic objective, environment and audience. There are frames of reference already in existence that provide a level of guidance to the practitioner at this point, including for example, Nye's approaches which categorises the shape of public diplomacy activity into the

- i) day to day communications, explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions and responding to crises as they occur;
- ii) strategic communication, building upon a central theme or policy based campaign; and
- iii) development of lasting relationships, including cultural and academic exchanges that build upon personal relationships and experiences.⁷⁶

In addition, as discussed within the previous chapter, McClellan's communications pyramid might also provide an alternative frame of reference in pinpointing the intended outcome of the public diplomacy activity.⁷⁷

Understanding both the strategic objective and applying a contextual frame to that objective are critical steps in the development of a public diplomacy approach that matches the policy objectives. By drawing upon both the Nye and McClellan perspectives related to public diplomacy approaches, as relevant to the identified audience, the practitioner moves closer to developing a public diplomacy strategy that will achieving the strategic policy objectives.

⁷⁵ Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice', p.13.

⁷⁶ Nye, *Soft Power – the means to success in world politics*, pp. 108-109. Refer also to Chapter Four: Public Diplomacy in Action.

⁷⁷ Refer to Chapter Four: Public Diplomacy in Action. Along similar lines, Zaharna seeks to establish two frameworks for public diplomacy activity, i) informational framework and ii) relational framework. Zaharna then maps public diplomacy activities to each of these frameworks depending upon whether the purpose of the activity is to provide information, or build relationships. See Zaharna, 'Mapping the Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Activities'.

5.2.3 The organisational phase

Strategic phase	Contextual phase	Organisational phase	Operational phase
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The organisational phase identified by Gynge and Wesley refers to structural mechanisms that allow policy to move from a strategic concept through a concrete deliverable. This level in the policy making process may involve the bureaucratic policy structure as a whole, or simply a single department such as DFAT (in the latter case, there may be coordination and negotiation across a range of interested work areas). The organisational phase involves considerations both of ‘the process for guiding a policy response through the existing organisational structures; alongside the process of marshalling and apportioning resources to that issue’.⁷⁸

Factors highlighted through the contextual phase, including the significance, urgency, audience, and approach, of an issue will impact on the organisational considerations. However, the organisational considerations to a policy issue will not necessarily require new initiatives, but rather should enable identification of the responsible decision-makers and relevant stakeholders, coordination mechanisms and potential networks for delivery of the public diplomacy activities. A robust organisational structure will support effective policy and public diplomacy planning and delivery.⁷⁹ For example, issues of an increased complexity and significance, touching on the policy space of a range of organisations, are likely to require an enabling point that allows the policy initiative to move from the strategy level through to the contextual level, as well as rigorous coordination, consultation and conflict management mechanisms that run across the bureaucracy and allow contributions from other sectors, and use of multiple delivery networks, all overseen by one agreed

⁷⁸ Gynge, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.30.

⁷⁹ Bridgman and Davis, *Australian Policy Handbook*, p.6; Hogwood and Gunn, *Policy Analysis for the Real World*, p.12.

decision point. As noted earlier, the International Strategic Policy Unit, PM&C might play such an enabling role.⁸⁰ In the current model, DFAT provides the coordination, consultation and conflict management role (within government via the IDC), with the diplomatic service as the central, though by no means the only, delivery network.⁸¹ There are opportunities for the IDC to improve effectiveness in tapping into and linking a broader range of external bodies and individuals with active interests in public diplomacy, while promoting the overarching public diplomacy themes.

The establishment of public diplomacy purpose-specific organisational entities by some states is a direct response at the organisational level to that ensuring that the public diplomacy activities of those states are delivered in line with the strategic policy objective. The United Kingdom provides a model of organisation developed deliberately as a result of the Lord Carter of Coles Public Diplomacy Review conducted in 2005, and following on from the earlier Wilton Review of March 2002.⁸² Following the Lord Carter Review, the organisation of public diplomacy in the United Kingdom was restructured to enable improved coordination and coherent delivery of the United Kingdom's public diplomacy method. The restructured organisation was characterised by three significant components, the first of which is the Public Diplomacy Board, chaired by the Foreign Office Minister with the defined purpose of improving public diplomacy effectiveness through i) setting of strategic direction ii) monitoring and evaluating outcomes; and iii) making recommendations on resource allocation.⁸³ The second component is the British Council, an international organisation charged with promoting British cultural relations and educational exchanges

⁸⁰ Though, in the case of current performance on public diplomacy the enabling link may be dysfunctional.

⁸¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry on the Nature and Conduct of Australia's Public Diplomacy*, p.8.

⁸² Public Diplomacy Board Terms of Reference, found at British Council website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.britishcouncil.org>>

⁸³ Ibid.

throughout the world. With sites in each continent across the globe, the work of the British Council purports to ‘strengthen understanding and trust between and within different cultures’.⁸⁴ The third organisational component of the United Kingdom’s public diplomacy organisation is the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) world service which claims to be the world’s leading international broadcaster, with content broadcast via television, radio, internet and mobile phone in 32 languages.⁸⁵ The latter two organisational components are coordinated via the first component (the Board), with input from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (the FCO, also represented on the Board).⁸⁶

In the case of Australia, bureaucratic organisation and coordination of public diplomacy is led by DFAT through an Interdepartmental Committee (IDC), which brings officer-level representatives together from those agencies with an interest in public diplomacy. The IDC meets quarterly to ‘ensure not only sharing of information, but to promote opportunity for collaboration in response and resourcing’.⁸⁷ The Senate Committee threw light on the breadth and scope of public diplomacy activities conducted by the range of agencies with international policy responsibilities. As noted in the Final Report, ‘the numerous agencies involved in public diplomacy and the diversity of their interests mean that public diplomacy programs may not always integrate or mesh smoothly’.⁸⁸ The more recently released Lowy Institute’s Report on the Australian Diplomatic Deficit reveals that in Australia, ‘18 of the current 19 Commonwealth government departments now have a dedicated international policy area... and virtually every contemporary policy issue has an international

⁸⁴ British Council website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.britishcouncil.org>>

⁸⁵ BBC website, viewed on 20 October 2009, http://www.BBC.co.uk/world_service/

⁸⁶ The current United Kingdom’s organisational approach to public diplomacy via the public diplomacy board is the product of the 2005 Lord Carter of Coles’ public diplomacy review.

⁸⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australian’s public diplomacy program*, p.8.

⁸⁸ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, p.95.

dimension'.⁸⁹ Yet, in contrast to the Lord Carter Review in the United Kingdom, the Senate Committee while noting concerns about the organisation and coordination of the range of agencies involved in giving effect to Australia's public diplomacy program, did not recommend full scale or even moderate restructure.⁹⁰

Other organisational components active within the Australian public diplomacy program include the AICC, the Australia Council, and the nine bilateral FCIs. The coordinating role of DFAT is consistent thread across each of these components. Of particular note, the ABC is a central strand to Australia's public diplomacy program. Importantly, the ABC has been subject to various internal reviews over recent years. The most recent restructure of the ABC which occurred in February 2007 created ABC International as the overarching unit to, 'promote the ABC's values of honesty, fairness, independence and respect by facilitating cross-cultural communication, encouraging awareness of Australia and building regional partnerships'.⁹¹ Within ABC International, the ABC's broadcasting arms of Radio Australia and the Australia Network, the ABC 'connects audiences in Asia and the Pacific through programs that complement and enrich their lives and foster informed dialogue'.⁹² To do this, the ABC currently broadcasts Australian content via radio, television and online services to 41 countries and in seven languages, with a specific focus on the Asia Pacific region, and regular weekly audiences of over 20 million.⁹³ ABC International extends beyond pure broadcasting, and the International Division fosters opportunity for exchange in the media

⁸⁹ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our instruments of international policy', p.14. The Lowy Institute Report statistics regarding the number of government agencies varies from those statistics previously quoted from Gynge, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy. The reason for the variance is the change in government administrations between publications. Since taking office Rudd has overseen the rationalisation of Commonwealth government agencies.

⁹⁰ Refer to the recommendations provided in the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image'. Also this point was supported in interview, Senator Russell Trood, 13 January 2008 and 30 June 2009.

⁹¹ ABC website, found at <http://www.abc.net.au/international/>

⁹² ABC, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program, ABC, April 2007, p.6.

⁹³ ABC website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.abc.net.au/international/>>

sector. For example, the ABC has established a partnership with AusAID for the delivery of formal capacity building assistance to public broadcasters and the provision of informal collegiate support to fellow public broadcasters.⁹⁴

Each of these significant threads of Australia's official public diplomacy program is coordinated, via the relatively flat coordinating structure offered by DFAT, and the DFAT-led ICD. Nonetheless, there is a sense provided by the Senate Committee that the activities of government agencies extend well beyond the parameters coordinated by DFAT, and as a result, the overall public diplomacy program is without the necessary guidance or direction of any single overarching strategic body of coherent direction.⁹⁵ The potential challenges presented by the complex and diverse range of public diplomacy activities were raised by former Australian Ambassador and witness to the Inquiry, Geoff Miller when he noted, '...a stance in one specialised, perhaps quite technical area can easily, if run unchecked, come to assume a weighting in a relationship that tilts it in an unwanted direction, even though this may not be intended by the government as a whole'.⁹⁶

The Senate Committee supported the general view that Australia needs a whole-of-government approach to public diplomacy, and expressed concern at the level of representation and overall impact of the IDC.⁹⁷ A number of witnesses to the Inquiry were

⁹⁴ Ibid. Though reference of this partnership not readily visible via AusAID website or corporate information.

⁹⁵ The Senate Committee questioned many government agencies about their public diplomacy activities including the Department of Defence, Invest Australia, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Department of Education, Science and training, ABC, Australian Sports Commission, Australian Film Commission, Australia Council for the Arts, Museums Australia, and the National Gallery of Victoria. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', pp. 44-46.

⁹⁶ G Miller, 'Current and Emerging Challenges to the practice of Australian diplomacy', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 56, No. 2, 2002, p.200.

⁹⁷ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.108.

‘less than enthusiastic about the work of the IDC’.⁹⁸ With particular reference to public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy the Committee was not persuaded that the IDC has formulated a strategic public diplomacy plan, nor that the IDC ‘took advice from or consulted with the relevant policy makers in DFAT’.⁹⁹

The role and responsibilities of DFAT as a coordinating body on matters of public diplomacy are also not entirely clear, and many entities operating within the sphere of public diplomacy, but outside federal government, including tertiary institutions, not-for-profits, media, museums, and state and local governments were consistent in noting a lack of active engagement with DFAT.¹⁰⁰ In their submission to the enquiry, RMIT lamented that ‘while DFAT undertakes much useful work with Australian universities, there is little coordinated recognition of the role they [universities] might play in this regard’, and more pointedly that, ‘the role and significance of the role of universities in Australia’s public diplomacy program is poorly articulated and relatively unexplored, and hence not well supported’.¹⁰¹ Ultimately, Australia’s current public diplomacy program appears to be not well supported by a robust infrastructure that connects public diplomacy to policy thinking and planning.

Despite noted concerns, the Senate Committee’s conservative recommendations were directed simply to strengthening of the IDC via the level of representation (departmental secretary level) and accountability (reporting to Parliament). Senator Trood conceded during interview, that ‘had the Senate Committee recommended a full scale restructure of the public diplomacy program, including the demolition of the IDC and establishment of a separate

⁹⁸ Ibid, p.103.

⁹⁹ Ibid p.109.

¹⁰⁰ The governance mechanisms separating the DFAT IDC, and DFAT Images of Australia Branch from the AICC, and FCIs is hazy and unclear and has the potential to lead to confusion of roles and responsibilities as well as significant gaps in understanding.

¹⁰¹ Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, *Submission to the Senate Inquiry on the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program*, RMIT, Melbourne, April 2007, p.1.

entity, such as an advisory board to establish the parameters for the Australian public diplomacy, there was a real likelihood that because of resource implications, no action would progress and the IDC would remain completely unchanged.’¹⁰² For this reason a moderate and pragmatic approach amending the composition to a senior executive officer level, and regularity of the existing IDC was suggested instead. Interestingly, when the concept of an overarching advisory board was suggested to one senior DFAT officer involved in the daily management of public diplomacy activities, that officer commented ‘such a body would only add to the already onerous coordinating burden borne by DFAT’.¹⁰³ According to that official, the task of coordinating public diplomacy activities across the existing structure was problematic because of the paralysing effect of many strong and varied opinions involved.¹⁰⁴ Such a statement again points to a lack of overall strategic direction and understanding of public diplomacy.

At this point, there is sufficient evidence to point to serious shortcomings with the current organisation of Australia’s public diplomacy program, and potential opportunities for improvement, whether through more senior representation at the IDC, or via other mechanisms are yet to be tested.¹⁰⁵ The fact remains that the organisational considerations must form a part of the practitioners’ thinking in order to maximise the impact of public diplomacy activities.

¹⁰² Interview, Senator Russell Trood, 10 January 2008

¹⁰³ Interview, Confidential Source, Senior DFAT Officer involved in public diplomacy activities, 22 June 2009.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Of interest, the Australian Government response to the Senate report notes without commitment that ‘the IDC will continue to take a strategic, coherent approach and will look at engaging other non government entities, and other levels of government...the composition and role of the IDC will evolve’. Australian Government Response to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Report: *Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image*, p.9.

5.2.1 The operational phase

Strategic phase	Contextual phase	Organisational phase	Operational phase
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The operational level refers to the tactical activities involved in the actual delivery or implementation of policy. For the purpose of this thesis, it is at this phase in the policy process that the actual activity is carried out for a particular audience, to give effect to a particular policy. Considerations at this point are pertinent to the front-line activities and what happens on the ground. For example, the operational phase involves considerations around how public diplomacy will be actioned, including the method/s or instrument/s to be used depending upon the context (including audience and identified approach).

The most well known public diplomacy methods include high profile visits involving prime ministers, cabinet members or ambassadors, and speaking engagements (use of local language or subtle cultural cues may be an impressive factor), strategic communications and campaigns, cultural, educational or media exchanges and broadcasting of particular content. Additionally, as identified in the previous chapter, development assistance opportunities are ‘more subtle programmes of influence that engage with rather than target foreign publics’.¹⁰⁶ Because of the relational basis of public diplomacy, changing needs of target audiences and the connectedness with innovations in communications technology, the methods used in public diplomacy are inexhaustible, with numerous variables for implementation and appear to evolve and adapt in an organic way to meet with the shifts in the environment.

The diplomatic service posted overseas is the central network through which public diplomacy activities are delivered. As at July 2008, Australia’s diplomatic service was

¹⁰⁶ Hocking, ‘Rethinking the new public diplomacy’, p.36.

spread across '91 diplomatic missions or posts, with 29 percent of those based in Asia, 24 percent in Europe, 12 percent shared across the South Pacific, Americas and the Middle East, and 7 percent in Africa, and the final 4 percent based at multilateral posts (such as the United Nations, World Trade Centre etc)'.¹⁰⁷ According to the 2007-08 annual report data, the portfolio agencies of DFAT, AusAID and Austrade are collectively responsible for approximately 1238 Australian based officers posted across those 91 missions or posts (the DFAT submission to the Senate Inquiry indicated that a far smaller number of those officials, approximately 232 DFAT officials, would be directly engaged in public diplomacy).¹⁰⁸

DFAT's written and oral evidence to the Senate Inquiry pressed the point that all 232 Australian staff employed overseas carry out public diplomacy activities as an integrated component of core duties.¹⁰⁹ As a previous Assistant Secretary of DFAT's Images of Australia Branch noted to the Senate Committee, 'All of our [DFAT] officers are expected to take public diplomacy seriously and to see how it fits into their normal foreign policy and trade work'.¹¹⁰ DFAT can point to public diplomacy programs across 85 of the overseas locations, with activities ranging from public advocacy campaigns, seminars, speeches, media releases, major cultural events and promotions, conferences exhibitions and displays. Interestingly, despite the range of activities conducted, all DFAT officials interviewed for the purpose of this thesis suggested that they had little to do with public diplomacy, also noting

¹⁰⁷ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy', p.17.

¹⁰⁸ Of the total 1238 officials employed, 542 are employed by DFAT, 592 by Austrade and 104 by AusAID. DFAT and Austrade also employ local staff members totalling 2067. DFAT, DFAT Annual Report 2007-08, Australian Government, Canberra, 2008, Appendix 2; AusAID, AusAID Annual Report 2007-08, Australian Government, Canberra, 2008, p.264; Austrade, Austrade Annual Report 2007-08, Australian Government, Canberra, 2008, p.131.

¹⁰⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission to the Senate Standing Committee Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's public diplomacy program*, p.8.

¹¹⁰ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', 14 March 2007, p.147.

that the coordination of such activities was generally relegated to the locally engaged staff.¹¹¹ Statements supporting this view support the disconnect that exists between DFAT rhetoric and a deeper understanding of the policy significance of public diplomacy.

While the diplomatic service is intended to represent the core of the public diplomacy delivery network there are many other actors involved - intentionally or not, and in direct and indirect interactions in the delivery of public diplomacy. The diplomatic network is complemented by this raft of external actors, including the media, academics and universities, non-government organisations, and individuals. The Senate Committee highlighted the fact that the personal networks developed through cultural and educational exchange programs, as well as Australia's overseas diaspora are potent, yet largely untapped resources that could be utilised to strategic effect in delivery of Australia's public diplomacy program.

At the operational level, the responsible individuals will be required to draw upon their experience and skill to make decisions, frequently within compressed timeframes and in rapidly changing situations. More importantly, the ability to engage and influence, not only government officials but foreign audiences via a range of channels may be confronting to the skill set of many traditional diplomats working within a traditional model.¹¹² International scholars and academics acknowledge that 'the skills, techniques, and attitudes of a traditional diplomat in particular are challenged by the emerging requirements of public diplomacy'.¹¹³ Furthermore, there is growing recognition in international discussions that traditional training methods were 'no longer enough' for diplomats who are also expected to carry out public

¹¹¹ In support of this statement, the author acknowledges that a recent employment advertisement appeared on DFAT's website seeking a person, from within Vietnam to undertake public diplomacy activities as a locally engaged staff member on behalf of the department. The advertisement was accessed in early 2009 at <http://www.vietnam.embassy.gov.au/>.

¹¹² Interview, Senior DFAT Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, 22 June 2009.

¹¹³ Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy', p.3.

diplomacy activities.¹¹⁴ For example, the key public diplomacy tasks of the diplomat posted overseas might include creating ‘understanding for the home country’ which would also involve the capacity to reach out to people in the host country, ‘connecting with the active publics’.¹¹⁵

In recent years, DFAT has engaged private public relations firm, Media Gurus to provide specialised public diplomacy training to staff preparing for an overseas posting.¹¹⁶ There is limited information available regarding the training of DFAT and other government officials in this field of public diplomacy. DFAT officials interviewed for the purpose of this thesis were not willing to release the public diplomacy handbook (referred to in the DFAT submission) and noted that the contract with Media Gurus had not been renewed following the Senate Inquiry. For these reasons there are arguments put forward that diplomats versed in traditional diplomacy are not sufficiently equipped to take on the practice of public diplomacy.¹¹⁷ That is, it requires different skills, techniques and attitudes than those found in traditional diplomacy.

Understanding and evaluating outcomes, so that policy delivery might be refined and improved is an important aspect of good policy making and implementation. The Gyngell and Wesley policy process is deficient in the respect of reviewing the activities that occur at the operational or tactical phase of the policy process against the strategic objective through a monitoring and evaluation loop. The omission of this review and evaluation loop from the Gyngell and Wesley model is consistent with what Wesley refers to as Australia’s mindset of

¹¹⁴ Conference on ‘Challenges for Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic Networks and Optimising Value’, *Summary of discussion*, 31 May–1 June 2006, Geneva, p. 4, quoted in the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Report, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building our Image’, p.12.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Media Gurus are self marketed as ‘consultants in strategic communications’, see: <http://www.mediagurus.com.au/>.

¹¹⁷ Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, p.3.

‘short-termism’ when it comes to foreign policy, and is reflective of current practice within DFAT.¹¹⁸ Indeed, the actual deficit in the evaluation of Australia’s public diplomacy program was not lost on the Senate Committee. The current focus of Australian public diplomacy rhetoric turns largely on the quantity of public diplomacy activities or outputs. However, this thesis suggests that the public diplomacy activity itself, which is considered at the tactical end of the policy process while significant, is of least consequence in the public diplomacy equation. Rather, as submitted earlier, it is the impact or effectiveness of the public diplomacy activities on achieving that objective that should dominate the discussion. In the case of Australia, there is little attention, outside an internally driven DFAT review of activities, to the linking of public diplomacy activities once delivered to the strategic objective through a mechanism that enables the long term evaluation of public diplomacy impact. The evaluation of public diplomacy activities as highlighted through the Senate Inquiry process, is not a straightforward exercise, and one witness to the Inquiry asserted that ‘a lot of agencies are stuck at the activity measure and struggling with how to determine effectiveness’.¹¹⁹ The Senate Committee noted there is a valuable role for the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) in undertaking a performance audit of DFAT’s public diplomacy programs.

¹¹⁸ The Bridgman and Davis policy cycle incorporates evaluation as a clear requirement for good policy making. Evaluations particularly those undertaken over sufficient time will allow for a determination on the effectiveness of a policy and its implementation.

¹¹⁹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, p.179.

5.3 Foreign policy drivers

The scaffolding for the second stage of the policy-based framework is set up through the identification and application of key foreign policy strategies. Henrikson's work identifies and describes the five key foreign policy strategies evident in foreign relations over the past fifty years. Each of these policy strategies is of relevance to public diplomacy activity, and provides the logic for understanding and applying public diplomacy activity to strategic policy objectives. In Henrikson's view key foreign policy strategies that hold relevance for public diplomacy include i) *consolidation*, ii) *containment*, iii) *penetration*, iv) *enlargement* and v) *transformation*. These five policy strategies provide the base foundation, but there is room to expand the framework to incorporate recent policy strategies that have developed both internationally and in the Australian context in response to particular challenges within the international environment.

In particular, for the purpose of this thesis an additional three strategies have been identified. The first of these, being particularly relevant to the Australian context, is the strategy of vi) *engagement* which has been a consistent theme in Australian foreign policy approaches (particularly towards the Asia Pacific region) across recent government administrations, and recently upgraded by Prime Minister Rudd. The next additional foreign policy strategy, vii) *stabilisation* is also particularly relevant to the Australian experience, and has emerged more clearly in the Australian approach to the Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific (otherwise known as the 'arc of instability'). Inspired by Australian National University's Paul Dibb, stabilisation of the 'arc of instability' has been taken up with renewed energy by the current Rudd government, though under the nomenclature of the 'arc of responsibility'.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ The phrase 'arc of instability' was used by Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb to refer to the region stretching from East Timor, through Papua New Guinea and into the South West Pacific, as noted in Graeme Dobell, 'The

Lastly, adding to the framework is the policy strategy of viii) *diversion* recently articulated by the recently appointed Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the US Department of State in 2008.¹²¹ Diversion is incorporated as an interesting policy response to combat the recruitment of young disadvantaged youths into terrorist groups, and may have some relevance to Australian interests, particularly in Indonesia. These additional three strategic policies have been identified and added to the framework to ensure the contemporary focus of the framework, and ensure a relevance to Australian foreign policy and public diplomacy programs.

Each of these policy concepts are generally familiar to foreign policy makers, and have shaped the actions and activities of state international interactions and relations over recent decades. However, through the consideration of the strategic, contextual, organisational and operational implications of the policy process from a public diplomacy perspective, practitioners can align, attach and deliver a public diplomacy strategy that will assist in achieving the strategic objective. When drawn together in an appropriate framework, each strategy can be deconstructed into appropriate layers, and aligned with the relevant public diplomacy tools.

The framework, set out at Table 3 is not intended to prescribe practice, but rather to reflect or guide practice in an organised and logical sequence. To some extent the framework offers a policy continuum that follows both a chronological and developmental sequence. For example, the strategy of ‘containment’ emerged through the Cold War years, that of

Pacific ‘arc of instability’’, *Correspondent’s Report*, ABC Radio National, 20 August 2006. More recently, Rudd has instigated a shift in terminology relating to the Pacific, referring instead to the ‘arc of responsibility’. See for example C Hawksley, ‘Australia’s aid diplomacy and the Pacific Islands: change and continuity in middle power foreign policy’, *Global Change, Peace and Security*, Vol 21(1), p.36; also T Vestergaard, ‘Man at work: Rudd walks Asian tightrope’, *Asia Times Online*, 17 April 2008.

¹²¹ Glassman, in U.S. ‘Public Diplomacy and the War on Ideas’.

‘enlargement’ is equated to the 1990s, and the strategies of ‘transformation’ and ‘diversion’ have been articulated more recently (2006 and 2008 respectively).¹²² However, as with any dynamic system, such strategies do not only or always occur in a linear timeframe, and practical examples will demonstrate that the policy strategies and their associated public diplomacy activities may overlap, or be implemented simultaneously or out of sequence – depending upon the context, external influences and desired outcome. The policy of containment, while relevant to the Cold War years, may also be relevant to contemporary foreign policy discussions.¹²³ Each policy requires further consideration. Consideration will turn firstly to the key foreign policy drivers that have been identified on the international stage. Following consideration of the internationally recognised foreign policies, the thesis considers those policies that have been identified as particular to the Australian context. While each policy will be further examined in isolation, together they form a part of the larger framework. In an effort to support the understanding of the framework as a whole through this section of the thesis, the policy continuum will be represented at the start of each new section, highlighting the specific policy under discussion for that section, as shown below:

Key Foreign Policy Drivers of Public Diplomacy:

Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Enlargement	Transformation	Diversion
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Key Australian Foreign Policy Drivers of Public Diplomacy:

Regional Stability	Engagement
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¹²² For example, the policy of ‘containment’ was articulated by George Kennan within the US Administration during the 1950s, see G Kennan, ‘The Origins of Containment’ in T Deibel, and J Lewis, *Containment: Concept and Policy*, National Defence University, Washington DC, 1986, pp.29-30. The policy of ‘enlargement’ was coined through the US Clinton Administration of the 1990s, see D Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 106, Spring, 1997, p.114. On the policy of ‘transformation’ see Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’. Lastly with regard to the policy of ‘diversion’ refer to Glassman, ‘How to Win the War on Ideas’.

¹²³ Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.18.

5.3.1 Consolidation

Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Enlargement	Transformation	Diversion
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The exploration of the policy strategies commences with the discussion of the underpinning strategy of ‘consolidation’ described by Henrikson as, ‘the political process of increasing the understanding of, and confirming the support for a country, and its policy activity within the sphere of the country’s own allies, friends and partners’.¹²⁴ The strategic objective of the consolidation strategy is to build or reinforce a sense of cohesion in common values, purpose or identity within the grouping in order to achieve a successful outcome. Consolidation involves public diplomacy activities that are aimed at a core community of like-minded, with the objective of building and validating identity. One significant factor of consolidation is that the domestic audience is always incorporated as a part of, and sometimes the only audience within the ‘core community’.¹²⁵

Public diplomacy in a contemporary context builds substantially upon the traditional and internally focused activity of public affairs (government communication aimed at the domestic constituency to build internal support for policy activity), because it links the domestic constituency into a broader community, and to both internal and external policy impacts. In his analysis of the theory and practice of public diplomacy, Melissen asserts the importance of engaging domestic audiences in the public diplomacy process because, ‘separating public affairs from public diplomacy is increasingly at odds with the interconnected realities of global relationships’.¹²⁶ Potter, in examining Canada’s public diplomacy response also notes that the increasing availability of information ensures that diplomats are accountable to their domestic constituency for the actions and statements made

¹²⁴ Ibid, p11.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Melissen, ‘Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice’, p.13.

abroad; and ‘increasingly being called upon to become good communicators at home, not just when they are assigned to a foreign posting’.¹²⁷ While Melissen cautions that governments need not be overly concerned with the ‘domestic societisation of diplomacy’ (or public affairs activities), it is sufficient to note that the inclusion of the domestic audience is an integral part of the consolidation strategy implemented through effective public diplomacy.¹²⁸

It is in the sphere of consolidation that public diplomacy intersects to an extent with the well known field of public affairs, a field in which government communicates with its domestic public on matters of domestic policy. There is evidence, particularly in the Australian context

of unresolved tension relating to this intersection between public diplomacy and public affairs, and it is an area that deserves brief attention within the context of the *consolidation* strategy.

In their submission to the Senate Inquiry, the International Public Affairs Network (an informal association of former members of Australia’s whole-of-government international public affairs organisation, which operated from 1939 to 1996), note that the term public diplomacy is ‘so contestable that definitions and explanations of the term precede most uses of it’. However, for the purpose of their submission the International Public Affairs Network also use the terms public diplomacy and public affairs at times interchangeably, indicating some sense of overlap and confusion in the use of terminology. In particular, their submission notes that ‘Australia established its first specialist international public affairs *or*

¹²⁷ Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, p .6.

¹²⁸ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.13. In the case of Australia, the Department of Foreign Affairs had been home to a specialised public affairs branch (with specialist media skills), until it was abolished on cost saving grounds at the time in 1986. During the 2007 Senate Inquiry into Australia’s public diplomacy program a consortium of public affairs professions (including those who had been engaged within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), pointed to this departmental restructure as indicative of critical flaws in Australia’s approach to public diplomacy, undermining Australia’s ability to engage effectively with domestic and external audiences on critical issues of foreign policy.

public diplomacy agency, the Department of Information, in 1939.¹²⁹ In no other submissions or discussions are the terms public affairs and public diplomacy equated in such a way. The work of Melissen in particular points to a clear overlap between public affairs and public diplomacy, but also notes that the two concepts remain distinct.¹³⁰

The Senate Inquiry indicates that Australia's past record on public diplomacy has had a minimal focus on the consolidation of its domestic audience. When questioned about the emphasis of its public diplomacy activities, a responding DFAT officer noted that 'aspects of what the department does under the general heading of 'public diplomacy' are in fact directed at the Australian population, but primarily for us—and this goes for foreign ministries the world over—public diplomacy is about reaching out to the populations and decision-makers of other countries and shaping their opinions and shaping their image of us.'¹³¹ However, this emphasis may in fact change under the Rudd Government.

Indeed, Australia's 2020 Summit, a forum bringing more than 1000 Australians of varying backgrounds together to discuss key issues on the national agenda, and shape Australia's long-term policy for Australia's future, was a clear example of consolidative public diplomacy at work. Prime Minister Rudd convened the 2020 Summit, 'the largest genuine community consultative forum in Australia's history' to consolidate Australia's goals and identity with reference to both domestic and international politics.¹³² The Summit followed on from other similarly symbolically powerful events, including Australia's signing of the

¹²⁹ International Network of Public Affairs Specialists, Submission to the Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 3 April, 2007, p. 9. viewed on (http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/fadt_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-2007).

¹³⁰ Melissen, 'Between Theory and Practice, pxx. The view that public diplomacy and public affairs are distinct activities is also supported in Zarharna, 'Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives'; and Heller and Persson, 'The Distinction Between Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy'.

¹³¹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, Wednesday 14 March 2007, p.4.

¹³² G Davis, 'Australia's 2020 Summit Final Report', *Letter of Transmittal*, 28 May 2008.

Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, and the formal apology issued by Rudd to Australia's Aboriginal stolen generations.¹³³ Each of these events received significant media coverage in Australia and abroad, and genuinely impacted on the perceptions of domestic and foreign audiences alike.

Public diplomacy requires domestic engagement and support, but as is demonstrated through the strategy of consolidation, it moves beyond domestic borders, and entwines the regional and international perspectives. Regional geographic or economic groupings and alliances are important in forming a base from which nations can jointly influence multilateral policy directions, and tackle significant global issues such as bird flu, climate change or economic crisis. The European Union (EU), and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) along with the Commonwealth and APEC are examples of communities which utilise public diplomacy tools to consolidate their identity and positioning. While not always based on:

traditional geographic parameters, nor common cultures (in fact, the nations brought together into such groupings may in other circumstances harbour intense rivalries and sometimes hostilities towards one another), public diplomacy aimed at consolidation accentuates the common psyche and interests.¹³⁴

Public diplomacy as a method for achieving consolidation usually involves high level conferences or other high profile / visibility events – where commonalities in values and cultures are emphasised. Henrikson points to the 2006 Commonwealth Games held in Melbourne which brought together athletes and audiences from the 53 nations of the Commonwealth in a spirit of goodwill, as a prime illustration of consolidation through public

¹³³ C Porteous, 'World Cheers as Rudd Signs Kyoto', *The Courier Mail*, 4 December 2007; D Welch, 'Kevin Rudd Says Sorry', *The Age*, 13 February, 2008.

¹³⁴ For example, the Cairns Group is a 'unique coalition of 19 developed and developing agricultural exporting countries with a commitment to achieving free trade in agriculture, comprising: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay. Refer to Cairns Group Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.cairnsgroup.org/map/index.html>>

diplomacy.¹³⁵ As Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon stated at the time, ‘For a Commonwealth Games, first of all you need a Commonwealth’.¹³⁶ In the same way, the symbolism surrounding the meetings of the APEC Leaders reflects public diplomacy consolidation strategy. Whether they are wearing batik shirts in Indonesia, dryzabones in Sydney or ponchos in Peru, the concept of all Leaders from across the 21 nation economic grouping dressing in the one national garment is a highly visible and effective demonstration of commonality in purpose and focus.¹³⁷ While it may appear trite or superficial, consolidation strategies such as the annual APEC Leaders’ photo provides an avenue for nations to reinforce their national identities within the regional group even when there may be inherent tensions in the value and cultural positions of those states.¹³⁸

Cultural exchange is an important vehicle for consolidation through public diplomacy. For example, the EU currently funds the European Children’s Cultural Exchange, a three year art-centred program involving 10-14 year-old students from the European Union countries of Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Italy, Romania, and Turkey (EU candidate nation), as a means of fostering understanding and acceptance.¹³⁹ A number of projects recently initiated with the ASEAN grouping bring together the publics of member states through the ASEAN student exchange and ASEAN youth festival.¹⁴⁰ More recently in March 2007, ASEAN states celebrated ASEAN’s 40th anniversary ‘in what can be referred to as a grand display of public diplomacy’.¹⁴¹ Music bands from the various ASEAN member states were involved in an event that strategically brought together the publics of those member states in Singapore in an

¹³⁵ Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.11.

¹³⁶ D McKinnon quoted in Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.12.

¹³⁷ APEC Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.apec.org/apec/member_economies.html>

¹³⁸ Opinion, ‘APEC Outfits Keep Leaders Dryzabones’, *The Australian*, 8 September 2007; M Davis, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Poncho’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 November 2008.

¹³⁹ European Children’s Cultural Exchange Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.ecceproject.eu/www/>>

¹⁴⁰ ASEAN Website: www.aseanregionalforum.org.

¹⁴¹ <http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Singapore>.

atmosphere of camaraderie. Events and activities such as these which engage a range of publics together are strategically designed to build networks, promote regional integration and consolidate an identity. On their own, such activities may appear to be frivolous, but as part of public diplomacy strategy, they consolidate and solidify relationships and strengthen the platform from which cooperative ventures or positioning may subsequently be launched.

In Henrikson's view consolidation is the most important of the strategies – because it is the most likely to achieve positive outcomes, and provides a foundation for moving forwards towards other more targeted strategies. For this reason he asserts it provides a 'necessary step – an absolute precondition – of all the others'.¹⁴² It is the strategy that should be implemented first and maintained for effective development of other public diplomacy strategies. Based on Henrikson's approach, provided a state has developed and consolidated its position with its domestic constituency, as well as with like-minded within its core community, other foreign policy strategies will be more likely to work.

¹⁴² Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve', p.11.

5.3.2 Containment

Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Enlargement	Transformation	Diversion
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The second strategy which can be delivered through effective public diplomacy is that of ‘containment’.¹⁴³ Containment is essentially a ‘defensive and reactive concept, designed to limit the further spread of powers or influences, not necessarily another country as such, that are deemed to be harmful or threatening – or are just too big and powerful for comfort’.¹⁴⁴

The strategy of containment was first articulated by George Kennan, a career Foreign Service Officer, and adopted by United States President Truman as a key foreign policy strategy for fighting the expansion of Soviet communism through the Cold War years (1947-1989). According to Kennan, ‘The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union, must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.’ In particular, by countering ‘Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world’ through the ‘adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy.’¹⁴⁵

Such a policy, Kennan predicted, would ‘promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.’ In the face of criticism from within the United States administration, Kennan qualified that his approach was not about the use of military force, but involved economic, political and information elements. In particular he referred to the use of ‘psychological warfare including overt propaganda and covert operations’ – both of which may imply both a propagandistic

¹⁴³ Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.17.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Kennan, ‘The Origins of Containment’ in Deibel, and Lewis *Containment: Concept and Policy*.

approach and an approach based on public diplomacy, which begs the important question: is public diplomacy simply a euphemism for propaganda?

For traditionalists such as Berridge the distinction between public diplomacy and propaganda is not sufficiently clear. In *Diplomacy Theory and Practice*, Berridge defines public diplomacy as ‘propaganda – a form of political advertising designed to influence a foreign government’s external policy’.¹⁴⁶ At the same time, scholars of propaganda define propaganda as ‘the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interests of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly’.¹⁴⁷ From this definition, it would appear that propaganda and public diplomacy may be seen to follow a similar methodology.

The blurring of the lines between public diplomacy and propaganda is furthered by propaganda scholar Richard Holbrooke, ‘Call it public diplomacy, call it public affairs, psychological warfare, if you really want to be blunt, propaganda’.¹⁴⁸ For Australian scholar, and former diplomat, Alison Broinowski the distinction between ‘public diplomacy’ and propaganda is one of perspective, ‘it is what governments would like to succeed in, - that is, converting people in other countries to see our point of view and agree with it. That is propaganda, except we always say propaganda is done by our enemies’.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, pp. 126-127.

¹⁴⁷ D Welch, ‘Powers of Persuasion’, *History Today*, 49, August, 1999, pp.24-26; Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, pp.16-19.

¹⁴⁸ R Holbrooke, ‘Get the Message Out’, *Washington Post*, 28 October, 2001. See also Cull, ‘Public diplomacy before Gullion: the Evolution of a Phrase’; and W Lippman, ‘Today and Tomorrow: Talking about Talking’, *Washington Post*, 19 November 1953.

¹⁴⁹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 11 April 2007, p.18.

However, Melissen is careful to clearly establish critical differences between propaganda and contemporary public diplomacy, and he asserts that the ‘distinction lies in the purpose and method of communication’.¹⁵⁰ Firstly, public diplomacy seeks to influence through information and education that aims to broaden the audience’s perspectives and options; where propaganda serves to influence through information that narrows perspectives and closes down options. Without dwelling on the negative connotations associated with propaganda, the patterns and methodology of propaganda based communications have been evidenced through Nazi and Communist regimes of the past (and in recent times in Communist China).¹⁵¹ In these examples, the methodology of propaganda involved persuasion through one-way communication from the authority to the public audience (domestic and external). By contrast, successful ‘modern public diplomacy involves persuasion through a two-way communication process that seeks to engage the audience in a dialogue process, based on a liberal notion of communication with foreign publics’.¹⁵²

To further the distinction, Melissen quotes Jay Black in making this point, ‘whereas creative communication accepts pluralism and displays expectations that its receivers should conduct further investigations of its observations, allegations and conclusions, propaganda does not appear to do so’.¹⁵³ While most states, including those based in Western democracy and liberal values, have and will continue to engage in propaganda at times, propaganda has been considered to be an instrument of choice used by authoritarian regimes such as North Korea, Iran, Stalinist Russia and China in manipulating both domestic and foreign opinion via state

¹⁵⁰ Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.18, See also Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’.

¹⁵¹ Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives’, pp.89-90. For discussion of propaganda in use in closed or authoritarian regimes, see also Nye, *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*, pp. 49-50.

¹⁵² Potter, ‘Canada and the new public diplomacy’; see also Fiske de Gouveia, ‘The Future of Public Diplomacy’.

¹⁵³ J Black, quoted in Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.18.

generated information that does not seek to engage, but bombards audiences with a single message, often lacking in credibility. For example, the main themes of North Korean propaganda are visible at the Demilitarization Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea. Signs with slogans reading ‘Our General is number one,’ or describing North Korean Leader, Kim Jong Il as the ‘Sunshine of the 21st century’ while another one reads, ‘Oppose America’ are all forms of current propaganda, and are quite separate and distinct from the current use of information through public diplomacy to engage publics.¹⁵⁴

In her analysis of the rise of China’s public diplomacy programs, d’Hooghe extends upon the distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy by defining the latter as being ‘about engaging publics, not just informing them: it is about establishing long term relationships that will build trust’.¹⁵⁵ d’Hooghe’s definition highlights the added dimension of building trusting relationships which takes public diplomacy beyond the concept of information and communication and into diplomacy. It also implies a fundamental need for public diplomacy to be founded in truth and fact, not just political spin. As Leonard points out, ‘simple propaganda often lacks credibility’.¹⁵⁶ Such concepts present challenges for governments in moving their public diplomacy programs away from propaganda, whether they be in China or Australia, in working beyond traditional and official circles and political timeframes. Australian academic, Kerr elaborates on this point in her contribution to the Senate Inquiry:

...good public diplomacy does require a great deal of listening and interaction with the groups being targeted. It is a two way process, where one party is actually listening to the other party and then accommodating some of their interests and concerns. If that process takes place, public diplomacy then does not become a tool in propaganda.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ M Chinoy, ‘North Korea’s Propaganda Machine’, *CNN International Edition*, 1 March 2003.

¹⁵⁵ d’Hooghe, ‘The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy’.

¹⁵⁶ M Leonard quoted in Nye, J, *Soft Power – the means to success in World Politics*, p. 125.

¹⁵⁷ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 11 April 2007, p.23.

Based on the argument that public diplomacy is sufficiently distinct from propaganda it is useful to identify a more recent application of containment through public diplomacy. Henrikson notes the current application of the containment strategy to the 'rising China'.¹⁵⁸ The former United States Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice during trilateral talks with former Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer and Japan's Foreign Minister, Taro Aso referred to the need for the containment of China, 'I think all of us have a responsibility and an obligation to try and ensure that the rise of China will be a positive force for the international community and not a negative force'.¹⁵⁹ The Final Report of Australia's 2020 Summit highlighted concerns around 'the growing influence of China in the region', particularly because China's visibility had increased rapidly and there remained uncertainty over what it was seeking to achieve, particularly in the long-term'.

The audiences generally targeted through a policy of containment may include domestic audiences, but are more generally foreign audiences of a like minded approach (for example, as noted previously, Japan and Australia - and the broader Asian region were the targeted audiences for the Americans in recent containment-related discussions on China).¹⁶⁰ The public diplomacy approaches may slide between all three of Nye's public diplomacy frames depending upon the containment requirements, including the day-to-day trouble-shooting through the daily media, a longer strategic campaign that seeks to build knowledge and spark some form of advocacy, and relationship building to develop longer term trust if warranted. The sort of tools used to give effect to policies of containment today through public diplomacy, include ensuring the free flow of ideas through information education and cultural exchange with publics of the targeted state. These tools provide for two-way understanding

¹⁵⁸ Henrikson, 'What Can public Diplomacy Achieve?', p.18.

¹⁵⁹ M Gawenda, 'Rice and Downer in Talks on How to Contain China', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 March 2006.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

and sharing to build relationships of trust and mutual regard, which enable opportunities for dialogue and influence. For example, Wesley's recent comments about the current challenges for Australia's relationship note that, 'getting China right means Australia must make the effort to *better understand China...*'.¹⁶¹ The reference to 'understanding China' directly relates to public diplomacy activities that enable wider understanding of the target foreign audience.

A recent Australian example of this policy strategy in action, might be the containment of negative Indian press regarding the treatment of Indian students travelling to and living in Australia for the purpose of obtaining a tertiary qualification. With the outbreak of negative Indian media, DFAT moved quickly into rapid response mode working at both ends of the public diplomacy spectrum, combating negative press via media outlets on the one hand, and ramping up a series of diplomatic visits and high level discussions with broad and positive media coverage on the other.¹⁶² This activity was in addition to the ongoing media and youth exchanges aimed at building positive bilateral and personal connections to the benefit of both countries.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Wesley, 'China an unfamiliar terrain', (emphasis added).

¹⁶² Dubey, 'Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under', *The Indian Times*, 3 June 2009. Bolt, 'We're not the racists', *Herald Sun*, 3 June 2009, BBC News, 'India Calls Off Australia Events'; Wesley, 'Australia's Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia', p.10; Healey and Trounson, 'Moves to Safeguard Indian Students'; News.com, 'Australia Assumes Safety of Indian Students', *Australian Associated Press Online*, 7 August 2009:

http://livenews.com.au/news/student_violence_prompts_rudd_to_visit_india/2009/8/7/215406; Banham and Gilmore, 'Rudd Forms Indian Violence Taskforce', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 June 2009.

¹⁶³ The Australia India Focus, *Newsletter of the Australia India Business Council*, May 2009.

5.3.3 Penetration

Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Enlargement	Transformation	Diversion
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The third strategic driver *penetration* is again a confined strategy to break open ‘areas of influence deep inside the target territory’.¹⁶⁴ The strategic objective driving the penetration strategy is to build a network of confidence and influence within specific groups of elites that may be useful in times of crisis, and will translate into uptake of political or economic products (such as goods or services, or multilateral policy direction). The audience for penetrative public diplomacy is targeted to groups of foreign elites who may hold some source of influence within their own state.

As Henrikson observes, the terminology used in an international relations context reflects its use in the commercial world. For example, market penetration refers to the situation where a product or brand penetrates a new market either by taking customers away from a competitor, attracting new users to a product, or convincing existing users to use more of the product or service. In the commercial world, penetration usually involves tactics such as price cutting, increased advertising, better positioning and/or improved distribution of the product or service.¹⁶⁵ In foreign policy, penetration can be achieved through the public diplomacy activities of educational and cultural exchange – where people-to-people relationships are established. The initial relationship provides leverage to access and influence expanded networks within the targeted state. Television and radio programming, along with the use of internet technology are all effective in penetrating and influencing otherwise hard-to-reach groups.

¹⁶⁴ Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.24.

¹⁶⁵ Description of ‘the marketing strategy of penetration’ found at Wikipedia, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/maket_penetration>

The strategy of penetration is less effective when utilised in isolation of other strategies. In particular, it is aligned to a degree with the strategy of containment (and has also been carried out effectively through an intelligence role). The two strategies were employed together by the United States against the former Soviet Union during the Cold War – to contain the spread and influence of communism, and to offer to individuals a taste of democratic values.¹⁶⁶ The latter was made possible through targeted exchange programs which were aimed at scholars, students, scientists, engineers, dancers, and athletes. Practitioners, such as former United States Foreign Service Officer, Yale Richmond, claims that the implementation of various cultural exchange programs which brought some fifty thousand Soviet Union citizens to the United States, and many Americans to the Soviet Union, ultimately led to the demise of the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁷ According to Richmond the contacts and exchanges between American and Soviet Union intelligentsia occurred from about 1954 through to 1988 in culture, information, science and technology. These exchanges which were conducted for the most part openly and under agreement, and resulted in an increase in Western influence among the Soviet Union intelligentsia at a time when the intelligentsia were attracted to Western themes and values.¹⁶⁸ Ultimately, according to Richmond such influence had a significant impact on the direction of policy development of the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve', p.24.

¹⁶⁷ Y Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: the Raising of the Iron Curtain*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania, 2003.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, p. xiv.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. For example, Richmond notes that one such beneficiary was Alexander Yakovlev, who later became Mikhail Gorbachev's adviser, and was 'considered by many to be the author of the Soviet Union's *glasnost* policy'. Giles Scott Smith takes this point up in noting that 'whereas most forms of public diplomacy work involve the presentation of image and information, exchanges directly involve the human factor, where an engagement with the personality and psychology of the participants is central'. G. Scott Smith, 'Exchange Programs and Public Diplomacy', in Nancy Snow and Phil Taylor (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 50-56.

More likely this is overstating the impact of penetration. However, penetrative activities can provide long-term leverage points for opening up a crack of influence within a key territory. A contemporary example highlighting the possibilities for penetration through public diplomacy is evident in the work of Australian-born playwright, Daniel Keene. Keene, introduced to the French theatre scene with some assistance from the Australian Embassy in Paris, has since had numerous works translated and performed in European theatres, and is now considered to be one of Europe's most notable contemporary playwrights.¹⁷⁰ While Keene's works do not specifically promote an image of Australia, they are considered to be challenging and confronting, sophisticated and emotionally sensitive pieces.¹⁷¹ That Keene has been so well accepted and awarded by the European cultural elites reflects well on Australia, and could provide a strategic opening into the elite grouping through which the Australian diplomats may manoeuvre to build further relationships. However, Keene's work does not feature in the DFAT summary of public diplomacy, and as such also provides evidence of 'loose or weak' coordination of Australia's public diplomacy program.¹⁷²

Successful penetration, which may occur through targeted radio broadcasting of Australian current affairs in local languages, is deemed to be extremely effective in building pockets of support in diverse areas, such as Indonesia or the Pacific islands, and supporting relationships between countries.¹⁷³ Radio Australia, despite having a significant funding cut over the last decade, currently broadcasts political, business and educational content into a range of foreign communities, such as Honiara, Suva, Nandi, Port Vila, Nuku'alofa and Dili – frequently in local languages, and through the goodwill of local governments and national

¹⁷⁰ Interview, Robyn Archer, 3 November 2007.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 11 April 2007, p.24.

¹⁷³ Radio Australia Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <<http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/>>

authorities to utilise airwaves.¹⁷⁴ Anecdotally, Radio Australia suggests that Australia is positioned to achieve positive outcomes through such broadcasting, including in establishing an understanding of Australian attitudes and affairs within a values based framework that promotes rule of law, equity of opportunity and respect for human rights'.¹⁷⁵ However, as discovered through the Senate Inquiry process, there is little in terms of substantive or statistical evidence to support this claim.¹⁷⁶

5.3.4 Enlargement

Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Enlargement	Transformation	Diversion
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Enlargement or 'expansion of the ideological, economic and also political sphere of a country and its allies on a very broad front, rather than to prise open a beachhead of influence within a country' was enunciated by former United States President Clinton in his 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly.¹⁷⁷ As the United States' first Cold War President, Clinton was under some pressure to define the US foreign policy strategy in a way that moved the United States beyond Kennan's cold war strategy of containment in recognition of the changed world order. At this time, the United States found itself to be the world's only superpower with troops deployed across unstable crisis situations including Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Iraq. Multilateral economic initiatives, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), APEC, and the Group of Seven (G-7) had moved onto Clinton's foreign economic policy agenda.¹⁷⁸ In this context, the Clinton administration developed the

¹⁷⁴ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p.65. However, Broinowski counters that from about 1992-2002, Australia's reputation in Indonesia was poor, and this image was not improved in any way by 'the sale of the Cox Peninsula transmitter to a fundamentalist Christian organisation for broadcasts into Indonesia by shortwave radio [rendering] Radio Australia [to be] barely audible'. See Broinowski, *About Face*, p.231.

¹⁷⁵ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p.65.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p.69.

¹⁷⁷ Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve' p.24.

¹⁷⁸ Brinkley, 'Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine', p.114.

strategy of enlargement, 'signifying the notion that as free states grew in number and strength, the international order would become both more prosperous and more secure'.¹⁷⁹

The enlargement blueprint developed by Clinton's administration focused upon 'four key points; i) to strengthen the community of market democracies – including our own – which constitute the core; ii) to foster and consolidate new democracies or market economies wherever possible especially in states of special significance and opportunity; iii) to counter the aggression and support the liberalisation of states hostile to democracy; iv) to help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.'¹⁸⁰

The concept of enlargement was by no means a blanket expansionist approach, and Clinton freely acknowledged that market competitiveness was at the heart of his foreign policy strategy.

Enlargement is a strategy that clearly incorporates elements of consolidation, containment and penetration where relevant. As such and guided by the four points above, the basic premise of the enlargement strategy is to 'extend 'Western enlightenment' where it was possible to do so'.¹⁸¹ The Clinton administration subsequently justified its withdrawal or avoidance of intractable military interventions, and prioritised its focus towards enlargement through those states most open to market forces, including Mexico and the Asia Pacific. Clinton utilised United States involvement in multilateral groupings including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), APEC and NAFTA, as key vehicles for deployment of the enlargement strategy.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Henrikson , 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve?' p.24.

From a public diplomacy perspective, the enlargement strategy works in an outwards direction starting with the foreign public audience already open to (if not engaged in) the concepts of democracy or market economy, towards those less aligned with such concepts - almost as a reverse adaptation of the Cold War 'domino effect'. The concept of democracy for the purposes of the enlargement strategy is loosely adapted to ensure alignment with the United States' primary strategic and economic interests. For example, in prioritising its audience for the enlargement strategy the Clinton administration did not quibble over significantly differing interpretations of democratic principles, as long as market forces were positive in the targeted nation.¹⁸² In this way that Clinton justified his focus on the economies of South Korea and Mexico while disregarding the less strategic concerns in sub-Saharan Africa or South America.¹⁸³ While at times difficult to sell internally, the impact of Clinton's enlargement strategy has been to bring more states to the table, whether for NATO or APEC without threat, and on the basis of inclusion.¹⁸⁴

Enlargement is progressed through activities based on strategic communications and lasting relationships. Henrikson states, 'enlargement requires a large organising vision, not just small penetrative devices'.¹⁸⁵ Therefore, high profile conferences, visits, speeches and symbolic gestures by political leaders, ministers and senior diplomats all feature as a part of the campaign. The United Nations and other multilateral fora provide opportunities for pursuing

¹⁸² Brinkley, 'Democratic enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine', pp.115-116.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve', p.31. See for example, NATO, 'NATO's Open Door Policy', *Nato Online Library*: <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/opendoor.htm>. The discussion of Clinton's policy of enlargement cannot proceed without recognition of scholarly criticism of enlargement as the promotion of US hegemony and the underpinning motivations of global capitalism, as progressed by Clinton, and subsequently by US President George W. Bush. For example, refer to: N Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival*, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2003; N Chomsky, 'A Century Later', *Peace Review*, Vol 10(3), 1998, pp.313-320; E Meiksins Wood, 'Kosovo and the new imperialism', *The Monthly Review*, Vol 51(2), viewed on 12 April 2010 at: < <http://www.monthlyreview.org/699wood.htm>>; E Meiksins-Wood, *Empire of Capital*, Twayne Publishers, Boston, 2005.

¹⁸⁵ Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve', p.29. See also A Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement', *Remarks at the School of Advanced International Studies*, John Hopkins University, Washington DC, 21 September 1993.

an enlargement strategy. Cultural diplomacy and exchange fostering targeted person-to-person relationships, and promoting cultural uptake appear to provide effective outcomes.

Recent activities by China to increase its influence and role as a responsible player in global international relations through its 'harmonious world' strategy may be seen as an adaptation on the enlargement strategy. d'Hooghe notes in her examination of China's public diplomacy strategy, that the concept of 'harmonious world', underpinned by an earlier strategy of 'peaceful rise' is built upon four key pillars, including 'i) effective multilateralism with a strong role of the United Nations; ii) development of a collective security mechanism; iii) prosperity for all through mutually beneficial cooperation; and iv) tolerance and enhancement of dialogue amongst diverse nations'.¹⁸⁶ By promoting its concept of harmonious world, China employs public diplomacy to send the message that its rise will not be destabilising, but will be peaceful, in an attempt to counter regional the perception that a rising China might pose a threat.¹⁸⁷

Interestingly, a key public diplomacy tool utilised by China to achieve this outcome is the establishment of the Confucius Institutes and Colleges aimed at 'promoting the friendly relationships with other countries and enhancing the understanding of the Chinese language and culture among the world Chinese learners'.¹⁸⁸ Between 2004 and 2007, China had established a total of 128 Institutes (six of those in Australia) incorporating each continent across the globe, with applications pending on a further 400 Institutes.¹⁸⁹ The Confucius Institutes not only facilitate the spread of China's culture and language, but reinforce the

¹⁸⁶ d'Hooghe, 'The Rise of China's Public Diplomacy', p.10.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. According to one Chinese official, 'China should help people from other nations acquaint themselves with Chinese culture, including its traditions, religions and particularly the Chinese way of thinking. This will help China overcome its cultural deficit'. Anon, 'China Threat Fear Countered by Culture', *China People's Daily*, 26 May 2006; Jumbo, 'Confucianism Vital String in China's Bow'.

¹⁸⁸ d'Hooghe, 'The Rise of China's Public Diplomacy', p.29.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

value of China's ancient culture to a contemporary audience, enhancing China's overall attractiveness.

5.3.5 Transformation

Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Enlargement	Transformation	Diversion
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The transformation strategy was most fully articulated by the former United States Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice during her address to The George Washington University School of Foreign Service in 2006, and the policy subsequently became more widely utilised within the US Bush Administration. Rice defines the objective of transformational diplomacy as working through diplomacy 'to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system'.¹⁹⁰ In this way it is the fundamental character of regimes that is driving the United States foreign policy, and a desire to interact with a view to changing dangerous or undesirable regimes into 'responsible sovereigns'.¹⁹¹ Rice qualifies this strategy as one that must be delivered in partnership with recipient states, (and therefore not through paternalistic approaches), at a grassroots level. In a clear alignment of the transformational strategy with the concept of public diplomacy, Rice asserts that 'in doing things with people, not for them, we seek to use America's diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures'.¹⁹² What Rice does not say, but is implied in her presentation, is that such activities will improve the American image and

¹⁹⁰ Rice, 'Transformational Diplomacy'.

¹⁹¹ U.S. State Department Director of Policy Planning, Stephen Krasner quoted in Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve' p.35.

¹⁹² Rice, 'Transformational Diplomacy'.

reputation abroad, positively impact on American soft power and ultimately enable greater influencing power.¹⁹³

Transformation is a significant progression from the enlargement strategy, because it reflects a recognition of the threats posed to United States national security and prosperity by poorly governed or weak states where democratic principles and institutions are compromised or simply do not exist.¹⁹⁴ Rice's explanation of transformational diplomacy outlines the clear impact of this strategy upon the traditional structures and networks of diplomacy, and she notes that 'public diplomacy is an important part of every diplomat's job description'.¹⁹⁵ For example, the starting point for delivering on the transformation strategy is to build a strong, well resourced and trained, adaptable and flexible diplomatic force to be focused on those states where democratic principles and institutions are lacking.¹⁹⁶ Rice notes that the role of diplomats would be to:

represent America in an emerging community of change... working with foreign citizens in difficult conditions to maintain security and fight poverty and make democratic reforms, not only as expert analysts of policy but as first-rate administrators of programs, capable of helping foreign citizens to strengthen the rule of law, to start businesses, to improve health and to reform education...It's not just about reporting on countries. It's not just about influencing governments. It's about changing people's lives.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Fukuyama notes the value of Rice's speech on transformational diplomacy as 'an effort to reorganize the nonmilitary side of the foreign-policy establishment' makes for a welcome change. However, with criticism of US foreign policy that follows similar lines to that of Chomsky and Meiksins Wood, Fukuyama expresses concern about how such change might be implemented, particularly as 'What is needed now are new ideas, neither neoconservative nor realist, for how America is to relate to the rest of the world — ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without its illusions about the efficacy of American power and hegemony to bring these ends about'. Refer to F Fukuyama, 'After Neoconservatism', *The New York Times Magazine*, 19 February 2006.

¹⁹⁴ To address the possibility of confusion between the enlargement and transformational strategies, there is value in briefly noting that Clinton's enlargement strategy was premised upon extending the principles of democracy and liberalism primarily associated with the West, through those states that were ready to move in such a direction. Enlargement draws upon the role of institutions, such as APEC for establishing parameters and building consensus. However, transformation takes a more radical approach to the working with that may be fundamentally different in values and culture, and through guerrilla diplomacy tactics (ie non conventional diplomacy) enabling a fundamental shift in those values and culture in a way that benefits the interests of the initiating state.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. Rice notes that 'the fundamental character of regimes now matters more than the international distribution of power'; also, Henrikson, 'What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve?', p.32.

¹⁹⁷ Rice, 'Transformational Diplomacy'.

As such Rice calls for the repositioning of diplomats as ‘the new front line of diplomacy in the field – outside the major capital cities of Europe and in the cities and country sides of the developing world, in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia’.¹⁹⁸

Rice alludes to the need for structural change to the diplomatic network in order to deliver upon the proposed changes required by the transformation strategy. These include the establishment of America Presence Posts, or rapid response networks or teams of diplomats who could be deployed within regional areas to monitor and assist on specific issues or challenges within a defined area.¹⁹⁹ Technology is also identified as playing an increasingly important role in supporting such diplomatic networks, including through virtual presence posts and digital meeting rooms that would ‘enable foreign citizens to engage online with American diplomats’.²⁰⁰ While there is no clarity provided as to why foreign citizens would want to engage directly with American diplomat, this line of thinking might follow the FCO precedent of setting up blogs by diplomats to promote the work undertaken overseas, and make the foreign diplomat more accessible to the ordinary person. Alternatively, such a proposal might also fit with the Glassman policy of diversion, whereby diplomats engage with a particular demographic to influence their significant life choices, and provide dialogue about options that might be available to the person. In this way, ongoing, targeted and relevant communications with foreign audiences, including through local language radio, television and Internet sites are seen to be critical instruments of the transformation strategy.

The strategy of transformation incorporates elements of all the five strategies identified in the policy continuum. There is a significant degree of consolidation involved in engaging both

¹⁹⁸ Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’ p.33. See also Walter Russell Mead, ‘Goodbye Paris, Hello Chad’, *Los Angeles Times*, 29 January 2006, and Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’, *Fact Sheet*, 18 January 2006: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm>.

¹⁹⁹ Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’.

²⁰⁰ Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’ p.33.

domestic audiences (and most particularly foreign service recruits and existing officers) as well as like-minded foreign audiences in taking up the cause of transformation. It is a much more difficult, dangerous and long-term path for any diplomatic service and requires substantial underpinning belief in the moral standing of the cause. Transformation incorporates elements of the containment strategy in limiting the impact or influence of rogue regimes, while at the same time taking steps to penetrate target groups and divert young people away from extremist activities as a part of the transformation process. If successful transformation will bring about the enlargement of the driving state's influence, through the spread of democratic principles and institutions, driven largely by that state's diplomatic networks working with the foreign publics at a local level. A word of caution is required when applying the United States defined transformation strategy, as some academics and policy commentators may view the United States implementation of transformation as a purely imperialist or interventionist approach.

5.3.6 Diversion

Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Enlargement	Transformation	Diversion
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Diversion is a relatively new policy term, which does not factor in Henrikson's strategic policy approach to public diplomacy policy, but is relevant to the discussion of strategic foreign policy drivers of public diplomacy. The diversion policy has been introduced more recently by the former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the United States Department of State, and fits neatly within the public diplomacy strategy spectrum. During several press conferences and interviews, Glassman has referred to the need for a diversion strategy aimed at 'the channelling of young people away from violence with the attractions of technology, sports, culture, education and entrepreneurship'.²⁰¹ Glassman refers

²⁰¹ J Glassman, 'A Leader on Fighting Terrorism', *Miami Herald*, Tuesday, November 25, 2008.

to this policy in the context of diverting young Islamist extremists away from terrorist activities against Western nations. He also notes that it is a concept that has application in a range of unstable environments, such as Colombia, where the extremist Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia (FARC), rely on the ability to ‘hijack vulnerable, impressionable, youth people looking for adventure and linking it to a doctrine of hatred, fantasy, greed and hysteria’.²⁰²

The Miami Herald reported in November 2008 anecdotal evidence that a large number of young Colombians find themselves caught up for years in a violent extremist group with little chance of an escape. Using the Colombian example, it is reported that anti-FARC campaigners have recently employed internet technology, such as Facebook.com to target and engage these young people as well as a broader audience in a campaign against FARC. As a specific anti-terrorism strategy, the ‘aim is to undermine the ideology of a violent extremist group and disrupt its flow of recruits by offering productive alternatives’.²⁰³

Utilised now by the United States as a distinct strategy in the so-called ‘war on ideas’ diversion adopts the more immediate and realistic goal of diverting impressionable segments of the population from the recruitment process.²⁰⁴

Based on information around current practice, the diversion strategy is highly targeted and specialised in its approach and message. The key audience targeted through the strategy of diversion includes those young people ‘at risk’ of turning to extremism, (usually as an alternative route to poverty or traditional/conventional lifestyle where there are few other

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Glassman, ‘US Public Diplomacy and the War of Ideas’, S Brodzinsky, ‘Facebook Used to Target Colombia FARC’, *Christian Science Monitor*, February 2008; Anon, ‘Colombia Marches Against Hostage Takers’, *The Economist*, 7 February 2008.

pathways or opportunities). The tools tend to be based on new technologies and mediums that are appealing and engaging for young people, including through the Internet, or mobile phone technology. Popular group based mediums such as 'Facebook' have proven successful in Colombia, in connecting young people from differing backgrounds in the free exchange of ideas, providing insight into other options and pathways and influencing attitudes.²⁰⁵ This strategy provides an opening for successful public-private partnerships in the field of public diplomacy where private organisations are in a position to deploy the latest, most captivating social networking technology in such a way to assist government policy delivery. As noted by Glassman, such partnerships are essential, because:

in this new world of communications, any government that resists new Internet techniques faces a greater risk: being ignored. Our major target audiences – especially the young – don't want to listen to us lecture them or tell them what to think or how wonderful we are.²⁰⁶

The diversion strategy has emerged through niche examples provided by Glassman, and is clearly a strategy that aligned with the United States public diplomacy program. Diversion provides an interesting addition to the policy strategy continuum for this thesis, and has been included because of the strong focus on garnering public opinion to influence outcomes, through social networking and new technologies.²⁰⁷ In particular, as noted previously technologies that utilise mobile phones and the internet, are proving to be effective in the space of younger generations, regardless of location or socio-economic conditions. For example, Twitter, which allows for 'a heady mixture of messaging, social networking, "micro-blogging" and something called "presence," shorthand for the idea that people should enjoy an "always on" virtual omnipresence' has emerged at the time of writing this thesis to

²⁰⁵ J Glassman, 'A Leader on Fighting Terrorism', *Miami Herald*, Tuesday, November 25, 2008.

²⁰⁶ J Glassman, 'Public Diplomacy 2.0: A New Approach to Public Engagement', presentation to New America Foundation Washington DC, December 1, 2008; S Brodzinsky, 'Facebook Used to Target Colombia' FARC'; Anon, 'Colombia Marches Against Hostage Takers'.

²⁰⁷ While evaluating the impact of new technologies is not fully understood, it is likely that the techniques for evaluating social marketing, (surveys, forums etc) will remain relevant. .

provide further opportunities for technology in the public diplomacy space.²⁰⁸ While twitter has become a popular and frivolous marketing tool for celebrities and individuals, it has become an effective tool for political organisation having been utilised in the US presidential elections by (then candidate) Barack Obama, and more significantly in recent Iranian elections by large numbers of people organising protests, gaining useful analysis of results, and to share information regarding police crackdowns on protests.²⁰⁹ While the measurement of use and impact of such technologies is not clear, the fact that the US state department officially requested Twitter to delay scheduled maintenance on its global network during the Iranian election period to ensure individuals in Iran would remain connected provides strong anecdotal evidence of the value of technologies.²¹⁰ Indeed, the application of new technologies such as Twitter in engaging populations and audiences are not only growing rapidly, but appear limitless, and must be considered essential in any discussion about public diplomacy.

²⁰⁸ Anon, 'Twitter', *The New York Times*, 26 April 2010, viewed on 26 April at: <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/twitter/index.html?inline=nyt-org>.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

5.4 The Australian policy perspective

The policy strategies outlined above reflect key foreign policy strategies that have been tested and employed in the international arena by various nations at key times during the past fifty years. As discussed, each of those policy strategies has some degree of relevance to the Australian experience and approach to the world during that same period. Yet, Australia has also articulated two additional and distinct policy strategies, namely i) regional stability and ii) engagement. Both policies being specifically focused on Australia's position within the immediate Asian-Pacific region. Those two strategies incorporate similar elements, but remain distinct in their objective and employment and require further analysis from the public diplomacy perspective.

5.4.1 Regional stability (constructive commitment)

Regional Stability	Engagement
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Regional stability relates to the need to bring stability to volatile external areas that are considered to pose a security threat to Australia. In particular, this policy has developed with regard to an area known since the 1990s as the 'arc of instability', which encompasses the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific (and including the hot spots of Fiji, Solomon Islands).²¹¹ As noted earlier within this chapter, the recent rhetoric employed by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has seen a shift in Australia's approach removing an overt reference to labelling the region as one of 'instability', to an

²¹¹ R Garnaut, *Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalisation: An Asia-Pacific Contribution to the World Trade System*, Institute of South-East Asian Studies, Singapore, 1996. R Garnaut, 'One System, Two Countries: Australia and New Zealand in the International Community, Paper Presented at a Conference of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 6 March 2000. G Dobell, 'The Pacific "Arc of Instability"', *The Correspondent's Report*, ABC Radio National, March 2006. For further reading regarding the definitions and emergence of terminology regarding the 'arc of instability' see also R Ayson, 'The Arc of Instability', Paper delivered to the International Studies Association, Annual Conference, Hawaii, 3 March 2005.

emphasis on the region as falling within Australia's 'arc of responsibility'.²¹² The shift in nomenclature, a public diplomacy exercise in itself, is supported by a policy focus that seeks to develop real partnership opportunities within the Pacific as a means to enabling stability. Such a shift may be important for the Australian Government in managing long standing perceptions of Australia as an overbearing paternalistic Pacific power.²¹³ The context for stabilisation comes from the notion that if states are left vulnerable because of internal conflict, natural disaster or poor economic and social conditions they may become a haven for transnational crime, or terrorism. As noted by one journalist recently, failing economies and unsettled politics pose danger and:

the possibility of more expensive police and military interventions, not to mention food and medical aid, more ethnic and political violence leading to a wave of refugees, an explosion of HIV/AIDS, and the possibility that power vacuums could be exploited by non regional states.²¹⁴

Furthermore, Australian policy analysts are cognisant of the range of potential threats and ongoing issues with stability in the region, that include the:

activities of terrorist network, Jemaah Islamiah within the Indonesian Archipelago, police and military crises in East Timor, continuing challenges to stability in Papua New Guinea, ethnic violence in Vanuatu, the implosion of law and order in the Solomon Islands, a coup d'etat in Fiji, a constitutional crisis combined with unprecedented local violence in Tonga and Nauru, the region's first properly defined failed state – having become centres for money laundering.²¹⁵

Essentially these conditions require broad diplomatic activities that will connect and engage with local communities, influencing the stability of the communities and the individuals within those communities. Scholars such as Hawksley note that the policy of state-building, an attempt to create stability through a combined strategy of political mediation and the

²¹² Vestergaard, 'Man at work: Rudd walks Asian tightrope'. Hawksley, 'Australia's aid diplomacy and the Pacific Islands: change and continuity in middle power foreign policy'.

²¹³ G Dobell, *Australia Finds Home: The choices and chances of an Asia Pacific journey*, ABC Books, Sydney, 2001, p.104.

²¹⁴ D Mark, 'Rudd outlines foreign policy vision', *The World Today*, 5 July, 2007.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

consolidation of institutions' emerges in response to challenging conditions of failing states.²¹⁶ Berger, provides a more detailed definition of the state-building policy as being:

An externally driven or facilitated attempt to consolidate a stable, and sometime democratic government over an internationally recognised national territory against the backdrop of the establishment and consolidation of the UN and the universalisation of the system of sovereign nation states.²¹⁷

Based on the definitions provided the state-building policy approach holds substantial relevance for Australia's approach to the Pacific, particularly in relation to specific interventions such as the INTERFET operation in East Timor, and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) initiative in Solomon Islands. The state-building policy provides a relevant backdrop to the broader policy of regional stability that will be pursued through this thesis as applicable to Australia's relationship with the Pacific region.

The underpinning policy of *regional stability* seeks to support economic and community development in a way that will combat poverty, unemployment, and poor education and build necessary infrastructure is 'the best way to prevent the emergence of failed states and the threat of terrorism'.²¹⁸ Australia has implemented significant defence and policing, development assistance and community development measures across the Pacific region to manage the vulnerabilities in Timor Leste, Fiji and Solomon Islands. In each case the target populations have been largely the local communities and indirectly, the local authorities.²¹⁹

The overall public diplomacy approach has been a relationship building approach based on

²¹⁶ C Hawksley, 'Australian interventions and occupations: post cold war state-building in the global empire' in *Occupying the Other*, C de Matos, R Gerster, (eds), Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, 2009, p.175. For further reading regarding the conditions apparent in failing states see also, R Rotberg, 'Failed states in a world of terror', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002, pp.127-140; R Rotberg, 'The new nature of nation-state failure', *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3), pp.85-96.

²¹⁷ M Berger, 'From nation-building to state-building: the geopolitics of development, the nation state system and the changing global order', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 27(1), 2006, p.6.

²¹⁸ Mark, 'Rudd outlines foreign policy vision'.

²¹⁹ Interview, Confidential Source, Senior AusAID Official, 8 December 2009.

developing local community capacity through development assistance projects.²²⁰ The policy of regional stability is distinct in that Australia is cast in a role of a major power within the Pacific region, where the power dynamic is constructive and founded in the spirit of partnership.²²¹

The RAMSI initiative, deployed in 2003 under a partnership agreement between the Solomon Islands Government and fifteen contributing Pacific nations (with Australia taking a lead role), provides an example of regional implementation of the stability policy. The purpose of RAMSI is grounded in a policy of regional stability, alongside that of state-building ‘to restore law and order, strengthen government institutions, reduce corruption and reinvigorate the economy’.²²² Since 2003, RAMSI has involved the deployment of some hundreds of civilian, police and military advisors into Solomon Islands to rehabilitate infrastructure, institutions and communities.

Quite apart from the planned policing and military activities of RAMSI aligned more appropriately to state-building, there is also a significant impact of work at the personal and relationship level with the Solomon Islands peoples.²²³ In essence, the development of relationships reflects a substantial public diplomacy component to the overall mission, though such terminology has not been explicitly used within the official commentary. As a Senior

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Regional stability is also known as constructive commitment in Evans, Grant, *Australia's foreign relations in the world of the 1990s*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1995, p.195.

²²² RAMSI Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.ramsi.org/>. See also Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ‘Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands’, Canberra, June 2003, accessed at <<http://www.aspi.org.au>>. Scholars such as Firth and Hawksley note that the alarmist tenor of this report changed the course of Australia’s policy towards Solomon Islands and the region. For further reading on the situation in Solomon Islands, and the subsequent development of Australian policy see Firth, *Australia in International Politics*, pp.197-209; S Dinnen, ‘Winners and losers: politics and disorder in the Solomon Islands, 2000-2002’, *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol 37 (3), 2002, pp.285-98; and J Fraenkel, *The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands*, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2004.

²²³ Interview, Confidential Source, Senior AusAID Official, 8 December 2009, although also noted that this frequently depends upon the individual involved in the provision of services, and will therefore vary.

AusAID official confirmed in interview, without positive public diplomacy that engages and influences the people of Solomon Islands the entire operation would be at risk of longer term transition and failure.²²⁴ In addition, depending upon public opinion, may also damage the reputation of Australia as lead or other contributing states within the Solomon Islands. While it is not clear whether consideration was given to the public diplomacy aspects of RAMSI at the time that RAMSI was established, it is clear that both consideration of and attention to the public diplomacy aspects has become an important element of the initiative. In recognition of the importance of the perceptions of the local audiences an ‘the people’s survey was designed and implemented from 2006 as an independent way of measuring each year what Solomon Islanders think about progress and development issues related to the work of the Solomon Islands Government RAMSI initiative’.²²⁵

The survey is conducted over an expansive area of five provinces and Honiara and involves close to 100 focus groups and 4500 surveys.²²⁶ The surveys themselves are focused on mission outcomes and closely tailored to stated RAMSI objectives, and the perceptions of people in relation to those people delivering assistance under RAMSI. The survey results provide an opportunity for performance measurement, and demonstrate to the Solomon Islands people that their views are important – lending both concrete and symbolic weight to the ‘partnership’ approach.²²⁷ Essentially, the RAMSI Mission provides an obvious example of Australia implementing the policy of regional stability. Public diplomacy directed towards the local Solomon Islands communities is occurring within the framework of the RAMSI

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ ANU Enterprise, *People’s Survey 2008*, RAMSI, August 2008. AusAID, *Supplementary Submission to Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy*, Australian Government, March 2007, p.16.

²²⁶ ANU Enterprise, *People’s Survey 2008*, RAMSI, August 2008. AusAID, *Supplementary Submission to Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy*, p.16

²²⁷ Interview, Confidential Source, Senior AusAID Official, 8 December 2009. Though noted during interview, that the people’s Survey is specifically targeted to RAMSI activities, and does not give a sense of the community attitudes towards Australia as a result of the RAMSI activities, nor does the survey approach the issue of general attitudes of the people towards RAMSI nations more broadly.

Mission, but not necessarily as a key thread of policy development or implementation. The longer that RAMSI continues, the more important will become the need for Australia to examine how public diplomacy fits and might be carried out within the policy picture.²²⁸

More recently the Australian Government under Rudd has reinvigorated moves towards establishing Partnerships for Development to 'achieve better economic outcomes in the Pacific, including through increased development assistance in response to commitments by Pacific nations to improve economic and financial management, to better manage essential infrastructure and achieve better outcomes in health and education'.²²⁹ The recent policy announcement is underpinned through the commitment of A\$10 million as core funding to support the operation of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, the region's premier political organisation, and Pacific-wide programs through the 2010-11 year.²³⁰ Australian support for the Pacific Islands Forum, of which Australia is a funding member, provides a legitimate platform for Pacific Island governments to work together in negotiating programs and solutions to common systemic issues. In addition, the development and implementation of further substantial yet targeted initiatives, such as the Pacific Islands Seasonal Workers Scheme²³¹ and through the *Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change*²³² add

²²⁸ Interview, Confidential Source, Senior AusAID Official, 9 December 2009. During discussions, the official noted a possible scenario where the people of the Solomon Island *may* grow weary of the 'regional invasion' under RAMSI and may strike out at the participating countries. This is where policy review and ongoing development might well consider changes to existing public diplomacy mechanisms that could either divert or combat such an outcome. This concern is addressed by Sean Dorney who notes the use of the term 'occupation' by a senior Solomon Islands official to describe RAMSI's role. S Dorney, 'Reactions to RAMSI', in *Occupying the Other*, p.204.

²²⁹ Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Australia's Commitment to Pacific Islands Forum', *Media Release*, 18 March 2010. Australia's aid commitment to the region for 2009-10 is estimated at A\$1.09 billion see also AusAID, '2009-10 International Development Assistance Budget', *Australian Government media release*, 12 May 2009.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ The Pacific Seasonal Workers scheme is a pilot scheme auspiced by the Australian Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations that builds upon the scheme already implemented by the New Zealand Government, and aims to provide Pacific seasonal workers with the opportunity to work in the Australian horticultural industry in areas of regional Australia where there is an unmet labour demand. The scheme allows for workers to spend up to seven months in Australia at a time with access to paid work and training, and the pilot scheme will see the approval of some 2500 visas in connection with the scheme. See Australian Government Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations Website, 'Pacific Seasonal

weight and credibility to Australia's interest in partnership-based solutions. The potential benefit of overall development programs, underpinned by a broad regional political organisation based on symbolic, if not authentic partnership within the Pacific, is significant. The programs utilise both traditional diplomacy alongside the development of people-to-people links, the latter of which from a public diplomacy perspective will be paramount.

While the DFAT, AusAID and Defence Submissions to the Senate Inquiry demonstrate that the Australian Government can point to a substantial array of activity in the Pacific primarily stemming from development assistance, the Inquiry process nonetheless gave an impression that public diplomacy surrounding such activities occurs on an ad hoc basis.²³³ Although, developments in the Australian policy approach in the recent twelve months, including through engagement in the Pacific Islands Forum, suggest that Australia's approach to activities in the region is changing, and that the Australia Government, and those government agencies with key portfolio responsibilities in the Pacific have begun to link overall engagement in the Pacific more closely to Australia's overall strategic objectives. However, public diplomacy initiatives remain patchy, and some of Australia's key relationships in the region, including with Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Solomon Islands are plagued by political tensions. There would be significant benefit for the government if DFAT and AusAID together considered and articulated a coordinated Australian public diplomacy

Workers Pilot Scheme Home', accessed online on 9 April 2010 at:

<http://www.deewr.gov.au/Employment/Programs/PSWPS/Pages/default.aspx>. For further examination of the opportunities and challenges arising from implementation of the Pacific Seasonal Workers scheme refer to J Ritchie, 'Pacific Solutions? The Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme as a symbol of Australian Relations with the Pacific Islands', *Social Alternatives*, Vol 28(4), 2009, pp.14-18.

²³² Further information on partnership initiatives aimed to support the *Pacific Island Framework for Action on Climate Change*, including on Australian contributions to global climate change adjustment funds for the Pacific can be found in, Australian Government, *Engaging our Pacific Neighbours on Climate Change: Australia's Position*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, accessed on 9 April 2010 at: <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/~media/publications/international/engaging-pacific-neighbours.ashx>.

²³³ DFAT, *Submission to Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy*, AusAID, *Supplementary Submission to Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy*, Department of Defence, *Submission to Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy*, Canberra, April 2007, and Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building our Image'.

approach in support of the partnership rhetoric and activity from the commencement of the strategic policy development process through to the evaluation of performance.

5.4.2 Engagement

Regional Stability	Engagement
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The final Australian policy strategy for exploration is that of *engagement*. Engagement has been a central policy theme for Australia's foreign policy approach particularly toward the South-East Asian region since the 1980s. The term engagement is an attempt to address through rhetoric at least the dilemmas and tensions of Australia's place within the region, understanding that Australia's economic interests are tied to the immediate region to the North. The policy of engagement as described by Bruce Grant and Gareth Evans is distinct from the policy of stabilisation in that the concept describes a 'mutual commitment between the countries which are in every sense equals'.²³⁴ The rhetoric of engagement has been generally flexible, and at various times is qualified as being either comprehensive or limited depending upon political imperatives at the time. For example, as Capling notes under the 'Labor government's of Bob Hawke and Paul Keating (1983-1996), Australia was unique in its deliberate and self conscious efforts to 'relocate' itself – economically, diplomatically and militarily – to the Asia-Pacific region'.²³⁵ In describing the factors that would enable Australia's comprehensive engagement in South-East Asia, Evans notes the following terms:

- i) building a diverse and substantial array of linkages with those targeted countries [South-East Asia], so that they have an important national interest in the maintenance of a positive relationship with Australia;
- ii) continuing support for existing regional frameworks for cooperation (such as ASEAN) as well as exploring new frameworks (such as APEC);
- iii) gradual development of regional security mechanisms based on shared security interests;
- iv) working towards the inclusion of other developing nations within the region (such as Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia); and
- v) recognising that Australia...is a confident and natural partner in a common neighbourhood of regional diversity, rather than as a cultural misfit trapped by geography.²³⁶

²³⁴ Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the world of the 1990s*, p.195.

²³⁵ Capling, 'Twenty years of engagement with Asia', p.602.

²³⁶ Ibid.

The targeted audience for Australia's policy of engagement, particularly with reference to South-East Asia includes the opinion-makers, industry leaders and the media, along with the diaspora already active within these circles. The public diplomacy approaches incorporate a range of levels to build relationships, including activities that develop interest, build knowledge, and encourage advocacy. From this, the tactical public diplomacy activities require a high degree of sectoral exchange and interaction between the government, business and media sectors, including those opportunities facilitated through multilateral fora such as ASEAN or APEC. DFAT and other agencies have demonstrated wide networks exist for the delivery of public diplomacy activities.

The media again plays an important proactive role in selling the engagement concept (including examples such as the APEC Leaders picture gallery – where for example, the APEC Leaders congregate in Batik overshirts while meeting in Indonesia, ponchos in Peru and Dryzabones in Australia). Other activities that occur below the media radar, but in a way to sustain personal exchange and relationships include the AusAID Youth Ambassador Program, and Asialink's Leaders exchange program as well as many cultural exchanges (including the Australasian World Music Expo).²³⁷ However, as the Senate Inquiry revealed, the networks appear to be piecemeal, and not fully leveraged to promote the Australian image overseas.

The Senate Inquiry noted the value of such academic and cultural exchanges and wide networks across government agencies and with non government entities and scope of public diplomacy activity. However, the Committee also commented on the inadequacy of the

²³⁷ For example, since 1998, nearly 2000 youth ambassadors have been sent overseas to some 20 participating countries, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Philippines, PNG, Samoa, Vietnam. AusAID, *Supplementary Submission to Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy*, p.11.

Australian public diplomacy strategies and infrastructure to leverage the potency of the connections, knowledge, networks and individuals beyond the primary event or connection.²³⁸

5.5 Building a framework

To build a framework, the components of the policy process and policy strategies described through this chapter must be linked together as an integrated whole. The following chapter describes the linkages between these components to construct a policy-based framework that allows a coherent consideration, organisation and view of public diplomacy programs. The Framework is diagrammatically represented in Tables 3 and 4 (referencing key strategic policy drivers and key Australian strategic policy drivers respectively).

²³⁸ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p. 49.

CHAPTER 6: A POLICY-BASED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FRAMEWORK

The policy-based public diplomacy framework established through this thesis is a direct response to systemic failures and the consistently disorganised approach taken to the discussion of public diplomacy; particularly within Australia, and including through the Senate Inquiry. As Gyngeell and Wesley discuss, ‘the need to establish conceptual frameworks to order and make sense of the vast complexity of everyday experience is a basic reality of all human existence’.¹ The central theme of this thesis has been that Australia’s public diplomacy program is made up of many parts, but rather than the parts coming together in a coherent and effective whole, the parts remain fragmented and ad hoc.

While the Senate Inquiry highlighted a range of key systemic issues currently impacting on the public diplomacy program, the key issue presented in this thesis is that Australia’s public diplomacy program operates from the periphery of diplomatic practice with little or no connection to foreign policy objectives. Public diplomacy in Australia is not (and never has been) sufficiently linked as a whole, to the advancement of strategic foreign policy interests. Yet, as many international academics and practitioners working in the field of public diplomacy can attest, ‘foreign policy counts’.²

While overall, the Senate Inquiry provided only a limited focus on the linkages between Australia’s public diplomacy and foreign policy, these linkages did not escape the

¹ Gyngeell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.207.

² Djerejian, *Changing Minds Winning Peace*, p.18.

Committee's attention altogether.³ The Committee made the pertinent observation in the final report that 'public diplomacy [generally] is much more than involvement in international conferences, exhibits, visits and exchange programs – it is a critical exercise of soft power and has a determining part in Australia's ability to pursue its national objectives'.⁴ The Committee continued the observation by noting that, 'Australian public diplomacy planning must benefit from engagement with Australia's foreign policy makers' and further reported that the Committee members were not persuaded that this was the case.⁵ Advancing a similar argument and in support of the Senate Inquiry's findings, the Blue Ribbon Panel Report into *Australia's Diplomatic Deficit* produced by the Lowy Institute pointedly notes that in fact 'Australia's public diplomacy often takes the form of a series of activities such as cultural events and trade expos intended to cultivate favourable, if vague impressions of Australia and to promote Australia as an attractive destination for tourism, investment and migration – rather than to pursue specific international policy goals'.⁶ Even the organisational placement of DFAT's Images of Australia Branch within the Consular Division adds weight to the perception that public diplomacy is 'seen as a separate and marginal activity rather than a mainstream part of the policy process to be integrated with it at every stage'.⁷

The policy-based framework (the Framework) developed as a unique contribution to the field of diplomacy through this thesis, seeks to address this current issue, and provides a starting point for practitioners to begin to identify the role of public diplomacy in advancing primary

³ As noted earlier in this thesis, the purpose of the Senate inquiry was not to conduct an in depth critique of foreign policy capacity in relation to public diplomacy, but to 'highlight and investigate issues of relevance to the national agenda'.

⁴ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.44.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy', p.32.

⁷ Ibid.

foreign policy objectives. The purpose of this chapter is to bring the relevant pieces of the public diplomacy puzzle together, and drawing on examples that are relevant to the Australian context, provide guidance on how the Framework might then be applied.

6.1 Using the Framework

The two threads of analysis, being the i) foreign policy process phases and ii) key policy strategies, provide the basic scaffolding or architecture upon which a public diplomacy framework is constructed. The foreign policy process phases and key policy strategies provide the vertical and horizontal axis respectively of the public diplomacy framework. For the purpose of this thesis, the framework presents a logical pattern intended to assist the practitioner better understand the ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ of public diplomacy for the purpose of achieving an appropriate policy outcome.

There is little complexity in the construction of the Framework. For example, when the policy strategies outlined in sections 5.3 and 5.4 of Chapter Five, are linked to the policy phases outlined in section 5.2, together they become the scaffolding for the Framework (refer to Table 3 and Table 4). From this point, the Framework operates as a matrix, guiding the practitioner in a considered and organised way through considerations of how public diplomacy fits into the spectrum of foreign policy strategy, and can be utilised effectively to deliver upon different objectives in a way and through channels and mediums that traditional diplomacy is not readily able to do. As noted above, Table 3 represents the Framework as it stands with the key foreign policy strategies of i) consolidation, ii) containment, iii) penetration, iv) enlargement, v) transformation and vi) diversion. Table 4 sets out the key

Australian foreign policy strategies, i) regional stability and ii) engagement.⁸ Tables 3 and 4 provide guidance from a generic structural perspective of how the Framework fits together, but are not of themselves the Framework in a final form. The scholar or practitioner would be required to engage in further exploration of the key policy and process concepts, and to consider the implications at each stage for the Framework to support any overall strategic benefit.

In bringing the pieces of the public diplomacy puzzle together, the Framework provides a structure that identifies firstly the strategic considerations to set the tone for any further policy development and delivery of any particular activities that may be associated with each of the policy strategies. From this point, the Framework guides consideration of the many aspects of public diplomacy to enable the practitioner to understand key policy objectives, align and deliver public diplomacy tools. However, based on the dynamic nature of public diplomacy practice, the Framework does not intend to, nor would be able to set out an exhaustive list of strategies, considerations, audiences, or activities. As Former United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher was known to have said, ‘foreign policy is a work in progress’ and this may be even more relevant when applied to the organic and evolving field of public diplomacy.⁹ Public diplomacy is a dynamic area of diplomatic practice which continues to evolve and adapt to a changing environment; and new approaches, technologies, audiences and issues will continue to impact on the nature of the scope, method and outcomes related to public diplomacy practice.¹⁰ Any framework intended to guide practice requires a certain

⁸ All the identified foreign policy strategies could be incorporated into one single view of the Framework. However, the strategies were separated across the two tables in this thesis for ease of readability.

⁹ Warren Christopher former United States Secretary of State, quoted in Brinkley, ‘Democratic enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’, p.114.

¹⁰ The Framework also facilitates reflection upon the related disciplines and concepts of public affairs and propaganda. While public diplomacy may share in certain aspects of each of these concepts, the Framework

measure of elasticity in order to keep pace with developments and maintain relevance to the field.

For the practitioner using the Framework, the first task would be to identify and define the issue or problem, and from there determine the appropriate foreign policy strategy that might apply to the issue at hand, noting that the issue of concern may be defined in specific, bilateral terms, or from a broader multilateral perspective. The foreign policy strategies are listed horizontally within the first row of the framework. The practitioner would identify those policy drivers that may be relevant to the particular issue, and subsequently work sequentially through each of the policy process phases, addressing the considerations identified in the layers of the policy process set out in the first column of the framework. At each phase the practitioner will be directed to relevant considerations. Each layer or phase leads naturally to the next until, at the conclusion of the process, the practitioner might identify with confidence the method that is best suited to the identified target audience for the required purpose. The benefit of working through the Framework comes from the holistic view of the public diplomacy program, and targeted approach of the components of that program.

6.2 Applying the Framework

To be more than a series of ad hoc responses to changing events, public diplomacy must be incorporated into the ground floor of foreign policy. Policy makers could take to heart the maxim that a policy that cannot be explained clearly and understandably to many different audiences is not sustainable. To extend this line of argument, foreign policy and public

demonstrates that public diplomacy extends beyond public affairs, and propaganda, particularly in the two-way engagement of foreign publics to understand the impact of positioning and messages to improve upon strategic outcomes.

diplomacy are inextricable and integrated throughout the process of policy formulation and implementation.

An effective national public diplomacy effort can be coordinated throughout the government to ensure that information priorities are clear, overall themes are established, messages are consistent, and resources are used effectively. Types of messages, language, audience, format, and media will vary greatly. All, however, might be part of a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy linked to the formulation of policy at its inception and coordinated broadly throughout the foreign affairs community. However, understanding the potential application of the Framework is difficult without practical examples. As this thesis is concerned with public diplomacy in the Australian context, this chapter will therefore examine two current issues in Australian foreign policy agenda working through the relevant consideration for the purpose of demonstrating how the framework might actually be utilised. The current issues, already identified at various stages of the thesis include i) India-Australia bilateral relationship; and ii) Australia's partnership approach to the Pacific. These examples will be examined in detail, as a way of illustrating the potential application of the Framework.

There is value in noting that for the purpose of this thesis the emphasis of the discussion is on the Framework, and a demonstration of the potential application of the Framework. As such, the discussion may not address the full complexity of the detailed content or background to the issue at hand. Furthermore, ordinarily, the construction of the Framework might be facilitated from within DFAT with access to a range of other interested parties, including government and non-government agencies. Discussion might be commenced at the executive management level, and evolve through the IDC level, including out of session, in order to

maintain connections with those who have the most relevant interests and contributions. From a practical perspective, the decisions reached through the Framework might be communicated through the bureaucracy via the memo or brief. Perhaps for future relevance the DFAT briefing template might require the author to address 'public diplomacy implications and considerations for briefing relevant Ministers.'¹¹ The Framework does not envisage a final point of conclusion, but provides a lens through which the public diplomacy program as a whole, or by issue might be viewed. As such, the Framework needs to be adaptable over time to accommodate the variances in foreign policy and the conduct of international relations.

¹¹ Interview, Andrew Shearer, Director of Studies and Senior Research Fellow, Lowy Institute for International Relations, 15 August 2009.

Table 3: Policy-based Framework
Key foreign policy strategies and public diplomacy

Policy Process Phases	Foreign Policy Strategy					
	Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Enlargement	Transformation	Diversion
Strategic: Identifying the strategic objective	To build or reinforce sense of cohesion, common purpose, common values or identity.	To build consensus that will limit the spread of powers, influences or impacts that could be harmful or threatening.	To gain acceptance of a country that will translate into greater uptake of economic or political product (ie. goods or services or policy direction).	Expansion of the ideological, economic political and cultural sphere of a state (and its allies).	To change the political / economic structure and approach of another state or group of states.	To ensure that negative sentiments and day-to-day grievances toward the state and allies do not manifest themselves in terrorist violence.
Contextual Understanding the contextual elements, including i) target audience; ii) PD approach	Identify and build on common identity within the grouping in order to achieve a particular outcome (ie. successful Commonwealth Games). Defining what is at stake – social values / - national interest building/reaffirming an identity.	Essentially defensive or reactive policy approach. Closely related to interests around balance of power.	To build discrete areas of relationships that are based in trust and understanding – building confidence and influence among broad group of elites that can be useful in times of crisis. Breaking into a closed market or society for trade or intelligence Needs to occur on ongoing and long-term basis.	Comprehensive and coordinated approach which will take in elements of consolidation, containment and penetration. Message to be consistent across all activities and to focus on positives of what is to be achieved. Need to work through and build upon multi-lateral structures also at regional and international levels, eg NATO, EU, UN. To extend the area of enlightenment from	Building partnerships for change Regional and transnational focus	Encourage other young people within audience demographic to actively denounce violence by young fundamentalists – build on peer group pressure. Proactive protective measure Undermining adverse authority – influencing fundamentalist / highly vigilant grassroots cohort

				the domestic market outwards into aligned and non-aligned areas		
Target Audience	Domestic constituency or internal relations within a specified 'grouping', eg Commonwealth countries or the European Union	Broad domestic and international public audiences – usually targeting like-minded and those with close interest to the specific issue/s	Targeted audiences including specific people or groups of people within an external market/territory.	Opinion leaders, Policy-makers, elites, diaspora friendly networks Next generation of social and political leaders	Populations of other states (to be transformed) Next generation of social and political leaders	Populations (generally young people) identified as at risk of turning to fundamentalism / extremism
PD Approach	Building Relationships Building Awareness Developing Interest Building Knowledge	Day-to-day Response Strategic Communications Building Knowledge Enabling Advocacy	Strategic Communications Developing Interest Building Knowledge	Strategic Communications Building Relationships Building Knowledge Enabling Advocacy Leading to Action	Building Relationships Enabling Advocacy Action	Strategic Communication Building Knowledge Enabling Advocacy Leading to Action
Organisational:	Whole of Government –	Whole of Government	Whole of Government Austrade as lead with private sector influence	Whole of Government DFAT as lead Partnerships with media, NGO, education, cultural, trade and industry	Whole of Government – DFAT as lead with dispersed on-the-ground networks, including diplomatic corps, media, diaspora,	Whole of Government – Defence Intelligence / DFAT as lead
Operational Public diplomacy methods or activities	Broad engagement within a 'community', including the domestic audiences. Involves two way dialogue – eg conference / ideas summit	May involve development and publicity of critical state based alliances and high level discussions Targeted Media releases /	Media (radio/tv) programming; Educational and cultural exchanges, including financial support / scholarships. Targeted information pamphlets &	Visible high level involvement – eg foreign policy speech-making by Ministers or senior diplomats; Educational and cultural exchanges, including financial support / scholarships.	Expanding upon and localising diplomatic presence in terms of numbers and locations of diplomats on the ground – esp outside the key capital areas in emerging centres of change.	Technology that has popular appeal: Facebook, Twitter etc Methods to provide positive alternative pathways to young people at risk and at point of disenchantment with

	<p>TV broadcasts of concerts</p> <p>Art exhibitions</p> <p>Media coverage of cultural events</p> <p>News reports (that raise awareness of aid or assistance projects / joint security or policing projects)</p> <p>May be carried out in target audience language, and by local people.</p>	<p>Correction of 'mis-information' or myth reporting through reactive media monitoring and releases</p> <p>Programming of content through local media</p> <p>Crisis driven responses to political issue – usually addressed through media and with fast turnaround.</p>	<p>promotions</p> <p>Support of groups documenting human rights abuses in country</p> <p>Connecting with a diaspora for internal information / networks.</p>	<p>Cultural centres, library resources, or institutes promoting the advocate state's language and studies</p> <p>University partnerships</p> <p>Lectures, seminars and academic programs</p> <p>Funded professorships</p> <p>Research grants</p> <p>Book translations</p> <p>Connecting with and fostering relationships with a diaspora to expand upon national image and networks.</p>	<p>Development of rapid response diplomatic networks to support change in localised areas for short-term periods</p> <p>Use of technology (eg internet) internet as a means of facilitating communication between populations of target state and driving state</p> <p>Increased use of –in language media reporting on local media channels (eg Arab-speaking US diplomats to play key role not only in response to but also in development and broadcast of news while in-country).</p>	<p>current cohort.</p> <p>Educational and cultural exchanges, including financial support / scholarships.</p> <p>Cultural centres or institutes promoting the advocate state's language and studies</p>
Examples	<p>Australian approach to the Melbourne Commonwealth Games</p> <p>Consolidation of the Cairns Group in preparation for WTO Rounds.</p> <p>Building of domestic image in through Australia's 2020</p>	<p>1945 – 1986 Cold War – containment of communism, and also of nuclear weapons;</p> <p>Political response (US / Australia / Japan) to contain the '<i>Rise of China</i>'</p> <p>Containment of negative publicity</p>	<p>ABC – Radio Australia network</p>	<p>Spread of Western ideology and market democracy</p> <p>Rise of China – Beijing Olympics</p> <p>Aust as 'good international citizen' under Evans/Keating</p> <p>Australian-Indonesian interfaith schools</p>	<p>Al Gore - environmental crusade</p> <p>2001 - War on Terror</p>	<p>Use of Facebook to engage with FARC members and provide alternative pathways</p>

	Summit ASEAN	related to an event or occurrence - Indian students being bashed in Australia; or Cronulla riots		funding		
Notes	<p>Seen to be a strategy in itself as well as a precondition for all other strategies of public diplomacy.</p> <p>Extension of 'public affairs' which was more focused on one-way dialogue by a state with the domestic constituency.</p> <p>Strong emphasis on building partnership.</p>	<p>Activities may be closely aligned to propaganda depending upon the nature and intent of the message.</p> <p>Credibility of the advocate state is important.</p>	<p>Nation Branding may emerge through this strategy.</p>	<p>Usually coordinated with other PD activities.</p> <p>Product of Clinton administration</p> <p>Aligns with: Evans / Keating Smith / Rudd Working towards position on UN Security Council</p> <p>Nation Branding may emerge through this strategy.</p>	<p>Started as Bush policy – hearts and minds (Rice initiative, also pursued by Glassman)</p>	<p>Use of latest technology (eg internet) important as a means of facilitating communication</p>

**Table 4: Policy-based framework
Key Australian foreign policy strategies and public diplomacy**

Policy Process Phases	Foreign Australian Policy Strategy	
	Regional Stability	Engagement
Strategic: Identifying the strategic objective	Partnership approach focused on development and security – that aim to improve the internal social and economic outcomes for a state or region, to ensure longer term political stability for other states / regions.	To actively commit or become linked to another states - economic, social, cultural and militarily engagement.
Contextual Understanding the context	To address political and military instabilities; Encourage broad political and military stability through community development approach (development partnerships, assisting improvements in local socio-economic conditions).	To commit and build close linkages across a range of sectors between states or groupings of states; Can include as a part of a broader grouping, e.g. regional grouping; Defence of isolationism; Defence against being marginalised by larger / more dominant powers.
Contextual: Target Audience	Community populations – often at disadvantage and with an interest in a range of matters at grassroots level including: -primary education and healthcare; -basic infrastructure; youth unemployment; micro-finance; -local council / authority governance; and improving security and local policing.	Political leaders, Opinion leaders, Policy-makers, Elites, Diaspora Other friendly networks.
Contextual PD Approach	Building Relationships Enabling Advocacy	Building Relationships Developing Interest Building Knowledge Enabling Advocacy
Organisational:	Whole of Government Partnerships in development assistance –also ties to Education, Transport and Infrastructure, NGO / IGO, Media.	Whole of Government – also ties to Business, University, Media, NGO / IGO Sectors / Diaspora

Operational Public diplomacy methods or activities	Opinion pieces / Media coverage (domestic and foreign); Professional exchanges building capacity (especially in providing an exchange for technical expertise – e.g. construction, civil engineering; legislation or governance; teaching; healthcare etc); Development assistance projects – where strong partnership element; Development grants; Radio Services.	High level Ministerial visits; High level of interaction between business and government sectors; Media exchange / visiting journalists; Sectoral based exchanges (e.g. science / telecommunications / agriculture / medicine) all building professional linkages; Educational and cultural exchanges, including financial support / scholarships; University partnerships; Conferences and opportunities to build dialogue.
Examples	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Cambodian Peace Process Australia in East Timor (INTERFET) Australia's policy approach to Pacific Region "Realising the Potential".	Australia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Increased engagement in ASEAN Bilateral engagement in China

6.2.1 Australia-India bilateral relationship

Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Engagement
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The starting point for each of the examples requires a determination about the overall objective or societal goal of the issue at hand.¹² In the case of the Australia-India bilateral relationship, the foreign policy objective hinges on a positive trade relationship, for example, Australia is currently working through the feasibility of a FTA with India.¹³ Within this important trade-based relationship, the potential for Australia to deliver tertiary educational services to Indian students is a prominent feature of the bilateral relationship, and Indian students make up 17% of Australia's international students.¹⁴ However, the violence against Indian students, together with migration crackdowns and education scams already highlighted within this thesis, present the key issue. Not only has the worldwide criticism of Australia generated as a result of these incidents damaged Australia's reputation as a safe and credible destination for international students (putting at risk the A\$15 billion dollar industry), there may be a flow on effect into other areas of the bilateral relationship with India.¹⁵

For the purpose of this exercise, the issue clearly relates to the negative treatment of Indian students in Australia. Media coverage both within India and within Australia has honed in on the violent attacks against Indian students. The underlying theme of reports, that the attacks were racially motivated, has not been sufficiently disproved by the Australian authorities, and as noted by former Australian Ambassador to India, John McCarthy, 'issues about the

¹² Bridgman and Davis, *Australian Policy Handbook*, p.6; Gyngell, Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p.12; R Curtain, 'Good Public Policy Making: How Australia Fares', p.35.

¹³ Australian Government, Federal Budget Statements 2009-2010, Australian Government, Canberra, June 2009.

¹⁴ Wesley, 'Australia's Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia', p.4; Australia Education International, *Government drive to raise Australia's international education profile*, Australian Government 2009, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.aei.gov.au/AEI/SIA2010.htm>.

¹⁵ Wesley, 'Australia's Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia', p.4.

assaults on students had a profound impact in India...The television footage...had a profound impact – it was non-stop. The impression that it had on Indians was serious’.¹⁶ Despite the ‘rhetorical reassurance’¹⁷ provided by senior Australian government officials to their Indian counterparts, the damage is already having an impact. According to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the ‘total number of Indians studying here is down by 5 percent this year [2010] compared to last’, while potential student numbers, measured through new Indian enrolment numbers is ‘down by 40 percent compared to last’.¹⁸

Clearly, there is an amount of damage control that must occur in an effort to minimise or contain the negative reports about Australia as a racist nation. However, there is also an overarching imperative to bring the broader strategic nature of the relationship to light. As India’s Minister for Human Resource Development, Kapil Sibal states: ‘We [Australia and India] have the great possibility for a long-term strategic relationship based on education’.¹⁹ From this position, the overarching strategic objective might be defined within the parameters of the bilateral trade relationship as, *Australia growing a strong education trade position in India*. Usually the strategic policy objective would be developed within the political ranks by high level bureaucrats with Ministerial approval. The supporting image or identity of Australia in support of this objective would be developed within the strategic phase to ensure the development of a single and consistent theme that differentiates and allows Australia to ‘capture and hold attention in an already crowded international space’.²⁰ Themes that might be utilised in the projection of image could include Australia as a ‘smart and creative’

¹⁶ P Hartcher, ‘When Indian students suffer, Australia risks being scarred for life’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 April 2010.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid. The report suggests that the estimated 5 percent drop in current student numbers equates to approximately 1,500 students which when translated into economic terms amounts to an annual cost of A\$50 million to the Australian education industry. Yet, as indicated, this cost does not reflect the potential loss to the industry, which would be significantly larger.

¹⁹ Kapil Sibal quoted in Hartcher, ‘When Indian students suffer, Australia risks being scarred for life’.

²⁰ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, p.51.

country, where international students are welcomed and looked after while they obtain a quality education. In developing such an image there would be value in the diplomatic network engaging in the local community to decipher and understand the needs of the target audience, test the acceptance of such an image, and provide advice on the most effective methods for engaging with the audience.

In accordance with the policy phases set out within the Framework the high level strategic considerations would occur at the political (Minister or Cabinet) and senior bureaucrat level. From that point the policy initiative would flow to the departmental staff to develop the policy further including through the identification of relevant stakeholders who may have an interest in the development and delivery of the policy. For the purpose of the exercise, the next key stage relates to the identification of the key policy strategies relevant to the overarching strategic intent. With regard to the example at hand, such strategies might include, i) consolidation, ii) containment and iii) penetration, and iv) engagement. Of those strategic policies, ‘penetration’ and ‘engagement’ might be the primary strategic focus for DFAT and related agencies. However, from a public diplomacy perspective, the focus is likely to encompass supporting policy strategies of consolidation and containment that will only improve the strategic outcomes overall. If these supporting policy areas are ignored, as has been seen in the past, the primary strategies are at risk, and the public diplomacy approach is likely to be derailed by crisis management and troubleshooting.²¹

Despite demonstrated inadequacies, the IDC coordinated by DFAT remains the only appropriate forum within which to progress such a discussion, with workgroups tasked to progress the initiatives and actions out of session, and report back through the IDC on

²¹ Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’; Dubey, ‘Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under’; and Bolt, ‘We’re not the racists’.

progress and outcomes (as is currently the case). Essentially, that group would be interested in understanding the contextual parameters (target audience and PD approach), and from there to consider organisational implications, that is, which organisations and networks will be involved in developing and delivering the activities, and the public diplomacy methods utilised. Information and advice obtained through diplomatic networks should feed into the IDC discussion process. The challenge for Australian practice would be to work collaboratively across not only agencies, but also identify and bring other entities into the discussion.

By identifying the strategic policy drivers up front, the Framework allows practitioners to tease out further implications, and identify that in many cases the policy strategies will require slightly different stakeholders, different approaches and ultimately different methods. The ability to identifying the underlying complexities and nuances of public diplomacy from the outset is important. For example, while there are strong synergies, each of the policy strategies may identify different target audiences and very different approaches to the interaction. Such a realisation highlights the need for a tailored approach and allows for the key stakeholders to similarly tailor their involvement. The methodology behind the Framework also enables a discussion of external participants in delivery of the public activity. While the diplomatic network is likely involved in much of the public diplomacy delivery, from a planning and coordinating perspective, working through the Framework considerations highlights other parties that might also be similarly active in the delivery, including for example state and local government, tertiary education sectors, community NGOs and the Australian diaspora.

The public diplomacy methods that are actually identified and developed may vary from strategy to strategy, but if linked to the same strategic intent, they will demonstrate common themes. For example, the activities identified to consolidate the domestic audience will be primarily focused upon local domestic audiences, and will combine elements of both informational and relationship based approaches, including community forums with the theme of addressing underlying prejudices or concerns and garnering domestic support for Australia as a provider of education to international students. The activities focused towards engaging with local Indian audiences (families seeking an international education for their children), would aim to promote similar themes, though possibly using different methods and mediums as identified by the diplomatic network. The considerations for each strategic policy, applicable to each policy phase are detailed in Table 5.

The overarching benefit to be derived from application of the Framework in this way, in the development of a coherent public diplomacy strategy that moves beyond costly, resource intensive of crisis management, enables effective and coherent engagement with a range of audiences both within Australia and within India, and allows for long-term strategic understanding, and relationship development (beyond elite circles). For example, local Australian communities might become more comfortable in welcoming the diversity of international students and provide information and pathways relating to personal safety, and community engagement; Indian (and other international) families might become increasingly reassured about the environment that their children will be living and studying in, and promote the experience to others; students themselves will develop expanded networks and strategies for living in Australia. The networks of relationships established through a coherent consistent public diplomacy strategy will provide a more robust platform from

which traditional methods of diplomatic negotiation and policy implementation might be progressed.

Table 5 Australia-India Bilateral Relationship: Australia as an provider of quality education

Policy Phases	Consolidation	Containment	Penetration	Engagement
Strategic	To build domestic support and pride in an internationally recognised education system, and domestic tolerance for international students generally (and Indian students specifically) as an important consumer of quality tertiary education and contributors to the Australia's domestic economy and broader social diversity.	Building a domestic and regional image of Australia as a smart and creative country offering a high standard of internationally recognised tertiary education and providing quality life experiences in a diverse and dynamic society.	Building interest within India regarding the opportunities for young Indian students and professionals to gain a quality education and education / life experience in a dynamic environment away from home, (in Australia)	To expand the Australian image within India as a smart, creative country with a broad spectrum, to offer students and professionals across education, culture and professional opportunities.
Contextual:	The broad context is to rebuild the credibility of Australia as an provider of international education, as well as a safe, tolerant and diverse society. Student bashings and negative media may stem from fears and prejudices. Need to address underlying community fears and combat prejudices.	Contain or eliminate negative regional media around the quality of education experience for young international students and professionals.	Maintain and grow the market for the provision of tertiary education to international students. India and Australian business ties have increased over recent years, and Australia is currently conducting a feasibility study into a possible FTA with India.	Some cultural linkages exist, such as a common interest in cricket. Build further linkages and demonstrate areas of commonality (beyond cricket) between the people of Australia and India. Identify opportunities to share richness of cultures. The AICC has identified India as a target country for cultural programs in 2012.
Target Audience	Target audience: Young Australians – tertiary students and young professionals, education industry, service, tourism and retail industries.	Target audience Journalists: domestic and international.	Target audience Political leaders, Australian education providers and institutions, Indian and Australian business leaders and opinion makers, diaspora and alumni.	Target audience Young populations: next generation social, political and business leaders, diaspora and alumni.
PD Approach	PD Approach: Strategic communication to: -build awareness -develop interests -build knowledge	PD Approach Strategic communication to: -build awareness -develop interests -build knowledge -enable advocacy	PD Approach: Strategic communication: -build awareness -develop interests -build knowledge -enable advocacy	PD Approach: Building relationships to: -build awareness -develop interests -build knowledge -enable advocacy
Organisational	Strategic government – foreign policy and diplomatic network,	Strategic government – foreign policy and diplomatic network,	Strategic government – foreign policy and diplomatic network,	Strategic government – foreign policy and diplomatic network,

	Australia-India Council, education providers and institutions, local government and local community (including service providers, retailers, housing, police).	education providers and institutions, immigration authorities, local government and local community.	education providers and institutions, Austrade, Australia-India Council.	education providers and institutions, Austrade, Australia-India Council, arts agencies, AICC, local government.
Operational	<p>Community forums – to generate ideas and discussion regarding importance of international education for domestic economy and discuss issues confronted by international students at grassroots level;</p> <p>University open days showcasing community involvement and support for students;</p> <p>Positive media coverage of local students travelling overseas, and international students within Australia.</p> <p>Film or food festivals within local communities, to demonstrate cultural richness – of both cultures</p>	<p>Targeted media releases and opinion pieces.</p> <p>Journalist visits and exchanges;</p> <p>Interviews with Immigration / police / local government / university authorities for distribution within Indian media.</p> <p>Distribution of an Australian Year Book to key Indian journalists and opinion leaders.²²</p>	<p>Targeted information and promotions provided through media.</p> <p>Developing and promoting educational and cultural exchange opportunities and scholarships for Indian students</p> <p>Connecting to Australian diaspora in India as key source of image projection and networks</p>	<p>Visible high level involvement and visits;</p> <p>Connecting to Australian diaspora in India as key source of image projection and networks</p> <p>Developing and promoting series of educational and cultural exchange opportunities and scholarships for Indian students</p> <p>Developing and promoting series of high level (national gallery quality) cultural exchanges that promote depth of culture.</p> <p>Building on and promoting Australian cultural resources within India</p>

²² The Australian Year Book concept as a specific public diplomacy method is being progressed by Dr Joseph Siracusa, Director, School of Global Studies, Social Science and Planning, RMIT. Interview, Dr Joseph Siracusa, 31 July 2009.

6.2.2 Australia in the Pacific

Consolidation	Containment	Regional Stability	Diversion
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In the case of Australia's approach to the Pacific, the initial strategic policy intent, the image of Australia, and the policy strategies and subsequent outcomes are likely to be different to the approach noted above in relation to the Australia – India bilateral relationship. From the outset the strategic intent might relate to regional stability as a partnership approach.²³ The image Australia is seeking to portray within the Region is that of a regional mentor with the influence to bring the regional heads to the table to facilitate joint solution building from a community development, and not paternalistic, approach.

From this point the primary policy strategy is that of regional stability (or constructive commitment).²⁴ The supporting strategies include 'consolidation', in this case to build regional consensus and cohesion, 'containment' to address negative regional media and potential local organised rebellion, and 'diversion' as a means of working with rebel leaders to minimise threats against stability. The target audiences across each of the policy strategy areas are likely to encompass broad groups from political, business and opinion leaders and NGOs through to localised communities, with the approaches ranging from providing information to building awareness, to building relationships that will enable action. Depending upon the on the ground advice and information provided to the IDC by diplomatic officials within the region, the mediums and methods utilised in the deployment of public diplomacy activities will be primarily face-to-face engagement to overcome issues relating to socio economic conditions including language barriers, literacy skills and gaps in infrastructure or technology. For example, the Facebook diversion strategy employed in

²³ Crean, 'The Pacific Region: Realising the Potential'; Mark, 'Rudd outlines Policy Vision'.

²⁴ Evans, Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s*, p.195.

Colombia to divert recruits away from the FARC may not be as appropriate to the Pacific environment. Once again the audiences and methods might be diverse, yet the themes and images conveyed should remain consistent. The considerations for each strategic policy, applicable to each policy phase, audiences and possible public diplomacy methods to be applied are detailed in Table 6.

Through application of the Framework, the depth of understanding and engagement between Australian and Pacific public audiences might develop to allow for more targeted and appropriate development assistance programs, identification of further exchange opportunities based in mutual benefit (such as the Pacific Seasonal Workers Scheme), improved education and employment outcomes for Pacific Islanders, and potentially an increased awareness of and support for global climate change policy. In addition, Australian's regional and global standing would benefit from positive outcomes in the Pacific, and Australia may gain the credibility required to take on international positions on the UN Security Council.

Table 6: Towards a Pacific Partnership

Policy Phases	Consolidation	Containment	Regional Stability	Diversion
Strategic	To build strong support for and recognition of Australia's role in the Pacific with the domestic Australian constituency and in other Pacific states	To enable Australian troops, police, diplomats and civilians to work within the region with the support of the local community and free from harm.	Partnership approach focused on development and security.	Local individuals / groups who may incite organised rebellion against and/or seek to overthrow recognised and democratic processes.
Contextual:	<p>To generate broad Australian community support for positive partnership and assistance in the governance, infrastructure and community services sector within the most unstable of states.</p> <p>To combat underlying fears or prejudices within the domestic community.</p> <p>To build a regional identity that will encourage partnership and solution building across states.</p>	To contain negative media or political rhetoric that may lead to potential community dissatisfaction and / or organised rebellion by local communities who see Australia as acting in a paternalistic way.	<p>To encourage political, social and economic stability through community development.</p> <p>Australia has played a lead regional role in delivering RAMSI to positive effect, though there is a risk of being seen to be highly interventionist.</p> <p>Australia has a significant development assistance program into the Pacific, with commitments to improve political, social and economic outcomes.</p>	<p>To prevent the emergence of radical / rebellious leaders / rebel elements in local communities; and build understanding of potential positive opportunities for communities and individuals through stability. The region has been marred by ethnic and political violence, poor socio-economic conditions and instability. Current health and environmental challenges may only exacerbate tensions.</p> <p>Furthermore, Australia's role in RAMSI may be seen to be paternalistic and interventionist.</p>
Target Audience	<p>Regional political leaders, business leaders and opinion-makers, NGOs.</p> <p>General Australian population, as well as in the defence, police and professional sectors.</p>	<p>Pacific community populations.</p> <p>High level and local opinion and political leaders.</p> <p>Regional media and journalists.</p>	Local community populations across Pacific communities, local political, business and social leaders, NGOs.	<p>Disaffected local political, military or social leaders or marginalised members of community (especially young populations).</p>
PD Approach	<p>Strategic communication to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -build awareness -develop interest -enable action 	<p>Strategic communication:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -build awareness 	<p>Relationship building:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -develop interest -build knowledge -enable action 	<p>Relationship building:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -build knowledge -enable action

Organisational	Strategic government – foreign policy and diplomatic network AusAID Media and NGOs	Strategic government – foreign policy and diplomatic network Media and NGOs	Strategic government – foreign policy and diplomatic network AusAID, Austrade, NGOs Police and Community Services (including housing), Education, construction, infrastructure orgs.	Strategic government – foreign policy and diplomatic network. AusAID, NGOs Police and Community Services
Operational	High level conference / meetings within the region for state based / local political, business and community leaders to exchange ideas. Positive media coverage of outcomes and profiling of community successes. Cultural festival.	Targeted media releases and opinion pieces. Journalist visits and exchanges; Face to face consultations.	Professional exchanges building capacity. Development assistance projects and funding (with community development aspects). Face to face / ongoing consultations with local communities. Radio services.	Radio / TV programming / comic book communications (relevant to younger audiences). Positive activity based engagement in community improvements. Targeted education / professional apprenticeship opportunities / scholarships. Face to face / ongoing consultations and dialogue.

The Framework starts an organised and coherent discussion that might occur across government and non government agencies about the threads of public diplomacy activity that could underpin any given strategic policy objective. In doing so, this thesis recognises that the Framework does not provide all the answers or detail. Each aspect covered through the Framework requires an additional level of discussion and detail to identify at exactly ‘who’ will do ‘what’ and by ‘when’. Furthermore, the Framework does not set up the evaluation of the activities, including the measurement of the impact of those activities on the strategic objective. As noted previously within this thesis, there is a further gap relating to the evaluation of Australian public diplomacy. The Senate Inquiry noted that, ‘practitioners had

been grappling for years with ways to measure the effectiveness of public diplomacy activities,... there is no single formula, and public diplomacy deals with something that is not necessarily tangible'.²⁵ The area of evaluation of public diplomacy is a significant area of study and development, and there is currently a study underway within the ANU to identify and test evaluation methods.²⁶ The evaluation of the effectiveness of public diplomacy is a significant issue to be addressed within the field, and requires a separate line of study outside this thesis.

However, the Framework does provide an important link to improved evaluation of public diplomacy, simply because the Framework ties each public diplomacy activity to a specific and overarching strategic policy objective/s. From this point, and with greater clarity around the purpose, context and audiences targeted, organisations involved in development and delivery of the methods, performance measures may be more accurately defined, established and understood from the start of the activity (rather than activities being measured in hindsight). Furthermore, as the public diplomacy activities are aligned to strategic policy, the effect those activities have on progressing strategic outcomes are likely to appeal to foreign policy makers, and might potentially assist in the process of broadening the acceptance of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. For future reference, a consideration of evaluation methods might be incorporated as an additional component within the Framework itself.

²⁵ Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.176.

²⁶ For example, Wilson and Horiuchi are working at ANU to test methods borrowed from market research and social and political psychology to measure the effects of public diplomacy.

CHAPTER 7: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT – BRINGING THE PARTS TOGETHER

By throwing light onto the subject of public diplomacy in Australia, the Senate Inquiry raised the level of awareness and interest in public diplomacy at a national level.¹ The rhetoric introduced by the Senate Committee at the time they presented the Final Report to Parliament heightened the immediate sense of urgency surrounding the need to improve the effectiveness of the program. The aim of this final chapter is to revisit the initial hypothesis posed within this thesis; that when it comes to public diplomacy in Australia, the whole is not as great as the sum of its parts, and present a way forward; and to provide a pathway for moving the discussion around strategic public diplomacy practice forward.

Australia has an established public diplomacy program in place, and there is a great deal of public diplomacy activity generated from across government and NGOs towards foreign publics.² However, as demonstrated the Australian public diplomacy program operates at the fringe of diplomatic practice, and has not expanded nor stretched beyond the traditionally accepted boundaries to meet the current challenges of the environment nor the expectations of the foreign public. Through the review of international literature, analysis of the Senate Inquiry documentation, and discussions with contemporary public diplomacy practitioners and academics, the thesis reinforces the finding of the Senate Inquiry that Australia's public diplomacy profile and activity is fragmented, ad hoc and disconnected from Australia's strategic foreign policy interests.

¹ For example, the Inquiry generated a degree of interest across government and non-government agencies, and some media interest. Hartcher, 'Rudd offers a cheeky lesson in soft power', Pickard, 'Rudd Government is Bad for Arts', *Crikey.com*, 21 January 2008; and Sorenson, 'Artists help public diplomacy to push Australian 'soft power'..

² Note the Senate Committee's remark regarding the 'sheer volume of public diplomacy activities' in Australia. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 'Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image', p.30.

The terminology of fragmentation suggests a phenomenon that ‘pulls apart something that is potentially whole’.³ More specifically, fragmentation ‘suggests a condition in which the people involved see themselves as more separate than united, and in which information and knowledge are chaotic and scattered’.⁴ This statement reflects the current sentiment regarding the Australian public diplomacy program.⁵ The program is described as a ‘hotch potch’, where a vast range of messages and activities are generated across some 18-19 government agencies to undefined and random domestic and foreign audiences, with only limited strategic coordination provided by DFAT.⁶ Of significant concern is the fact that from the time of inception, public diplomacy has been conducted quite separately from those areas of practice most closely aligned to foreign policy outcomes. Public diplomacy is a key tool of influence that Australia could deploy effectively in putting international policy in place. For this to occur, it would seem that there is a need to shift thinking so that:

rather than being seen as an adjunct, public diplomacy is a core element of effective international policy responses to contemporary threats such as extremism, terrorism and people smuggling and to other complex international challenges.⁷

A prominent feature of public diplomacy is the richness of layers and networks, and that public diplomacy entices practitioners into partnerships and collaborations that may cross traditional boundaries within the government and non-government sectors. However from the outset, such richness and texture offered through public diplomacy messages, relationships and networks can pose significant challenges for organisations and individuals,

³ Conklin, ‘Wicked Problems and Social Complexity’, p.3.

⁴ Ibid, p.3.

⁵ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’.

⁶ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’ and Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy’, p.30.

⁷ Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy’, p.30.

particularly for those directly responsible for the deployment of public diplomacy strategies. If public diplomacy is not viewed from the outset as a strategic strategy, and aligned with tangible foreign policy outcomes and coordinated alongside traditional diplomacy channels, the outcomes are not likely to be effective. A critical factor in aligning public diplomacy to policy rests in the strong transference of political will through to the bureaucracy, and the subsequent coordination of bureaucracy around a policy intent. The Senate Inquiry highlighted the fact that such a strategic policy focus with subsequent coordination does not exist within the Australian system with regard to public diplomacy.⁸

Public diplomacy presents particular challenges for diplomatic practice because of the complexity and texture that occur in the structures, processes, relationships and activities of public diplomacy practice. For example, the examination of public diplomacy does not develop or occur in a linear format where inputs will correlate easily into outputs, and relationships are clear; or even where the whole is clearly equal to the sum of the parts. Public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy, involves from the outset a more complex, multi-dimensional system of drivers, actors, processes, activities in pursuit of an elusive outcome. Senator Trood acknowledged the complexity of the public diplomacy field during the Senate Inquiry proceedings: ‘this is a very disaggregated field. The practitioners of public diplomacy are all over the country at different levels of government, and they are in private and public areas...’.⁹ Australian author, David Malouf eloquently describes such a system, in a way that applies to the complex system of public diplomacy whereby, ‘their parts

⁸ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’.

⁹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, *Committee Hansard*, Thursday 15 March, p.11.

deeply intricate, affecting one another in ways that are sometimes hard to assess; to isolate any one of them may be to misread the dynamics of the whole'.¹⁰

The concept of a 'complex system, defined as a configuration of parts connected and joined together by a web of relationships, or similarly as a family of relationships among the members acting as a whole' might be applied to the development and delivery of public diplomacy.¹¹ For example, as Wilhelm asserts the applicability of complex adaptive systems theory to public policy to provide a framework for the analysis of 'instances where things do not operate in a clockwork manner, ...are open to outside influences, are unstable, inefficient, unpredictable, and not controllable...'.¹² Such a description applies well to public diplomacy within the Australian context.

Given the multidimensional and complex nature of public diplomacy, this thesis has identified the need to develop a new approach to understanding public diplomacy in the Australian context, that is closely tied to strategic foreign policy. The resulting Public Diplomacy Policy-based Framework (established within Chapter Five), enables logical and organised discussion and understanding of the complex system that is public diplomacy.¹³ Drawing on the systems theory approach, it is intended that the Framework present at a high level the complexity of government driven public diplomacy including the consideration of a number of strategic and contextual considerations, and enabling improved identification, targeting and leveraging of potential audiences. The Framework could be applicable to the

¹⁰ Malouf, Foreword in 'Securing the Future', 1999 *Major Performing Arts Inquiry Final Report*, p.94.

¹¹ B Banathy, '[A Taste of Systemics](http://www.newciv.org/ISSS_Primer/ase04bb.html)', *The Primer Project* accessed on 9 April 2010 at http://www.newciv.org/ISSS_Primer/ase04bb.html

¹² K Wilhelm, *An Examination of the Applicability of Complex Systems Theory to Policy Making*, National War College, 1998, p.2.

¹³ While also being mindful of Gyngell's cautionary note that 'academic commentators and other observers sometimes read more structure and order into government policies than actually exist'. Gyngell, 'Ambition: the emerging foreign policy of the Rudd Government', p.4.

differing foreign policy strategies driving public diplomacy, regardless of whether that strategy is consolidation, engagement or transformational.

The Framework is not intended to provide a ‘solution’ or end point for public diplomacy discussions in Australia. The complexity of the system derives from the ongoing evolution of relationships, audiences and methods. For this reason the Framework should not be overly prescriptive, but allow for ongoing adaptation and innovation in practice where outcomes can be evaluated on the basis of qualitative impact against the initial objectives; and audiences approaches, methods and messages revised accordingly. The Framework is intended to reflect a learning system that continues to improve and adapt to meet the changing needs of the state.

7.1 Public Diplomacy and the challenges of strategic government

In meeting the challenges not only of adapting diplomatic practice to the changing international challenges, public diplomacy practitioners might also utilise the Framework as a mechanism that aligns with the strategic government approach to policy development and delivery. The global and nature of the challenges on the global policy agenda requires all governments to interact outside traditional models. The global agenda is complex and interconnected – ‘defying the capacity of the traditional silos of public sector policy formulation to deal effectively with them’.¹⁴ Lynelle Briggs, Australia’s Public Service Commissioner, summarises the challenge in delivering collaborative government action in the face of contemporary and complex policy challenges:

A whole of government approach assumes the need to respond and adapt to the complex and networked environment of modern government...– it is about how we remain relevant in a new and fundamentally different world. It is not a single instrument, for, say, collaboration on service delivery. Rather it is a cohering principle, necessary to maintain our sense of government as a consolidated entity, a single

¹⁴ Gyngell, *Ambition: the emerging foreign policy of Kevin Rudd*, p.1.

system that can be worked upon to deliver the outcomes expected by the government and the community.¹⁵

In their presentations to the Inquiry, non-government organisations such as Asialink, the City of Melbourne and RMIT articulated their support for government taking a partnership approach in the development and delivery of public diplomacy. Julie Wells of RMIT University stated:

Public diplomacy is not something that a government can do effectively on its own. We think it is a partnership enterprise and we would like to see the actual and potential contribution of universities to Australian public diplomacy recognised, supported and exploited.¹⁶

The statement is also made that there is little discussion of what the goals of public diplomacy might be, outside reference to supporting the specific policy goals of government thereby reducing it to ‘a relatively minor subset of official diplomacy’.¹⁷

In support of these statements, the RMIT University submission to the Inquiry notes that ‘the more diffuse nature of public diplomacy suggests that it is difficult for government or government departments working alone to achieve its goals’.¹⁸ Effective public diplomacy requires significant investment by government of ideas and resources, but it also requires creative partnerships and engagement with agencies and individuals who can assist in achieving these goals.’¹⁹

¹⁵ L Briggs, *A Passion for Policy*, Lecture to the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, Australian National University 25 October 2005, found in Essays in Public Sector, viewed on 20 October, http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/policy/mobile_devices/pr03.html.

¹⁶ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, *Committee Hansard*, Thursday 15 March, p.22.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ RMIT University Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of Australia’s Public Diplomacy Program, April 2007, p.1.

A clear issue to emerge is DFAT's limited reach and ability when it comes to engagement of agencies outside the Commonwealth government circle in public diplomacy activities.²⁰ The Chief Executive of the City of Melbourne told the Inquiry that 'we have very little direct involvement with the federal government and particularly the federal bureaucracy. We think there is a huge possibility to expand.'²¹ Reinforcing the key findings of the Senate Inquiry regarding the fragmented and ad hoc nature of Australia's public diplomacy program, Wells elaborated on the RMIT University perspective, 'our own relationship with DFAT is very constructive and positive but, one again, it tends to be issues based and ad hoc.'

Such a deficiency is not limited to the work of DFAT in developing and delivering public diplomacy. It is an issue that faces many government departments at both the federal and state level.²² The concepts raised by public diplomacy in a strategic environment, such as collaboration, engagement and partnership with both the government and non government sector are part of a broader agenda of 'strategic government' impacting on the delivery of effective and efficient government business. According the Director of the Sydney University Graduate School of Government, Professor Geoff Gallop, strategic government:

involves the outlining of a vision, the setting of objectives and targets in consultation with the public, the development of strategies to achieve the objectives, and the formation of collaborative arrangements

²⁰ Of interest on this point, in his critique of 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper: *Advancing the National Interest*, Alan Dupont a Senior Fellow in Strategic and Defence Studies at the Australian National University, noted, 'we still lack in this country an overarching whole-of-government approach to foreign policy, trade and national security. This is a sectoral paper...There is a sense in which this is only part of the story...'. Refer to Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Advancing the National Interest', *White Paper*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003. For a critique of that White paper refer to The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, *The (not quite) White Paper: Australia's Foreign Affairs and Trade Policy, Advancing the National Interest*, Senate of Australia, Canberra, 2003.

²¹ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, *Committee Hansard*, Thursday 15 March 2007, p.15.

²² Briggs, 'A Passion for Policy'. G. Gallop, *Towards a New Era of Strategic Government* Lecture to the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, Australian National University 25 October 2006, found in Essays in Public Sector Reform, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/policy/mobile_devices/pr03.html>

within government and between the government and private and community sectors to carry out these strategies.²³

In recent address to the Australian Public Service, following his appointment as Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd reiterated the ‘government’s agenda for the APS is to encourage wider participation in the processes of government from all parts of the community’.²⁴ Rudd defined the ‘more inclusive policy process as engaging average Australians as well as experts, think tanks and business and community groups in policy development and delivery’, noting that the ‘more inclusive approach extends to policy implementation and service delivery.’²⁵ From Rudd’s perspective more inclusive government is a strategy that should become evident across all areas of government policy, including foreign policy.

Rudd’s comments while aligning with the developments and trends affecting government policy more generally, (led to a large extent by the work of the Strategic Policy Unit in the United Kingdom), provide a concrete basis for DFAT to review and adjust to more active engagement strategies and deliver more effective outcomes through public diplomacy. These comments establish a foundation for the public diplomacy policy-based framework to be utilised as an effective tool that might enable improved whole-of-Government thinking simply by virtue of highlighting the foreign policy objective, stepping out the subsequent phases of policy development and aligning public diplomacy considerations to each of those phases in an ordered manner. In this way, the Framework becomes a trigger for coherent and consistent discussion.

²³ Gallop, *Towards a New Era of Strategic Government*. Geoff Gallop served as a Minister and Premier in Western Australia prior to taking up the position as Director of Sydney University’s Graduate School of Government.

²⁴ K. Rudd, *Address to Heads of Agencies and Senior Executive Service*, Canberra, 30 April 2008.

²⁵ Ibid.

7.2 Underpinning principles of effective public diplomacy

In concluding the thesis, there is value in revisiting the common principles that have arisen throughout the discussion of public diplomacy, and would underpin practical application of the Framework, and might guide the practitioner in public diplomacy practice. The work of contemporary public diplomacy scholars and practitioners, including Henrikson, Cull, Leonard, Sharp and Ross present a range of key public diplomacy principles i) tailored credibility; ii) dialogue and exchange and iii) alliances and partnerships.²⁶ Each of these principles and their respective relevance to public diplomacy outcomes are examined in more detail below.

7.2.1 Tailored credibility

In 2007 respected Australian statesman and former diplomat, Richard Woolcott wrote that ‘for public diplomacy to be effective, the policies being projected need to be credible and have a practical change of general acceptance’.²⁷ This has also been noted as marking the commonly agreed dividing line between public diplomacy and propaganda. Whereas the latter may not always be grounded in credibility or substantiated fact and is unlikely to lead to trusting relationships, truth and credibility are seen to be central elements of any public diplomacy program. To quote Woolcott, ‘no amount of information activity can present to the public horse manure as ice-cream, or raw red wine as vintage Grange’.²⁸

What does it really mean for a government to demonstrate truth and credibility through its public diplomacy efforts? Essentially, from Woolcott’s perspective, and supported through

²⁶ Ross refers to the pillars of public diplomacy in his article, ‘Pillars of Public Diplomacy – Grappling with International Public Opinion’. Other sources that refer to underpinning principles of public diplomacy include Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’; Henrikson, ‘What can public diplomacy achieve?’; Leonard, Small, Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the “Age of Schisms”’; and Woolcott, ‘Stop Waltzing and Advance our Nation Fairly’.

²⁷ Woolcott, ‘Truth Spinning out of Control’.

²⁸ Ibid.

the recent research of Goldsmith and Horiuchi, alignment of truth and credibility is critical to the effectiveness of public diplomacy strategies, and ultimately to the successful delivery of the overarching policy position. This is particularly so when dealing with a connected, savvy and interested public audience. As Leonard notes ‘attempts to distort the truth will be exposed and will create even greater scepticism of governments’.²⁹ In their recent detailed study of credibility and public opinion, Goldsmith and Horiuchi assert that ‘credibility in the eyes of foreign publics is critical in shaping attitudes towards...foreign policy’.³⁰ Through their analysis of high level visits and statements made overseas specifically by US political leaders, Goldsmith and Horiuchi claim that ‘a leader who is perceived a credible abroad, even to a limited extent, can have a substantial impact on public opinion and foreign policy in the country he or she visits’.³¹ However, the analysis also shows that ‘as credibility diminishes so too does influence, while the potential for negative backlash rises’.³²

While being consistent and truthful, there is scope to tailor messages for specific themes and different audience groups – whether they are defined by interest, culture, location, demographic, or economic status. As Ross asserts, ‘there need be no contradiction between consistency and tailoring. For example, an information campaign in support of open trade or religious freedom will employ vastly different images and words for different audiences. The values that stand behind such efforts, however, are enduring’.³³

²⁹ Leonard, ‘Diplomacy by other Means’, p.2.

³⁰ Benjamin Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi, ‘Spinning the Globe – US public diplomacy and foreign public opinion’ *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming 2009), p.4.

³¹ Ibid. p.26.

³² Ibid, p.26.

³³ Ross, ‘Pillars of public Diplomacy: Grappling with Public Opinion’.

7.2.2 Dialogue and exchange

The ability to build lasting relationships and partnerships founded in trust, requires a re-think in the way that government's engage. As Nye puts it, 'effective public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening as well as talking'.³⁴ In this way, the delivery of the message in public diplomacy is important, yet how it is received and understood is critical and the test rests with the receiver or audience. The traditional government approach of preaching to its audience or informing its public by means of media release without any avenue for discourse are no longer sufficient. 'All information goes through cultural filters, and declamatory statements are rarely heard as intended'.³⁵ Face-to-face communication such as that delivered through cultural or educational exchange, and some forms of development assistance remains the most effective method of engagement encouraging dialogue. Other forms of communication such as the Internet, and particularly two-way dialogue streams available through Facebook or other chat rooms are effective and targeted.

Dialogue with the domestic audience on foreign policy is an important aspect of effective public diplomacy. In the past, discourse or dialogue on foreign policy was almost discouraged by the foreign policy culture and bureaucracy. This has moved in recent years, and developments such as the establishment in 1996 of the Joint Standing Senate Committee on Treaties has encouraged broader consultation and dialogue on certain multilateral issues between the Australian government, DFAT and the non-government sector.³⁶ Although, almost as a step back from building two-way dialogue and exchange in practice one senior

³⁴ Nye, *Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.111

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Interview, Chris Lamb, Special Adviser, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Former Diplomat and Australian Ambassador, 13 May, 2009.

DFAT official pointed only to the DFAT annual report and fact sheets (available online) as the primary resources for engaging the Australian population and audiences overseas ‘to get a sense of what our foreign and trade policies are about’.³⁷

7.2.3 Alliances and partnerships

Public diplomacy has evolved into a multi-stakeholder business, with non-governmental organisations increasing their role in international relations alongside states.³⁸ The notion of partnership is a familiar one, that is at the heart of new directions in the development and delivery of public policy internationally, quite apart from and now including the area of foreign policy. For example, the United Kingdom, Canada and Scotland have all enshrined the principles of partnership in the domestic policy agenda through the Compact Agreement model between Government and the non Government sectors.³⁹ Such agreements, traditionally negotiated by government with the community or volunteer sector establish a positive environment for partnership and ultimately focus all parties on a shared accountability for the outcomes delivered into communities, families and individuals. The agreements are also underpinned by an understanding of mutual regard, the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities and robust regulatory frameworks – all important elements where parties are working towards the delivery of shared outcomes.

From a foreign policy perspective, the partnership notion aligns with the fluid nature of public diplomacy. The notion of partnership in public diplomacy supports not only the

³⁷ Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Standing Committee, *Committee Hansard*, 14 March 2007, p3.

³⁸ Henrikson, ‘What Can public Diplomacy Achieve?’, p.32; and Ross, ‘Pillars of public Diplomacy: Grappling with Public Opinion’

³⁹ See the UK Compact Model at: <http://www.thecompact.org.uk/>

government to non government collaboration, but also underpins the identified need for strategic of ‘whole-of-government’ approaches that cut across traditional silos.⁴⁰

Partnership or collaboration is about ‘enhancing the capacity of the other partner for mutual benefit and a common purpose, and implies greater trust and commonality of purpose within a relationship than an approach based on ‘networking’ or ‘coordinating’’.⁴¹ Partnerships in public diplomacy may enable governments to channel messages more effectively and innovatively, and to a more diverse and wider audience while involving fewer resources. In this way, partnership allows for the crossing of ‘the boundaries from the domestic sphere into the international sphere’, and enables various government and non-government agencies both within a single state or across several states to work together to deliver a single message.⁴² This thesis has noted the disconnect that exists currently between DFAT , other government agencies (across state and local tiers of Government), other entities such as the university sector, the non-government sector, and the Australian diaspora. All of these entities representing parts of the whole, yet currently untapped resources for the development and delivery of public diplomacy. Ultimately with effective partnerships in place, the whole when viewed together, should be greater than the sum of the parts.

With regard to Australia’s public diplomacy program, the Senate Inquiry revealed a significant number of government and non government agencies actively working towards the promotion of positive image of Australia through public diplomacy activities.

⁴⁰ L. Briggs, ‘A Passion for Policy’; G. Gallop, *Towards a New Era of Strategic Government*, K. Rudd, *Address to Heads of Agencies and Senior Executive Service*.

⁴¹ The three stages leading to partnerships are described in the Victorian Government’s Partnership Analysis Tool as including i) networking - the exchange of information for mutual benefit and requires little time and trust between partners, ii) coordinating - exchanging information and altering activities for a common purpose, iii) cooperating - exchanging information, altering activities and sharing resources, requiring a significant amount of time, high level of trust between partners.

⁴² Henrikson, A, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’ p.33.

Commonwealth agencies actively contributing to Australia's public diplomacy program include Invest Australia, Department of Education, Science and Training, AusAID, Department of Defence, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, and Austrade. However, only some of those agencies were included in the twice yearly meetings of the ICD coordinated by DFAT. Furthermore, other key organisations clearly operating within the public diplomacy space, including many universities such as RMIT, statutory bodies such as Asialink, the Australian Film Commission and the Australian Sports Commission and the local government including the Melbourne City, had limited contact with DFAT regarding outside of the existing public diplomacy linkages. The result is a system that falls short of partnership, where it becomes clear why, as the Senate Committee reported, the whole is not greater than the sum of the parts.

7.3 Australian public diplomacy: The sum of the parts...

Public diplomacy will play an increasing role in building relationships with foreign audiences to progress foreign policy goals in a chaotic, complex and less predictable world. More specifically, public diplomacy is a key tool of influence that Australia could deploy effectively in putting international policy in place. Moving forward, the Lowy Institute suggests that the growing influence of non state actors, the complexity of international policy problems, and the need to assemble non-government coalitions and persuade not only states, but the audiences that those states represent, means that traditional diplomatic practice will be severely tested in coming years.⁴³ The traditional boundaries of diplomacy are eroding, yet the expectations and challenges of the international community are growing progressively more complex and difficult. Public diplomacy or the ability to inform, understand, engage

⁴³ Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy', p.17.

and influence foreign audiences, will therefore become increasingly more important as a tool for progressing strategic foreign policy outcomes.⁴⁴

Alignment of public diplomacy to strategic foreign policy objectives presents an opportunity for the Australian Government to move beyond the 'hotch potch' parts and activities that make up public diplomacy in Australia, and view public diplomacy as a whole and coherent program that is increasingly important in progressing Australia's international interests.⁴⁵

Without such strategic alignment, public diplomacy is likely to continue to float around the fringe of foreign policy, appearing only at a superficial level in rhetoric and symbolic gestures, one-off or randomly planned events and activities, and crisis media management. Against this background, the real benefits of strategic public diplomacy in tangibly advancing national interests might be realised.

The Framework presented in this thesis provides a new view of public diplomacy that aligns with strategic policy in such a way as to allow the concepts and methods to become more accessible and relevant to the Australian practitioner. This approach represents a significant shift in Australia's traditional approach to public diplomacy, which as noted earlier has been to separate public diplomacy between information provision, carried out via a separate agency (AIS); and cultural/educational exchange, carried out as an activity separate from policy within DFAT.

Furthermore, the methodology of the Framework allows for public diplomacy to recognise, incorporate and more openly coordinate a broad range of activities not traditionally seen as 'public diplomacy', across a range of approaches from information provision to relationship

⁴⁴ Senate of Australia, *Senate Hansard*, 16 August 2007.

⁴⁵ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, *Committee Hansard*, 11 April 2007, p.45.

building.⁴⁶ As such, the Framework provides a starting point for Australian practitioners to start to engage in the complexities and opportunities that might exist in building a coherent and consistent public diplomacy program.

However, for the diplomacy scholar, the framework is not intended to be prescriptive, and indeed might present limitless opportunities to identify or introduce new strategic policy concepts, process parameters, or activities / methods for addressing each of these within the field of diplomacy. For the scholar, the Framework represents a methodology rather than a reference tool for exploring multidimensional and complex issues or approaches, and is the sort of tool Diplomacy theorists look to in order to create better theory and develop the area of Diplomatic Studies.

The Framework therefore is not intended to provide a 'solution' or end point for public diplomacy discussions in Australia. The complexity of the system derives from the ongoing evolution of relationships audiences and methods. For this reason the Framework is not designed to be overly prescriptive, but to allow for ongoing adaptation and innovation in practice where outcomes can be evaluated on the basis of qualitative impact against the initial objectives; target audiences, methods and messages revised accordingly. The Framework is intended to reflect a learning system that continues to improve and adapt to meet the changing needs of Australian diplomatic practice.

The Framework does show that in line with the central issue of this thesis that while Australia has many activities in public diplomacy occurring as separate parts, and generally in isolation of each other, these parts could make a substantial whole. With coherent consideration of the

⁴⁶ The various methods of structuring public diplomacy articulated by Nye, McClellan and Zaharna as discussed in Chapter Four, all find relevance within the Framework.

overall strategic intent of policy, the Australian image, and the many parts that might come together to deliver activities, the public diplomacy program may start to consolidate into a whole. While the Framework provides a useful tool to organise discussion for this purpose, a key factor will lie in the ability of DFAT to shift in approach to public diplomacy, and start to connect and engage strategically with other relevant parties to the public diplomacy equation.

In particular, while this engagement would normally include other federal government agencies, other bodies outside the federal boundary might be relevant, such as state and local government bodies, universities and the education sector, NGOs, and individuals within the Australian community as well as those living abroad. Diplomats will not be immune from the challenge. This thesis demonstrates the essence of traditional diplomatic skill, that is, ‘persuasion and accommodation and of building support in other countries for one’s policy’ apply equally to the realm of public diplomacy.⁴⁷ However, the audience is expanding and moving, and the need to understand and engage with foreign audiences not just within official ranks inside the embassy gates, but at a local grassroots level is becoming more important. Developing and promoting a ‘smart and creative’ Australia that has significant impact on the world stage, or in advancing foreign policy interests during a challenging period of international relations, will come from smart and creative connections to audiences across the globe. The complex and multilayered puzzle that is the new public diplomacy reflects a significant innovation in diplomatic practice that sits comfortably alongside the traditional and official methods of diplomacy. From the Australian perspective, the pieces of the puzzle are becoming evident, and with some strategic, coherent direction from DFAT, including clear linkage into foreign policy objectives, public diplomacy might gain credibility as an increasingly important tool of strategic value.

⁴⁷ R Woolcott, *The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings*, p.281.

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